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Abstract  
 
The object of this analysis is the moment of consensus that 
was achieved in the Italian political economy in the 1990s, 
which allowed the élite to implement ‘neoliberal’ reforms 
of industrial relations, pensions, labour market, as well as 
austerity measures. In contrast to previous work on these 
issues, I apply a neo-Gramscian theoretical approach that is 
able to overcome the limitations of an institutionalist 
paradigm without at the same time taking refuge in a form 
of determinism. The notion of ‘common sense’ is fruitfully 
applied to the Italian case: through a 'common sense' 
analysis of interviews with representatives of social forces 
and parties, I show that the genesis of consensus can be 
both described and explained. A second - related - aim of 
the research is to explore the 'common sense' 
underpinnings of the Left's ideological transformation in 
1990s Italy. The main finding of the research is that the 
shared 'common sense' assumption among the social actors 
was that Italy suffers from economic vulnerability and thus 
unilateral sacrifices (including - crucially - wage 
moderation) on the part of labour are necessary in order to 
adapt the national political economy to 'the international'.  
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1   
Introduction 
 
This research aims at understanding how social 
consensus is reached within a national political economy.1  
This introduction presents the general themes that will be 
dealt with in the course of the work, concerning itself with 
identifying the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of the research. In the next 
chapter, I will present the literature that has dealt with the 
object of study, before I turn to the theoretical framework 
adopted – the ‘how’ of the research – and the 
methodological implications of my ontological and 
epistemological choices.  The fourth and fifth chapters are 
devoted respectively to a reconstruction of selected 
elements in Italian economic and political history and of 
the historical period under consideration (broadly, the 
1990s).  In the sixth chapter the empirical material 
(interview data) is analysed. 
The object of this analysis is the moment of 
consensus that was achieved in the Italian political 
economy2 in the 1990s, which allowed the country to 
implement ‘neoliberal’ (see below) reforms of industrial 
relations, pensions, labour market and austerity measures, 
in this way facilitating Italy's accession to the Euro among 
the first group of countries in 1999. In contrast to previous 
work on these issues, I use a neo-Gramscian theoretical 
approach that is able to overcome the limitations of an 
institutionalist paradigm without at the same time taking 
refuge in a form of determinism (see chapters 1 and 3). The                                                         
1 The author takes full responsibility for all translations from languages other 
than English.  
2 I use the term ‘political economy’ to refer to the political foundations which 
govern the economy, which include nationally specific elements. 
2   
notion of ‘common sense’ is applied to the Italian case: I 
will show that through a ‘common sense’ analysis, the 
genesis of consensus can be both described and explained.  
This ‘moment’ or, better still, momentum of 
consensus (as it characterised a period which lasted from 
1992/1993 to the late 1990s) and the crucial socio-economic 
reforms that were implemented allowed Italy to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and thus adopt the 
Euro among the first group of countries in 1999. The 
creation of EMU has radically changed the social and 
macro-economic context of the national political economies 
of the member states of the European Union. It had also 
previously provided a very strong catalyst for change in 
many member states, with the Maastricht criteria acting as 
the ‘yardsticks’ with which to measure whether a state was 
fit or not to join EMU and adopt the European currency. 
For Italy, the early to mid-1990s represented a crucial 
period. Most observers agreed that the country was not 
ready to join EMU among the first group of countries. The 
Maastricht treaty itself was signed by the government – 
soon to be swept away by the Tangentopoli (‘bribesville’) 
revolution, together with large sectors of the political class 
– with the well-grounded fear that Italy would not have 
‘made it’ (a brief historical reconstruction of this period is 
provided in chapter 4). Yet, against all expectations, and 
notwithstanding a very large public debt, Italy was 
admitted in EMU in 1999.  
What this research aims at understanding and 
explaining is precisely how this consensus was achieved. 
1993 is the crucial year here: it is the starting point of the 
moment of consensus that has characterised the Italian 
political economy in the 1990s and has generated the 
political credit needed to implement innovations such as 
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the creation of an incomes policy and  far-reaching reforms 
in the fields of industrial relations, pensions and the labour 
market. The research is based on semi-structured 
qualitative interviews with representatives of trade unions, 
the employers’ association and the centre-left political 
parties, as well as with scholars of Italian economic and 
political affairs. Most of the interviews were carried out by 
the author. However, reference was also made to a series of 
interviews carried out by Mania and Orioli (Mania and 
Orioli 1993).  
 ‘Technical’ and centre-left governments ruled the 
country in the 1990s (except for a 9-month interlude, the 
1994 Berlusconi government), and thus I focus explicitly on 
the centre-left’s ability to create consensus. This focus also 
allows for an analysis of the elements of transformation in 
the left’s own ideological positions. While aware that 
definitions of ‘the left’ are controversial and that any 
attempt to define it excludes some historical components3, 
for the purposes of the research, I conceive of the ‘centre-
left’ as the coalition that consolidated in the 1990s and won 
the 1996 political elections.  
Consensus and capitalism 
   
The first question of interest for a critical approach to 
the study of consensus in political economy is: how is 
consensus achieved at all within a national political 
economy? Reasoning from a perspective grounded in the 
Marxist tradition, consensus needs to be explained in itself, 
as capitalist social relations are structurally based on 
power, exploitation and conflict, that is, on the separation                                                         
3 For instance, in the Italian case, the former members of the defunct PSI (Partito 
Socialista Italiano) that joined Silvio Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia in 1994. 
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of society in two camps: those who possess capital, and 
those whose only ‘property’ (in the liberal sense) is their 
own labour-power, and who are thus forced to sell it in the 
market in order to survive. Both camps are subject to the 
same imperative: the self-valorising accumulation of 
capital. Class struggle is seen as a constitutive and 
ineliminable aspect of the way a capitalist mode of 
production functions.  
 
“The first historical act, Marx writes in The German Ideology, 
is the production of the means to satisfy our material 
needs. Only then can we learn to play the banjo, write 
erotic poetry or paint the front porch. The basis of culture is 
labour. There can be no civilisation without material 
production” (Eagleton 2011: 107).  
 
This first premise points out that historical materialism is a 
form of materialism precisely because our relations of 
production are bound up with our physical survival. Any 
mode of production is based on specific social relations of 
production, that become entrenched into institutions and 
culture not because culture is simply an epiphenomenon of 
‘the economic’ –  that is, because of economic determinism – 
but because these relations and the historically developed 
elements that go hand in hand with them (states, 
institutions, culture) are built into the very structures by 
which we produce and reproduce our material life, they are 
essential for our very survival. In fact, according to Marx, it 
is not ‘the economic’ that shapes the course of history (this 
would indeed be a form of technological determinism) but 
class struggle, and classes – as will be seen – are not 
reducible to economic factors. Class struggle is conceived, 
first and foremost, as a political phenomenon.  
5   
Our social and political (and not merely economic) 
relations of production are bound up with the ahistorical 
need of means of subsistence that characterises the human 
race, but also with political factors. In fact, it could even be 
argued that the whole of Marx’s work was concerned with 
dismantling the notion of ‘the economic’ and revealing the 
political and social relations that constitute and lie at the 
core of supposedly neutral ‘economic’ laws4: his was a 
critique of political economy as political economy rather 
than an alternative political economy (Colletti 2011: 30). 
Enriching Marx’s theory with the insights provided by 
Gramsci’s work it can be argued that the very notion of 
‘production’ is to be viewed in a holistic sense as entailing 
both “the production of physical goods used or consumed” 
and “the production and reproduction of knowledge and of 
the social relations, morals and institutions that are 
prerequisites to the production of physical goods” (Cox 
1989: 39).  
This insight is not meant to indicate that culture, 
religion or ideas are simply economics in disguise. In fact, 
the latter have their own history and develop through 
specific logics, which also shape the world of production. 
However, what is claimed is that “the way men and 
women produce their material life sets limits to the kind of 
cultural, legal, political and social institutions they 
construct” (Eagleton 2011: 114). As Stuart Hall argues, “we 
should not be surprised that over time this (i.e. capitalism)                                                         
4 In Capital Vol.1 Marx argues that “it would be possible to write a whole 
history of the inventions made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing 
capital with weapons against working class revolt” (Marx 1976: 563). This claim 
and Marx’s analysis of the class struggle on the working day in Britain in ch.10 
of Capital Vol.1 demonstrates that Marx’s idea of the ‘economic’ base is that of a 
realm of class struggle that does not determine consciousness or ideas, put poses 
constraints and limits to their development. 
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comes to be taken for granted and viewed as somehow 
natural, for the ‘market’ experience is the most immediate 
daily and universal experience of the economic system for 
everyone” (Hall 1996: 38 cited in Bruff 2008: 9). 
 It can now perhaps become easier to understand that 
consensus, based as it is on forms of thought, ideas – or 
culture – is inherently bound up with the ways we go about 
organising production. In more abstract terms, consensus, 
in a capitalist society, can be seen as itself an exception, as a 
phenomenon that needs explaining, rather than as the 
natural mode of existence and reproduction of society. A 
society based on a radical and insurmountable separation, 
that nonetheless reproduces itself largely consensually is in 
itself something that is interesting and worthwhile as an 
object of study. In fact, as John Holloway stresses, there is a 
powerful bias in the social sciences that sees conflict and 
lack of consensus, protest or revolution, as meaningful 
objects of study, neglecting that what needs explaining is 
also – perhaps foremost, from a critical perspective – order, 
lack of conflict, the ‘peaceful’ reproduction of society, 
consensus: “the thinker in the armchair assumes that the 
world around her is stable, that disruptions of the 
equilibrium are anomalies to be explained” (Holloway 
2002: 5. See, in particular, chapters 1 and 7). Thus, 
consensus in itself is a revealing object of study that allows 
for an understanding of how our social relations are 
produced and reproduced over time and in specific 
moments in history, and the crucial role that forms of 
thought, ideologies, hegemonies and common sense play in 
the production of consensus, a process that depoliticizes 
crucial aspects of our socio-economic life, thus allowing for 
an internalisation of ideology and forms of power into our 
daily lives, rendering them natural, objective elements of 
7   
‘reality’: constraints one may not appreciate or positively 
supports, but nonetheless ‘facts of life’ that one cannot 
change.  
However, these very ideas are not simply ‘floating 
signifiers’ – as the post-structuralists would argue (see 
Torfing 1999; Laclau and Mouffe 1985) –, random outcomes 
of political struggle that are entirely contingent on the 
struggles that attach a temporary meaning to them, a 
meaning which moreover finds no correspondence with the 
ways humans go about organising production and 
producing the means of subsistence which are essential for 
their daily lives. Ideas are also not another independent 
variable to be added in an ad hoc way to analysis, but are 
structurally dependent upon and influenced by the way 
production is organised – our mode of production, and they 
traverse the whole sphere of ‘the social’, conditioning how 
institutions are created and reproduced. There is no 
determinism involved here. The mode of production 
(capitalism) poses limits to our forms of thought, it skews 
them towards certain directions, without determining 
them. Clearly, within a capitalist state there are ideas and 
ideologies that are counter-hegemonic, in the sense that they 
question the depoliticized assumptions on which 
production and the political and social institutions are built 
on, but it is not a chance that these forms of thought are 
marginal and very rarely reach the status of common sense. 
If this were so, we would live under an entirely different 
mode of production, or at least would be rapidly moving 
towards it. While it is plainly wrong to argue that our mode 
of production, or class struggle, determines our forms of 
thought, on the other hand it is clear that our ideas are not 
separated from the way we organize production, and that 
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“the class that is the ruling material force in society is at the 
same time the ruling intellectual force” (Marx 1968: 64).  
 As will be argued more extensively later referring to 
Marx’ work, the ahistorical human need of means of 
subsistence is a common characteristic of the human race, 
but the way humans go about organizing production in 
order to meet those needs is historically specific. This 
organization over time shapes our forms of thought in 
radical ways so that “the pressures and limits of what can 
ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political and 
cultural system (i.e. capitalism) seem to most of us the 
pressures and limits of simple experience and common 
sense” so that we live in a “lived system of meanings and 
values (…) which as they are experienced as practices 
appear as reciprocally confirming (…) It is, that is to say, in 
the strongest sense a ‘culture’, but a culture which has also 
to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of 
particular classes” (Williams 1977: 110). There thus need 
not be positive societal acceptance of common sense, as the 
pressures of a mode of production may come to be seen as 
simply the pressures of how production is organized in 
general, of ‘reality’ – ‘whether we like it or not’. Passive 
acquiescence is thus also a possible outcome, as will be 
made clear in the analysis of the interviews. 
1993: building consensus 
 
The 1993 ‘Ciampi’ protocol is seen as the initial and 
fundamental element in the successful search for and 
achievement of consensus, and thus is taken here as the 
initial focus of analysis of how consensus came through. In 
1993, a comprehensive agreement between the social 
partners and the state was signed: the government – led by 
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Ciampi – CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), 
CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori), UIL 
(Unione Italiana del Lavoro) and the employers’ organisation 
Confindustria.5 The so-called ‘Ciampi’ protocol was a 
fundamental step that allowed on the one hand to lower 
labour costs, limit inflation and interest rates and on the 
other hand to create the social consensus for implementing 
the necessary macro-economic policies in the run-up to the 
Euro. Moreover, the unprecedented consensus among the 
social partners also on welfare state reform – consider the 
successful pact on pension reform in 1995 and the 1996 
‘Labour Pact’ (Patto del Lavoro) on supply-side measures for 
employment creation, as well as the lack of conflict with 
which several reforms of the state budget were met – also 
eased the way towards the Euro by limiting the state’s 
expenditures and hence allowing it to respect the 
Maastricht criteria on the budget deficit. This season of 
reform was indeed without precedents in Italian history, 
considering both the extent of reform and the widespread 
consensus among the social partners. As a matter of fact, 
the 1993 ‘Ciampi’ protocol was the first ever tripartite 
agreement on the reform of the industrial relations system 
(and incomes policies) to be signed in Italian post-war 
history. The consensus built among the social partners in 
the early 1990s was based on “the renewed importance of 
public policies – not as the traditional source of welfare 
benefits but as a crucial factor in national competitiveness”                                                         
5 In Italy, there are three major confederations of trade unions, historically 
divided along political lines. CISL is the catholic confederation, historically 
linked with the Christian-Democratic party. CGIL was the communist-oriented 
confederation, with a class-based tradition and ideology. UIL is a smaller 
confederation that is linked with the socialist tradition. Confindustria is the 
national employers’ association, by far the largest representative body of Italian 
capital, representing all sectors of industry and services. 
10   
(Regalia and Regini 1997: 228), which was seen as brought 
about by incomes policies and reforms aiming at a partial 
retrenchment of the welfare state. 
The goal of ‘entrare in Europa’ (joining Europe) was 
certainly central within the Italian state, among the social 
partners and public opinion more generally. The 
Eurobaromater in fact shows how Italy was, and still is, one 
of the most Euro-enthusiastic member states of the EU.6  
Scholars have talked about the reform season of the 1990s 
as the success of a European ‘saving’ of Italy from itself 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004), from what were considered to 
be entrenched clientelistic practices, from state inefficiency 
and tax evasion (see chapter 1). The strong pro-European 
sentiment resurfaced during the Tangentopoli scandals 
starting in 1992, which decimated the political class and 
showed the extent of corruption at all levels in the state 
apparatus and in the political parties that had ruled the 
country in the previous decades. 
 In contrast to the instability and uncertainty in the 
relations between the social partners and the state in the 
1980s (Regini 1997b: 262), the ‘Ciampi’ protocol set in stone 
new rules for industrial relations, implemented an incomes 
policy, and created a climate of reciprocal trust between the 
trade unions, the employers’ organizations and the 
governments that made the reaching of agreement on 
further reforms much easier.  (see chapter 5 for an in-depth 
discussion of the reform agenda of the 1990s) Starting with 
the incomes policy and the reform of industrial relations, 
trade unions acquired a pivotal role in economic                                                         
6 Eurobarometer data show that in 2000 67% of Italian had a ‘positive image’ of 
the EU vis-à-vis an average of 43% for the whole EU. Moreover, 41% of Italians 
identified themselves as both Italian and Europeans, against a EU-wide average 
of 25%. (European Commission 2000) 
11   
restructuring, including reforms of pensions and of the 
labour market (introducing greater flexibility, in particular 
with the 1997 comprehensive legislative package). It has 
been argued that the concertation initiated by the 
technocratic governments of the early 1990s (in which key 
cabinet positions were held by personalities who later 
became members of the centre-left coalition) “rapidly 
assumed the longer-term characteristics of a policy-alliance 
between the centre-left and organised labour, which was 
sustained throughout the decade” (Simoni 2009: 2). The 
largely consensual re-orientation of social policy goals and 
principles that has characterised the reforms of the welfare 
state during the decade has been described as a “paradigm 
shift” (Fargion 2001) or a “Copernican revolution” (Salvati 
1997). 
 The Ciampi protocol was thus the crucial starting 
point of a season of reforms that was based on mutual trust 
and consensus among the social partners. In particular, it is 
emphasised in the literature )see chapter 1) that the 
subsequent reforms, whose content was negotiated with 
the social partners, or at least the trade unions, (such as the 
reform of pensions in 1995, the labour market flexibility 
laws of 1997 and the 1998 ‘Christmas Deal’ on concertation) 
were conditional upon the consensus that was first 
developed in 1993 (Ferner and Hyman 1998). The 
budgetary policies that allowed Italy to join EMU with the 
first group of countries have been described as “the most 
drastic attempt to balance the state accounts since the late 
1940s” (Regini and Regalia 2004: 65). 
The tripartite agreements of the early 1990s have also 
been described as the “turning point” in the relationship 
between the social actors, brought about by a significant 
change in the nature and strategies of the social actors 
12   
(Regini and Regalia 1997). In fact, the two authors stress 
that the tripartite agreements of 1992 and 1993, together 
with the pension reform of 1995, were hailed as the 
“cornerstones of Italy’s economic recovery” (Ibidem: 217). 
The focus on the Ciampi protocol is proposed because the 
1993 deal is the first one that manages to achieve a 
comprehensive reform of the rules of bargaining and 
indexation, marking the beginning of what has been 
termed the “new constitution” of industrial relations by the 
Minister of Labour who negotiated the deal (Mania and 
Orioli 1993: 139). While also crucial, the 1992 pact – as will 
be explained in more detail in chapter 4 – limited itself to a 
few temporary measures in a moment of ‘emergency’ (the 
speculative attack on the Lira): the elimination of the 
previous system of wage indexation, conceived as a 
preliminary measure before adopting a new system, and a 
temporary freezing of company-level bargaining for 1992-
1993. This incomplete agreement was followed by a more 
detailed and comprehensive reform of industrial relations 
that was achieved a year later. With the Ciampi protocol, 
the Italian industrial relations tradition based on a low level 
of institutionalisation and on voluntarism (Cella and Treu 
1989), was replaced by an institutionalisation and 
formalisation of relationships between partners, that 
imposed order and introduced rules on the collective 
bargaining structure (even if not turned into law). In the 
chapter devoted to theory, I will show how the discursive 
construction of ‘economic emergency’ as a situation of 
crisis that can lead to an ‘impending catastrophe’ has 
played a decisive role in building consensus.  
The 1993 pact is seen by Regini and Regalia as going 
beyond the emergency measures enacted in the previous 
year and creating – for the first time in Italy’s post-war 
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history – a stable architecture for incomes policies and 
collective bargaining in which “for the first time, collective 
bargaining, and especially the relationship between the 
social partners and the government has become the core of 
economic and social regulation” (Regalia and Regini 1997: 
214-215). It has also been argued that the incomes policy 
and reform of industrial relations achieved with the Ciampi 
protocol (together with the 1992 pact which abolished wage 
indexation and froze wage bargaining for one year) marked 
the beginning of a problem-induced learning process 
characterised not by interest-driven confrontations among 
the actors but by what the authors term ‘puzzling’ – the 
analysis of problems and the common search of solutions –, 
a pre-requisite of ‘powering’ – the orchestration of 
consensus and the actual exercise of power to carry out 
reforms (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). What is indeed 
remarkable about the 1993 pact, and a fact that has been 
acknowledged by many authors, is that it was not based on 
the kind of ‘political exchange’ (Pizzorno 1978) which had 
characterised traditional tripartite deals; instead, it was 
based on regulative rather than redistributive policies, in a 
wider context of ‘economic emergency’ in which the logic 
of the agreement was not one of exchange of resources but 
one based on a sharing of objectives as common goals (see 
chapters 1 and 5). The two agreements, and particularly the 
1993 deal, were presented by economic commentators and 
the main political forces as key to avoiding an outright 
collapse of the Italian economy (Regini 1997b). 
There is wide agreement on the fact that the Ciampi 
protocol – both because of its content and because of the 
moment in which it was signed – signalled the beginning of 
a new phase in the relations among the social partners, the 
“era of concertation” (Ricciardi 1999) and has been seen as 
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the fundamental pillar of the consensus of the 1990s 
(Regalia and Regini 1998: 493), characterised by a policy 
alliance between organised labour and the centre-left. It 
was this alliance that was seen as responding to the needs 
of ‘globalisation’: “wage demands were tamed; the pension 
system was reformed, and its scope considerably reduced; 
heavy doses of flexibility were injected in the labour 
market” (Simoni 2009: 2). The 1993 pact was acknowledged 
as a “vital step” and as “crucial” in the recovery of the 
economy and in the road towards meeting the Maastricht 
criteria (Bordogna 2003a; 2003b). It was indeed a 
remarkable change from what has been described as an 
‘anomic division of political labour’ (Sapelli 1995, cited in 
Rhodes and Bull 1997a: 3).7 Therefore, the terms of the 
consensus achieved in 1993 are seen as reflecting the wider 
nature of the compromise and of the versions of common 
sense that have characterised the season of reforms of the 
1990s.  
One can thus ask how labour and trade unions as its 
representatives have come to accept the need for, and the 
terms of, consensus and why they threw their lot behind 
the need to ‘entrare in Europa’. What needs to be 
understood is what this master-signifier ‘Europe’ actually 
concretely meant in terms of socio-economic policies. 
Resistance would have been a predictable outcome, 
considering the neoliberal implications of the reforms (see 
below). The crucial moment in Italy’s road to EMU (aiming                                                         
7 According to Sapelli, as the two authors report, this is the result of the 
balkanisation and exploitation of the state by particular sectors of the political 
and economic élite and the absence of an administrative technocracy. “For 
Sapelli, Italy is a significant example of the weakness to be found in southern 
European democracy based as it is on ‘collusion, lack of sense of state and the 
ubiquity of clannish parties’, a problem compounded by its weak embrace of 
the weberian concept of ‘belief in law’” (Ibidem: 3). 
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at a radical change in economic policy that would allow for 
a decrease in public spending, a decrease in the 
deficit/GDP ratio and the battle against inflation) was the 
July 1993 tripartite pact. This conjuncture in the Italian 
political economy can be referred to as the ‘moment of 
capital’ (Bruff uses the same concept to refer to the 
Wassenaar agreements in the Netherlands in 1982 – see 
Bruff 2008 ch.5), which then launched a momentum of 
consensus. This pact, apart from confirming the previous 
year’s abolition of the wage indexation mechanism, set in 
stone new rules for the conduct of industrial relations at the 
national and local levels, de facto guaranteeing wage 
increases lower than inflation and of productivity increases 
and maintaining social peace for several years. The balance 
of the agreements was – from labour’s perspective – 
dramatic, as labour’s share in the total wealth produced in 
the Italian economy from 1993 to 2003 saw a decline of 10 
percentage points (see ch.4). Once Italy was part of the 
Eurozone, moreover, the only possible reaction to what 
economists call asymmetric shocks that member states can 
take is labour market flexibility, so that “regions or states 
affected by adverse shocks can recover by cutting wages, 
reducing relative prices and taking market shares from the 
others” (Blanchard 1998: 249, cited in Talani and Cervino 
2003: 203). Thus, as Bonefeld underlines, within EMU, 
those countries with lower rates of productivity (and Italy 
is certainly part of this group) can only compete with more 
productive countries through the extraction of a larger 
share of surplus value at the moment of production 
(Bonefeld 2001). Moreover, according to Rhodes (1997: 10-
11) the so-called southern cluster of welfare states 
experienced a remarkable shifts from very low both 
external (numerical) and internal (functional) flexibility of 
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the ‘legal’ labour markets in the 1970s to a much higher 
level of flexibility in the 1990s. One must on the other hand 
remember that these changes in the labour market went 
hand in hand with a concomitant ‘financialisation’ of the 
Italian economy in the 1990s, as a consequence of the 
extensive privatisation of public assets, and a dramatic 
increase in equity markets (the latter represented 27.6% of 
financial wealth in 2000 – a figure higher than that of 
France and Germany -, up from 14.4% in 1995) (Della Sala 
2004: 1048).  
Strictly in terms of decrease of labour market 
legislation protection, after the end of the era of union 
centrality (Lange et al 1982) in the late 1970s, Italy’s entry 
into the EMS provided the background for a partial 
retrenchment of the scala mobile, the wage-indexation 
mechanism, in 1984 (confirmed in a referendum in 1985). 
This was a major defeat, which occurred after the historic 
1980 FIAT strike defeat and after the economic crisis had 
significantly increased the rate of unemployment and 
created new divisions among the Italian working class and 
union movement, leading to a decline in its political and 
bargaining power. Talani and Cervino (2003) argue that 
shifting the ‘power battle’ from the national to the 
European level was by no means neutral, privileging 
certain groups over others, and that this shift made it easier 
to introduce neoliberal market reforms. 
What can be seen in Italy in the 1990s is a battle 
between competing political projects, with one of them – 
what I call the ‘technocratic centre-left’ project – prevailing, 
because it was better able to interpret the country’s 
historical moment, linking Italy’s development with 
European integration and the interests and worldview of 
transnational capital as it was developing both within Italy 
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and across the European Union. The centre-right in Italy did 
clearly aim at introducing what can be considered 
‘neoliberal’ reforms, but skewed in a different way, partly 
resisting the process of European integration (see chapter 
4). In the mid-1990s, the ‘technocratic centre-left’s project 
prevailed because it was able to connect to a wider set of 
social forces: transnationalising capital, organised labour 
and sectors of state employees.  
 While other European countries managed to achieve 
quite profound changes in this period while maintaining a 
high level of consensus, this outcome is still paradoxical for 
the Italian case. The former could rely on a tradition – what 
can be called common sense sedimentations – that favoured 
consensus and the search for shared goals over conflict, 
while the Italian state could not.  This is a case that is not 
taken into consideration in Bruff’s study. Nonetheless, I 
believe it could prove the validity and generalizability of 
his theory to political economies where consensus has not 
been the rule but was nonetheless achieved. Italy is 
conceived as a ‘disciplined interpretive case study’, as it 
“interprets or explains an event by applying a known 
theory to a new terrain” (Odell 2001: 163). An in-depth 
focus on this case study helps to refine the theory and at the 
same time the theory sheds light on the Italian situation, as 
highlighted above. There is thus a constant and mutual 
interpenetration between the theoretical apparatus 
proposed and the empirical evidence from the interviews. 
What is presented here as an apparent paradox is in fact the 
proof that the theoretical lens we are applying is fruitful in 
understanding and explaining consensus (see Chapter 3) 
also in the Italian case, the case of a political economy that 
is not characterised by a tradition of consensualism. The 
aim of this research is thus both to go beyond the existing 
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largely institutionalist literature on this moment of 
consensus (see ch.1) and shed light on the Italian ‘route’ to 
neoliberalism, and at the same time refine Ian Bruff’s 
theory to include other countries that do not share a 
consensual tradition of neo-corporatism, contributing to 
ameliorating the theoretical framework incorporating the 
concept of trasformismo.  
Van Apeldoorn (2002; 2006) argues that the socio-
economic policy consensus that emerged from Maastricht 
was a synthesis of three different political projects at the 
European level: the neoliberal one, supported by TNCs and 
financial capital, and aiming at integrating Europe within 
the global economy adopting a strategy of negative 
integration and the creation of an open (also to the outside 
social forces), competitive and deregulated internal market; 
the mercantilist project, promoted by parts of industrial 
capital, which aimed at constructing a sort of defensive and 
partly protectionist regionalism building a strong internal 
market that would serve as a home base for global 
competition also using industrial policy to promote ‘Euro-
champions’; the weaker social-democratic project promoted 
by European Commission president Jacques Delors and 
generally supported by labour, which envisaged the single 
market as the first step in the creation of a ‘European 
organised space’ with high levels of social spending and 
the reproduction of corporatist institutions at the European 
level. The ‘embedded neoliberal’ compromise, which 
included most of the elements of the first project, is defined 
as stopping  
"short of fully disembedding the European market 
economy from its post-war social and political institutions. 
On the one hand, the primacy lies with freedom of capital 
and of markets, implying that the post-war 'European 
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model' needs to be fundamentally restructured. On the 
other hand, it is recognised that this restructuring process 
cannot take place overnight, that it will have to be a 
gradual process, in which a high degree of social consensus 
is maintained. Finally, and crucially, a pure neoliberal 
strategy would also undermine the long-term 
accumulation prospects of industrial capital, which still 
needs the state to educate the workforce, to provide the 
infrastructure, to pursue macroeconomic policies that 
favour growth and investment, to maintain social and 
political stability."(Van Apeldoorn 2006: 8) 
This work is also conceived as a contribution to an 
understanding of the construction and the entrenchment of 
the ‘embedded neoliberal’ project within the Italian variety 
of capitalism, adding to the growing body of studies on the 
national trajectories of European political economies (Bieler 
2006; Bruff 2008). A national focus is all the more important 
now that the EU’s socio-economic governance is under 
increasing stress and is perhaps more clearly manifesting 
its neoliberal bias, with its pressures for austerity policies. 
Hancké and Rhodes (2005: 13), writing about EMU’s 
influence on welfare state reforms, argue that  
 
“both the Italian and Portuguese pacts then took the form 
of an augmented concertation, linking incomes policy and 
collective bargaining reform with broader innovations in 
the labor market and social security systems, amounting to 
an extensive remodelling of their respective political 
economies. Governments took the opportunity of EMU 
membership constraints to strike deals across adjacent 
policy arenas and bolster their legitimacy by making 
employers and unions their close accomplices in reform. 
(…) The special character of these pacts, which separates 
them from the other countries joining EMU, was because of 
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the need simultaneously to tackle the twin imperatives of 
high inflation and high deficit or debt reduction and was 
made possible through the existence of microlevel labor 
market institutions that could be reorganised to allow 
companies and workers to upgrade skills and product 
market strategies (as in Italy).”  
 
 Here one can see – from an industrial relations 
perspective – the  particularity of the Italian situation, and 
the radical changes that were brought about in order to 
generate a different form of economic governance more in 
line with the “embedded neoliberal” compromise sought at 
the European level (see ch.4). 
 The object of analysis is thus both understanding 
how the various actors ‘made sense’ of consensus – the 
versions of common sense that overlapped to establish the 
moment of agreement – and the consequences of the 
consensus. What is studied is the development of a 
hegemonic ideology within the Italian form of state, an 
ideology that was able to build on the historical 
sedimentation of common sense in order to depoliticize 
certain elements in line with the “embedded neoliberal” 
hegemony that was being constructed at the European 
level. Basically, it will be argued that consensus is built on a 
correspondence between what the economic ‘reality’ or the 
economic ‘facts of life’ are for the different actors in the 
Italian political economy, that provides an overlap for the 
different versions of common sense. This overlap is based 
also on how ‘the international’ has been internalised into 
‘the national’, that is, how national actors perceived Italy’s 
position in the international capitalist totality (see Chapter 
3). 
This work aims to fill a double gap in the literature, 
thus enhancing our knowledge in two directions: 
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- from above: by using the Gramscian notion of 
‘common sense’, this work aims at extending 
Ian Bruff’s theoretical framework for 
analysing the trajectories of European 
‘varieties of capitalism’ (see chapter 3). It will 
show that ‘common sense’ is a useful heuristic 
device for analysing consensus formation 
even in countries that, contrary to the case 
studies proposed by Bruff (the Netherlands 
and Germany) have not experienced a history 
of consensus among the social partners in 
socio-economic policy-making and industrial 
relations (the concept of trasformismo will be 
employed here).  - from below: this theoretical framework is used 
to shed light on a case which has received 
little theoretical attention. While descriptions 
of the reform season inaugurated in 1993 in 
Italy are not missing, in-depth analyses are 
limited to institutionalist approaches, which, 
as I will show (see chapter 1), are unable to 
both describe and explain the moment of 
consensus.  
The next paragraph will explore in a little more 
detail these two correlated directions of the research.  
 
Common sense and trasformismo in the Italian 
political economy 
 
 In this work I utilise Gramsci’s notion of common 
sense as developed and refined by Ian Bruff (2008, 2010, 
2011). My goal is to show that Bruff’s notion of common 
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sense is the key in understanding and explaining the 
moment of consensus that was achieved in Italy in the 
1990s. The two case studies that Bruff takes into 
consideration when illuminating the empirical validity of 
his theory are the Netherlands and Germany. I would like 
here to dwell briefly on this choice and explain how the 
case of Italy could shed light on the more general validity 
of the concept of common sense, and also point to a 
possible theoretical refinement of the theory to account for 
the Italian case, by incorporating the concept of 
trasformismo into the theoretical framework. 
The Netherlands and Germany (the latter since the 
end of the Second World War) are seen by Bruff as 
examples of consensual political economies. In the 
‘corporate liberal’ era (see Van der Pijl 1998 ch.3 and 4), 
both countries have developed extensive Fordist forms of 
regulation of the economy, comprehensive welfare states 
and a form of socio-economic policy-making that has 
included the representatives of labour, the trade unions, 
into the political and institutional realm. Crucially, in both 
countries, social-democratic parties in government have 
been an important factor in the development of neo-
corporatist institutions. In fact, it is because of this long-
standing historical legacy that consensus is seen as inherent 
in the common sense assumptions of the various actors in 
the respective political economies. For the Netherlands, 
Bruff has argued that “the assumption of economic 
vulnerability forms the anchor for various versions of 
common sense which exist in the Netherlands, and thus 
provides ample scope for their content to develop” (Bruff 
2008: 91), and that “the means by which the international 
has been internalized into the national – highlighting their 
intertwining in a unique combination of the two – has been 
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via (…) “consensualism”, a Dutch policymaking tradition 
which places great emphasis on agreement being reached 
between the actors” (Bruff 2008: 92). In contrast, the author 
argues that in Germany, consensus for the ‘Alliance for 
Jobs’ process of the late 1990s was not achieved precisely 
because “there was little scope for assumptions about the 
political economy to act as an anchor for the various 
versions of common sense” (Bruff 2008: 115). He argues 
that Germany had a different insertion into capitalism: “its 
position in the international has been stronger, owing to the 
fact that this material basis for existence was largely 
internal to its territorial boundaries” (Bruff 2008: 119). 
Thus, while capital’s versions of common sense evolved as 
capital became more transnationalised in the 1990s, 
witnessing the “growing transnationalization of Germany’s 
material basis for existence” and hence “switching 
employers perspectives away from the traditional 
interpretation of the social market economy concept” (Bruff 
2008: 124), labour’s common sense still remained linked to 
the latter, particularly due to the strong working class 
identity and skill level which German technological 
development had spurred. 
Bruff’s study is based on the idea that an “essential 
prerequisite of the economy performing well is the 
presence of a consensus across the state, employers and 
trade unions – the tripartite actors – on economic and social 
policy” (Bruff 2008: 1). He provides a theoretical 
framework which allows for analyses of the role of 
consensus in European political economies. However, one 
would be at pains to claim that the above statement applies 
to all European countries. Italy, for instance, clearly did not 
historically manifest a consensus “across the state, 
employers and trade unions on economic and social 
24   
policy”, yet did perform economically well for long periods 
in the post-war era. The search for consensus among social 
partners in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands 
has been institutionalized into predictable rules, procedures 
and negotiations that have formed an outright ‘model’ of 
consensual capitalism – what has been termed the 
Rhineland model (Albert 1992), co-ordinated market 
economy (Hall and Soskice 2001) or consensual social 
capitalism (Schmidt 2002). Consensus in both countries is 
therefore institutionalised within the state apparatus. This 
strongly shaped the versions of common sense of the 
different ‘organic intellectuals’ of the social forces involved, 
imparting a bias towards the need to achieve consensus in 
both states, that, for instance, manifested itself in the 
assumption of economic vulnerability that characterised 
the Netherlands’ shared version of common sense. 
My claim is that Bruff’s theoretical framework can be 
successfully employed also in political economies that have 
not historically shown a stable search for consensus among 
the social partners. The Italian political economy cannot in 
fact be easily included in any ‘model’ that has been 
developed by the Varieties of Capitalism school (see 
chapter 2 for a review of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ 
literature) and has been analysed as a model in its own 
right (Regini 1997a; Della Sala 2004). It presents unique 
characteristics and – crucially, for our purposes – has 
historically displayed a remarkable lack of consensus and of 
institutionalization of tripartite bargaining and negotiation 
among social partners without however representing an 
example of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, or liberal market 
economy (Hall and Soskice 2001). This renders the successful 
development of consensus in the early 1990s all the more 
interesting and paradoxical. My aim is to show that Bruff’s 
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conceptual framework can be usefully applied also to this 
case, and this allows me to both refine the theory and shed 
light on unexplored aspects of the Italian consensus of the 
1990s. 
The notion of trasformismo can be fruitfully utilised 
in order to explain how the consensus in the early 1990s 
was achieved and why the trade unions and the main 
centre-left party, the PDS (Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra)8, the heir of the PCI (Italian Communist Party) 
became its most convinced promoter. Trasformismo is 
defined by Gramsci as not only a political concept (the 
strategic construction of consent) but fundamentally as an 
economic one: it is a model of development that 
marginalises the labour movement – attempting to avoid 
the development of a counter-hegemonic bloc – and 
excludes from its priorities substantive increases of internal 
demand (Liguori and Voza 2009: 860-862). It is from the 
beginning conceived as a deeply modern process, in which 
the inherent relation between ‘backwardness’ and 
clientelism is refused. Quite on the contrary, trasformismo 
means not governing in the absence of modernity, but 
modernising against the working class. The perspective of 
the mass society is thus incorporated, so that the goal of the 
ruling class becomes to insert into defined ‘rules of the 
game’ a network of organised mass interests by linking 
them with the dominant party, with the goal of 
marginalising the working class and blocking its 
constitution into an autonomous political subject. The                                                         
8 The PCI changed name in 1991 to PDS. Then, the latter changed its name 
twice. In 1998, joining forces with other minor centre-left parties, it renamed 
itself DS (Democratici di Sinistra), dropping the term ‘Party’ (perhaps out of fear 
of identification with the First Republic). In 2007, the latter merged with former 
leftist christian-democrats and founded PD (Partito Democratico), currently by 
far the largest centre-left political force in the country.  
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ruling class is in this way able to prevent the potential 
emergence of a counter-hegemonic bloc (Forgacs 2000). 
In the post-war era, this constant element in Italy’s 
history – Gramsci (Liguori and Voza 2009: 860-862) notes 
that both Giolitti’s rule and Fascism were heavily based on 
a logic of trasformismo – manifests itself in avoiding that the 
main socio-political antagonist of an advanced industrial 
society can reach full and definitive legitimacy within the 
political system (as had happened in other European 
countries) through a logic of exclusion that blocks access of 
the working class party to the increasing resources of the 
welfare state. The conventio ad excludendum (the permanent 
impossibility of the main opposition party to acquire 
governmental positions, an unicum in the European 
context) is one of the crucial manifestations of this 
exclusion. The main content of this particular form of 
integration of the working class party was, as I will show in 
detail in chapter 4, the internalisation, on the part of the PCI 
and the CGIL – the communist trade union confederation – 
of an essentially liberal understanding of social relations. 
I will explore the nature of trasformismo in Italian 
post-war history in chapter 4. Here, just a few elements are 
worth mentioning. The polarised political system based on 
the conventio ad excludendum went hand in hand with 
conflictual relations between the social partners.  Italy has 
been ruled from 1945 to 1993 by either coalition 
governments or a single party government, but crucially 
both were led by the same party: the DC (Democrazia 
Cristiana - Christian Democratic Party). The social base of 
this party in the petty bourgeoisie, together with the 
historical roots of Italian big capital and the peculiar 
tradition of state-led development that has characterised 
capitalism in Italy, imparted a particular anti-Fordist (and 
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anti-Keynesian) bias to the Italian state apparatus (Amyot 
2004). Thus, Italy – unique among the continental 
democratic ‘varieties of capitalism’ – never developed a 
comprehensive welfare state or an inclusive and consensual 
industrial relations or neo-corporativist system in the same 
way France, Germany or the Netherlands did. Universal 
policies of social insurance that were commonplace in these 
countries were largely lacking in Italy, or they were 
belatedly developed only for particular groups following 
clientelistic relations between the parties and civil society 
(see LaPalombara 1964; Allen and MacLennan 1971). What 
I believe is important to point out is the fact that consensus 
in Italy has been uncommon. There was a brief, albeit 
unproductive, moment of consensus among political 
parties and social partners at the end of the 1970s, but it 
produced very little concrete results in terms of policy and 
was marked from the beginning by strong resistances, 
stemming from the strategic position of Italy in the cold 
war and the obstacles posed by large sectors of the 
bourgeoisie and fractions of the DC to the creation of a 
consensual model of industrial relations that would create a 
sort of belated Fordist mode of regulation, including a 
social-democratic compromise (Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986 
ch.1) and was definitively abandoned with the switch to 
flexible accumulation strategies in the 1980s (Amyot 2004 
ch.9). Importantly, this attempt at consensus was attempted 
in a moment of economic crisis and ‘national emergency’ 
that bears resemblance to the 1992-1993 conjuncture.  
 Thus, when consensus emerged in the early 1990s, it 
was met with bewilderment. The consensus was achieved 
in the wake of an economic and financial crisis which 
ushered in Italy’s exit from the EMS (European Monetary 
System), and thus in a climate of ‘national emergency’, and 
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was aimed at forcing a radical U-turn in the way the Italian 
state apparatus had been managed and run, in order to 
bring Italy to lower public deficit and debt, reduce inflation 
and interest rates (following the Maastricht criteria) and 
thus join Economic and Monetary Union at the end of the 
decade. This was a goal that – considering Italy’s dire 
economic situation and the proven inability of the political 
system to correct the country’s fiscal and structural 
imbalances – was considered next to impossible by 
influential national and international observers, and in fact 
by the very politicians who signed the Maastricht treaty 
(Ibidem: 170). This moment of consensus went hand in hand 
with a radical crisis of the Italian political system, as 
between 1992 and 1994 all the parties of the so-called First 
Republic either disappeared electorally – the DC and PSI 
(Partito Socialista Italiano), as well as the minor parties of the 
governing coalitions – or changed their name and ideology 
(the PCI split in 1991 between the moderate Democratic 
Party of the Left – PDS – and the more radical Partito della 
Rifondazione Comunista).  
The Ciampi protocol of 1993 was signed in a 
moment in which the most pressing problem was that of 
public deficit. The protocol for the first time set in stone a 
series of rules for the conduct of national-level and firm-
level bargaining over wages and contracts, and an incomes 
policy based on the search for consensus on shared 
objectives among the social partners. It also confirmed the 
elimination of the wage-indexation mechanism which had 
been approved the year before by the social partners, and 
which was substituted by a much ‘softer’ indexation of 
wages to the rate of expected inflation, that considerably 
lowered salaries in the following years (see ch.5).  In 1992, 
large tax increases and a significant reduction of public 
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spending were approved by the Amato government, 
supported in parliament by the ‘old’ parties but benefiting 
from a large autonomy from the latter due to the scandals 
of Tangentopoli which hit the governing parties. The Amato 
government – forced to resign after these revelations – was 
followed by a government led by the technocrat Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi, who had worked at the Bank of Italy for 
decades. Significantly, both Amato and Ciampi would later 
join the centre-left coalition.   
The consensus that was generated around the 
protocol and the goals it set allowed the technocratic Dini 
government (supported by the centre-left and the Lega 
Nord in parliament)  to approve a crucial pension reform in 
1995 (after the Berlusconi government’s unsuccessful 
attempt of a year earlier) that would have been challenged 
only a few years before. This was negotiated with the trade 
unions and, although formally dismissed by the employers’ 
organisation, it was in the end accepted as a useful way 
forward from the public debt impasse. Crucially, all through 
the 1990s, official government statistics show the marked 
decrease in the intensity of industrial conflict and strikes 
(Istat 2003). A fundamental confirmation of the consensus 
achieved at the beginning of the decade emerged in the last 
years of the 1990s, when the centre-left governments (1996-
2001) implemented harsh fiscal reforms in order to meet the 
Maastricht criteria and allow Italy to join the Euro among 
the first group of countries.  Moreover, the 1997 and 2003 
reforms of the labour market increased the flexibility (both 
numerical and functional) of the Italian labour market. The 
major socio-economic reforms of the decade, all of them 
negotiated with the social partners, were therefore enacted 
by either technocratic or centre-left governments, with the 
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former leaning to the centre-left, as evidenced by the fact 
that their leaders then joined the centre-left coalitions.  
The consensus achieved in the 1990s signalled an 
agreement on shared objectives across the social forces and 
actors in the political economy and a transition to a new 
form of economic management based on ‘competitive 
disinflation’ in the Eurozone (see Bonefeld 2001). The 
results of the reforms of the 1990s, such as the fall of the 
deficit/GDP ratio and of inflation, greatly favoured by 
orthodox fiscal policies and stagnant wages, were heralded 
by Deaglio (president of the Einaudi foundation), in a 
report commissioned by the Trilateral Commission, as “one 
of the most spectacular turnarounds in economic history” 
(Deaglio 2000: 5). Being delivered in the context of a report 
to a commission which has been one of the most important 
transnational planning bodies for capitalist restructuring 
since its foundation in 1973 – scholars talk about a 
corporate/Trilateral Commission ‘world government’ (Van 
der Pijl 1998: 125) – the comments by Deaglio signal that 
this moment was indeed seen as a crucial turning point by 
transnational capital. 
The goal of this research is to analyse the common 
sense assumptions of the actors. This moment represents a 
fundamental turning point (or momentum) to study because 
of its uniqueness in the history of post-war Italy. It was 
truly a moment of consensus, and a moment of hegemony.  
Consensus can be achieved because of a shared outlook on 
the future. But this outlook needs to be based on shared 
assumptions regarding the direction of economic and social 
policy, and thus ideas on European integration, 
globalisation, the role of the state, that is, forms of political 
power in a certain moment of capitalist development and 
restructuring. As Simoni has noted, “in Italy, rather than 
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subscribing to a traditional policy platform based on broad-
brushed Keynesian economics, the trade unions accepted to 
endorse a policy platform based on wage moderation, 
welfare state retrenchment, and labour market flexibility” 
(Simoni 2009: 15). 
 The paradox is evident: how was this outcome 
achieved? How was Italian capital able to achieve 
consensus in such difficult economic and political 
conditions, and a consensus that was so clearly skewed 
towards capital’s rather than labour’s interests? (see Ch. 4 
and 5) What was in fact offered to organised labour at this 
moment cannot be compared to the institutional benefits 
and welfare state policies that formed an integral part of 
the political exchange in classic ‘Fordist’ neo-corporativist 
systems. How was this achieved in a country that had 
witnessed a lack of consensus on socio-economic policy for 
decades, coupled with the lack of a formalised industrial 
relations system, a comprehensive welfare state and trust 
among the social partners, ingredients that are considered 
to be necessary for neo-corporatist political exchange? The 
paradox is that consensus was achieved precisely in a 
moment in which the traditional conceptions of the welfare 
state – and social-democracy – were weakening and under 
stress for reform all across Europe, and thus when 
neoliberal rationalities were gaining ground and being 
implemented in many countries and were being entrenched 
into the EU architecture via the Single Market Programme, 
the Maastricht treaty and Economic and Monetary Union, 
thus conditioning in a neoliberal sense the national 
trajectories of the member states of the EU. Thus, Italy 
achieved consensus on neoliberal reforms, while it had 
before failed to achieve it during the Fordist era.  
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 This research is not of the hypothesis-testing kind. 
However, literature on the economic and political history 
of Italy did provide some theoretical expectations on the 
dominant version of common sense. These theoretical 
expectations then framed the way interviews were 
designed, and the analysis of the interviews, that is 
presented following certain recurrent themes in the 
interviews. These recurrent themes have been generated 
through a careful analysis of the interviews that was 
guided by certain theoretical expectations, themselves built 
upon a certain reading of the history of social relations in 
Italy (presented in ch.4).  
Defining neoliberalism as a concept of control 
 
Before moving on, just a very brief discussion on the 
definition of neoliberalism is warranted. Rather than a 
complete or coherent political and economic programme, in 
a Marxist perspective neoliberalism as economics is seen as 
a class project enshrining capital as the sovereign force in 
organising society:  
 
“the sole agencies that it (neoliberalism) explicitly recognises 
are the property-owning individual, who is ‘free’ to engage 
in a competitive quest for improvement; and the market, 
which is the regulator of this quest. Capital, as the mobile 
wealth that has already accumulated and has entrenched 
itself politically, is obscured as a social force by 
resurrecting an imagined universe of individuals, some of 
whom happen to own Microsoft, and others only their own 
labour power, or not even that. Neoliberalism thus 
naturalises capitalist relations by taking the economic 
definition of man as the starting point for an integral social 
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science, while leaving ‘outcomes’ entirely contingent” (Van 
der Pijl 2006: 162). 
 
There is a  diverse and extensive body of critical 
literature on neoliberalism (just to cite some of the most 
representative contributions, Bourdieu 2001; Giddens 1998, 
Chomsky 1999, Campbell and Perdersen 2001, Harvey 
2005, Duménil and Lévy 2011; Saad-Filho and Johnston 
2005). Historically, neoliberalism can be seen as a reaction 
to Keynesian economic theory and demand management 
practice and to the increasing power of the working class in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Neoliberalism as a political project 
aimed at restoring the primacy of the ‘market’ as the 
regulatory mechanism in society and as the normative 
commitment of state policy, and the resurgence of financial 
capital over industrial capital (Duménil and Lévy 2001).  
The flexible accumulation of capital, that is one of the 
defining characteristics of neoliberalism (Hardt and Negri 
2000), goes hand in hand with a tendency towards a new 
form of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005). 
However, if we were to provide a tentative definition of 
what neoliberalism stands for in terms of political and 
economic policies, a few elements could be highlighted: 
• ‘The market’, and not the state, should regulate 
prices and movements of capital according to the 
goals of efficiency and profitability. 
• Public spending on social services must be 
reduced in order to eliminate a culture of 
dependency (what in Italy would be called 
assistenzialismo). 
• Public regulation (“red tape”) must be eliminated 
in order to ‘let the market do its job’. 
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• Privatization should be promoted, as it increases 
efficiency and a rational allocation of resources, 
both of which have been hampered by excessive 
state intervention. 
• Social risk and responsibility are rendered 
individual, substituting the welfare principle of 
collective responsibility.9 
There is however a danger, which is present in some 
critical literature, of confusing rhetoric with practice. Not 
necessarily the political programmes that present 
themselves as explicitly neoliberal are then able to put this 
project into practice. The rhetoric on the negative role of the 
state is often accompanied by a practice that relies on that 
very state for the implementation of specific policies 
(Panitch and Konings 2009). Moreover, there is no such 
thing as a coherent and complete ‘neoliberal project’ set in 
stone in some think tank such as the Mont Pèlerin Society 
or the Heritage Foundation, which was then carefully and 
consciously put into practice by political leaders and 
entrepreneurs in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Such a 
view would resemble a sort of conspiracy theory, which is 
a far cry from a critical analysis of social reality, and in fact 
can be seen as a branch of populist élite theory.10 For sure, 
                                                        
9 “The process of neoliberal restructuring (‘reform’) turns the ‘free’ individual 
into a force contributing to the dynamic instability of a rapidly developing 
capitalism, because, given ‘risk’, ‘choice’ has far reaching consequences that 
may decide one’s life experience in its entirety” (Van der Pijl 2006: 162). 
10 Van der Pijl’s Global Rivalries (2006) is a mine of valuable information and 
history and of thought-provoking reflections on many issues including 
conspiracy theories. The author argues that “conspiracy arguments revolve 
around the theory that the ruling class is in total control of society. It can 
therefore even stage events ostensibly harmful to itself, only to dupe ‘the 
people’ even more. Thus the East Coast establishment supposedly created the 
Soviet Union to rip off the decent folks in the mid-west and keep the arms 
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however, ideas and hegemonies are developed by ‘organic 
intellectuals’ of social forces with the aim of restructuring 
societies (see ch.3). Nonetheless, 
 
“a concept of control such as neoliberalism is not a ready 
package which can be ‘applied’. It is, as Gramsci writes of 
Hegel’s spirit, ‘not a point of departure but one of arrival, it 
is the ensemble of superstructures moving towards 
concrete and objectively universal unification and it is not a 
unitary presupposition’. Certainly, Hayek and the Mont 
Pèlerin Society had elaborated the key neoliberal principles 
long in advance; but neoliberalism as a concept of control 
crystallised only once the period that I call the interregnum 
had seen the demise of the most exposed representatives of 
the corporate liberal counterpoint. Other options were 
floated too, and were seriously considered before being 
discarded again. What is realised in the end, however, is 
never an abstract blueprint; everything that happens on the 
road to neoliberalism, all the unforeseen complications and 
grim details, contribute to and are implied in the new 
relations. This is what in the end determined the ethical 
and political status of neoliberalism.” (Van der Pijl 2006: 
157) 
 
 This long quote is intended also as an introduction to 
the wider theoretical reflection presented in Chapter 3. 
Moreover, understanding neoliberalism as a political 
project promoted by the political right – particularly in a 
country like Italy, but also elsewhere – would be 
misunderstanding the nature of a ‘concept of control’ or 
‘hegemonic concept’ (see ch.3). Neoliberalism is not a clear-
cut political project, but a process: “as a political reality,                                                                                                                          
business going; Bush ordered planes to fly into the Twin Towers to be able to 
go after Saddam Hussein; and so on and so forth.” (139) 
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neoliberalism is both a broad strategy of restructuring and 
a succession of negotiated settlements, of concessions to the 
rigidities and dynamics of structures, as well as the political 
possibilities of the moment” (Drainville 1994: 116).  
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1. Literature review: a critique of ‘1993’ in 
the literature 
 
In this section I present the main arguments 
advanced in the literature to explain the emergence of 
social pacts in Europe and Italy in the 1990s.  After having 
briefly presented the literature, I propose some general 
critiques, which are valid for all the institutionalist literature 
that is reviewed below, that stem from the fact that they 
neglect the capitalist nature of the state, and hence 
disregard the fact that national ‘varieties of capitalism’ are 
all – by definition – capitalist. It is precisely the 
institutionalist focus which is problematic and makes these 
approaches unable to understand and explain the moments 
of consensus in European varieties of capitalism. Bruff’s 
critique of the varieties of capitalism literature is presented, 
before I turn to a review of the neo-Gramscian literature. 
The next chapter then presents the Gramscian notion of 
‘common sense’ as an alternative approach to study 
consensus in European national political economies.  
Institutionalist and industrial relations 
perspectives 
 
The social pacts that have emerged in many 
European countries in the 1990s have been the focus of a 
quite extensive literature. Perhaps the most equipped and 
successful approach to the study of the different trajectories 
of national political economies has been New 
Institutionalism (see Hall and Taylor 1996 for an excellent 
summary) and, as a subgroup of it, the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). These trends 
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in the study of national political economies emerged out of 
a critique of the theory of convergence, which re-emerges 
cyclically in the social sciences. These latter theories tend to 
see the power of ‘external constraints’ linked to 
globalisation as entailing the ‘withering away of the state’ 
(Ohmae 1990; see Yeung 1998 for a critique) or the drastic 
reduction of the possibilities for alternative routes to what 
are presented as unavoidable and irresistible trends 
towards liberalisation, trade interdependence and the 
power of finance. A tacit assumption of convergence 
theories is that all that resistance is able to do is to delay the 
inevitable course of history.11 The new institutionalist 
approaches have instead argued that there is a path-
dependency involved in the trajectories of national political 
economies. The varieties of capitalism approach (see Regini 
1997a for an application to the Italian case) lays particular 
emphasis on specific national institutions, their historical 
formation and trajectories and stress, in contrast to any 
convergence theory, the continuous diversity of national 
‘varieties of capitalism’ and their different paths within 
globalisation.  
The varieties of capitalism approach has insisted on 
the role of trade unions and employers’ organisations in 
inducing firms and workers to coordinate their action in 
order to produce collective goods such as the control over 
wages or the creation of training schemes. The Industrial 
relations literature, which we will take into consideration, 
can be seen as a sub-group of institutionalist approaches, 
because of their focus on interest associations (trade unions, 
employers’ associations and governments) as the main                                                         
11 From a critical approach, what becomes interesting is the fact that the very 
insistence in academic discourse on the greater viability or preference of a 
model is an important factor of convergence itself. 
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actors and institutions, which provide the framework for 
the regulation of the economy. All the institutionalist 
literature focuses on consensus to be achieved within the 
institutional environment (Bruff 2011: 1-6).  
The literature on the social pacts stems from a 
reflection on the consequences of Economic and Monetary 
Union on national industrial relations systems. An 
economic literature on the relation between centralisation 
of wage determination and economic performance had 
emerged years before (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). This 
well-known theory of a U relation between centralisation of 
wage setting and economic performance12 can be criticised 
for being class-biased: it takes as proxy for economic 
performance the unit labour costs, therefore treating as 
general interest what is evidently an interest of capital.   
Turning to the political science literature, three main 
hypotheses can be distinguished on the nature of the effects 
of EMU on national industrial relations systems. Boyer 
(2000) has argued that that the deregulatory effects of 
capital mobility, budget constraints and ECB monetarism 
would lead to an ‘Anglo-saxonisation’ of national political 
economies. The ‘europeanisation hypothesis’, on the other 
hand, argues that EMU will eventually lead to the creation 
of EU-level corporatism (Schulten 2000). Thirdly, and most 
convincingly, the ‘renationalisation’ hypothesis argues that 
the need for income policies would lead to a renewed trend 
of social pacts within member states (Crouch 1998). In fact, 
robust evidence has been provided in favour of the last 
hypothesis (Fajertag and Pochet 1997; 2000), as many 
                                                        
12 The argument is that the wage bargaining systems that provide the best 
economic performance are those that are either very decentralized or almost 
completely centralized. 
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European countries have witnessed the re-emergence of 
social pacts starting from the early 1990s.  
The institutionalist literature on the social pacts – 
which takes for granted this last hypothesis – can be 
divided in two strands. The first one focuses on internal 
mechanisms of change, the so-called endogeneity 
argument. For instance, Meardi (2006) argues that the 
factors that explain the emergence or lack of social pacts are 
not related to the Maastricht ‘pressures’ but stem from the 
nature of the interest associations: intra-organisational 
coordination, power balance among actors and 
encompassingness (the ability to control lower level 
bargaining levels). There has also been work linking the 
emergence of social pacts to a political alliance between the 
centre-left and organised labour (Simoni 2009; Fargion 
2001). Salvati (2000) illustrates that the success of social 
concertation in the early 1990s was a result of the 
convergence of the national social partners around ‘shared 
objectives’ (see also Negrelli and Pulignano 2008). 
The problem with these views is their failure to 
explain the choice of entering Economic and Monetary 
Union, as if it were a choice external to the actors involved, 
that is, as if the agency of capital on a supranational level 
(or transnational level, as the neo-Gramscian literature 
would call it) did not exist. There is also an unquestioned 
notion of ‘problems’ to be solved by the partners. As will be 
argued, what is lacking here is an adequate 
conceptualisation of the relationship between state and 
society. 
A second strand of the new institutionalist literature 
on the social pacts examines them by making reference to 
external constraints, which are presented as ‘common 
challenges’. The literature on the ‘Ciampi’ protocol has 
41   
explicitly focused on mounting labour costs and public 
spending (Regalia and Regini 2004) and globalisation and 
its pressures for competitiveness (Regini 2003).  However, 
it is the link between these social pacts and the external 
constraints posed by the road towards EMU, which has 
received the most attention. One reason for concertation, 
which is advanced by this literature, might be that this 
form of policy-making can deliver results which other 
forms are incapable of achieving (Pochet and Fajertag 
1997,2000; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Schmitter and Grote 
1997). In short, tripartite agreements are seen as a result of 
increased competition and budgetary pressure.  
There is a recognition of the modified nature of the 
political exchange between the social partners in these new 
social pacts. Regini (2000) sees our contemporary era as 
marked by an alternative between deregulation and 
concertation, with the latter expressing a new logic of 
‘shared objectives’ (see also: Regini 1997b, 2003; Baccaro 
2003, Rhodes 1997; Hassel 2003): “this no longer displays 
the typical features of the old neocorporatist systems, such 
as bargaining centralisation, close regulation of the labour 
market and expansion of welfare benefits. Instead, the 
distinctive features are the search for greater wage 
coordination to counterbalance the effects of 
decentralisation, (…) and the involvement of the social 
partners in welfare reform to render it compatible with 
competitiveness without endangering consensus” (Regini 
2000: 16) Therefore, the framework of policies in which 
there has been a devolution of policy-making functions to 
organised interests is now much more regulative than 
redistributive.  
Other authors have instead seen these new pacts as a 
‘hybrid’ form of regulation, blending hard and soft law, 
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self-regulation and concertation (Visser 2005). The process 
basically entailed an allocation of authority in socio-
economic policy in a context of shared goals (often during a 
political or economic ‘emergency’), rather than the ‘classic’ 
political exchange. Hassel (2003) claims that tripartite 
negotiations are driven primarily by the aim on the part of 
governments to ease the transition towards a tight 
monetary regime by negotiating with unions. In contrast to 
previous political exchanges, tripartite pacts on wage 
restraint under monetarist policies are not based on an 
exchange whereby unions are compensated for wage 
restraint. Rather, governments can threaten unions with 
tight monetary policy and unions have the choice of either 
engaging in ‘negotiated adjustment’ or suffer restrictions. 
Thus, the emergence of social pacts under such a monetary 
regime does not depend on the ability of governments to 
compensate unions, but on the ability of governments to 
show a commitment to restrictive monetary policies. The 
challenge on the part of unions is thus to be able to 
‘internalise’ the new policy constraints and the negative 
externalities of high wage settlements.  
This literature, however, is largely descriptive, and 
does not explain the moment of consensus, but merely 
categorises the different agreements (or lack thereof) in 
European countries in the face of ‘common challenges’, 
whose genesis is left unquestioned. Where does the need 
on the part of the unions to ‘internalise’ the tight monetary 
constraints come from? And why do some unions succeed 
and others not? A neo-Gramscian approach, as we shall 
see, is able to overcome these shortcomings by focusing on 
the social purpose of consensus, as well as on the role of 
ideology, and sees what most of the literature views as 
simple ‘external constraints’ stemming from ‘globalisation’ 
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as an aspect of the neoliberal political project which has 
been authored by certain social forces in a transnational 
setting.  
Italy, in this context, has often been portrayed as one 
of the front-runners of the upsurge of a new corporatism, in 
spite of not possessing the traditional conditions identified 
by classic corporatist theory, notably associational 
monopolies (Regini 1997b, Baccaro 2003).  Regini (1997b) 
makes the point that the widely shared objectives between 
unions and employers were the basis for the success of 
national social concertation in the 1990s.  The consensus 
achieved in Italy to meet European monetary goals was 
reached through “the participation of centralised and 
strong interest organisations to which national 
governments devolve regulative policy-making functions” 
(Regini 1997b: 268). In contrast to other studies, Regini also 
points out that one condition for the success of such pacts is 
a union leadership that is not insulated from the rank and 
file, so that unions can consult their base and acquire the 
necessary legitimacy.  
Rhodes (2001) argues that there is no inconsistency 
between ‘globalisation’ and EMU and new forms of 
corporatism, and in his article he aims to show that in fact 
the new social pacts can achieve both competitiveness and 
social cohesion and trust. Rhodes also argues that coalition 
building is required for successful social pacts. The mutual 
interest of the social partners in creating economic stability 
with the aim of joining EMU affected the extent to which 
social pacts were implemented throughout Europe. 
However, the article is mainly descriptive and is 
ambiguous with regards to the origins of this need to 
adapt, referring to globalisation as a “period of transition in 
which the market is clearly more important than in the 
44   
past, in which international constraints and influences have 
increased” (Ibidem: 193). Using such a wide all-
encompassing term as globalisation, the article can describe 
the different trajectories of national varieties of capitalism, 
but is unable to understand and explain their genesis.  
Ebbinghaus and Hassel (1999) argue that there are 
two main conditions that are favourable to the 
development of social pacts: the potential intervention of 
the state in wage formation, which provides the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ of the state that creates the common interest on 
the part of employers and unions to negotiate; and a 
deliberate ‘political exchange’ where the state offers 
compensation in return for the consent on wage 
moderation by the social partners. 
The problem with these views is that, on the one 
hand, interests cannot be portrayed as fixed but are 
historically and socially constructed and, on the other, there 
is a lack of focus on the role of ideology and culture. As 
there is no inherent harmony of interest in a capitalist 
society, consensus is built upon cultural assumptions (what 
we term ‘common sense’). 
Hancké and Rhodes (2005), in a more complex 
approach, argue that the different forms of institutional 
innovation in wage setting in the EU depended on the 
combination of the character of the external pressures and 
the pre-existing proto-institutional structure of the labour 
market. For instance, they explain the emergence of a social 
pact in Italy (and elsewhere) by two factors: the fact that 
Italy experienced a heavier urgency with respect to the 
need to control inflation and deficit/debt than the ‘core 
countries’ (the D-mark area and France) – as there was an 
‘asymmetric distribution’ of the pressures imposed by 
Maastricht – and the strong ‘microfoundations’ in the 
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labour market, that is the control unions could exercise on 
the lower level of bargaining.  What still needs explaining, 
however, is the very willingness of the central trade union 
confederations to sign such asymmetric pacts, which 
cannot be simply explained as stemming from an ‘external 
constraint’.13 This constraint may have been present for 
governments (although, as will be seen, a neo-Gramscian 
approach focuses on the ‘internalisation’ of constraints) but 
why should they have been internalised by trade unions? 
And how was this done? The approach used here  attempts 
to answer these questions.  
Another institutionalist work on social pacts (Natali 
and Pochet 2009) argues that the emergence and evolution 
of social pacts in Europe are directly related to three key 
determinants: exogenous constraints, actors’ roles and 
institutional dynamics. They explicitly critique the 
rationalist approach for defining interests in an objective 
way, arguing, with Thelen (1999) that the “definition of 
interests and objectives is created in institutional contexts 
and is not separable from them”, and that actors’ behaviour 
is not just instrumental but is influenced by norms and 
institutions of the past. Although the latter argument can 
be retained, our approach goes beyond a focus on 
institutions arguing that interests are not defined by 
institutions but by culture (or common sense).                                                          
13 However, the second part of the argument can be retained. In the second part 
of the paper, the authors argue that after the introduction of the euro in 1990 
broad encompassing social pacts rapidly disappeared in large part because the 
Maastricht criteria had become embedded and internalised in a set of 
framework rules managed by experts both at the national and supranational 
level through the Stability and Growth pact. “In Italy, a small group of union 
and employers experts determine, in cooperation with central bank officials, 
the past and expected inflation rate and set a central wage norm” (Hancké and 
Rhodes 2005: 22).  
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Hassel (2009) – from an industrial relations 
perspective – argues that varying forms of social 
partnership are embedded in and largely determined by 
their macro-economic contexts, so it is the latter which 
prompts both sides of the partnership to define their 
motivations and guides their interaction. For instance, trade 
unions would be willing to sign a pact and hence commit to 
wage restraint only in the face of a strong commitment on 
the part of the government to implement monetarist 
policies anyway. Also this article takes for granted the 
‘external pressures’ – tight monetary policy, liberalisation 
and globalisation – and hence is unable to account for the 
social purpose of the pact, and the fact that these ‘constraints’ 
are part of a political and social struggle between capital 
and labour.  Moreover, Hassel states that “actors have only 
limited capacity to choose one preference over the other; in 
most cases, they are reacting to pressures that derive from 
their environment (in particular their economic and 
political environment)” (Hassel 2009: 6). This quotation 
highlights the main problem of all the institutionalist 
literature: its exclusive focus on institutions, and hence its 
inability to conceptualise the relationship between state 
and society. As will be explained in more detail below, 
what Hassel calls ‘the environment’ cannot but refer to the 
society standing ‘under’ the institutions.  So, if change 
comes from this environment, which surrounds the 
institutional system, then it surely must be taken in 
consideration in the explanation. And, crucially, such an 
environment is a capitalist one, structurally characterised by 
an irreducible antagonism between capital and labour. 
Institutions, as will be explained in more detail, are seen as 
the embodiment of certain common sense assumptions 
about how to organise production, and these assumptions 
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themselves are rooted in – although not determined by – 
capitalist social relations. Crucially, these common sense 
assumptions are present throughout society and they 
traverse both the state and society (the Gramscian notions 
of political and civil society in the extended state).  
Key to the critique of mainstream approaches in 
International Relations/International Political Economy is 
the neglect of capitalism as a mode of production. A 
Marxist approach views the state not as a neutral ‘box’ or a 
set of decision-making rules and procedures, but as 
crucially embedded in and constitutive of capitalist social 
relations. As the theoretical chapter will hopefully make 
clear, the state does not act from the outside on society, as if 
society were standing in a separate realm from the state, 
but is part and parcel of the reproduction of a certain mode 
of production (see next chapter for a more thorough 
analysis of the capitalist state).14 The capitalist state, and 
the separation between the public and the private, the 
economic and the political, produces and reproduces those 
very conditions that mainstream literature tends to portray 
as ‘external constraints’, the ‘environment’, ‘socio-economic 
change’, ‘globalisation’. Approaching these issues as if they 
were pressures emanating from outside the state (and here 
one can refer also to the entire state-system as such) is 
missing the point about the nature of the capitalist state. 
The state is seen – in a neo-Gramscian critical approach – as 
the embodiment of continually shifting yet constantly 
unequal class relations in society. While it is certainly 
difficult if not impossible to pinpoint what is capital’s 
interest in the immediate, as there are always several routes 
open to it and, crucially, its ‘interest’ is depended upon                                                         
14 On Marxist state theory see: Therborn 2008, Jessop 2002. 
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historical, cultural and ideological aspects, what we can 
talk about is the logic of capitalist accumulation as a strong 
constraint on the possible routes of action of single 
capitalists. As Therborn (2008) has noted, the point is not to 
identify the subjective interest of capitalists. A historical 
materialist approach does not start from the point of view 
of the actor - it is not actor-centred – but from the point of 
view of the process of reproduction and transformation. The 
basic focus of analysis is thus not the capitalist or property 
itself: it is capital, the objective process of capital 
accumulation (Therborn 2008: 131).15  
 Moreover, approaches that see ‘globalisation’ as 
simply an increase in capital mobility or an enhanced 
liberalisation or ‘marketisation’ of national economies tend 
to provide a purely quantitative assessment of recent 
trends. Capital is here fetishised as a ‘thing’ and not as a 
social relation. What allows capital to move from one side 
of the globe to the other is not technology or liberalisation 
per se. The latter can allow for such mobility only if 
capitalist social relations are in place at the receiving end; 
hence, the roots of ‘globalisation’ are not economic or 
technical, but social.16 For instance, it can be argued that the 
proletarianisation of the peasantry in countries such as 
China and India is at the root of capital’s successful 
accumulation strategies in these countries. Peter Burnham 
points out how mainstream approach in IR and IPE 
fetishise the state and view the market a technical arena in 
which the ‘external’ state intervenes (Burnham 1995: 136).  
In Capital, Marx shows how, even if in the market one can                                                         
15 “Marx’s central objective was (…) to lay bare the ‘economic law of motion of 
modern society’, to show how wealth and poverty, domination and 
subjugation are (re-)produced and changed” (Therborn 2008: 132). 
16 This point has been made also by Bieler 2006: 29.  
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witness an exchange among equals – that is, each 
commodity is sold at its price and there is no ‘unequal 
exchange’ – this process hides the exploitative process 
which goes on in the realm of production, where surplus-
value is extracted from the worker and profit is generated. 
Crucially, it is in the very sphere of exchange, predicated 
upon a state power that guarantees equal rights to property 
to everyone (some possess means of production, while 
others only their labour-power) that the process of capital 
accumulation takes place. Thus, what institutionalist 
authors portray as ‘external’ events to which the state 
reacts are generated by the society of which the state is the 
embodiment and the crystallisation. 
Many of the authors we cited above adopt a form of 
empirical pluralism as their method of analysis, that is, 
they explain the social pacts by referring to a series of 
explanatory variables.  Just to give a couple of examples, 
Hancké and Rhodes (2005) for instance refer to the 
‘microfoundations’ of the labour market and the 
asymmetric pressure of the Maastricht criteria; Hassel 
(2009) makes reference to the macro-economic context and 
the commitment of the government to impose tight 
monetary policies.  As Bieler points out, the problem with 
empirical pluralism is that it falls precisely into the 
theoretical trap we have briefly explained above, that is, it 
separates “the state from the market and the political from 
the economic in an ahistoric way. By extension, due to the 
lack of problematising the internal relationship between 
state and market, the underlying rationale of activities 
cannot be assessed by mainstream approaches” (Bieler 
2006: 30). 
More in detail, the state-centric approach that 
dominates much of the literature sees – and it is one of the 
50   
consequences of its neglect of the capitalist nature of the 
state – the state as the only actor at the international level. 
In a typical billiard-ball model of International Relations 
that the comparative politics/political economy literature 
has inherited from the Realist approach in IR, it are the 
domestic actors that compete with each other domestically 
in order to determine the national interest. There is thus a 
neglect of the transnational agency of capital, which recent 
research within the neo-Gramscian approach has shown to 
be at the origin of the phase of European integration 
starting from the mid-1980s, culminating in the Maastricht 
compromise, which has been termed ‘embedded 
neoliberalism’ (Van Apeldoorn 2002). A neo-Gramscian 
approach is able to view capital as constitutive of the 
‘extended state’ (see below), and thus as an important 
agent that itself set in stone the Maastricht parameters, that 
are taken by the literature as simple ‘external’ constraints. 
The process of European integration is seen as a political 
project which, temporarily and in a contradictory manner 
(see Van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2008), aims at 
constitutionalising a set of policy choices which are 
favourable to the interest of transnational capital, mainly 
financial capital. 
 Perhaps the most detailed and innovative critique – starting 
from a critical theory perspective - of the institutionalist approaches has 
been provided by Bruff (2008, 2010, 2011). Bruff defines the 
institutionalist literature as “a body of knowledge comprised of 
contributions which take institutions as their starting point when 
considering the evolution of national political economies” (Bruff 2011: 
2) It is clear that this definition is quite encompassing, and different 
strands of literature, including new institutionalism and industrial 
relations literature, fit into it. As Radice reminds us, “from the 
standpoint of comparing national capitalisms, the extent of an 
institutionalist common ground within the social sciences is 
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striking”(Radice 2004: 188, cited in Bruff 2008: 2). I will sum up here the 
thrust of Bruff’s argument, as it is directly relevant to this research.  
 The neglect of capitalism as a specific mode of 
production renders the institutionalist approach unable to 
account for the fact that institutions are produced and 
reproduced in a capitalist society (see also the next chapter 
on the capitalist state), and hence they cannot be separated 
from it and analysed in their own right. The point Bruff 
makes is that while this literature aims to study ‘varieties of 
capitalism’, it often loses track of the fact that these are 
varieties in capitalism (Bruff 2011). These institutions thus 
need to be studied as based and dependent upon capitalist 
social relations and conditions of existence. According to 
Bruff, institutionalist literature suffers from reductionism 
because it views institutions as the foundation of society. 
Thus, any change, path dependency or resistance is caused 
by factors that are seen as internal to the institutional 
environment. In this way, institutions are separated from 
the society that they are supposed to regulate. The shared 
focus across all the institutionalist literature I have 
reviewed above is on the institutions as the locus of 
consensus formation. This emphasis crucially neglects the 
social content of the institutions. As argued above, the 
institutionalist literature, by focusing on interest 
organisations (mainly unions and employers’ 
organisations) contending for influence on the state, views 
the state as a neutral ‘thing’ standing above society, 
neglecting the nature of power in a capitalist society.17                                                         
17 The inability to adequately understand the relationship between state and 
society in a capitalist setting seems to be a common feature in the literature. As 
Bruff stresses, “For neo-pluralism this manifests itself (…) in the failure to 
discuss the state in any depth. (…) For the varieties of capitalism literature it is 
the other way around: comprehensive discussion of national institutions and 
the role of the state in tripartite negotiations leave society unexplored. For both 
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Moreover, this ‘society’ is then seen as emanating certain 
pressures, to which the institutionalist environment must 
react in an external manner, as if dealing with some kind of 
external constraint that limits its actions. What is neglected 
is the mutual constituting of the very separation between 
state and society. This separation is a crucial pre-condition of 
the capitalist mode of production, which thus forms a 
whole, of which state and society are apparently separated 
elements that both create the economic and political 
conditions for capital accumulation and are themselves the 
expression of a historic bloc of social forces. 
An example of this error is the taking for granted of 
the ‘external’ pressures for competitiveness and 
liberalisation (as in Regini 2000, 2003; Hancké and Rhodes 
2005; Negrelli 2000). There is here an unquestioned 
assumption that ‘globalisation’ generates pressures for 
competitiveness. It seems that change stems either from the 
institutionalist environment per se, or from socio-economic 
changes whose origin is outside the institutionalist 
environment, but whose genesis and nature is left 
unexamined.  
 The institutionalist approach reviewed above also 
seems to find a common ground in the assumption that 
many of the elements of ‘social protection’ (in the 
Polanyian sense), which are seen as embodying a social-
democratic compromise that has characterised many 
European states, are now too ‘rigid’ in the face of 
‘globalisation’ and need to be reformed in light of the 
sweeping socio-economic transformation that marks our 
contemporary era. Ferrera and Gualmini’s work, reviewed                                                                                                                          
literatures, the root cause of such blind spots is the inability to accord culture 
an integral role in the trajectories of national political economies” (Bruff 2008: 
30). 
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below, is a good example of this stance, that tends to 
present itself as objective but almost by default gives 
precedence to capital’s accumulation needs. For instance, 
most of the literature views the signing of new social pacts 
as a positive phenomenon in light of the ‘inevitable’ need 
for change in European welfare states towards greater 
marketisation and liberalisation.  
As will be argued in the next chapter, within 
capitalism power is not equated with state power or 
institutions, but crucially stems from the very separation of 
the political and the economic: capital accumulation and 
the capital relation operate within the ‘purely economic’ 
sphere of ‘freely’ interacting human beings. However, the 
constitution of the latter is dependent upon the action of 
the state, which provides the necessary institutional, law-
making and repressive apparatus (see the next chapter for a 
more detailed discussion of the capitalist state). Institutions 
have a specific social purpose, which is nationally distinct, 
but is also inherently capitalist. Bruff argues that the 
Gramscian notion of common sense makes it possible to 
capture both the institutional environment and society in 
one conceptual framework through its focus on the 
material basis for existence in shaping – albeit not 
determining – how humans view the world, which in turn 
creates shared understandings on what is perceived as 
economic ‘reality’ (Bruff 2008: 7-11; see more below).   
 Bruff argues that the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach avoids a discussion of culture (what is here 
termed ‘common sense’), as the latter is simply seen as 
providing the norms and conventions operative within the 
institutional environment (Bruff 2008: 5). However, as Bruff 
argues, “culture is embodied in all social practice” (Ibidem) 
and “culture cannot be conflated with institutional norms, 
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bracketed off as a variable or viewed as a vague umbrella 
term: it traverses all parts of the social world – including 
state and society” (Bruff 2008: 9). The origin of consensus is 
thus to be looked for in the realm of culture or common 
sense, and not merely in the institutional environment or in 
the interaction among various institutions and/or actors.  If 
institutions are the focus of analysis, one cannot take them 
for granted and ‘fetishise’ them as the source of consensus 
or change, or in fact the only objects of analysis: one needs 
to understand their genesis and how they are reproduced 
over time, and that they are the crystallisation of power 
relations within the society they supposedly regulate ‘from 
the outside’. This critique can be seen as stemming from the 
general Marxist critique of capitalism (and its ideologies) as 
generating an apparent (not illusory) inversion of subject 
and object. Institutions in mainstream approaches are 
fetishised as a ‘thing’ standing over society and governing 
it. However, within a capitalist state, institutions are the 
creation of subjects in civil society and crystallise their 
unequal material relations. 
 Moreover, analyses that underline almost 
exclusively the external pressure from Maastricht suffer 
from a further problem. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, 
the role played by the Maastricht criteria cannot be 
discarded, also by way of the discursive frame that 
constrained the ‘limits of the possible’ in political terms. 
However, it is unconceivable that the simple signing of a 
treaty can in itself produce such far-reaching consequences. 
The treaty’s provisions must thus be seen as instrumental 
for a political project enacted by specific social forces. The 
literature that postulates an almost automatic effect of 
‘Europe’ on different policy areas (industrial relations, 
fiscal policies) suffers from what Bruff terms ‘institutional 
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isomorphism’: “the implicit argument is that this 
transformative project, once formulated at the European 
level, is able to penetrate the member states in a uniform 
manner because the national units fall into line with what 
the supranational unit dictates” (Bruff 2010: 4). 
One of the most in-depth works dealing with this 
phase of reforms in the Italian political economy is the one 
provided by Ferrera and Gualmini (2004). This detailed 
work offers a good description of both the substantive 
issues faced by the political parties, trade unions and 
employers’ organisation in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
nature of the relationship between the various actors in the 
Italian political economy. However, I argue that it is unable 
to explain the events described, because of its reliance on 
the neo-institutionalist paradigm, with the corresponding 
problem of separating institutions from ‘their’ society. 
Running through the whole book, there is an argument 
based on the ultimate ‘rationality’ of the choices made in 
the 1990s by all the actors, based as they were on 
“empirically-grounded debates” (Ibidem: 30). The critiques 
advanced to this work are basically three, all interlinked: 
 Firstly, there is an exclusive focus on institutions, 
and thus the grounding of the argument in a paradigm of 
‘institutional learning’ (Ibidem: 64). For instance, the 
problematic aspects of the budgetary process before the 
reforms are presented as stemming from a ‘misconceived’ 
set of rules for the setting of budgetary policies, from which 
the actors ‘learned’ how to adapt in the future. The basic 
argument is that the various actors found consensus 
because they learned from past mistakes on how to solve 
common problems to the Italian political economy, 
conceived as a totality, which has its own ‘interest’. 
Learning is defined as a “delicate process whereby policy-
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makers come to adjust the existing institutional status quo 
in the light of the consequences of past policy and of new 
information” (Ibidem: 22) and also as a “particular kind of 
interaction, based on argument and persuasion” (Ibidem: 
121), which thus overcomes the logic of ‘political exchange’.  
In this context, Maastricht put in place a number of 
conditions that have “widened the scope for problem-
induced learning to policy change” (Ibidem: 28). Moreover, 
achievements are presented as outcomes of “substantive 
puzzling”, that is, “confrontations based on analyses, 
arguments, empirically grounded debated” (Ibidem: 30). 
The authors therefore present in a neutral ‘learning-by-
doing’ way what was essentially a political project. Within 
the framework designed at Maastricht, trade unions had to 
‘learn’ that in a European monetary union wage restraint 
had to be institutionalised, otherwise inflation would start 
growing and thus create macro-economic imbalances for 
Italy. As the German political economy had found a way to 
structurally contain wage pressures (in a negotiated way 
with the trade unions) other Eurozone members were 
forced to try to keep pace with German inflation, or 
otherwise face problems of competitiveness (McGiffen 
2011; Scharpf 2011; see below for a more in-depth analysis 
of the European socio-economic framework as developed 
at Maastricht). Thus, the ‘learning’ the two authors are 
talking about is also clearly linked with a socio-economic 
framework that strongly constrains the actions and 
autonomy of trade unions in the national (and 
supranational) political arena. Basically, unions had to 
‘learn’ to lose power and implement wage restraint. This is 
quite a peculiar way to learn, and it is best explained as the 
outcome of an ideological battle for hegemony that played 
out in Europe and Italy, an aspect that is neglected in 
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Ferrera and Gualmini’s analysis. The way these very 
‘problems’ are constituted and framed is the outcome of a 
political struggle that responds to specific social pressures. 
Secondly, in the two authors’ analysis there is a use 
of a normative vocabulary, that reveals a certain preference 
for an ‘élite democracy’ (in contrast to mass democracy), 
where decisions are taken based on rational discussions 
among experts and not based on the projection of interests 
on the political economy by various actors. For instance, 
Ferrera and Gualmini advance an essentially dichotomous 
idea of what a welfare state is about and thus what Italy 
lacks to become an efficient welfare state. The use of words 
such as “syndromes”, “sins” and “uncivicness of culture” 
(Ibidem: 50) signal such as approach. However, one cannot 
posit a (moral?) parameter on which to judge the 
effectiveness and ‘virtue’ of a state. It is unquestionable that 
in the 1970s the whole Western world witnessed the so-
called ‘fiscal crisis’ of the state. However, to understand the 
origin of such a crisis as lying in ‘wrong’ choices made by 
policy-makers or by the misallocation of resources on the 
part of political élites described as essentially clientelistic or 
consociative (if not outright corrupt) is to miss the point 
about the nature of such a crisis. The latter view is 
reminiscent of the famous ‘Crisis of Democracy’ report of 
1975 (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975), in which 
conservative and liberal scholars argued that the problems 
of the welfare state lied in ‘excessive democracy’, that is, in 
an over-participation of the mass of the population in socio-
economic life. The problem, from the (neo)liberal 
perspective of the authors, was that democracy had started 
to invade the supposed ‘private’ sphere of the economy, a 
sphere in which it should not adventure itself without 
facing crises (essentially inflation) (see Streeck 2011). This 
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situation, according to the authors of the volume – 
representatives of a wider neoliberal counteroffensive that 
was just beginning to be framed in those years – must be 
reversed by restoring micro-economic rationality to each 
individual’s life choices.  
Thirdly, the underlying (albeit never explicit) 
economic argument that runs through the book is based on a 
mainstream economics understanding of what a ‘good 
economic policy’ is. An effective way to present the 
structural bias implied by mainstream economics is to 
make reference to Michal Kalecki’s seminal 1943 article 
“Political Aspects of Full Employment” (Kalecki 1943). 
Here, the Polish economist argues that the confidence of 
the investors depends on whether expectations of capital 
owners are sufficiently and reliably supported by the 
distribution of political power and the policies that arise 
from it (a similar argument has been made by Keynes – see 
Lunghini 2012: 81-109). Economic dysfunctions – such as 
unemployment, but also inflation – ensue when capital sees 
its profit expectations threatened by political interference. 
Therefore, “wrong” policies are the ones that result in a loss 
of business confidence, and thus a rise in unemployment, 
in what can be seen as an investment strike by owners of 
capital. Crises, in the mainstream of neoclassical economics 
that serves as the basis for Ferrera and Gualmini’s analysis, 
appear as the punishment for irresponsible governments 
that do not respect the natural laws that govern the 
economy. It is clear that the only politics such a theory can 
envisage entails opportunistic or incompetent attempts by 
political actors to bend economic laws, since a good 
economic policy is non-political by definition. However, 
standard neoclassical economic theory is also political and 
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moral, as it promotes by default policies that favour owners 
of capital.  
In order to understand the problems with a view of 
an economic rationality that is being disrupted by political 
‘interference’, one needs to be cognisant of the underlying 
structural compromises and mediations that constitute a 
democratic capitalist political economy. Here, it may be 
useful to briefly present the brilliant argument developed 
by Streeck (2011). The German author argues that the idea 
of economic policy as a ‘science’ with which politics should 
not mesh tends to find an obstacle in the democratic 
participation of the citizenry, who have expectations for 
social entitlements and for an elected government to enact 
policies and provide resources based also on ‘non-
economic’ criteria. Their political demands will thus differ 
from what mainstream economics theory prescribes. His 
article therefore describes the political economies of 
‘democratic capitalism’ as characterised by an unstable and 
constantly shifting compromise between two contrasting 
principles of resource allocation: the market principle, that 
allocates resources based on marginal productivity and 
thus on the ‘merit’ sanctioned by the ‘play of market 
forces’; and entitlements based on social rights, developed 
by democratic choices.  
Now, going back to Ferrera and Gualmini’s account, 
it can be argued that they fail to appreciate the complexity 
of this interaction and posit ‘good’ economic policy or 
political choices as decisions that allow for the deployment 
of the free play of market forces. For instance, in presenting 
what they call one of the ‘sins’ of Italian welfare capitalism, 
the two authors argue that “the situation of the 1970s fell 
short of all expectations of the Keynesian modernisers of 
the 1960s”, as there was a “lack of pragmatic culture, the 
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partisan colonisation of the administrative apparatus, the 
opportunistic use of public employment by the patronage 
system, the failure to design rational systems of incentives” 
(Ibidem: 45). The use of terms such as ‘partisan 
colonisation’, ‘opportunistic use of employment’ and 
‘rational system’ clearly signal the adoption of neoclassical 
economics viewpoint and imply that the Italian settlement 
was – from this standpoint – considered to be sub-optimal. 
The authors also talk about “fiscal irresponsibility” (Ibidem: 
124) as one of the defining features of welfare capitalism 
Italian-style. It is claimed that “under the increasingly 
stronger spurs produced by the Maastricht process and the 
constraints/opportunities of the new domestic rules of the 
game, actors developed new orientations, new capabilities 
and new modes of interaction” (Ibidem: 30), presenting 
these innovations as entailing a “virtuous change” (Ibidem: 
60), in contrast to the previous ‘vicious circle’18 (Ibidem: 
121). Change was possible because the EMU constraint 
eliminated certain veto points in policy-making, also 
because of the disappearance of the ‘status quo’ as an 
alternative choice: the authors argue that not reaching an 
agreement in the mid-1990s would have meant suffering 
immediate and heavy financial sanctions (Ibidem: 168).  
 Ferrera and Gualmini argue that in a form of 
consensus marked by ‘institutional learning’ the logic of 
political exchange, albeit always remaining a possibility, is 
largely avoided because “the cost and benefits of the                                                         
18 As the authors argue, “up until the 1980s the high institutionalisation of the 
Keynesian welfare state and of the regulated labour regime centred on passive 
distributive policies, on a disproportionate protecton for insiders and a 
persisting exclusion of outsiders”. This “originated a highly resistant vicious 
circle, sustained by an interest coalition including powerful industrial unions, 
centre-left governments and weak employers associations” (121). 
 
61   
various policy options (and thus their distributive 
implications) become very high to quantify and predict, 
also in the wake of the extremely high volatility of financial 
markets” (Ibidem: 121). As actors become more uncertain 
about what to demand and to whom, they “mature an 
interest in a common search for policy solutions that can 
stabilise the constellation as such, rather than bring specific 
advantages to their part” (Ibidem). Actors thus learned to 
interact with each other through “genuine puzzling 
exercises” looking for “technical solutions to policy 
challenges” (Ibidem). 
 What the authors fail to problematise is precisely the 
absence of a political exchange. The process of adjustment 
to the Maastricht criteria and to EMU has been a process of 
welfare retrenchment and trade union weakening (not least 
because wage dynamics were now deemed to be almost 
entirely outside of the negotiation arena). Thus, the unions 
have effectively ‘learned’ to accept the rationality of the 
market and of the enterprise as their own, as is clear from 
the very text of the 1993 deal (see below). This puzzle must 
be explained. And the focus on institutions and 
institutional learning neglects the fact that institutions are 
placed in a capitalist environment, with its corresponding 
ideas, ideologies and versions of common sense. What 
must be analysed is precisely through which ideas and 
forms of common sense have the various actors interpreted 
the situation. This must be done keeping in mind, as the 
next chapter will explain, the constraints that living in a 
capitalist environment poses on our forms of thought.  
The next chapter is devoted to a neo-Gramscian 
conceptualisation of the state and its relationship with 
society, one that is able to avoid separating institutions 
from the society they are part of.  Cox’s notion of 
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state/society complex in fact aims precisely at 
demonstrating the reciprocal constitution and conditioning 
of state and society as two different aspects of the same set 
of social relations.  Discussing the notion of common sense, 
it will be shown that institutions are crucially dependent on 
versions of common sense that originate in the mode of 
production – capitalism – and how this is understood: how 
‘sense is made’ of the ahistorical need for basic means of 
subsistence that we all share. It are these versions of 
common sense that then make their way to the institutions 
and provide for their social content. As will be seen in more 
detail below, the fact of living within a capitalist mode of 
production means that our versions of common sense are 
asymmetric in that they tend to give preference to capital’s 
dependence on the market rather than to labour’s, and this 
is because our conditions of existence – the production of 
the basic means of subsistence – are, in a society in which 
basic goods are accessed almost exclusively through the 
market, effectively dependent on favourable conditions for 
capital accumulation. These conditions are then seen as 
providing the neutral ‘necessities’ of the economy, thus 
depoliticising aspects of our productive social relations, 
naturalising them as simple ‘facts of life’.  
 
 
Neo-Gramscian perspectives 
 
This work is grounded in a neo-Gramscian 
theoretical framework, as initially developed by Robert Cox 
and further expanded by a variety of scholars since the 
early 1980s (see next chapter for a theoretical overview). 
Since Cox’s two seminal articles in the beginning of the 
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1980s, the neo-Gramscian literature has focused on a wide 
variety of issues in IPE and IR. A particular attention has 
been given to the process of European integration (Bieler 
and Morton 2001a; Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Van 
Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009). In particular, 
there has been work on the transnational struggle among 
different fractions of capital for hegemony at the European 
level, culminating in the project of ‘embedded 
neoliberalism’ (Van Apeldoorn 2002); on the eastward and 
southern enlargement process (Holman 2004); on the 
transnational capitalist class in the EU (Holman and Van 
der Pijl 2003); on the question of (un)employment within 
the EU (Overbeek 2003); on the emerging ‘new 
constitutionalism’ (Gill 1998; 2001) aiming at bracketing off 
significant aspects of political economic policy and 
institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic 
accountability, also through the development of a ‘juridical 
Europe’ (see Holman and Van Der Pijl 2003) – a further step 
in what Van der Pijl terms a ‘sanitised democracy’ (Van der 
Pijl 2006b); on the agency of trade unions and social 
movements within the European Union (Bieler 2003; 2005; 
2006; 2008 ); and, more recently, on the role of the 
Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ in the consensus (or 
lack of consensus) among social forces on the direction of 
national socio-economic policy (Bruff 2008; 2010).  
A dense theoretical debate has also emerged 
focusing on issues of class struggle in IPE (Morton 2006), on 
the role of discourse in IPE (Bieler and Morton 2008) and on 
the problematic notion of ‘school formation’ (Morton 2001). 
Moreover, there have also been theoretical contributions 
focusing on the similarities and differences between a 
‘critical economy’ approach to IPE and the so-called Open 
Marxists (Bieler et al., 2006, Bruff 2009a, Bruff 2009b), and 
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between the former and the varieties of capitalism 
literature (see Bruff 2008 ch.1 and 2; 2011). 
The focus here is on the transformation within the 
Italian political economy.  As Bieler and Morton point out, 
the national context is the only place where a historical bloc 
can be founded (Bieler and Morton 2006c), as it is bound up 
with how various classes and fractions construct or contest 
hegemony through national political frameworks. 
Although the focus of this research is on the 
transformations of the Italian political economy, the 
international/transnational dimension is not overlooked.  
Transnational relations could be defined as social relations 
across and beyond national borders. As Van Apeldoorn 
points out (2004: 161), “a focus on social relations 
emphasises how groups of people are also linked 
transnationally without any direct (personal) relationship. 
Characteristic of social relations in capitalism is that they 
often involve no such relationship at all, with people’s fate 
nevertheless directly tied up with one another through the 
world market”. Thus, a study of the Italian political 
economy and consensus formation in Italy cannot neglect 
the position of Italy within the European and global 
political economy. (For instance, the decision by the 
economic and financial élite to join the ERM in 1979 has 
had a crucial role in the disciplining of trade unions 
throughout the 1980s – see Talani 2003). As Morton 
underlines, one should focus on the national level as our 
point of departure while remaining aware at all times of the 
national’s conditioning by the international. (Morton 2007: 
170). One way to analyse the national-international 
relationship is to couple internationationalisation of the state 
– in Cox’s understanding of the term (Cox 1987: 254) – with 
internalisation, the condensation of social relations into the 
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‘institutional materiality’ of national state apparatuses. (see 
Bieler and Morton 2006c and ch.4 of this thesis). The 
transnationalisation of Italian capital is also analysed in this 
work as a significant catalyst for change and consensus 
formation. 
There has been an extensive focus on the forms of 
agency linked to the elaboration of a neoliberal strategy at 
the transnational level, involving elements in transnational 
capital and élite interaction (for instance in the Bilderberg 
conferences, the Trilateral commission and other 
international organisations or planning bodies) (see Gill 
1991; Holman and Van der Pijl 2003). The economic crisis of 
the 1970s generated an ‘organic’ crisis, out of which 
emerged the new hegemonic project of neoliberalism which 
reaffirmed the ‘general’ capitalist interest through the 
adoption of neoliberal economic policies, forcing micro-
economic efficiency on a society that was interpreted as 
increasingly ‘ungovernable’. Cox has explained the 
transformation towards neoliberalism as the outcome of a 
conflict of social and political forces at the three levels of 
production, state and world order (see: Cox 1987 ch.8).  It is 
claimed that neoliberalism was not a coherent all-
encompassing project, and thus it is analysed as a project 
and as a process, involving various kinds of mediations, 
concessions “to the rigidity of the moment” (Drainville, 
1994: 116) and different ‘politics of control’, which in the 
USA and the UK are seen as involving a form of moral neo-
conservatism. This transnational class struggle has been 
analysed also with reference to the European Union, where 
the outcome has been termed ‘embedded neoliberalism’ 
(Van Apeldoorn 2002), a form of hegemony that involves 
not a mere translation of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ neoliberalism, but a 
type of skewed compromise between the latter and elements 
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of the ‘social-democratic’ and ‘mercantilist’ projects for 
integration.  
The transnationalisation process is seen as driven 
primarily by capital’s expansion across national borders 
and engendering the transnationalisation of the capitalist 
class, more markedly within the ‘Lockean heartland’ (see 
Van Apeldoorn 2004; Van der Pijl 1998; 2006a). These 
studies should remind us that one cannot study domestic 
politics only in the national context, and thus that 
transnational relations are part of the fabric of how 
‘national’ social relations and their corresponding forms of 
ideology and hegemony are to be framed. As Van der Pijl 
also reminds us: “all social action is simultaneously 
structured by the tendency towards global unification 
represented by capital, and by the fact that every concrete 
state/society complex is ultimately held together by a 
specific structure of power and authority mediating with 
other such complexes”(Van der Pijl 1998: 64. For a critique 
of state centrism in mainstream IR-IPE and Political Science 
see: Overbeek, 2004).  The point is not to assume neither 
that state forms have autonomy within the global political 
economy nor that they are mere ‘transmission belts’ 
between the national and the global. States should be seen 
as nodal, not as dominant points (Morton, 2007: 6).  
However, notwithstanding these theoretical claims 
on the importance of studying transformations within 
national political economies, the neo-Gramscian literature 
on national trajectories or national ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
(Bieler 2006; 2008: Shields 2008) remain somewhat limited. 
Moreover, it is only Bruff that has focused on consensus 
formation and common sense within national political 
economies. The two case studies he has chosen are 
characterised by a historical tradition of consensual 
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industrial relations and the formation of thick corporatist 
institutions during the ‘corporate liberal’ (or ‘Fordist’) era. 
Italy, as argued above and as the next chapters will show in 
detail, has historically not been characterised by consensus 
among organisations of capital and labour. Thus, until 
1993, industrial relations in Italy had never experienced 
moments of consensus on reforms or shared goals for socio-
economic governance among the social partners. The aim 
of this project is thus to contribute to the development of 
neo-Gramscian theory by focusing on the explanatory 
power of Gramsci’s notion of ‘common sense’ even in 
countries marked by a more conflictual history than 
Germany or the Netherlands.  
An aspect that has often been overlooked in neo-
Gramscian literature is the forms of thought developed by 
the working class. Bieler (2006) has studied trade unions’ 
ideological potion on European integration, but remains in 
some way trapped in a form of determinism by assuming 
that those trade unions that represent workers in certain 
sectors would tend to develop a certain position on 
European integration. Specifically, he argues that workers 
in transnational sectors of production would tend to be 
most in favour of European integration and the creation of 
a European neo-corporatist structure (thus, switching the 
‘power game’ to the European level). However, I believe 
that the Gramscian notion of common sense, as developed 
by Bruff, can open up new avenues for thinking about 
labour. Labour, the working class, does not act based on 
some form of pre-determined class consciousness. Labour’s 
form of consciousness is clearly conditioned by its position 
within the social relations of production, but is also 
dependent on forms of common sense that have roots in 
national history, class identity, previous forms of 
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hegemony, and the political discourses and cultural 
background of the organisations developed by the working 
class itself. Moreover, they are conditioned by the country’s 
particular insertion into capitalism. I believe that the Italian 
case could shed light on this dimension.  
 Talani and Cervino (2003) have analysed the impact 
of EMU on labour in Italy and Spain, underlining how the 
path to EMU and the current framework within which 
socio-economic policy is made within the EU has had 
“undeniable consequences for the limits within which trade 
unions are able to conduct wage policies” and the rigid 
limitations on the conduct of fiscal policy imposed by the 
Maastricht treaty “are deeply modifying in terms of the 
debate over the survival of the welfare state” (Ibidem: 199). 
Talani (2003) has also analysed the shift from the domestic 
to the European level of governance as a means used by the 
Italian industrial and banking sectors to implement a set of 
economic policies aimed at reducing public spending and 
curbing trade union influence at a time when they still 
enjoyed significant bargaining power19.  
However, their contribution does not shed light on 
the social purpose of the trade unions’ position and conduct, 
thus failing to identify the reasons why trade unions 
eventually accepted an unfavourable fiscal and monetary 
framework clearly at odds with the previous historical 
experience in Italy (and elsewhere). The explanation Talani 
gives for such a shift is the trade union’s co-optation into                                                         
19 However, as Talani notes, the attitude of Italian big industry toward the 
process of European monetary integration, starting from the agreement on the 
ERM in 1979, was ambiguous: on one side, there was the strategy to shift the 
power struggle to the supranational level, while on the other – particularly in 
times of crisis – there was the need to devalue the national currency in order to 
maintain exports competitive. (Talani 2003: 133-135) 
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Delors’ vision of a ‘Social Europe’ or of a Europe as an 
‘organised space’, which is also how Van Apeldoorn (2002) 
explains labour’s acquiescence to the ‘embedded neoliberal’ 
compromise. However, the author fails to explain how the 
unions were co-opted into such a vision. Talani and 
Cervino’s claim (Talani and Cervino 2003) that, because of 
their unprecedented weakness, trade unions confined 
themselves to a rear-guard struggle over the social 
dimension of EMU is what needs to be explained, and not 
the reason for trade union acquiescence. 
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2. The theoretical lens: capital, hegemony 
and common sense 
 
“The separation of 'genesis' from 'existence' constitutes the blind spot of 
dogmatic thought” 
Max Horkheimer  
 
“The labour theory of value is indeed an economic mistake from the point of 
view of capital, that is from the point of view of its science. But the correct 
relation is that between a law and its object. And the object, in Marx – this is 
the simple element, but difficult to understand – is not the economic world of 
commodities, but the political relation of capitalist production.” 
Mario Tronti  
 
The aim of this chapter is to present a neo-
Gramscian framework for thinking about socio-economic 
transformation and consensus formation in capitalist 
societies. This framework provides a conceptual apparatus 
which draws from Marx and Gramsci in order to show the 
centrality of the concept of ‘common sense’ as the basis of 
how human beings think about (or  ‘make sense of’) the 
society they live in, its processes of transformation and its 
relationship with ‘the international’. In Bruff’s 
conceptualisation (Bruff 2008; 2010; 2011) – on which this 
research draws –, common sense is viewed as embodied in 
all human social practice, and thus cannot escape the 
material conditions of existence. The central idea is that 
every society contains different versions of common sense 
that have sedimented over time in the state’s 
administrative apparatus and that social and political 
struggle involves the attempt to reformulate certain 
common sense assumptions of the population in order to 
develop a ‘hegemonic project’ which seeks to steer society 
in a certain direction – in line with the dominant group’s 
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version of common sense and interests – or to resist it. 
These different versions of common sense are pushed 
forward by classes or fractions of classes which seek to 
present their version of ‘common sense’ as the general 
interest of a society, hence linking it with other and 
previous versions of common sense in order to generate a 
hegemonic project based on a certain historic bloc of social 
forces.  
However, common sense cannot be easily moulded 
and changed in order to suit the changing hegemonic 
projects and practices, but tends to possess a strong path-
dependency that reflects a country’s particular positioning 
within ‘the international’, as well as the sedimentations of 
common sense that have built up in the country in the past 
(see below). Bruff argues that in all aspects of life, common 
sense is the basis on which humans ‘make sense’ of their 
situation and the world they find themselves in (Bruff 2008: 
47). The neo-Gramscian approach in the study of 
International Political Economy is not a unified framework 
or a ‘school’, but has in fact been theorised and applied in 
different ways. What is presented here is a series of 
theoretical steps that will be useful for conceptualising 
common sense in a way that will enable us to fruitfully 
conduct empirical research.  
Ontological and Epistemological Premises 
 
In this section I outline the ontological and 
epistemological premises of the research project. Within a 
theoretical approach, ontology refers to the 
units/structures that ‘reality’ is seen as made up of. 
Epistemology, on the other hand, is the branch of 
philosophy concerned with what human beings can know 
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about ‘the world’. Clearly, there is a strong internal relation 
between ontology and epistemology. Certain ontological 
positions can only lead to a specific understanding of what 
humans can know about their societies (and also others in 
space and time), and also to certain methodological 
positions on empirical research.  
 This research project is placed within the academic 
discipline of Global Political Economy (GPE), in particular 
it intends to contribute to a growing body of work within 
neo-Gramscian approaches. As Van der Pijl points out, the 
peculiarity of GPE approaches is that they tend to 
overcome the rigid separation between politics, economics 
and sociology that has emerged in the late 19th century, and 
which has characterised mainstream theories of social 
science since then20 (Van der Pijl 2009 ch.1; Lunghini 2012: 
33-37). 
Neo-Gramscian perspectives, as well as critical 
theories generally (see Burchill et al 2009) stress the 
importance of transcending academic distinctions, such as 
the one between Comparative Politics and International 
Relations. In fact, one of the main critiques of mainstream 
theories by the neo-Gramscians, has been a critique of the 
tendency for conventional academic analyses to focus 
either on the national scale or on the global (international) 
scale. Thus – this is their criticism – one misses the point 
that national political economies are part and parcel of 
wider structures of transformation (capitalism). Cox terms 
these wider structures ‘historical structures’, but one can 
also refer back to Marx’s own theoretical emphasis on an                                                         
20 The term ‘economics’ was introduced for the first time by the father of 
marginalist economics William Jevons. He in fact recommended that the term 
‘political’ be replaced from ‘political economy’, in that way highlighting its 
scientific and objective character and eliminate an association with politics.  
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the idea of an integral, historical society.  What is criticised 
is also an empirical focus on the distinction between ‘the 
national’ and ‘the international’. This dichotomy is, in 
critical approaches to GPE, seen as overdetermined by the 
dynamics of social relations within a capitalist mode of 
production (for the concept of overdetermination, see: Van 
der Pijl 2007: 16), conceived as a totality that encompasses 
and incorporates the state-system and thus the very 
distinction between what is ‘national’ and what is 
‘international’. As Overbeek points out, the critique 
concentrated on  “identifying state formation and interstate 
politics as moments of the transnational dynamics of 
capital accumulation and class formation” (Overbeek 2004: 
122). 
As will become clearer in the course of this chapter, 
this critique of the conventional disciplinary divisions in 
social science reflects the ontological and epistemological 
claims of the theory itself, as it is posited that there is no 
such thing as a universal theory of social science that is 
applicable across different historical epochs. Instead, 
knowledge is conceived as both historically situated and as 
constitutive of social practice. As Mark Rupert noted, 
historical materialism is a “situated knowledge, constructed 
within and relevant to the historical relations of capitalism 
in particular times and places” (Rupert 2003: 186, cited in 
Bruff 2010: 3). Critical theory – and particularly Marxist 
critical theory – is thus practical, in the sense that it posits 
that all knowledge about the social world is but an aspect 
of social practice, it is part of human activity: thus, “there is 
no verification of any claim about the world other than 
through practical application” (Van der Pijl 2007: 12). A 
critical theory of capitalism is thus able to situate itself 
within the confines of a particular standpoint in space and 
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time; it is thus able to account for not only the development 
of other disciplinary branches, but for its own very 
constitution as a historically situated theory.  
 
Ontology  
 
The social world we live in differs from the natural 
world in that human beings have made the former but not 
the latter. Hence, inquiry within social science cannot 
follow the same scientific and methodological routes as that 
of natural science, whose object is first-order reality – the 
natural world. In contrast, social sciences’ ambition is to 
analyse the second-order reality that has been produced and 
is reproduced over time by human beings living in concrete 
historical situations. The world of social science is one 
which human beings produce and reproduce in different 
ways over history, hence explanation cannot start from the 
assumption of a separation of the subject from the object as 
though the latter were a simple external thing one analyses, 
and also cannot theorise in terms of cause and effect (Gill 
1993a:.21-22).  
This understanding reflects Marx’s famous critique 
of Feuerbach in The German Ideology, where he argued that 
one cannot posit a universal ‘man’, as the only men that 
exist are ones living in concrete societies and specific 
historical situations (see Marx 1968). It is this 
understanding that leads to historical materialism, the idea 
that thought is constitutive of (although not determined by) 
social practice. However, 
 
“to bourgeois materialism it means that ideas are the 
product of the brain, to be explained from the structure and 
transformations of brain matter, and hence, ultimately, 
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from the dynamics of the atoms in the brain. To historical 
materialism, it means that the ideas of man are determined 
by social circumstances: society is the environment which 
through his sense impresses itself on him” (Pannekoek 1938: 25 
cited in Van der Pijl 2007: 14). 
 
The forms of society created by human beings over 
history are characterised by specific relations between 
people and the natural substratum. In fact, the need to 
produce (through what Marx would term ‘concrete labour’, 
that is labour that produces use-values) can be seen as the 
only transhistorical, or universal, aspect of human existence 
that characterises all modes of production and historical 
epochs. Human beings produce, in all historical epochs, and 
that is all one can say about humans in general: 
 
“we must begin by stating the first premise of all human 
existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, 
that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 
“make history”. But life involves before everything else 
eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other 
things. The first historical act is thus the production of the 
means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life 
itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental 
condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years 
ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to 
sustain human life” (Marx 1968: 10). 
 
However, how the relations of production are in turn 
organised then constitutes the differentia specifica of a 
particular mode of production, creating a ‘second nature’, 
shaping the actions and thoughts of human beings. This 
reflection parallels that between the first-order reality of the 
natural sciences and the second-order reality of social 
sciences.  As the object of social sciences is always, 
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ultimately, the ‘historical structure’, then the way one goes 
about doing research in social science must be based on a 
different set of ontological and epistemological premises 
than research in the natural sciences.  
 Thus, as we argued above, one can say that human 
beings have ahistorical needs such as eating, drinking, and 
shelter, but how the production of these use-values is 
organised constitutes the specific character of a particular 
mode of production. The latter is created and modified by 
human beings themselves historically, and it includes 
specific social relations of production. Crucially, in this 
perspective, an important part of any historical structure 
and any mode of production is the ideational element, that 
is, how humans in that specific historical structure think 
and reason reflectively on their own social conditions. 
Thought patterns are a part of the historical structure and 
are not simply the way human beings go about analysing 
an object that is external to them. Thought on human 
society is always reflexive, it is always perspectival, based on 
the observer’s standpoint: “theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128). Ideas are therefore 
intrinsically part of the political economy, as they shape 
how human beings go about producing their means of 
subsistence, and the institutions that are needed to organise 
that production. The point is that without the ‘explanatory’ 
function, that is the role of ‘organic intellectuals’, no social 
structures can hold, and this intellectual function and 
content changes with humanity’s overcoming of historical 
limitations to its self-determination. This is why Marxism 
can be conceived as absolute historicism: “the absolute 
secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute 
humanism of history” (Gramsci 1971: 465). 
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 The relationship between the past and the present is 
crucial here. The social world inhabited by concrete human 
beings has been ‘made’ in the past and thus constrains 
present human action into a framework, which however 
does not determine how human beings will act (obviously, 
as, in this case, where would historical change come from?), 
but limits the range of possible routes or choices, and thus 
the avenues for change. As Gramsci points out, “each 
individual is the synthesis not only of existing relations, but 
of the history of these relations. He (or she) is a précis of the 
past” (Gramsci 1971: 353). Gramsci is here reformulating 
the Hegelian idea that the ‘objective’ forces created in the 
past have been created by the subject through alienation: 
humans produce something that is outside of themselves 
which contains what they have produced, and this then 
confronts human beings as something external to 
themselves, the ‘objective’ world. This ‘objective’ world is 
then fetishised as a thing, a structure that determines human 
action, neglecting the fact that it is being created by human 
action. In Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of 
production, the key form of alienation is the labour process 
itself (while Hegel referred here to a form of mental 
alienation of the freedom-seeking subject). 
One can thus arrive at identifying the basic unit of 
the social ontology of a neo-Gramscian approach: the 
historical structure, defined by Cox as “persistent social 
practices, made by collective human activity and 
transformed through collective human activity” (Cox 1987: 
5).  According to Cox, three categories of forces interact in a 
non-deterministic way in such a structure: material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox 1981: 136).  
Common sense is a synthesis of past and present, a 
sedimentation of previous historical structures into 
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particular common sense assumptions about the world, 
that is both path-dependent and dynamic (see more below).  
 
Structure and agency in political economy 
 
 As is probably clear, the idea of a historical structure, in line 
with a historical materialist understanding of dialectics and historical 
change, involves a specific theorisation of the structure/agency 
dilemma in social science.21 In contrast to positivist, constructivist and 
post-structuralist understandings of the relationship between structure 
and agency that either grant primacy to structure or to agency (the 
former) or posit a sort of ‘indeterminate determinism’ (Wight 1999 cited 
in Bieler and Morton 2001b: 16) (the latter), a neo-Gramscian approach 
views agency in structure, as dialectically interrelated with structure, 
thus creating the structural framework within which further agency is 
then constrained (but not determined) to choose among a limited realm 
of possibilities for change.  
The revival of the dialectical method is an important 
element in the ontological position of neo-Gramscian 
approaches. “History is at once freedom and necessity” 
(Ibidem: 19). A historical structure is inherited from the past 
and hence is not the outcome of the agency of individuals 
of a particular society, who are born in a concrete historical 
situation over which they do not have control. The sphere 
of freedom is thus constrained but not eliminated by the 
structure, as individuals, imbued with the intersubjective 
meanings and dominant and/or counter-hegemonic forms 
of thought of a given era, always have several avenues for 
agency.  Structure in all its elements exists because humans 
beings made it exist, and therefore cannot logically be seen 
as in turn determining human being’s existence, lest we fall 
                                                        
21 This section is largely based on Bieler and Morton 2001b. 
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back into a fetishistic logic22 As Colin Hay points out, 
“strategic action is the dialectical interplay of intentional 
and knowledgeable, yet structurally-embedded actors and 
the pre-constituted (structured) contexts they inhabit” 
(Ibidem: 27). This framework for action is defined by the 
limits of the possible and the thinkable of a given historical 
structure – agency in structure. In criticising a series of 
approaches – structuration theory, constructivism and post-
structural approaches –, Bieler and Morton emphasise how 
one can overcome the agency-structure dualism (most 
theories in fact posit either one or the other as the primary 
element) by showing how actors are not independent 
autonomous entities: “People make history but not under 
conditions of their own choosing” (Marx 1963: 15). There is 
a dialectical relationship between structure and agency that 
entails their mutual constitution: “structure presupposes 
agency as it only exists in virtue of intentional human 
action in which social structures are reproduced and 
transformed. Society does not exist independently of 
human activity (error of reification) but it is not the product 
of it (error of voluntarism)” (Van Apeldoorn 2004: 152) 
 Referring back to our division between first-order 
and second-order reality, one can see how structures such 
as states or world orders are not in themselves ‘objective’, 
but become so only through the intersubjective meanings 
that people attach to them. The aim of an analysis of the 
historical structure is thus both its material and ideational 
dimension, which together create the framework of 
                                                        
22 One is reminded here also of debates which see the nation-state as simply a 
passive agent in the face of structural change in the economy, or see individuals 
as recipients of impersonal market mechanisms over which they supposedly 
have no control.  
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institutions, ideas and material capabilities and the 
possibilities for change incorporated in them.23 
 
“It might seem that there can exist an extra-historical and 
extra-human objectivity. But who is the judge of such 
objectivity? Who is able to put himself in this kind of 
‘standpoint’ of the cosmos in itself and what could such a 
standpoint mean? … Objective always means ‘humanly 
objective’ which can be held to correspond exactly to 
‘historically subjective’: in other words, objective would 
mean ‘universal subjective’… We know reality only in 
relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, 
knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is 
objectivity” (Gramsci 1971: 445-6, cited in Bieler and 
Morton 2001b: 20).  
 
Forms of thought are ‘humanly objective’: they 
correspond to a specific situation or historical structure and 
thus are a constituent element of this human construction, 
that is nevertheless ‘historically subjective’ and ‘universal 
subjective’ as it corresponds to a historical situation in 
which man has reached a certain phase in its material and 
intellectual development. This amounts to criticising the 
subject/object duality, and points to the fact that the subject 
is plunged into a historical ‘reality’ that imbues his 
frameworks of thought so that what appears to be 
‘objective’ to him is actually ‘historically subjective’ as it is 
the result of the past that has condensated into a structure 
in the present, a framework which influences and shapes 
both his thoughts and his actions, but does not determine 
them. From this reflection, it is clear that the subject-object                                                         
23 See the section on common sense for a discussion of the role of organic 
intellectuals in the shaping of the intersubjective meanings and their common 
sense underpinnings.  
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duality, which mainstream theories of social science do not 
problematise, must be overcome.  
 Within neo-Gramscian perspectives this dichotomy 
is overcome by emphasising the unity of the subjective and 
the objective, by highlighting how one cannot exist without 
the other; how the object is created by the subject, but the 
subject is also shaped (but not determined) – both 
materially and in its identity and ideational/theoretical 
outlook – by the object.  This historicist epistemology sees 
structures as made by humans but then in turn confronting 
people as ‘objective’ reality.  
 
“Structures are formed by collective human activity over time. 
Structures, in turn, mould the thoughts and actions of 
individuals. Historical change is to be thought of as the reciprocal 
relationship of structures and actors” (Cox 1987: 395).  
 
For instance, the state cannot be analysed and 
conceptualised as an objective category, but acquires such 
status as ‘humanly objective’ only because people have 
‘made’ the state in the past and people now act as if the 
state were an entity in reality, as if “there exists above them 
a phantom entity, the abstraction of the collective organism, 
a species of autonomous divinity that thinks, not with the 
head of a specific being, yet nevertheless thinks, that 
moves, not with the real legs of a person, yet still moves” 
(Gramsci, 1995: 15). Thus, the existence of ‘the state’ is not 
objective: the state exists only insofar as people act in a 
certain manner and conform their social relations to certain 
rules that give the concept of ‘the state’ an aura of 
objectivity. However, it is always people’s actions that 
make ‘the state’ exist. The state is ‘humanly objective’.  
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The view of the state as a ‘thing’ standing above 
society and independent from it24 parallels the view of 
capital as a ‘thing’ and hence is the expression of a 
festishised understanding of human relations that sees 
humans as determined or objects of autonomous, 
independent “things”. This view overlooks the fact that 
these ‘things’ are the creation of human social practice, and 
thus they acquire an ‘objective’ status only in the practice 
and the forms of thought developed within the confines of 
a specific historical structure. Marx, talking about 
socialisation among people in their work, says that “the 
social relations between their private labours appear as 
what they really are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social 
relations between persons in their work but as material 
relations between persons and social relations between 
things” (Marx 1976: 165-6). Marx argues that these social 
relations “appear as they really are”, which means that these 
appearances are not mere illusions, they are necessary 
aspect of an historical structure and of capitalism as a mode 
of production. As Tronti notes, for Marx the verb erscheinen 
has an ambiguous meaning, which can be best translated 
more as to present itself, to manifest itself rather than to appear. 
Thus, the separation between the worker and capital is not 
simply an appearance: it is a real historical fact, a real 
relationship that presents itself in a certain way (Tronti 1966: 
185).  
 Historical materialism is often misunderstood as a 
reductionist theory which sees relations of production, 
hence material forces, as ruling over human beings, that is, 
as matter determining consciousness (Van Apeldoorn 2004:                                                         
24 Including the contractual tradition in modern political thought that sees the 
state as emerging from an abstract ‘contract’ among people, that is 
characteristic of the Hobbesian and Lockean idea of the state.  
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152). Primacy, within a neo-Gramscian approach, is indeed 
given to the social relations of production but reductionism 
as well as determinism are avoided, as production is 
intended in a very broad sense that goes beyond the mere 
production of physical use-values: 
 
“production …is to be understood in the broadest sense. It 
is not confined to the production of physical goods used or 
consumed. It covers also the production and reproduction 
of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and 
institutions that are prerequisites to the production of 
physical goods” (Cox 1989: 39).  
  
This expanded notion of production also 
incorporates the intersubjective meanings that shape the 
identity of individuals or collective agents and patterns of 
thought through which humans understand their situation 
and the possibilities for change, as well as more entrenched 
forms of ‘common sense’ that encompass longer historical 
periods. How humans understand the world is part and 
parcel of their social practice, and hence of the ‘situation’ 
they find themselves in. This historicist method draws 
attention to intersubjective meanings as constituents of 
historical structures. How people perceive action and the 
outer world also enables and constrains certain routes of 
agency, as it is bound up with avenues for producing and 
reproducing hegemony or contesting it through anti-
hegemonic practices and ‘collective images’.25 
 A further point worth mentioning is the fact that several 
historical structures may co-exist at the same time, each one of them 
referring to a certain conception of time. Gill makes reference to 
Fernand Braudel’s conceptions of time in the analysis of history (See:                                                         
25 On the difference between ‘intersubjective meanings’ and ‘collective images’ 
of the world see Cox 1981: 136.  
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Gill 1993a; 2001).  Braudel speaks of the longue durée, that is the gestes 
répétées of history, or the wider “structure of necessity” (Gill 1993a: 36) 
in which the évènements take place. The longue durée is linked to wider 
macro-structures such as the capitalist mode of production, which is a 
specific capitalist way of extracting surplus-labour, and the (apparent) 
separation between politics and economics.  At the intermediate level, 
one can refer to Cox’s historical structures as a particular configuration 
of material capabilities, ideas and institutions that give content to a 
structural framework organised around a set of social relations of 
production. At the micro-level there is the day-to-day conduct of 
politics, or what Braudel called the évenèments.26 All these structures or 
levels are produced and reproduced by humans, and thus all of them 
must be kept in mind while engaging in social science analysis, without 
making reference to objective structures determining human action, but 
always being aware of their historical and social production that, 
although incorporated in ingrained institutions and beliefs, is 
nevertheless produced and reproduced by human social practice.  
 
Epistemology 
 
The social ontology and historicist method we have 
outlined has clear implications on the epistemological 
position of this approach.  If we view the world as ‘made 
up’ of historical structures as configurations of material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions, then our theory of 
knowledge will be affected. It is claimed that there is no 
such thing as knowledge in general, or a universal social 
theory which is applicable to all times and places. What is 
refused is a positivist theorising on precise causal laws that 
are applicable to humans and human institutions in general 
(thus positing also a fixed human nature which stands 
beyond history). Instead, we posit the unity of objective                                                         
26 This distinction between macro-level, meso-level and micro-level is proposed 
by Bieler and Morton, 2001b: 26. Gramsci himself distinguished the 
“occasional” from the “permanent” in political economy.  
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and subjective, that is we focus on the development of 
social structures which then confront human beings as a 
part of objective reality. The object of analysis of critical 
theory is the social structure per se, its processes of 
production and reproduction.  
One of the most relevant interventions by Cox 
concerns precisely the crucial epistemological difference 
between ‘problem-solving theory’ and critical theory’ (Cox 
1981; 1983). Within a given historical structure, theory, as a 
form of human knowledge, can serve several functions but 
is never independent of the configuration of material forces 
and institutions that also constitutes the structure. Again, 
there is no such thing as knowledge that is detached from 
the surrounding society: there is no thought without a 
thinker, a person that views ‘the world’ from a particular 
historical, social and geographical standpoint.  According to 
Cox, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” 
(1981: 128). There is no such thing as a theory in itself, 
separated from a certain standpoint in time and space: 
where you are determines how you see the world, and what 
you see in the world (ontology). Whenever any theory 
presents itself as a universally-valid theory, whenever the 
standpoint from which it is formulated is obscured, it 
becomes more interesting and fruitful to study the theory 
as ideology, in order to bring to light its unquestioned 
assumptions.  
Slavoj Zizek, who has widely studied the concept of 
ideology, notes that one of ideology’s founding elements is 
precisely the distinction it promotes between the meanings 
attached to their experience by ordinary people and the 
theory advanced by external ‘rational’ observers who are 
able to perceive the world “as it (supposedly) is” and its 
laws, as if it were a natural organism (Zizek 2010: 42). 
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Ideology thus presents itself as neutral knowledge that 
detaches itself from what it itself terms ‘ideology’. Thus, the 
very distinction between ideology and ‘truth’ is 
internalised within the notion of ideology:  
 
“it is only this modern position of the value-free scientist, 
approaching society the same way as a natural scientist 
approaches nature, that amounts to ideology proper, not 
the spontaneous attitude of the meaningful experience of 
life dismissed by the scientist as a set of superstitious 
prejudices (…) There is thus a duality inscribed into the 
very notion of ideology: 1.”mere ideology” as the 
spontaneous self-apprehension of individuals with all their 
prejudices. 2. neutral, value-free knowledge to be applied 
to society to engineer its development. In other words, 
ideology is (or rather appears) as its own species” (Zizek 
2010: 42).  
 
Thus, a prominent feature of ideology is this 
distancing itself from specific historical or social standpoints. 
Critical theory overturns this position: any theory must 
have a perspectival lens through which ‘the world’ is 
analysed, and those theories that tend to conceal this origin 
in their own ontology and epistemology are the hegemonic 
theories, that internalise the historical structures and social 
and power relations by presenting them as natural and/or 
objective relations. Based on the premise that theory always 
reflects certain social or national interests, Cox then argues 
that the “pressures of social reality present themselves to 
consciousness as problems” (Cox 1981: 128) and thus 
theories differ from one another in their problematique.  
Problem-solving theory aims at resolving problems “within 
the terms of the particular perspective which was the point 
of departure” (Ibidem). Problem-solving theory 
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“takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social 
and power relationships and the institutions into which 
they are organised, as the given framework for action. The 
general aim of problem-solving theory is to make these 
relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing 
effectively with particular sources of trouble. Since the 
general pattern of institutions and relationships is not 
called into question, particular problems can be considered 
in relation to the specialised areas of activity in which they 
arise. Problem-solving theories are thus fragmented among 
a multiplicity of spheres or aspects of action, each of which 
assumes a certain stability in the other spheres” (Ibidem 
128-9). 
 
On the other hand, critical theory is  
 
“critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing 
order of the world and asks how that order came about. 
Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not 
take institutions and social and power relations for granted 
but calls them into question by concerning itself with their 
origin and how and whether they might be in the process 
of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very 
framework for action, or problematic, which problem-
solving theory accepts as its parameters” (Cox 1981: 129).  
 
Critical theory’s object of study is therefore the 
historical situation, the genesis of Gramsci’s ‘humanly 
objective’ or ‘historically subjective’. The relative strength 
of problem-solving theory is its capacity to fix limited 
parameters to a problem and identify a number of variables 
that interact on a ‘ceteris paribus’ assumption. This thus 
makes it possible to generate certain laws or general 
patterns that start from the assumption of the continuous 
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reproduction of the social and historical parameters that 
have been taken as starting points. Cox argues that this 
strength of problem-solving theory also reveals its 
ideological bias in its assumption of fixity of social and 
political relations (Ibidem). The crucial point, which also 
allows for a reflection on the notions of hegemony and 
common sense, is that  
 
“problem-solving theories can be represented, in the 
broader perspective of critical theory, as serving particular 
national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable 
within the given order. Indeed, the purpose served by 
problem-solving theory is conservative, since it aims to 
solve the problems arising in various parts of a complex 
whole in order to smooth the functioning of the whole. 
This aim rather belies the frequent claim of problem-
solving theory to be value-free, it is methodologically 
value-free insofar as it treats the variables it considers as 
objects; but it is value-bound by virtue of the fact that it 
implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own 
framework” (Cox 1981: 130).  
 
These quotes clarify some of the critiques of other 
approaches in the previous chapter. Mainstream positivist 
IPE or IR theories tend to take a form of thought derived 
from a particular historical structure, a specific phase of 
history, and thus a peculiar set of social and power 
relations, and universalise it, assuming it to be eternally 
valid. However, following Hegel, there is no immediate 
knowledge, since this would imply that we have no 
consciousness that mediates with reality (Schechter 2007: 1-
12).  
One is reminded here of Marx’s famous polemic 
against the so-called ‘Robinsonades’, the myth of Robinson 
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Crusoe as the paradigm of homo oeconomicus, that is the 
universalisation of a typical phenomenon of capitalism: 
persons conceived as owners of property (be it their labour-
power or means of production). Such a conception 
represents the social relations of production as immortal, 
transhistorical elements of any labour process, and not as 
peculiarities of capitalist social relations.  
One of the main differences between problem-
solving theory and critical theory is the object of analysis: 
while the latter is concerned with the ‘resolution of 
problems’ within the status quo, including the maintenance 
of social power relationships, a critical theory pays due 
attention to the genesis of a specific social order; through 
what norms, institutions and material power the order 
emerged. I understand in such way Tronti’s quote at the 
beginning of the chapter: the object of critical theory is a 
different one from the one of problem-solving theory. It is 
thus not useful to compare them as if comparing theories 
on the same footing: their object of analysis, their 
problematique, is different. Thus, as Van der Pijl reminds us, 
there can never be a social theory that entirely transcends 
the specific society in which it originated and to which it 
applies (see Van der Pijl 2009 ch.1). In fact, the whole 
problem of the ‘submersion’ of the subject and the object is 
the way Van der Pijl goes about analysing the various 
theories of GPE in his survey.  
Obviously, there are different strands of critical 
theories, but they all share this concern – reported in the 
quote at the beginning of the chapter – with the genesis, 
production and reproduction of the historical structures  
(and its political relations) that mainstream social science 
tends to take for granted. For instance, there is a focus not 
on the external relationship between state and market, but 
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on their mutual constitution within the same set of social 
relations and thus of their historical reciprocal 
conditioning. The object of this study is thus ultimately the 
historical structure: 1993 as the moment of consensus of a 
series of changing social relations and corresponding 
ideational structures in the Italian political economy.  1993 
also as a moment of transformation towards a new form of 
state/society complex. The state/society complex – as will 
be explained in more detail when considering Gramsci’s 
conceptualisation of the state – is a reciprocal relationship 
between the structure (economic, social relations) and the 
superstructure (the so-called ‘ethico-political moment’). In 
fact, the interrelationship and reciprocal constitution of 
both structure and superstructure is, within a neo-
Gramscian approach, so dense that it can be argued that the 
whole distinction between the two is indefensible (This is 
Morton’s argument in Morton 2006). In fact, the 
overcoming of a determinist relation between the two, that 
had characterised the positivist scientific Marxism of the 2nd 
International, was one of Gramsci’s theoretical concerns.  
 Bieler and Morton cite Hollis and Smith’s division 
between two traditions in the social sciences: one focused 
on identifying the building blocks of reality, the units of the 
social world, in order to then discover external causal links 
between them (the tradition of explanation), and another 
that produces an ‘inside’ story looking at the meanings the 
actors themselves attached to their own actions 
(understanding) (Bieler and Morton 2001b: 13-15).  In fact, it 
is the two authors’ argument that a neo-Gramscian account 
aims at both understanding and explaining: understanding 
“the intersubjective making of the social world – how 
intersubjective structures become instantiated in human 
practice” and explaining “how such structures are 
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materially experienced by individual and collective agency, 
as both enabling and constraining properties” (Bieler and 
Morton 2001b: 14).  
  Neo-Gramscian theory can thus develop limited 
hypotheses and generalisations based on an analysis of the 
historical situation, and thus differs on a fundamental level 
from positivist empirical approaches. The latter’s goal is to 
generate testable hypotheses which then face the ‘test’ of 
reality and can be approved or rejected. The assumption is 
that there is a separation between the mind of the observer 
and social reality, so that the task is one of recording what 
already exists ‘objectively’ out there in society. The method 
is therefore akin to the scientific method of natural sciences. 
As hopefully this section has made clear, critical theory 
starts from the premise that the social world is a ‘second-
order reality’ that has been created historically by human 
beings, and that thought patterns are an intrinsic part of 
this process (how we make sense of the world is a 
constituent part of how we make the world), so that it is 
impossible to separate the subject and the object of social 
analysis.  
 A capitalist mode of production – as well as the 
several ‘historical structures’ in which it historically 
manifested itself – functions through specific class relations 
that allow us to identify social forces based on their 
position in the production structure. However, this does 
not imply that the outlook, interests and ideas (as well as 
political strategies) of these forces are determined by their 
location in the production process. “One can only identify 
the relevant social forces as the core actors and may 
formulate hypotheses for research on the basis of the 
specific social relations of production” (Bieler 2006: 35).  
Production here is intended in Cox’s extended definition of 
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production cited above. Moreover, in line with the previous 
argument on a dialectical understanding of the relationship 
between structure and agency, a neo-Gramscian approach 
refuses any determinism: there are always several possible 
courses of action or class struggle within a structural 
framework. What is refused here is a notion of class 
struggle – that is theorised by both the Open Marxists and 
the workerist tradition - that is unmediated, that is seen as 
simply a refusal of the imposition of work in the capital-
relation (see: Bonefeld’s and Burnham’s contributions in 
Bieler et al 2006). As the section on common sense will 
further argue, ideas, in this conceptualisation of class 
struggle, play a fundamental role.  
 
The Marxian dimension  
An upside-down world: capital as a social force 
 
The heuristic tool used in this research in order to 
analyse the 1992-1993 agreements in Italy is the Gramscian 
notion of ‘common sense’. In order to conceptualise 
common sense, a step ‘backwards’ is needed to understand 
the functioning of the capitalist mode of production. In 
capitalist states one is immediately presented with the 
apparent division between politics (what Gramsci called 
political society) and economics (civil society). This division 
is indeed internalised by most theories of social science 
with their analytical separation between the sphere of the 
state and that of the market. Within capitalism and in 
mainstream theoretical approaches, it thus seems that the 
state acts in an external fashion within the supposed 
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autonomous sphere of the market.  This view obscures the 
mutual constitution of state and market as aspects of the 
same set of social relations. It is, once again, a real 
phenomenon – not a mere illusion – that is constitutive of 
capitalist social relations. Real and ideological, for Marx, are 
not contrasting phenomena, are not self-excluding 
elements: on the contrary, the capital relation and the 
fetishism that attaches itself to the commodity-form are no 
illusion, they are real phenomena that originate from men’s 
concrete relations in the labour process, from the workers’ 
production and reproduction of the capital relation (on one 
side the worker, on the other capital as a social force). As 
Postone argues, 
 
“the quasi-objective structures grasped by the categories of 
Marx’s critique of political economy do not veil either the 
‘real’ social relations of capitalism (class relations) or the 
‘real’ historical Subject (the proletariat). Rather, those 
structures are the fundamental relations of capitalist society 
that, because of their peculiar properties, constitute what 
Hegel grasps as a historical Subject” (Postone 1993: 78). 
 
 In order to understand the intimate and reciprocal 
relationship of state and market, politics and economics, 
one needs to comprehend the process of surplus-value 
extraction in capitalist societies, and the power relations 
that underpin it. Thus, the first step will be to present a 
brief overview of the Marxian labour theory of value and, 
referring to the writings of Tronti, Panzieri and Cleaver, a 
theory of technological change in capitalism. On this I will 
then build in order to conceptualise hegemony and 
understand the production and reproduction of common 
sense in a capitalist society.  
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Common sense, as it includes references to the realm 
of production – the what and how of production – is, clearly, 
capitalist common sense. Thus, this chapter starts by briefly 
reviewing the main elements of Marx’s analysis of the 
capitalist mode of production. What is presented here is a 
synthesis of an analysis of capitalism as a mode of 
production. The mechanisms of state and class formation 
and class struggle are mediated by other elements 
including culture, nationally-specific compromises and 
historic blocs and the geopolitical system, from which we 
abstract in this section. Thus, class struggle cannot reduce 
the antagonistic aspect of the capital relation to an 
unmediated idea of class struggle. There are always 
material social practices, norms and institutions that 
mediate the class struggle that accompanies the capital 
relation. These elements will be incorporated when we take 
into consideration the Gramscian dimension of analysis and 
the production of  common sense.   
Cox reminds us that production is the material basis 
for all human existence, because in order to eat, drink and 
satisfy our human needs, we need to produce, and this 
need to produce must be organised in a certain way. As 
will be seen in the next section, the way this need to 
produce is organised “affects all other aspects of social life” 
(Cox, 1987: 1) and thus also versions of common sense that 
are not only nationally specific, but also socially specific, in 
the sense that in each country there might be differing, and 
even contrasting versions of common sense. Common 
sense thus cannot escape this material basis of human 
existence, and it surely must include references and 
assumptions regarding the organisation of production, as 
our ways of thinking are part of the organisation of 
production. Political struggle, and the struggle over 
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hegemony, is also a struggle between social forces that 
attempt to impose a specific version of common sense as 
the hegemonic one in a particular society, naturalising 
social relations and universalising them, thus making them 
the way most people in society ‘make sense’ of their social 
world. The more these common sense assumption can 
relate to human being’s transhistorical need for means of 
subsistence in that particular society, the more it is likely 
that they will succeed in becoming dominant, for human 
beings will tend to internalise ideas that ease their access to 
the “material basis for our existence” (Bruff 2010: 3).  
As will be seen, however, one must not fall prey to 
the fallacy of exaggerating the ‘structural literacy’ of the 
(national or transnational) capitalist class. Common sense is 
strongly path-dependent and adjustments are not easy to 
make. On the other hand, and I will focus on this more 
extensively in the next chapter, the accepted-as-legitimate 
must not be confused or equated with the taken-for-
granted (see Bieler et al 2006 ch.3), because capital is a social 
form that organises society according to capital 
accumulation’s necessities, and thus the capital relation is 
also reproduced through the ‘silent compulsion of 
economic relations’ (Marx 1976: 899). There is certainly a 
sense in which, as Althusser famously remarked, ‘history is 
a process without subject’: the process of capital 
accumulation, as Postone reminds us in the quote cited 
above, creates a ‘quasi-objective structure’ that is the 
creation of human beings in the labour process that then 
acts back upon them as a “thing” (a fetish: the attribution of 
mystical quality of determining social relations to an 
inanimate object, the commodity). Thus, capital 
accumulation is a quasi-objective process that is both the 
creation of humans and independent of them. In an inspiring 
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passage, Colletti describes the process by which in a 
bourgeois society, people are both independent and 
dependent on each other, and thus on ‘the market’: 
 
“where each individual is independent from the others (the 
freedom of bourgeois entrepreneurs), also the social nexus 
or connection becomes independent from the individuals. 
And if the social connection, the link, becomes independent 
from the single individuals, it will also escape their control. 
In a society in which everyone is independent, what is 
established is a general dependence with respect to the 
global direction of the social process that escapes the 
control of the very producers and members of society. The 
global direction of the social complex in turn becomes 
independent, and being independent, it becomes 
uncontrollable on the part of individuals. Thus, that 
independence between individuals has as a counterpart the 
dependence of each from a power that escapes any control” 
(Colletti 2012: 40, my italics). 
 
 This situation of an unconscious mutual dependence 
masked by individual independence in production 
produces the real illusion of fetishism: individuals appear 
as independent from the social link – and on this point the 
whole edifice of liberalism is based – and exchange value 
appears as a feature that belongs to ‘things’ by nature (and 
not as qualities of a specific historical context). Even if this 
dependence is denied, it is nonetheless real: if you cannot 
exchange, you cannot eat! 
For instance, the genesis and recovery from 
economic crises in the accumulation of capital possesses a 
certain automatic character that is largely independent 
from human conscious control, will or ideology. It is a 
‘process without subject’, because human beings have 
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entrusted their subjectivity to a quasi-objective process that 
then determines their actions. Once again, it is not an 
illusion, a simple deception of the mind. It is a real process 
that – according to Marx – should be transformed not in 
people’s minds, but in the real relations between people. 
Ideology is the totality of social practices that are produced 
and reproduced. These ideas that are taught and operate 
constantly at the state level are not forms of indirect 
coercion and thus do not condition the subject externally: 
they are experienced as the ‘truth’ of social life, they are a 
“necessary relation between subjects and the conditions of 
their lives” (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009: 109).  
A capitalist system is a particular way of organising 
production, in which the “what” and “how” of production 
are organised in a specific way, that, as in any mode of 
production, is based on specific social and power relations 
among individuals.  Understanding the nature of these 
social relations is crucially important to carry out an 
analysis of how common sense is constructed. Marx 
posited labour, as the creation of use-values, as a condition 
of human existence that is independent of all forms of 
society:  “it is thus an eternal natural necessity which 
mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and 
therefore human life itself” (Marx 1976: 133). Labour can 
thus be considered as a transhistorical aspect of human 
existence that is present in all human societies. 
The capitalist mode of production is one in which 
the direct producers are separated from the means of 
production, that have become an autonomous force and 
now function as ‘capital’, that is as self-valorising value. 
This separation between the workers and the means of 
production (known as ‘primitive accumulation’) occurred 
in different periods in different parts of the world, and it is 
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still on-going, as the struggles over primitive accumulation 
in several parts of the world show. The means of 
production, separated from the workers, turn into capital, 
‘self-valorising value’, value that is constantly 
accumulating by extracting surplus-value from labour. In 
order to valorise itself, capital needs labour-power as its 
counterpart, because it is socially-necessary labour time 
which lends value to commodities. In order for capital to 
‘find’ wage labourers in the market, individuals need to be 
set free from the previous conditions of production, so that 
they become Vogelfrei (Marx 1976: 874), (literally, free as a 
bird): the freedom of the workers is freedom in the double 
sense that they neither form part of the means of 
production like slaves or serfs, nor do they own the means 
of production, as self-employed peasants or artisans. They 
are economically forced to sell their labour-power in order to 
have access to the means of production and of subsistence, 
but this constraint is not imposed by law or does not arise 
out of relations of personal (hence, directly political) 
dependence as was the case with pre-capitalist societies. It 
rather arises out of the ahistorical need human beings have 
for food, drink and shelter, and the fact that these can be 
accessed, in a capitalist society, only through the market. 
This forces workers, in order to survive, to sell their labour-
power to a capitalist and thus to submit it to capital’s 
valorisation process. 
One of Marx’s fundamental innovations in political 
economy is its distinction between labour and labour-
power: what the capitalist buys in the market is not labour 
itself, but a potential for labouring, that is labour-power, 
the capacity to work. Thus, it is labour-power that 
possesses a value, that is correspondent to the socially 
necessary labour-time needed to reproduce it (that is the 
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element that lends value to all commodities), in this case 
the means of subsistence necessary for the reproduction of 
the worker. Labour itself, thus, does not possess value, it 
cannot be bought in the market. Labour is the use-value of 
labour-power, it is the ‘productive consumption’ of labour-
force in the process of valorisation (or the production 
process under capitalism). Labour is the way the 
commodity labour-power is employed productively. It 
does not have any value because once labour is used in 
production, labour-power as a commodity has already 
been sold in the market, and thus legally belongs to the 
buyer of that commodity, the owner of capital. It is 
precisely starting from this distinction that one can 
understand the production of surplus-value in capitalism.  
Once a certain technological level has been reached, 
and with it a corresponding increase in productivity, the 
value of the labour-power decreases to only a fraction of 
the total working day. However, the capitalist has paid the 
worker in order to ‘productively consume’ his labour 
power for an agreed amount of hours daily. Thus, the rest 
of the working day, the wage-labourer works, and thus 
creates value, without being paid for it. This is surplus-
labour, which creates surplus-value. An important point to 
grasp is that this process is not the outcome of some sort of 
‘cheating’ on the part of the capitalist, in which the worker 
is fooled or forced to work for an amount of money which 
is less than its value.  No, and Marx here is quite clear: the 
laws of exchange are respected, every commodity is 
entirely paid for under conditions of equality.  The 
capitalist pays the worker according to its value, and not 
less than it. However, the peculiar characteristic of the 
commodity labour-power is that it is the generator of value 
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as such, and will be employed by the capitalist only if it can 
produce more value than it is paid for. 
Thus, the proper functioning of the ‘Lockean market’ 
is a crucial condition for the functioning of a capitalist 
mode of production.27 However, the sphere of the market, 
of equal exchange among individuals, is not the sphere 
where surplus-value is extracted, and thus the one where 
one must look in order to find the secret of profit-making 
and thus of capital accumulation: 
 
“accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of 
labour-power, we therefore take leave for a time of this 
noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface 
and in view of all men, and follow them both into the 
hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there 
stares us in the face “No admittance except on business.” 
Here we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how 
capital is produced. We shall at last force the secret of 
profit making. This sphere that we are deserting, within 
whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power 
goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. 
There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and 
Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a 
commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by 
their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the 
agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give                                                         
27 Marx’s goal was to refute the theories of the classical economists on their own 
terms. The capitalist labour process is thus the process in which the worker 
works under the control of capital, to whom its product belongs. Secondly, “the 
product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the worker, its 
immediate producer” (Marx 1976: 292). Here, Marx aims at disproving the 
Lockean view that the foundation of private property is the autonomous 
production on the part of the worker, whose product can only belong to him. In 
a capitalist society, based on market freedom and equality, the equal exchange 
is entirely respected in the market sphere, yet the product of one man generate 
surplus-value for another man. 
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legal expression to their common will. Equality, because 
each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple 
owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for 
equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is 
his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to 
himself” (Marx 1976: 279-280).   
 
It is only within the production process that surplus-value is 
extracted from labour-power. If one looks at the circulation process of 
capital M-C-M′, one cannot understand where the surplus-value could 
come from, because we are dealing here with exchanges among equals 
within the marketplace. Money is exchanged for labour-power and 
means of production, which produce a commodity, which is then sold 
in the market. Each transaction fully respects the law of equal 
exchange. Thus, surplus-value has to originate somewhere else, namely 
from the sphere of production, and precisely from the use-value of a 
very peculiar commodity: labour-power. It is here that the distinction 
between the use-value and the exchange-value of labour-power 
becomes crucial. What the owner of capital buys in the market is not 
labour, because labour is not a commodity. And thus the expression 
‘price of labour’ or ‘value of labour’ is nonsensical.28 labour is the 
substance that creates value, it does not have value. It is labour-power 
which has a value, that corresponds to the socially-necessary labour-
time needed to reproduce the worker under given historical conditions. 
What the owner of capital buys is the commodity labour-power, whose 
‘consumption’ is labour. Labour, as the use value of labour-power – 
once a certain technological level has been reached – produces in a 
working day more than the value of the labour-power that is paid for in 
the market as salary. Or, and it is the same thing, capital puts labour-                                                        
28 This in fact forms the core of Marx’s critique of the ‘utopian socialists’ such as 
Proudhon, for whom the ideal form of society is one in which the quantity of 
labour equals the value of labour. Marx answers that if the value of a 
commodity is the socially-necessary labout time needed for its production, then 
the ‘value of a working day’ is a nonsensical expression, as it equals the 
quantity of labour of a working day. Upon this basis, the only possible demand 
or claim was, according to Marx, the equality of wages. (See: Marx 1968). It is 
interesting how Tronti recovers this critique in order to underline how ‘real 
existing socialism’ conforms to this vision of equality of wages as the defining 
characteristic of socialism (Tronti 1966: 157-159). 
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power to work only if it generates more value than it is paid for. One 
can thus understand, with Marx, “the crucial importance of the 
metamorphosis of the value and price of labour-power into the form of 
salary, that is into the value and price of labour. On this phenomenic 
form which renders invisible the real relationship and displays 
precisely its opposite, are founded all the juridical ideas of the worker 
and the capitalist, all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of 
production, all its illusions of freedom, all the apologetic chatter of 
vulgar economics” (Marx 1976: 680).29   
 
“The law of exchange requires equality only between the 
exchange values of the commodities given in exchange for 
one another. From the very outset, indeed, it presupposes a 
difference between their use values and it has nothing 
whatever to do with their consumption, which begins only 
after the contract has been concluded and executed” (Marx 
1976: 729). 
 
The key to understanding capital as a social relation 
is the unique characteristic of the commodity labour-
power. Its exchange-value is in no way exceptional: it is the 
socially-necessary labour time needed for its production. Its 
particularity is in its use-value. The value of this                                                         
29 As Tronti remarks, “For capitalist production, it is essential that labour-
power presents itself as pure and simple labour and that the value of work is 
paid for in the form of salary…For it is not concrete labour, which, within the 
value-relation, possesses the general quality of being abstract human labour. 
On the contrary: being abstract human labour in the abstract is its nature; being 
concrete labour is only the phenomenic form of a determined form of 
realisation of this nature. Work becomes, on this basis, the necessary mediation 
for labour-power to transform into salary: the condition for living labour to 
present itself only as variable capital, and labour-power only as a part of 
capital. The value in which is represented the paid part of the working day 
must thus appear as value or price of the entire working day. It is in the salary 
that any trace of the division between necessary labour and surplus-labour in 
the working day disappears. All work appears as paid work. And it is this that 
distinguishes wage labour from other historic forms of labour” (Tronti 1966: 
41).  
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commodity is, like that of any other commodity, already 
determined once it is bought and sold in the market. 
However, its use-value, in contrast to the use-value of other 
commodities, is not already determined in its existence as a 
commodity, but is determined afterwards, as the enactment 
of a potentiality, in the production process. Its historic 
uniqueness is thus that it is the source not of value in 
general, but of a value that is bigger than the one is 
possesses; otherwise, it would not be bought in the market 
in the first place, because the capitalist could not attain 
more capital than it set in motion in the production process. 
Capital is the control on the part of objectified labour 
(accumulated capital) over living labour, the subjectification 
of the object and the objectification of the subject: “material 
relations between persons and social relations between 
things”(Marx 1976: 165-6).30  
The extraction of surplus-value (which, after sales, 
appears as profit) shows that while on the surface the 
exchange of equivalents is a convincing explanation of the 
economy by the classical political economists, it is however 
accompanied by its negation, which is expressed by the fact 
that the use-value of a particular commodity, labour-
power, enables at the same time an unequal exchange.31 
This fundamental contradiction is at the root of class 
struggle. Class, in Marx’s understanding is thus not simply                                                         
30 “The labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society, 
only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly 
between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To 
the producers, therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual 
with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at 
work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social 
relations between things” (Marx 1976: 165-6). 
31 It must be recalled that to try and actually calculate value is to mistake an 
abstract concept for an empirical one. The empirical category is prices, not 
values. (Van der Pijl 2009:.210) 
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an empirical concept: it is a relation. Classes exist only 
insofar as they are brought into a relation with one another, 
and these relations are characterised by a fundamental and 
irreconcilable antagonism, a relation of struggle.  
It must be kept in mind – and this element is crucial 
– that capital is not money. Capital is money used in a 
certain way, in the form M-C-M′, that is, capital that acts as 
self-valorising value. Capital is value in motion, in 
circulation in order to create more capital. Unpaid surplus 
value, which appears as profit, under the compulsion of 
competition is turned again into investment, and thus 
capital as a self-sustaining social force is reproduced, 
expanding through accumulation. The commodity-form is 
thus the physical, objectified form of capital, of value in 
motion: 
 
“if we pin down the specific forms of appearance assumed 
in turn by self-valorising value in the course of its life, we 
reach the following elucidation: capital is money, capital is 
commodities. In truth, however, value is here the subject of 
a process in which, while constantly assuming the form in 
turn of money and commodities, it changes its own 
magnitude, throws off surplus-value from itself considered 
as original value, and thus valorises itself independently. 
For the movement in the course of which it adds surplus-
value is its own movement, its valorisation is therefore self-
valorisation. By virtue of being value, it has acquired the 
occult ability to add value to itself. It brings forth living 
offspring, or at least lays golden eggs” (Marx 1976: 255). 
 
Labour – as the use-value of labour-power – 
produces commodities, which have the double 
characteristic of possessing exchange value and use-value. 
This double characteristic arises out of the double aspect of 
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labour in capitalist societies: labour is both abstract labour 
and concrete labour. Concrete labour is the material, 
physical activity actually undertaken in order to produce a 
use-value, and it is – as mentioned already – an ahistorical 
aspect of human existence. Abstract labour, on the other 
hand, is the labour that generates exchange-value, it is the 
element that measures the value of a commodity. When 
two commodities’ values are compared quantitatively, 
what is compared is their exchange-value, hence the 
quantity of abstract human labour embodied in them, 
because this is the only element that they have in common. 
 
“The exchange relation of commodities is characterised 
precisely by its abstraction from their use-values. If we 
make abstraction from its use-value, we abstract also from 
the material constituents and forms which make it a use-
value. With the disappearance of the useful character of the 
products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of 
labour embodied in them also disappears (…) Concrete 
labours are reduced to the same kind of labour, human 
labour in the abstract: congealed quantities of 
homogeneous human labour” (Marx 1976: 128). 
 
“It is thus wrong to see in labour the only source of 
material wealth: because it would still be concrete labour, 
which produces use-values. One must speak, instead, of 
abstract labour as the source of exchange-value. Concrete 
labour is enacted in an infinite variety of its use-values; 
abstract labour is enacted in the equality of commodities as 
general equivalents” (.Tronti 1966: 124). 
 
Marx arrives at this crucial distinction by asking 
himself how it is that commodities can be compared to one 
other quantitatively, and are thus commensurable.  As use 
value, commodities differ in quality but as exchange-value, 
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only in quantity, and so its commensurability is not 
constituted by its utility. The answer lies precisely in the 
fact that it is only as being products of abstract labour that 
commodities differ from each other quantitatively: "If we 
abstract from the value in use of commodities, there 
remains to them only one common property, that of being 
products of labour” (Marx 1976: 128). As products of 
concrete labour, commodities cannot be distinguished 
quantitatively, because they are qualitatively different as 
use-values.  
Value is what is passed on in the process of 
commodity exchange. It is the hidden element in the 
commodity that makes all commodities in principle 
exchangeable. Here, as in many aspects of Marx’s analysis 
of the capitalist mode of production, the relationship 
between the process and the thing is crucial. The thing is a 
representation of the process. What is sold in the market is 
not the process, but the thing; however, the latter would 
not exist without the process: “It is under everyone’s eyes 
the process through which past labour disguises itself 
every day as capital” (Tronti 1966: 40). The process is the 
process of valorisation, in which the exchange relation is 
the form while the appropriation of surplus-value is the 
content: “property turns out to be the right on the part of 
the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of others” 
(Marx 1976: 729).32 What is at work here is the Marxian                                                         
32 “While private property appears as the reason and the cause of expropriated 
labour, it is instead a consequence of the latter, just like the gods are not the 
cause, but the effect of the estrangement of the human intellect. Then, this 
relation is inverted into a reciprocal effect. Only at the last culminating point of 
the development of private property does the latter show once again its secret: 
that it is on one side the result of expropriated labour, and secondly that it is 
the means by which labour is expropriated, the realisation of this 
expropriation” (Tronti 1966: 127).  
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dialectics. Use-value is not caused by value. It is not a 
causal analysis, but one about dialectical relations.  
Thus, one can begin to see how the commodity is not 
just an object but also a representation, a bearer, of a social 
relation, of the capital-relation.  And that capital is not a 
thing but “a social relation between persons which is 
mediated through things” (Marx 1976: 932). Incidentally, by 
itself this can cast some doubts on analyses of 
transformations in the global economy that simply register 
the movement of capital and analyse it quantitatively as if 
it were a thing. It can be argued that this is a form of 
commodity fetishism, since the relations between things hides 
the social relations between people.33  In order for capital to 
be exported – for instance – a specific set of social relations 
must be in place in the receiving country, namely the 
separation between workers and the means of production, 
and a juridical apparatus that enforces property rights.34 
In line with the dialectical structure of Capital, it is 
only in vol.III that the analysis finally reaches the surface 
sphere of capitalist society. In extreme synthesis, here Marx 
shows how profit is distributed via the price system over 
the various economic sectors of society, and how the profit 
rate will tendentially be equalised across different sectors.                                                         
33 For instance, the otherwise brilliant critique of the globalisation thesis by 
Hirst and Thompson (1996) also falls prey to this problem.   
34 See Marx 1976 (ch.33). Here, Marx sets out to prove this point. He reports the 
story of Mr.Wakefield, who wanted to export capital and move a number of 
workers to the British colony of Australia in order to produce for profit there. 
However, once he arrived there, “he was left without a servant to make his bed 
or fetch him water from the river. Unhappy Mr.Peel, who provided for 
everything except the export of English relations of production to Swan River!” 
(Marx 1976: 933). In the remaining part of the chapter, the colonisation of the 
United States of America is taken as an example to prove how a certain set of 
social relations must be in place before the process of capital accumulation can 
reproduce itself.  
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Ultimately, capital rests on an exploitative relation with 
living labour power, and competition refers to raising the 
rate of exploitation (surplus-value divided by the value of 
labour-power) more than the competitors can. However, 
there is a tendency to replace workers by machinery in 
order to become more competitive. This undermines the 
sole source of surplus-value, bringing about a tendency of 
the fall of the rate of profit. There are several ways that capital 
can counteract this tendency, so that its actual realisation 
can only be tested empirically; for instance, the value of 
producer goods also fall and capital can find new ways of 
exploiting living labour power or incorporate new 
territories35. There is thus an inherent logic of expansion in 
the contradictory nature of capital, which has been studied 
by Marxist authors such as Rosa Luxemburg as entailing 
the constant need, on the part of capital, of a non-capitalist 
outside. 
The capitalist mode of production is not aimed 
directly at the production of use-values, useful objects for 
human existence; these use-values are important to capital 
only insofar as they provide a means for valorisation, only 
insofar as they are “bearers” of exchange-value.36 “Unlike 
previous societies whose rulers have imposed surplus 
labour on others to benefit themselves, in capitalism the 
imposition of work is endless and independent of the 
production of any particular use-value, including the 
luxuries consumed by the capitalist class” (Cleaver 1992: 
115). “The social relation of capitalist production sees                                                         
35 See Harvey 2006 for the argument that capitalist accumulation always 
requires a non-capitalist social (and natural) substratum. See: Harman 2009 
(part 1) and Callinicos 2010 for analyses based on the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. 
36 This is the starting point for understanding Marx’s theory of alienation, the 
experience of work as an imposed rather than self-determined activity.  
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society as a means and production as an end: production 
for the sake of production” (Tronti 1966: 53). If capital is a 
form of power which does not aim at producing useful 
objects, or use-values, but at controlling people’s work in 
order to generate profit, it is incorrect to claim that capital 
has power. Capital is power. It is the power to decide what 
to produce, with which means of production, where to 
produce and when to produce.37  
What needs to be stressed is that capitalist society is 
not a synonym of market society. Capital is not (only) 
about creating a market. Capital could not be capital 
without the process of wage-labour creation, or 
proletarianisation, which preceded it. The creation, and 
constant reproduction of a proletariat, of a group of people 
whose only commodity to sell is their labour-power is a 
necessary and defining, element of the capitalist mode of 
production. 
Class struggle is seen by Marx, from a legal 
standpoint, as a struggle among equal rights: “There is (…) 
an antinomy, of right against right, both equally bearing 
the seal of the law of exchange. Between equal rights, force 
decides” (Marx 1976: 344). In the following sections, I will 
present a conceptualisation of class struggle that is more 
nuanced and includes an ideological aspect, and thus 
incorporates the role of culture and ‘common sense’ within 
class struggle.  
In synthesis, the capitalist process of production, 
seen as process of production and reproduction, produces 
not only commodities, not only surplus value, but it also 
produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself: on the 
one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage labourer. It                                                         
37 This insight is drawn from Gallino 2011: .6-7.  
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does so by its own internal logic: if wages rise so that 
capital cannot valorise itself, then capital reacts by several 
means, the main one being ‘technological fix’38, that is by 
modifying the technological conditions of labour so that 
labour is once again thrown back into the market 
(increasing unemployment) until wages decrease to the 
level that will allow capital accumulation to restart on a 
more profitable basis. Therefore, “the working class, even 
when it stands outside the direct labour process, is just as 
much an appendage of capital as the lifeless instruments of 
labour are” (Marx 1976: 717). An important element to 
retain from this discussion is that the class relation does not 
simply begin at the moment of production, when capital 
buys labour-power in the market. What must exist in order 
for this to happen is the existence of a mass of people 
separated from the means of production. The class 
relationship between capital and labour is thus already 
present, already presupposed in the moment in which both 
‘find’ each other in the M-C (money - commodity, that is 
capital - labour-power) movement, it exists already in the 
sphere of the market. The class relation precedes and 
therefore brings about the capital-relation (See: Tronti 1966: 
139-144). 
 
Capital’s ‘technological fix’ 
 
In order to understand the social force behind capital 
accumulation, and to outline a framework for thinking 
about technological change under capitalism, one needs to 
bring in the picture the coercive laws of competition (This 
concept is first introduced in Marx 1976: 434 435).  This is a                                                         
38 see Harvey 2006. 
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constraint under which capital produces, and forces it to 
continually revolutionise the production process. Socially-
necessary labour time, the value of a commodity, is a social 
average, and some capitalists work below the average, thus 
receiving more surplus-value than the others. There is thus 
a form of surplus-value driven by the coercive laws of 
competition that is ephemeral. This is what individual 
capitalists are after when they innovate. This individual 
motivation of the capitalist, driven by the coercive laws of 
competition, produces the reduction of the value of labour-
power, hence increases the rate of exploitation. 
Here it can be seen how Marx internalises 
technological innovation within the logic of capital 
accumulation. Capitalist society must be technologically 
dynamic, it is inevitable and necessary for capitalism to 
reproduce itself. Marx’s theory of technology is about 
machinery and organisational forms, such as cooperation 
and organisation of labour, as integral in raising relative 
surplus-value, that is a form of surplus-value that emerges 
from productivity growth (in contrast to absolute surplus-
value, which is the form of surplus value that derives from 
the lengthening of the working day - see Marx 1976 ch.7-12, 
in particular ch.7 and ch.12.). Relative surplus-value is 
essential in capitalist development, because, while it 
shortens the necessary labour-time for the production of a 
commodity, its aim is not to shorten the working day but to 
generate surplus-value. Its result is a continuous decrease 
of the quantity of labour-time necessary to reproduce 
labour-power (if there is productivity growth in those 
sectors that produce the means of subsistence of labour-
power), and hence an increase in surplus-value. For this to 
happen, the conditions of the labour process need to be 
continuously revolutionised. 
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Technological innovation becomes crucial as a factor 
increasing relative surplus-value only once capital has 
reached the stage of ‘real subsumption’ of labour. Real 
subsumption differs from ‘formal’ subsumption of labour 
under capital in that, in the latter, workers depend upon 
capital for their livelihood, but capital is not in control of 
the production process and of the means of production. 
Workers here possess the means of production and hence 
are in control of the labour process. Real subsumption 
begins when workers are brought into manufacture, into 
the factory, where they are under the supervision of capital, 
and where the whole labour process is under the control of 
capital, and no longer of the worker.  
 
“At first, the subjection of labour to capital was only a 
formal result of the fact that the worker, instead of working 
for himself, works for, and consequently under, the 
capitalist. Through the co-operation of numerous wage-
labourers, the command of capital develops into a 
requirement for carrying on the labour process itself, into a 
real condition of production That a capitalist should 
command in the field of production is now as 
indispensable as that a general should command on the 
field of battle” (Marx 1976: 448).  
 
With its continuous driving motive of self-
valorisation, capital brings into cooperation an ever greater 
quantity of workers. This cooperation is entirely brought 
about by capital: the plan of production is set out by capital 
with the aim of valorisation, and represents an external 
force to the wage-labourer.  “Hence the interconnection 
between their various labours confronts them (i.e. the 
workers), in the realm of ideas, as a plan drawn up by the 
capitalist, and, in practice, as his authority, as the powerful 
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will of a being outside them, who subjects their activity to 
his purpose” (Marx 1976: 449). Thus, with the switch to real 
subsumption, the command of capital evolves into a real 
condition of production, as the capital-relation is embodied 
into the very conditions of production, that no longer 
belong to the worker but to an external force (that the 
worker continually produces and reproduces). Moreover, 
the coordination and surveillance functions become a 
function of capital itself. 
 
“Being independent of each other, the workers are isolated. 
They enter into relations with the capitalist, but not with 
each other. Their cooperation only begins with the labour 
process, but by then they have ceased to belong to 
themselves. On entering the labour process they are 
incorporated into capital. As cooperators, as members of a 
working organism, they merely form a particular mode of 
existence of capital. Hence the productive power 
developed by the worker socially is the productive power 
of capital. The socially productive power of labour 
develops as a free gift to capital whenever the workers are 
placed under certain conditions. Because this power costs 
capital nothing, while on the other hand it is not developed 
by the worker until his labour itself belongs to capital, it 
appears as a power which capital possesses by its nature – 
a productive power inherent in capital” (Marx 1976: 451). 
 
Describing that remarkable phenomenon by which 
as technology develops and the necessary labour-time for 
producing a commodity decreases, the pressure on 
increasing the labour-time of the worker heightens, 
Therefore, being the production process both a labour 
process (concrete labour) and a process of valorisation 
(abstract labour),it is not the worker who employs the 
conditions of work in order to produce needed use-values, 
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but rather the conditions of work employ the worker in 
order to generate surplus-value. “Capital sees the labour 
process exclusively as a process of valorisation, and sees 
labour-power exclusively as capital” (Tronti 1966: 39). It is 
with the factory system that this dialectical inversion – 
parallel to the inversion between subject and object, and 
that between means and ends – acquires a material reality as 
constant capital, dead labour that confronts the worker and 
subsumes his living labour. “The separation of the 
intellectual faculties of the production process from manual 
labour, and the transformation of those faculties into 
powers exercised by capital over labour, is…finally 
completed by large-scale industry erected on the 
foundation of machinery” (Marx 1976: 548-549). 
One can thus use Marx’s theory of value to focus on 
a key mechanism of domination: the use of fixed capital for 
the control of living labour. In capitalism, technology 
embodies a rationality that is the rationality of valorisation, 
and by its own logic tends to increase the powers of capital 
over living labour. It does so by several means, both within 
the labour process and in the market. In the latter, through 
its control over constant capital, and thus technology, 
capital controls both the demand and supply of labour-
power. The demand changes as wages increase or decrease, 
and correspondingly technology is developed in order to 
react to an unsustainable pressure of wages: “capital acts 
on both sides at once. If its accumulation on the one hand 
increases the demand for labour, it increases on the other 
the supply of workers by ‘setting them free’, while at the 
same time the pressure of the unemployed compels those 
who are employed to furnish more labour, and therefore 
makes the supply of labour to a certain extent independent 
of the supply of workers” (Marx 1976: 792-793). 
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Technological change is hence used as one of the weapons 
of class struggle that regulates both the demand and 
supply of labour.  
One can refer here to the concept of ‘organic 
composition of capital’, which is a rise in the C/V ratio – 
the ratio between constant and variable capital – that 
results from the introduction of new machinery or 
technology which raises the productivity of labour. This is 
a central concept in a theory of technological change of 
what can be seen as a tendency of capital to substitute 
controllable machinery for less controllable workers, and 
thus generate an ‘industrial reserve army’ of unemployed.39  
Within the production process, technology tends to 
deskill the worker by transferring his skills onto the 
‘objective’ labour process, on constant capital, so that 
technology becomes “the most powerful weapon of 
suppressing strikes” (Marx 1976: 562), as it gradually takes 
away one of the powers of the worker, that is the control 
and knowledge of the production process. It is at this point 
that one can start to talk about abstract labour also as a 
description of the actual material conditions of labour, that 
is, abstract labour as a material reality and not only as an 
abstract concept, as the generator of value. The worker is 
turned into a cog of the machine, an appendage of a labour 
process over which he has no control, and outside of which 
his skills have little use. Marx’s analysis of the productive 
activity under capitalism as valorisation in terms of ‘value’ 
“captures the essentially undifferentiated sameness of the 
production activities included within this process from the 
point of view of capital. It doesn’t make any difference 
what kind of production is undertaken, what kind of work                                                         
39 On the distinction between technical, organic and value composition of 
capital see: Fine 1989: 60-62. 
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is done, as long as it produces a product whose sale will 
realise enough surplus to make it possible to begin all over 
again” (Cleaver 1992: 114): production for production’s sake. 
As Cox reminds us, “technology consists after all in the 
practical methods selected for the purpose of solving 
production problems. Thus defined the questions that arise 
are: problems for whom? Solutions towards what purpose? 
The answers are simple: for the accumulators and for the 
purpose of accumulation” (Cox, 1987: 315). Ultimately, this 
is one of the strengths of the capitalist mode of production: 
its capacity to subsume the workers’ efforts in order to 
modify the forms of the accumulation process, without 
changing the hierarchical relationship.  
Tronti, Panzieri, Alquati and others within the 
Italian New Left of the 1950s and 1960s drew new 
implications from Marx’s work. If Marx affirmed that any 
given division of labour is a vehicle for capital’s control 
over the production process, then – that was their 
argument – any change in that division of labour, and 
hence of tasks, would have an impact over that control.  
Marx himself seemed in certain parts of his work to 
support such a thesis, as when he affirmed that “it would 
be possible to write a whole history of the inventions made 
since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with 
weapons against working class revolt” (Marx 1976: 563). 
Moreover, in the chapter on the Working Day of 
Vol.1 of Capital, Marx argued that class struggle against the 
extension of the working day ultimately acquired such a 
force that it was translated into laws for a maximum length 
of the working day (see Marx 1976 ch.10, “the Working 
Day”). Capital thus faced a constraint on its valorisation 
necessity and the only way to overcome it was to increase 
the rate of exploitation by intensifying relative surplus-
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value, thus productivity growth. In this way, not only the 
single capitalist managed to extract the ephemeral surplus-
value discussed above, but this worked also to decrease the 
value of commodities that the worker needed in order to 
sustain himself, and thus to decrease the value of labour-
power (for all capitalists), hence to increase the rate of 
exploitation (surplus-value divided by the value of labour-
power).40 Here, Marx’s argument seems to be that 
technological change was introduced as a reaction to the 
workers’ successful struggle on setting in law a maximum 
length of the working day.  
The theories and analyses developed by the 
aforementioned authors, in fact, are akin to an non-
economistic understanding of the capital relation, as what 
is stressed is the political aspect of the antagonism, in 
contrast to a reading which focuses on the automaticity or 
determinism of the capital relation. Panzieri argues that, in 
their capitalist use, “not only the machinery, but also the 
methods, the organisational techniques, are incorporated 
within capital, face the workers as capital, as alien 
rationality” (Panzieri 1976). Alquati and Panzieri’s research 
thus allows for a focus, in the study of technological 
change, not only on the changing needs of capitalist 
valorisation, but also on the way capital reacts to class 
struggle.41 Worker struggles in the sphere of production                                                         
40 Therefore, productivity growth (an increase in the rate of exploitation) can 
feasibly go hand in hand with a rising average living standard of workers as 
measured by the amount of use values available to them. Hence, a critique that 
is often voiced against Marx’s critique of political economy – that the process of 
capital accumulation would eventually lead to the absolute impoverishment of 
the working class – plainly misses the point. A rise in relative surplus-value 
does not warrant a fall in the use-values available to the working class. 
41 A series of new concepts were developed by this strand of research, known 
as workerism (including Tronti, Panzieri, Alquati, Negri and the authors of the 
journal ‘Quaderni Rossi’): class composition, political recomposition and 
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aim at restoring some control over the labour process, and 
hence inevitably undermine capital’s valorisation needs 
and question property as “the right on the part of the 
capitalist to appropriate the unpaid labour of others” (Marx 
1976: 730). As Robé points out, property is not so much a 
claim “over the thing itself, as much as a right over the 
behaviour of others…in connection with the thing (Robé 
1996: 60).  
Since a presupposition of the process of valorisation 
is capital’s control over the production process, if worker 
struggles are successful in limiting capital’s ability to 
control, then a reaction sets in. This reaction usually takes 
the shape of technological change – ‘technological fix’ – 
which aims at restoring the conditions of control over the 
labour process, and hence re-establish the conditions for 
capital valorisation. It can thus be seen how technological 
change is the result not only of ‘the coercive laws of 
competition’ but also of class struggle, which forces capital 
to switch to a different way of producing in order to 
minimise worker control. Thus, the introduction of 
technological change possesses an inherent class bias. 
To sum up this section, organisational and 
technological innovations are not the result of a neutral 
process of scientific advancement, but technology is 
‘subsumed’ under capital, in the sense that it is 
incorporated within the valorisation needs of capital. In                                                                                                                          
decomposition. Class composition refers to a picture of the class power existing 
within a given division of labour, taken as a given organisation of constant and 
variable capital. Worker struggles which undermine capital’s control on a given 
production process, and “recompose the structures and distribution of power 
among themselves in such a way as to achieve a change in their collective 
relations of power to their class enemy” (Cleaver 1991: 113) bring about a 
political recomposition of the class relations. Capital must then decompose the 
workers and create a new controllable class composition. 
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Marx’s account, this includes the necessity of controlling 
the workers, deskilling them and avoiding possible 
disturbances within the production process.  There is, 
however, a contradiction here. While the necessity of 
avoiding worker control of the labour process is important, 
it is also crucial to generate new skills and capabilities for 
the changing needs of production. This is one of the many 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production: while 
on the one hand, one can see a tendency towards a 
simplification of work tasks and repetitive processes, not 
only in industry but also in services (Bravermann 1974), on 
the other hand, as constant capital increases and the 
production process becomes ever more complex, 
technological development becomes more important and 
hence also the workers’ abilities to control and manage 
production must be enhanced.  
Seeing technological development as mere deskilling, 
thus, was perhaps a useful way of looking at capitalist 
restructuring until the period of Fordism or ‘corporate 
liberalism’ (see Van der Pijl 1998 ch.3 and 4). Davies has 
pointed out how Taylor himself was quite consciously 
aiming at undermining the workers’ ability to control 
production and thus limit the quantity of work (Davis 
1975). 
Gramsci himself was interested in the Fordist system 
of mass production and mass consumption. In fact, while 
cognisant of the deskilling effects of such a system, Gramsci 
also stressed how the introduction of Fordism in Italy 
relied on a “skilful combination of force (destruction of 
working-class trade unions on a territorial basis) and 
persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely 
subtle ideological and political propaganda” (Gramsci 
1971: 285). In Americanism and Fordism, Gramsci is thus 
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aware of the sophistication of the new instruments of 
control and surveillance at the workplace that go hand in 
hand with the transformation from craft production to 
industrial production. This in turn has effects on culture, 
consumption and even physical appearance. One could say 
that here Gramsci anticipates Pasolini’s observation that in 
the 1950s one could walk into an Italian square and 
recognise immediately the class belonging of the people. 
However – Pasolini argues – in the 1970s, after the 
economic miracle of the previous decade, this would have 
been impossible, as the way power is produced and 
reproduced is no longer visible in physical traits but has 
shifted to other sites of struggle (Pasolini 2008: 80-83) 
The division between politics and economics, the 
state and the market – discussed above – is an 
indispensable element of capitalism. The market appears to 
be the private sphere in which individuals interact with 
each other as equals, each one buying or selling the 
commodities he possesses on a plane of equality.42 The                                                         
42 “Each individual transaction continues to conform to the laws of commodity 
exchange, with the capitalist always buying labour-power and the worker 
always selling it at what we shall assume it its real value. It is quite evident 
from this that the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws based on 
the production and circulation of commodities, become changed into their 
direct opposite through their own internal and inexorable dialectic. The 
exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, is now 
turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange, since, 
firstly, the capital which is exchanged for labour-power is itself merely a 
portion of the product of the labour of others which has been appropriated 
without an equivalent; and secondly, this capital must not only be replaced by 
its producer, the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. The 
relation of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere semblance 
belonging only to the process of circulation, it becomes a mere form, which is 
alien to the content of the transaction itself and merely mystifies it. The 
constant sale and purchase of labour-power is the form; the content is the 
constant appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the 
labour of others which has already been objectified, and his repeated exchange 
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state is the guarantor of the laws of exchange and of 
contract, and seems to act externally on a self-constituted 
sphere, that of civil society, the sphere of the “Eden of the 
innate rights of man” (Marx 1976: 280). However, as 
pointed out above, behind this separation, and in fact 
constitutive of this separation, is the process of capital 
accumulation:43 “the constant sale and purchase of labour-
power is the form; the content is the constant appropriation 
by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the                                                                                                                          
of this labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others. Originally the 
rights of property seemed to us to be grounded in a man’s own labour. Some 
such assumption was at least necessary, since only commodity-owners with 
equal rights confronted each other, and the sole means of appropriating the 
commodities of others was the alienation of a man’s own commodities, 
commodities which, however, could only be produced by labour. Now, 
however, property turns out to be the right on the part of the capitalist, to 
appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and the impossibility, 
on the part of the worker, of appropriating his own product. The separation of 
property from labour thus becomes the necessary consequence of a law that 
apparently originated in their identity. Therefore, however much the capitalist 
mode of appropriation may seem to fly in the face of the original laws of 
commodity production, it nevertheless arises not from a violation of these laws 
but on the contrary from their application” (Marx 1976: 729). 
43 On the other hand, as Zizek points out, there is an ambiguity in the Marxist 
notion of the gap between formal democracy, with is emphasis on political 
freedom, and the economic reality of exploitation: “this gap between 
appearance of equality-freedom and the social reality of economic and cultural 
differences can be interpreted in the standard symptomatic way, namely that 
the form of universal rights, equality, freedom and democracy is just a 
necessary but illusory expression of its concrete social content, the universe of 
exploitation and class domination. Or it can be interpreted in the much more 
subversive sense of a tension in which the ‘appearance’ of ‘égaliberté’ is 
precisely not a ‘mere appearance’, but has a power of its own. This power 
allows it to set in motion the process of the re-articulation of actual socio-
economic relations by way of their progressive ‘politicisation’: why shouldn’t 
women also vote? Why shouldn’t conditions at the workplace also be of public 
political concern? And we could go on” (Zizek 2008: 669).This insight in fact is 
not too distant from Gramsci’s own analysis of political and social struggle as a 
process of politicisation of previously taken for granted relations and his 
historicist understanding of socialism and democracy.  
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labour of others which has already been objectified, and his 
repeated exchange of this labour for a greater quantity of 
the living labour of others” (Marx 1976: 729).  
In order to detect a class relation, one must start by 
looking at the sphere of the market, although the actual 
enactment, the ‘secret’ of that class relation is in the sphere 
of production. As pointed out earlier, it is in the sphere of 
circulation that the class relation originates, as in the 
market there are on one side a mass of people whose only 
commodity is their labour-power, and on the other side the 
means of production that have become autonomous as 
capital, and whose owners buy labour-power in the 
market. If one limits the analysis to the sphere of the 
market, one sees class struggle only as a struggle over 
wages, over forms of social protection (in the Polanyian 
sense – Polanyi 1957) or over some form of 
decommodification – in the sense used by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). These are indeed crucial elements in any class 
analysis of a given ‘variety of capitalism’, but they tend to 
identify the class relations of capitalism as manifested in 
the sphere of distribution and not that of production.  
However, class relation cannot be reduced to this 
economic ‘market’ relation. If the vision is enlarged to 
encompass the actual ‘productive consumption’ of labour-
power in the sphere of production, one can see that here 
constant capital acquires the form of the ‘objective’ 
conditions of production which face the worker as an 
autonomous force over which he has no control. 
Technological change as a means to enhance valorisation 
includes also the need to contain possible resistances on the 
part of the labour-force, to limit strikes and to extract as 
much surplus-value as possible.  These changes are often 
introduced as a reaction to worker struggles. Thus, one 
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must not fall prey to the idea that class struggle is a 
struggle only over redistribution of the wealth already 
produced. It is a struggle also – perhaps foremost – in 
sphere of production, and thus the changing technological 
requirements of production can be seen as the flip-side of 
the valorisation requirements of capital.  
Different hegemonies (or historical structures) 
involve a different configuration of ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions, and one can see in this 
complex interrelation of different elements also a particular 
configuration of the balance of class forces at the moment 
of production and distribution. For instance, the ‘corporate 
liberal’ era involved the definition of a particular worker 
subjectivity, the enlargement of the sphere of mass 
production and consumption to include the life-world of 
workers and the regulation of demand-management in a 
Keynesian way, reducing the role of finance and giving 
importance to sustaining the demand of the working class 
by income policies and an extensive welfare state.  
 
The Gramscian dimension  
Hegemony and the Integral State 
 
After having presented the thrust of Marx’s theory of 
surplus-value, I now turn to the specific Gramscian 
dimension of the approach, which deals with the concepts 
of state, historic bloc, hegemony and common sense. The 
object of this section is to understand how class struggle is 
mediated by social practices, the form of state, and how 
common sense is linked to class struggle. 
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Gramsci himself wrote at a time when Marxism was 
still imbued with deterministic and objectivist readings of 
social change. In fact, as Van der Pijl argues, as Marxism as 
a social theory and as the theory of the working class 
moved further to the East in the course of the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century, due to the particular statist 
dimension of industrial development in Germany and 
Russia, the reading of Marx acquired an economistic veer, 
so that agents tended to be seen as merely acting out the 
necessities of the structure, with the superstructure seen as 
automatically reflecting changes in the economic sphere 
(See Van der Pijl 2009: 215-224 and ch.8). This trend in 
Marxism, which neglected the dialectical understanding of 
social change that was dear to Marx and tended to give a 
positivistic twist to his theory, continued well into the post-
war period, with the French philosopher Althusser 
arguably its most prominent figure in recent decades, 
aiming as he was to develop a scientific theory of the 
capitalist mode of production. It was Althusser in fact who 
coined the phrase “economic causation in the final 
instance” and proposed the distinction between a ‘young 
Marx’ still concerned with humanistic issues such as 
alienation and fetishism and the later ‘mature Marx’ which 
sought to scientifically analyse the capitalist mode of 
production (see: Althusser 1970).   
Gramsci’s philosophy can be considered a reaction 
to such objectivist and essentialist currents in Marxist 
thought, as an effort to develop a theory of politics and of 
the relative autonomy of the ‘political’ in mass societies 
which does not reduce agents to either subjects passively 
determined by economic forces (a determinist theory) or to 
subjects freely acting without economic constraints in 
making choices (a subjectivist approach). In fact, it can be 
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argued that Gramsci recovered Marx’s preoccupation with 
the dialectics between humanity as a force of nature 
(materialism) and humanity as developing an historical-
spiritual world of its own making, which acts as a ‘second 
nature’ (historical idealism) (see Van der Pijl 2009 ch.1). 
Gramsci’s historical materialism gives importance to the role 
of consciousness, ideology and culture in the reproduction 
of capitalism and the state, and thus also to the role of the 
agency of collective classes. In this section, I present a 
theory of the capitalist state that owes much to Gramsci’s 
original approach. Armed with these insights, common 
sense production and reproduction in a capitalist state can 
be conceptualised. 
 
“The state is neither a thing – instrument that may be taken 
away, nor a fortress that may be penetrated by a wooden 
horse, nor yet a safe that may be cracked by burglary: it is 
the heart of the exercise of political power”  (Poulantzas 
2000: 257-258).   
 
“Individuals consider the state as a thing and expect it to 
act and are led to think that in actual fact there exists above 
them a phantom entity, the abstraction of the collective 
organism, a species of autonomous divinity that thinks, not 
with the head of a specific being, yet nevertheless thinks, 
that moves, not with the real legs of a person, yet still 
moves” (Gramsci 1995: 15 cited in Bieler and Morton 2006c: 
165).  
 
 All theories of social science, including theories of 
International Relations and  International Political 
Economy include, whether implicitly or explicitly, a theory 
of state power. The cornerstone of Realism in IR, and of 
most IPE approaches for instance, is the concept of the state 
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as actor (For a critique of the assumptions of Realist IR 
theory, see: Rosenberg 1994).  This notion reflects the idea 
that the state is a fixed concept and that all states are the 
same with regards to their constitution, only differing 
quantitatively in their power and thus in their capacity to 
project force and/or ‘soft power’. The state is thus 
fetishised, naturalised as a ‘thing’, and the underlying 
social relations are overlooked. This is problematic not only 
because it neglects to investigate the social forces that give 
power to the state, and the social relations that underpin 
the apparatus of the state, but also because it fails to 
acknowledge the existence of different forms of state across 
both time and space.   
 Gramsci understood the fundamental importance – 
for both the ruling class and potential counter-hegemonic 
forces – of creating consent in society through the 
elaboration of ‘political programmes’ in the sphere of civil 
society. Although with opposed political commitments, 
Gramsci revived the lesson of the neo-Machiavellians, a 
groups of intellectuals in early-1900s Italy whose concern 
was to understand how to maintain order and discipline in 
a society that was rapidly urbanising and increasingly 
educated.44 With the emergence of mass politics and the 
increasing integration of the masses within the state and 
mass political parties, the neo-Machiavellians asked 
themselves: how was it possible to maintain the power of 
the ruling classes? The answer lied in the mobilisation of a 
cadre in the middle classes that could effectively develop 
political formulas or comprehensive programmes with the 
aim of bringing in powerful aesthetic and emotional 
                                                        
44 We refer here to figures such as Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto.  
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elements (such as war, nation, religion) in political struggle. 
As Mosca argued, 
 
“political formulas are not merely quackeries aptly 
invented to trick the masses into obedience…the truth is 
that they answer a real need in man’s social nature; and 
this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing 
that one is governed not on the basis of mere material and 
intellectual force, but on the basis of a moral principle, has 
beyond any doubt a practical and real importance” (cited 
in Van der Pijl 2009: 235). 
  
 Gramsci sees the modern capitalist state as an integral 
state, which is formed by political society and civil society. 
According to Peter Thomas, whose recent intervention in 
the debate on Gramsci’s thought has proposed a novel 
interpretation, the key concept around which Gramsci’s 
thought revolves is precisely that of the integral state. The 
latter allows Gramsci to analyse the interpenetration, and 
reciprocal dialectical relationship between ‘political society’ 
and ‘civil society’ (Thomas 2009: 137). Following Thomas, it 
can be seen that Gramsci develops a dialectical conception 
of the “overdetermined status of consent and coercion and 
of civil society and the state,” (Ibidem: xxii) rather than 
seeing them as exclusionary terms in different locations.  
 In order to grasp the centrality of the integral state 
and hegemony, Thomas criticises the influential 
interpretation of the concept of hegemony proposed by 
Anderson (1978) that sees hegemony as a strategy aiming at 
the production of consent rather than coercion and sees its 
terrain of efficacy in civil society rather than the state. In 
fact, civil society is not a pre-political realm that forms the 
basis of political society. The former is in fact dependent on 
the latter, as it is only the juridical apparatus of the state 
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that in the first place creates the conditions for the 
emergence of the apparently spontaneous interaction in civil 
society.  
 Let us first look at the relationship between coercion 
and consent. Gramsci sees hegemony not as the antithesis 
of domination. Quite to the contrary, he argues that 
hegemony constitutes a moment of domination, one of the 
concrete forms in which it appears.45 Their combination is 
not conceived as that between distinct parts, as an external 
relationship: they form a unity that depends on the 
maintenance of a particular equilibrium. The ‘proper’ 
relationship must be formed between them, one in which 
force must not appear to predominate too much over 
consent (Ibidem: 165). One can thus see that in 
parliamentary states, “coercion is the ultimate guarantee 
for consent which in turn legitimizes what could be 
described as a type of ‘coercion by consent’ (coercion of 
opposed classes with the consent of allied social groups, 
crystallised as public opinion)” (Ibidem). Coercion and 
consent therefore form a dialectical unity although they are 
theoretically distinct.  
 The second assumption that Thomas criticises is that 
Gramsci viewed the proper terrain of hegemony in civil 
society rather than the state. According to this view, civil 
society is the locus of consent and hegemony, while the 
state represents the sphere of coercion (domination). 
Gramsci’s idea was, however – according to Thomas – 
more complex: he saw civil society and political society as 
two superstructural levels. In fact, Gramsci radicalises and 
overcomes the classical base-superstructure model by                                                         
45 Gramsci argued that “a class is dominant in two ways, that is, it is leading 
and dominant. It leads the allied classes, and dominates over the adversial 
classes.” (Ibidem: 163). 
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seeing the latter as overlaying the former, as part of the 
base itself: the terrain of ideologies “are less conceived in 
spatial terms than as forms of social practice, or forms in 
which men know about their conflicts based in the 
economic structure of society and fight them out” (Ibidem: 
171). Here one can appreciate not Gramsci’s relative neglect 
of the economic sphere or his choice for the primacy of 
politics over economics, as has been argued for instance by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) but his understanding of the 
economic terrain as a political terrain, overcoming all kinds 
of determinism. The very form of the circulation of capital 
thus is the expression of a political relation, and cannot be 
autonomised as standing outside of politics.  
 
“The superstructures are agonistic forms that compete to 
become the essential form of appearance of a content that is 
itself contradictory – that is, they seek to resolve the 
contradictions in the economic structure of society of which 
they are the (more or less adequate) comprehension, or by 
emphasising their unstable nature and driving them to a 
moment of crisis” (Ibidem: 172). 
 
 Therefore, civil society and political society are seen 
as the major superstructural levels, two spheres where men 
become conscious of the contradictions and conflicts of the 
economic sphere, that in turn influence the economic 
relation. There is no clear separation between civil society 
and political society. Simply, they have different functions 
within the integral state: 
 
“Civil society, that is, the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called private, and political society or state 
correspond on the one hand to the function of hegemony 
that the dominant group exercises in the entire society and 
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on the other hand to the function of direct domination or 
command which is expressed in the state and juridical 
government” (Ibidem: 172).  
 
Civil society is an ensemble of practices dialectically 
linked with political society. In Hegelian terms, it is the 
“ethical content of the state”: it is not a sort of pre-political 
sphere that lies beyond the state. As Thomas argues, 
Gramsci follows Marx in seeing in civil society “the secret 
of the state” (Ibidem: 181). Political society is seen not in a 
Hegelian manner as a universality, as the ‘actuality of the 
ethical idea’, but as a false universality that is in truth a 
particularity, that attempts to but ultimately does not 
(cannot) resolve the contradictions of civil society. 
Gramsci sees political society as an enwrapping 
(involucro) in which civil society can develop. Political 
society is the form of a content, the container of civil 
society, surrounding but also shaping it: “rather than the 
negation of the rationality of the state, a complex and well 
articulated civil society” in this vision would represent its 
maximum affirmation, its concrete realisation and ‘truth’” 
(Ibidem: 189). Political society represents the universality of 
the ‘political’ in class society.  
 “If the political represents the ‘consciousness’ of the 
supposedly ‘non political’ or civil society, the state 
apparatus functions as the moment of self-consciousness of 
the political itself” (Ibidem: 189). Political society represents 
the transition of a ‘fundamental social group’ or a class 
from the economic corporative phase to a truly hegemonic 
phase, in which its interests are reformulated and modified 
in order to project them on a universal plane, on the sphere 
of political society that provides the false universality on 
which class rule is grafted. Political society is the 
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(temporary) juridical resolution of civil society’s inherent 
contradictions.  
 Thomas stresses how, for Gramsci, the sphere of civil 
society is only apparently consensual – a fact that is 
moreover highlighted by Gramsci’s own use of quotation 
marks when talking about ‘consent’ –, as the very 
dimension of civil society can only be constituted by the 
prior juridical intervention that creates the very division 
between civil society and the state (Ibidem: 192). The 
moment of universality as the condition of possibility of the 
moment of particularity. In this sense one can better 
understand political society as the enwrapping (involucro) 
of civil society. They mutually constitute themselves, in the 
sense that before any kind of hegemonic project can be built 
in the ‘consensual’ sphere of civil society, that very sphere 
has to be separated from political society, from the 
juridical, administrative and repressive apparatus of the 
state and present itself as an autonomous sphere over 
which the state acts ‘externally’.  
 Political society can only exist as the condensation of 
civil society, and the latter is in itself constituted by the 
prior separation between the two: “Just as Spinoza’s 
proposition that ‘mind is the idea of the body’ – that is, it is 
the idea of the body that constitutes the mind, rather than 
the mind giving rise to the body, Gramsci assigns priority 
to one of the terms. Political society is the idea of civil 
society, the mind of civil society’s body” (Ibidem: 193). The 
social forces in civil society condensate their power on the 
state, which then in turn acts upon civil society based on 
the social forces’ political project. This is the very 
constitution of the ‘political’, as the route that social forces 
must take in order to integrate their power into an existing 
state.  
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 One can therefore see how, if civil society and 
political society are viewed as mutually constituting each 
other, and distinct only in a functional sense, hegemony is a 
social practice that overlays both spheres. Hegemony is a 
process by which social forces condensate their power in 
political projects and political power at the level of the 
state. The social basis of the power of the state (conceived 
as the government apparatus) constitutes hegemony. The 
latter is the dialectical unity of the integral state, the 
dominance of a class in political society, which is 
dependent on its mobilising skills and capacities in civil 
society (Ibidem: 220). However, hegemony is not – as in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (1985) or other post-
structuralist theories of hegemony (see Torfing 1999) – a 
general theory of social power, meaning that it is not 
indifferent to its class content. According to the post-
structuralists, hegemony can be applied by different social 
classes for different class projects. In contrast, it must be 
stressed that hegemony is a phenomenon of a class society, 
, it is capitalist hegemony: “the state will remain the ‘truth’ 
of civil society until the latter becomes aware of its own 
secret: its capacity for self-organisation and self-regulation” 
(Ibidem: 193). 
Robert Cox in the 1980s re-read Gramsci in order to 
develop a theory of IR/IPE that is now known as neo-
Gramscianism (see above). Cox’s object of analysis are what 
he terms ‘historical structures’, a particular configuration of 
ideas, material capabilities and institutions in which a 
certain balance of class forces is crystallised (Cox 1981; 
1983; 1987). These are seen as world-wide structures that 
affect every ‘state-society complex’. It is in fact a 
reformulation of Gramsci’s concept of the integral state as a 
dialectical unity of the moments of civil and political 
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society. A neo-Gramscian perspective thus retains the 
understanding of the state as an aspect of the social 
relations of production. In capitalism, the public (state) and 
private (civil society) spheres appear to be separated from 
each other. As made clear in the previous section, 
exploitation in capitalism is carried out in the private realm 
of civil society, which is shorn from the public sphere of the 
coercive apparatus of the state. However, it is precisely 
through the latter’s guarantee of private property and the 
contract that the process of exploitation can be conducted. 
Neo-Gramscian theory incorporates this understanding 
and goes beyond this, being able to analyse directly how 
different social class forces build hegemony in civil society, 
which then gets crystallised in the administrative and 
institutional terrain of political society. The latter in turn 
creates the conditions for the consolidation of societal 
hegemony in civil society. The state-as-force thus becomes 
the expression of a political programme that traverses both 
civil and political society. Force is used selectively to deal 
with marginal dissent, but a hegemonic form of state is one 
that does not need to use force massively, relying mostly on 
consent.  
In contrast to conventional IR theory, that sees 
hegemony as simply the reflection of the economic or 
military power of states, the neo-Gramscian theory of 
hegemony in IR/IPE broadens the field of hegemony so 
that it becomes a form of rule based on a broad consent, 
which is, to be sure, backed up in the last instance by force. 
This hegemony consolidates itself in a form of state and can 
then be projected outwards on a global scale. There can be 
hegemonic and non-hegemonic world orders. Non-
hegemonic orders are ones in which the coercive aspect is 
at the forefront, while hegemonic orders are ones in which 
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the coercive aspect recedes to the background, leaving 
space for the consensual consolidation of hegemony in civil 
society.46 
It is argued that there is no fixed state form, as in 
Realism, which sums up what the state is about, but the 
forms of state change along with the social foundations 
from which they arise. The hegemonic state form of the 
period of the pax britannica was the liberal state, the 
dominant form of state of the inter-war era of rivalry the 
welfare-nationalist state, and the typical state form of the 
pax americana was what Cox calls the neoliberal state – what 
Van der Pijl calls the corporate liberal state (Van der Pijl 
1998 ch.3 and 4) now that ‘neoliberal’ refers to the 
Hayekian form of liberalism (See Cox 1987 ch.2 for a 
periodisation of world orders).  
Hegemony is seen as an ‘opinion-moulding activity’ 
(Bieler and Morton 2006b: 10), rather than the manifestation 
of a direct form of coercion or dominance. However, this 
opinion-moulding activity is directly linked to political 
leadership. Hegemony is thus not some vague notion of a 
sort of cultural ideology or the power of a ‘discourse’, but 
is, even if only implicitly, always political. In fact, the way 
Gramsci himself uses hegemony is as a synonym of 
leadership, in the same way Lenin had used the term to 
refer to the leadership of the Bolshevik Party (Thomas 2009: 
232-233).  
In Cox’s understanding, hegemony encompasses 
and expresses a particular fit between three spheres of                                                         
46 For instance, the era of pax britannica was a hegemonic world order in which 
liberalism was the key hegemonic formula. The inter-war years were, on the 
other hand, a non-hegemonic period in which the dominant form of state was 
the welfare-nationalist state. A new hegemonic order later developed based on 
a ‘corporate liberal’ state until the late 1970s 
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activity. The first is that of the social relations of 
production, that covers the totality of social relations in 
material, institutional and discursive forms. The second is 
the forms of state, which are seen as historically contingent 
state-civil society complexes. The third is the sphere of 
world orders. It is the ensemble of these three spheres that 
constitutes the ‘historical structure’ mentioned before. The 
way social forces in a given epoch are constituted stems 
from the social relations of production, of which Cox sums 
up a range of historical forms, which he calls ‘modes of 
social relations of production’ (Cox 1987 part 1). It is from 
these foundations that class structures and historical blocs 
arise.  
Cox and neo-Gramscian scholars start from the 
assumption that class is a historical category and that class 
identity emerges out of specific contexts of exploitation and 
resistance to it: “class consciousness emerges out of 
particular historical contexts of struggle rather than 
mechanically deriving from objective determinations that 
have an automatic place in production relations” (Bieler 
and Morton 2006b: 13). On the other hand, I would stress 
that one must not lose track of the fact that class as a 
conceptual category cannot be reduced to ‘class 
consciousness’ or ‘class identity’ in moments of struggle as 
is implied here.  If we see capital as acting precisely via the 
separation between the direct producers and the means of 
production, and capital as a social force that necessarily 
exploits living labour in the sphere of production, then 
class also has an ‘objective’ side to it. Hence, whether or not 
class identity and struggle emerges in concrete historical 
situation, class as an objective element of a capitalist mode 
of production is always present, as social antagonism is a 
defining aspect of any capitalist society as such. Refusing 
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this ‘objective’ element would mean neglecting the historical 
materialist notion of ‘mode of production’ and hence falling 
back to a post-structuralist theory.  
As seen in the previous section, in capitalism, the 
wage-labourers, the direct producers, only have access to 
the means of production by selling their only commodity, 
labour-power. This is mediated by the ‘economic’ sphere of 
the market. The market is therefore seen not as an 
opportunity, but as an ‘compulsion’  to which both the 
wage-labourers and the capitalists have to bow (Wood 
2002: 96-98). This imperative acts through the necessity of 
competition and profit-maximisation on the part of the 
capitalist, and survival on the part of the wage-labourer. 
Thus, social relations based on class are at the heart of the 
production and reproduction of capital. On the other hand, 
non-class themes acquire importance as aspects of struggles 
over hegemony, as elements that are re-connected to a 
political project aiming at achieving hegemony.  
The state and its coercive power, as the second 
element in Cox’s ‘historical structure’, is viewed as resting 
on configurations of class forces. As we mentioned before, 
instead of viewing the state as a self-explanatory category 
and take for granted its coercive power, a neo-Gramscian 
theory investigates into the various forms of state (the 
integral states). The concept of historical bloc is 
fundamental here. A historical bloc is “the way in which 
leading social forces within a specific national context 
establish a relationship over contending social forces” 
(Bieler and Morton 2006b: 14). A historical bloc is not 
simply an alliance between different interests of different 
fractions of classes. It is a synthesis between them, a 
programme for hegemony that “brings about not only a 
unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual 
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and moral unity (…) on a universal plane” (Bieler and 
Morton 2006c: 167). A historical bloc consists of structure 
and superstructure and their reciprocal relationship, as “it 
forms a complex, politically contestable and dynamic 
ensemble of social relations, which includes economic, 
political and cultural aspects” (Bieler 2006: 37). Hegemony 
as an organic cohesion of leaders and led implies the 
existence of a leading historical bloc of classes. 
The state is not itself an actor, but it is the terrain, the 
field upon which classes fight for hegemony. In line with 
the thought of Poulantzas, which has drawn extensively 
from Gramsci, the state is seen as a social relation, that is as 
a condensation of class forces in civil society (see Bruff 
2012). The state, in this view, enjoys a ‘relative autonomy’ 
(as Poulantzas argued) with regards to the class forces or 
historic bloc of class forces supporting it. However, and this 
point is fundamental, as it marks a clear line of distinction 
with regards to approaches such as the institutional one or 
the Varieties of Capitalism approach, this relative 
autonomy is not towards society as such, but with respect 
to the class forces of which it is the expression.  As Bruff 
points out, 
 
“the state is not the reflection but the crystallisation of 
unequal power relations. It ‘exhibits an opacity and 
resistance of its own’ (Poulantzas, 1978: 130) because 
changes in the class relationship of forces – such as the 
internationalisation of capital – necessitate those in the 
ascendancy to confront a multiplicity of institutional and 
policy legacies laid down over time (that is, not necessarily 
concurrently) as the result of earlier struggles” (Ibidem: 
185). 
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‘Opening up’ the state allows for an overcoming of 
the limitations of a simple instrumentalist view of the state. 
The latter is seen as an aspect of the social relations of 
capitalism mediated by the struggles between different 
social forces that find a temporary equilibrium (which may 
be hegemonic or not) between them. The state is, to be sure, 
the guarantor of the functioning of the market through the 
guarantee of private property and the contract. But it does 
this in specific ways, which are crucially dependent on the 
underlying historic bloc between classes and fractions of 
classes.  Bieler and Morton, in reporting Poulantzas’ 
argument, state that 
 
“Social classes do not … exist in isolation from, or in some 
external relation to, the state. The state is present in the 
very constitution and reproduction of the social relations of 
production and is thus founded on the perpetuation of 
class contradictions…Social classes are therefore defined 
principally, but not exclusively, by the production process 
and related to the political, ideological and economic social 
practices of the state” (Bieler and Morton 2006c: 169). 
 
Different forms of state are primarily distinguished 
by the different historical bloc of forces upon which their 
power rests. A particular configuration of social forces 
forms the ‘raison d’état’ of a form of state, that constitutes 
its ‘historical content’. These are, clearly, temporary and 
potentially unstable orders, as specific circumstances, such 
as an economic crisis or a war, may activate a different set 
of social forces or a counter-hegemonic set of forces that 
contests the hegemonic one (however, based on previous 
forms of ‘common sense’).  In this conceptualisation, the 
state is seen as the entire set of practical and ideological 
activities used by the ruling class not only to produce and 
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reproduce its dominance, but – crucially – to win the active 
consent of those over whom it rules. As such, the state 
comprises what Milios and Sotiropoulos term a 
“concentrated history”, that of the “modifications through 
class struggle of the respective strengths of the contending 
classes, within one and the same system of class power” 
(Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009: 106).  
Historical bloc, hegemony and ‘comprehensive 
concept of control’ (see below) should not be 
misunderstood as conspirational devices used by the 
capitalist class to ‘fool’ the workers. In fact, they cannot 
even simply be reduced to forms of alliances between 
fractions of the capitalist class. A hegemonic order involves 
and rests on the incorporation and persuasion, on the part 
of the dominant class, of subaltern classes (essentially, the 
working class) to accept as legitimate a certain form of class 
rule and its corresponding institutional context and 
ideology. This attempt is linked with the ascendance of a 
particular class or class fraction within the national political 
economy. Often this entails concessions to sections of the 
working class, or the activation of non-class or non-
economic issues as ideological elements to generate 
consensus.  
The concept of hegemony has been used by a group 
of scholars informally known as ‘the Amsterdam School’, 
which reformulated the elements of what Jessop calls a 
‘hegemonic project’ and called it a ‘comprehensive concept 
of control’.47  Van der Pijl and Overbeek see the latter as a                                                         
47 The idea of a comprehensive concept of control seeks to capture the 
dialectical ensemble of structure and agency, between the dynamic of the 
accumulation of capital on the one hand and the sphere of politics on the other, 
without reducing one to the other. On the genesis of the idea of ‘comprehensive 
concept of control’ as well as of the broader ‘Amsterdam School’ approach, see: 
Overbeek 2004. 
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‘bid for hegemony’, a project for the conduct of public 
affairs and social control which, in order to be 
‘comprehensive’, has to incorporate all spheres of social 
life: labour relations, socio-economic policy and foreign 
policy. Concepts of control are devised by a constellation of 
national or foreign social classes, with each transcending its 
own specific interest in order to project its programme on a 
universal plane. In line with the division among fractions of 
capital first outlined by Marx in Vol.III, concepts of control 
can be defined starting from ideal-types relating to the 
functional perspective of different moments in the 
circulation of capital (Van der Pijl 1984: 8). Thus, one can 
speak of circulating capital, productive capital and money 
capital concepts of control (Van der Pijl 1998 ch.2). 
Neoliberal hegemony has been analysed  by Van der Pijl as 
a concept of control emerging in line with the ascendancy 
of money (financial) capital, whereas the previous 
‘corporate liberal’ era was characterised as a ‘productive 
capital’ comprehensive concept of control. In fact, as a 
consequence of the process of transnationalisation of 
production and finance (the process commonly known as 
globalisation), Cox has argued that “it becomes 
increasingly pertinent to think in terms of a global class 
structure alongside or superimposed upon national class 
structures”(Cox 1981: 147). Thus, new transnational social 
forces of capital and labour, potentially in conflict with 
national capital and labour, have been identified (See Van 
Apeldoorn 2002: 26-34). 
A ‘concept of control’ refers to a particular and 
always temporary conjunction between a trend in the 
economic sphere developed by particular ‘moments’ in the 
capitalist cycle (the financial, productive, commercial, or 
even the national or world market perspective), each with 
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own specific world view and, secondly, the capacity to 
translate this perspective into a ‘comprehensive’ 
programme for society as a whole. This translation can 
involve elements which have little or nothing to do with 
the directly economic sphere, such as xenophobic feelings, 
nationalism, a general distrust of politicians, but these will 
become important elements when they connect with the 
ascendant trend in the economy in terms of the interests 
and worldview of a fraction of capital.  
The creation of the necessary consensus for a certain 
option can be described as a process of persuasion 
(“opinion-moulding activity), the attempt to make someone 
give up a set of beliefs in favour of another set. This is done 
by proposing a suitable redescription of the world, of 
‘reality’ which, however, is not based on a simply logical or 
rational argument (thus implying the existence of a ‘truth’ 
to which the individual has to conform), but is guided by 
the provision of ‘reasons’ and motivations for someone to 
adopt this new set of beliefs  (Torfing 1999: 68-69). What is 
more important and in fact is constitutive of the translation 
of a political project into ‘reality’ is more what it does than 
what is says or if what it says corresponds to ‘reality’ (as, in 
a historicist theory, ‘reality’ and ‘reason’ acquire different 
meanings as history unfolds).  For instance, in 1993 what 
needs to be understood is not whether ‘Italy’ had other 
alternative options at hand or if really there was no 
alternative to signing the Maastricht treaty and preparing 
the path to joining the Euro, but what this narration of ‘no 
alternative’ entailed, what it did to social relations within 
the Italian form of state, how it excluded or marginalised 
other alternative projects.  
This process always involves the repression of 
alternative options, either by simply preventing their 
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realisation and reconstituting ‘reality’ in a way that 
weakens the alternative narration or makes it ‘unrealistic’, 
or by partially incorporating the alternative option into the 
winning project, albeit in a subordinate manner. The use of 
physical violence is, in certain circumstances, not excluded. 
Thus, active consent is a possible outcome, but passive 
acceptance or acquiescence may as well be the result. This 
happens when individuals do not positively endorse the 
‘new normalcy’ but see in practice no alternative to it, as it 
has become the ‘truth’ of social reality. This happens also 
because in capitalism, conditions of existence are effectively 
dependent on the market and thus creating the conditions 
for successful capital accumulation is often seen as the only 
way to conduct a good economic policy.48  
The concept of articulation is crucial in 
understanding the functioning of a hegemony. Within the 
conflictual terrain of the capitalist state, articulation aims at 
establishing “relations among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105). It thus involves developing 
a discourse, linked with a particular trend in the process of 
capital accumulation, which modifies the horizon of 
politics and social action by partially fixing identities and 
meanings and thus stabilising a social order. Gramsci used 
the concept of hegemony “in order to account for the 
contingent articulation of a plurality of identities into 
collective wills capable of instituting a certain social order” 
(Torfing 1999: 103). This involves not only an alliance of                                                         
48 This is another way of saying that the structural power of capital is in control 
over investment, and thus ‘good economic policy’ is simply equated with 
creating favourable economic and political conditions for capital accumulation, 
in the face of the threat of an ‘investment strike’ (see Kalecki 1943 for the 
classical argument; see below). 
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economic interests, but also their positioning within a new 
set of collective identities. Although I do not adopt here a 
post-structuralist theory, the notions – developed within 
this tradition – of myth and social imaginary can be 
incorporated as elements within a hegemonic articulation 
that provide the horizon  of some vision of an ideal society, 
as the idea of fullness or transparency, or a realised society 
without conflict or antagonism (Torfing 1999: 113-119). An 
example of this is the neoliberal emphasis on the inherent 
efficiency of market mechanisms that, starting from the 
mid-1980s, has profoundly influenced the process of 
European integration. It provided an horizon of meaning 
from which to understand ‘Euro-sclerosis’ and what were 
perceived to be the problems of an ‘unsustainable’ welfare 
state. A myth, or an ideology, thus constitutes a ‘new 
objectivity’ that, however, is always the product of the 
agency of specific social forces, and does not rest, as the 
post-structuralists would argue, on the undecidability of the 
political terrain and hence of politics itself (See: Torfing 
1999: 67). 
The concept of control has to leave untouched the 
prerogatives of private property, as this is an element of a 
capitalist order that is not negotiable. But, beyond property, 
interests are fluid and can be recomposed according to the 
ascendant forces in the economy. Thus, for instance, as a 
high interest rate/low inflation framework – in line with 
the interests of financial capital – sets in, other fractions of 
capital may come on board the historic bloc by shifting 
economic strategy, for instance from an export-oriented to a 
capital investment strategy. The overall concept of control 
will also have to make references to other aspects of the 
general aspirations of the population that may not have a 
class or economic basis – what Gramsci termed the 
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‘national-popular’ dimension. What is realised in the end is 
always implicit rather than explicit, thus demarcating what 
Fernand Braudel has called the ‘limits of the possible’ in 
political terms (Braudel 1981: 29, cited in Gill 1993b: 9).. An 
example from history occurred in the 1930s, when a tory-
dominated government in Britain took the country off the 
gold standard. In 1929, a Labour government collapsed in 
the face of the financial crisis and demands for cuts in state 
spending. Sidney Webb, a member of the former Labour 
government, in commenting the decision by the Tory 
government, complained: ‘nobody told us we could do 
this!” (Callinicos 2010: 7). Exiting from the gold standard 
was considered – even by a member of the Fabian society 
such as Webb - as anathema: it was simply outside of the 
‘limits of the possible’ or the thinkable in political terms. 
The crisis then set in motion a series of reactions that 
turned off the ‘autopilot’ in the world economy, opening 
up the political field for alternative projects.  
“One cannot speak of the power of the state but only 
of the camouflaging of power” (Gramsci 1995:191 cited in 
Morton 2011: 20). The point is that the dominant classes no 
longer pursue their interests directly or nakedly, but the 
fashioning of a class rule in the guise of the ‘general 
interest’ has a price attached to it, in the sense that certain 
compromises need to be found with other classes or 
fractions in the historical bloc. On the other hand, certain 
issues will be eliminated from public debate, as they are 
simply depicted as irrational or impossible to deal with. In 
fact, I would argue that one of the ways ideology functions 
today is by presenting alternative political projects as 
antiquated, decrepit. Political issues are thus depoliticised. A 
concept of control establishes in this way a ‘field of the 
politically thinkable’. It is only once a concept of control is 
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quite clearly devised, and a certain direction has been 
identified, that spaces are created for the intervention of the 
actual ‘formal’ sphere of politics, where certain leaders will 
be encouraged while others will be marginalised.49 As we 
will see in the next chapter, any political programme is to 
be analysed both as a project and as a process, meaning that 
what is realised in the end is never simply the actualisation 
of a blueprint programme, but its translation into ‘reality’, 
that is, including the compromises and modifications it has 
to go through in order to function (or not to function) as a 
hegemonic project and discourse stabilising a social order. 
The executors of the programme are the managerial 
and political cadres, which were considered crucial by the 
neo-Machiavellians. This involves both the corporate elite 
mingling in the transnational planning bodies such as the 
Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg conferences and the 
Davos Economic Summit (see Gill 1991; Van der Pijl 2010) 
as well as the clustered joint directorates (see Van der Pijl et 
al 2011) and the political and media staff. Spaces are created 
for actual intervention by class-conscious (or, ‘fraction-
conscious’) intellectuals, which intervene in public debate 
with the aim of steering it in a certain direction.  
As Van der Pijl notes, 
 
“Capital is a comprehensive force, a discipline over society 
and nature, but, in order to maintain the fundamental 
pattern of exploitative class relations that supports it, it 
requires a dynamic and responsive mode of imposing that 
discipline which is adequate in the shifting conditions. So 
the idea of a concept of control is not a conspirational 
device, but captures the idea that whilst discipline must be                                                         
49 See Van der Pijl 2006a. Here, Van der Pijl includes explicitly the role of the 
secret services and of informal networks in reactivating certain fault lines in the 
global political economy.  
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established (there is no natural capitalist economy on its 
own account), this still requires a social process of concept 
formation, programme writing, and the recruitment of 
allies in order to establish a coalition of class forces behind 
the proposed formula of the general interest” (Van der Pijl 
2009: 248).50 
 
Going back to Poulantzas’ conceptualisation of the 
state as enjoying a ‘relative autonomy’ with respect to 
classes and fractions of classes, one can see more clearly 
that the state is not simply or merely an instrument of the 
dominant classes. Thus, ‘foreign’ capital, represented for 
instance by multinational corporations or flows of foreign 
direct investment, cannot be seen unproblematically as 
diminishing the power of the state or causing the retreat of 
the state (as in Strange 1996). In neo-Gramscian terms, 
globalisation can be conceived as a form of ‘internalisation’ 
of the interests of foreign financial or productive capital 
(see more on this below). “This means that the 
internationalisation or transnationalisation of production 
and finance does not represent an expansion of different 
capitals outside the state but signifies a process of 
internalisation within which interests are translated 
between various fractions of classes within states” (Bieler 
and Morton 2006c: 170). New political projects need to be 
developed at the state level and new legitimacy needs to be                                                         
50 Jessop (2002) has developed a conceptual apparatus that is in many respects 
similar to the ‘concept of control’. He distinguished between an accumulation 
strategy and a hegemonic project. The former can be seen as a strategy for 
capital accumulation based on one of the moments in the circulaiton of capital 
(see above), but also from a national/transnational perspective. The latter is the 
more explicitly political process of constructing a hegemonic practice and 
discourse that can accommodate such an accumulation strategy. He then 
develops the concept of ‘strategic selectivity’ to account for how state practices 
become condensations of a certain relation between classes. 
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created in order for neoliberalism as a comprehensive 
concept of control to spread. The concept of globalisation 
can be re-framed in this perspective as the coupling of 
transnationalisation of finance and production, and hence 
of production relations, and its ‘internalisation’ within the 
different forms of state. This in turn leads to restructuring 
of production patterns and social relations within states.  
 The construction of a historical bloc within a state – 
conceptualised as the complex of activities with which the 
ruling class maintains consent in society - is a national 
phenomena, because it is through national political 
frameworks that classes or fractions of classes become 
hegemonic or contest the prevailing hegemony. The 
national sphere is also the most relevant sphere of political 
consciousness of most people, and the lens through which 
people and social forces both understand their situation 
and devise political programmes. In fact, the construction 
of a ‘we’ that is a national ‘we’ has fundamental 
implications, for it tends to present a national community - 
with its inherently contradictory social relations – as 
possessing a unified ‘interest’. 
 The concept of the ‘nation’ as such concentrates 
within its framework aspects of the ideological dimension 
of capitalist power, for instance in the idea of subjection to 
the jurisdiction of the state as the expression of a national 
community of destiny. The class interests of capital obscure 
the internal divisions within society so that  “the nation 
‘transforms’ that is to say renders universally binding, the 
class interests of capital, presenting them, setting them in 
operation, as national interests” (Milios and Sotiropoulos 
2009: 107). The class divisions in society are not entirely 
effaced, but for sure they are given a secondary role within 
a broader context of national cohesion and unity.  
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The focus is thus on how classes ‘nationalise’ 
themselves, building on previous hegemonies that have 
become institutionalised in the state apparatus in a way 
that reflects the specific historical legacy of the state and of 
national class formation. On the other hand, “the 
hegemony of a particular class can manifest itself as an 
international phenomenon insofar as it represents the 
development of a particular form of the social relations of 
production. It can connect forces across countries” (Bieler 
and Morton 2006b: 16).  
As Bieler and Morton point out, notions such as the 
‘internationalisation of the state’ and the state as a 
‘transmission belt’ of neoliberalism (as developed by Cox 
1992) are too top-down, in the sense that they do not point 
to how the changing social relations of production were 
authored within a specific form of state. It is claimed that 
one cannot analyse the developments within a national 
political economy as resulting simply from transnational 
social forces operating from the outside, but one has to 
capture the moment of internalisation of certain class forces 
within the raison d’état, the social purpose of the state. For 
instance, the way social forces have operated within the 
Italian form of state has engendered a modification of 
forms of consensus formation that went hand in hand with 
the transmission of new policy preferences through the 
policy-making channels (on internalisation see also: Bieler 
and Morton 2006c: 485-9). 
 
Crisis and ‘national emergency’ in the political economy 
 
The momentum of consensus developed in the 
Italian political economy in 1993 and continuing 
149   
throughout the decade emerged in a period in which the 
Italian economic situation was officially described as one of 
‘national emergency’ marked by recession, speculative 
attack on the national currency, devaluation. From a critical 
perspective, it is however important to investigate the 
forms of thought and consciousness that accompany such 
moments. One must not lose track of the discursive nature 
of crises and crisis formation. Colin Hay (1996; 1999), 
studying the development of crises and their consequences, 
argues that there are no objective criteria that must be 
fulfilled for a situation to be described ‘objectively’ as a 
situation of crisis. Instead, he argues that crisis is a 
narrative, and that the consequences of a crisis need to be 
analysed in terms of subjective interventions into a 
situation that forms the ‘story’ of the crisis, which then 
discursively creates the very obstacles to surmount in order 
to overcome the crisis itself. A crisis can be constructed in a 
number of ways and has all the elements of a narrative: 
protagonists, a plot, a setting and a climax, as well as story-
tellers – who, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, could be 
called ‘organic intellectuals’ (see Hay 1996).  
With this crisis-as-narrative view, Hay points out that 
a crisis is one when it permeates discourse, creates new 
understandings and thus new political projects that build 
on such understandings. As Hay argues, a crisis is a process: 
“as such it requires both a subject and an object. For a 
particular conjuncture to provide the opportunity for 
decisive intervention it must be perceived as so doing – it 
must be seen as a moment in which a decisive intervention 
can (and perhaps must) be made. Furthermore, it must be 
perceived as such by agents capable of making a decisive 
intervention at the level at which the crisis is identified” 
(Hay 1996: 254).  
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 For our purposes, it is important to highlight how 
the power of the state is itself involved in creating this 
narrative of crisis: “state power (the ability to impose a new 
trajectory upon the structure of the state) resides not only 
in the ability to respond to crises, but to identify, define and 
constitute crisis in the first place” (Hay 1996: 255). 
Elsewhere, Hay argues that  
  
“crisis can thus be seen as a process; a process in which the 
tendential unity of the state is discursively renegotiated 
and potentially (re-)achieved as a (…) trajectory is imposed 
upon the apparatuses and institutions which comprise it. 
Crisis is a process in which the site of political decision-
making shifts from the disaggregated institutions, policy 
communities, networks and practices of the state apparatus 
to the state as a centralised and dynamic agent. The state is 
constituted anew through crisis” (Hay 1999: 338). 
Although based on a constructivist viewpoint, these 
reflections – even if they may exaggerate the ‘subjective’ 
element and tend to neglect the ‘objective’ one – can be 
taken on board also from a neo-Gramscian perspective. 
Neo-Gramscian historicism is based on a dialectical relation 
between subjective and objective elements, and 
incorporates a Marxian political economy, thus giving due 
weight to the dynamics of capital accumulation. Therefore, 
the crucial materialist dimension must be inserted: our 
forms of thought, and also our crisis awareness, are never 
independent from our material reality. It is our dependence 
on the market for our means of subsistence, and the 
capitalist mode of production, that permeates our thoughts 
about the economy. Hence, even crisis awareness must, in 
the last instance, be linked to problems of capital 
accumulation and profitability and to our material base for 
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existence. On the other hand, the fundamental discursive 
dimension is indispensable, as a situation of crisis needs to 
be narrated as such so that the field can be opened or 
closed to different political projects that present themselves 
as solutions.  Gramsci himself argued that 
 
“it may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of 
themselves produce fundamental historical events; they 
can simply create a terrain more favourable to the 
dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain 
ways of posing and resolving questions involving the 
entire subsequent development of national life” (Gramsci 
1971: 184, cited in Bruff 2008: 103).  
 
This conception of moments of crisis shall be kept in 
mind, as it will be referred to in the section on the 
interviews, when the actors’ perception of crisis will be 
analysed. A further element that is helpful for analysing 
such moments can be ‘imported’ from so-called ‘ripeness 
theory’ in the field of conflict resolution. The theory, 
initially developed by Zartman (1989) concerns itself with 
analysing the reasons why decision-makers decide to 
negotiate or mediate during conflicts in which previously 
the parties have been trying to defeat one another. One of 
the conditions necessary for the policy-makers to be 
receptive to negotiation is the presence of a “mutually 
hurting stalemate” that – and this is the crucial point for the 
purposes of the research – is especially motivating if 
augmented by an ‘impending catastrophe’. The idea is that 
conflict resolution is based on general perceptions of an 
intolerable situation in case of lack of agreement. A 
moment that is ‘ripe for resolution’ is thus associated with a 
‘precipice’: the perception that the situation is rapidly 
bound to get worse if an agreement is not reached (Ibidem: 
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268). This moment of ‘impending catastrophe’ provides a 
“deadline or a lesson that pain can be sharply increased if 
something is not done about it now” (Zartman 2002: 228). I 
see moments of ‘impending catastrophe’ – such as 1992-
1993 in the Italian political economy – as reactivating 
shared elements of common sense of the social partners 
and political parties, in particular trade unions and the 
centre-left parties. The narration of ‘impending catastrophe’ 
– as is argued in ch.6 – acts as a sort of rallying cry in which 
the pressure is for conflict to be temporarily suspended 
because ‘we’ are in danger. The state in this way acquires 
new authority to define and respond to the crisis.  
 
The 'nodal' state: the national and the international 
 
A neo-Gramscian conception of the state is able to 
account for globalisation and transnationalisation of 
production without, on the one hand, assuming that the 
logic of the world market simply subsumes different forms 
of state and acts externally on them and, on the other, 
without resorting to a theory of class struggle which 
reduces restructuring to an objective developmental logic 
of capital. ‘Globalisation’ is authored by certain class forces 
that act within specific forms of state. What is in fact 
overcome through this approach is precisely the separation 
between state and civil society, as the way concepts of 
control are formulated – based on a certain configuration of 
class forces and the ascendancy of a particular fraction of 
capital – allows us to see the ‘genesis’ of a particular set of 
state practices.  
Van der Pijl and Overbeek have analysed the 
formation of a neoliberal ‘comprehensive concept of 
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control’ and the associated historical bloc on a transnational 
level (lit: Overbeek 1993; Van der Pijl 1998). This process 
involved the devising of a hegemonic programme on a 
transnational (mainly Atlantic51) plane, which in the 
context of the European union was expressed in the so-
called ‘embedded neoliberal hegemony’ at Maastricht (Van 
Apeldoorn 2002), a compromise programme that was 
nevertheless skewed towards the interests and worldview 
of the transnational fraction of European capital. The 
process of transnationalisation was driven from what has 
been termed the ‘Lockean heartland’, conceived both as a 
series of historically and organically unified group of states 
of the Anglo-Saxon core of the world economy (Van der Pijl 
1998; 2009) and as a social space where the concepts of 
control circulate (Overbeek 2004: 128). Transnationalisation 
is thus also understood as a process of expansion of the 
Lockean heartland and the gradual incorporation of other 
states within it. Nevertheless, “transnational capitalist 
relations of course also extend beyond the Lockean 
heartland, the whole system is embedded in them” (Van 
Apeldoorn 2004: 164).  
However, and this is one of the points where this 
research project enters the debate within neo-Gramscian 
theory, a ‘transnational historic bloc’ also has nationally 
segmented dimensions. Within this perspective, what is 
significant once again is that it is within the state that the 
‘general interest’ is formed, and it is the state’s role to 
devise the overall economic strategy in order to maintain 
the general conditions of accumulation. Capitalist 
regulation thus depends on state practices that enjoy                                                         
51 On the Atlantic link, see Van der Pijl 1984. On the transnationalisation of 
European big business in terms of an evolution of an Atlantic ruling class 
structure see: Holman and Van der Pijl 2006. 
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‘relative autonomy’ and mediate nationally specific class 
relations and understandings of the ‘general will’. One 
should not lose track that the concepts of historical bloc and 
hegemony are cantered on the national state, as that is the 
locus of power in contemporary societies, and where 
hegemony is produced and reproduced.  
As Gramsci stresses, the international situation 
should be considered in its national aspect: “to be sure, the 
line of development is towards internationalism but the 
point of departure is ‘national’. It is from this point of 
departure that one must begin, yet the perspective is 
international and cannot be otherwise. Consequently, it is 
necessary to study accurately the combination of national 
forces that the international class will have to lead and 
develop, in accordance with the international perspective 
and directives” (cited in Thomas 2009: 215) There is a 
dialectical relationship between national and international: 
hegemony is the ‘nationalisation’ of the international 
perspective, the concrete making of, the constitution of the 
dynamic of an expansive political and economic order 
within national moorings.  
In order to understand class formation and strategy, 
one has to start from the assumption that capital in general 
is a comprehensive social force that is dependent on 
extracting surplus-value from living labour in order to 
generate profit, in this way imposing a specific discipline to 
society. The owners of capital embody the capitalist class. 
According to Gramsci, this is only the material basis of the 
existence of capital as a class, it is what Gramsci calls “a 
relation of social forces which is closely linked to the 
structure, objective, independent of human will, and which 
can be measured with the exact systems of physical 
science” (cited in Holman and Van der Pijl 2003: 72-73). 
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Class rule is established beyond this level. Stephen Gill 
talks about relations of political forces and synthesizes 
Gramsci’s own work, subdividing collective political 
consciousness into three moments (Gill 2003). The first level 
is the economic-corporate one, the building block of class 
formation. The second one refers to the consciousness that 
a common interest is no longer confined to a specific 
fraction, but extends to the whole class. However, even 
here we are still dealing with interests of an economic 
nature. It is the third moment that is the hegemonic one, in 
which the a class perspective overcomes the boundaries of 
one’s own class in a purely economic sense and projects its 
interests and vision on a universal plane, as the ‘general 
will’, as a ‘comprehensive concept of control’. Therefore, 
“under capitalist conditions, ruling class formation is a 
highly dynamic process that runs through and unifies these 
three moments” (Holman and Van der Pijl 2003: 74). Thus, 
one must look at how a constellation of class alliances are 
pursued at the same time as political strategies at the levels 
of the economy, civil society and political society. It is clear 
to Gramsci that power circulates in capillary networks in 
society and thus political strategy here refers not only to 
the control over the economic sphere. The integral state, 
when it is hegemonic, has an educative and formative 
function in the attempt by the hegemonic force to create a 
‘new civilisation’. This formative function is also directed 
towards economic life, where certain norms and morals are 
propagated while others are modified or eliminated.   
As the section on common sense will hopefully make 
clear, however, hegemony is based also on elements that 
cannot be grasped by only taking into consideration these 
three moments. It is also crucially dependent on previous 
forms of thought and their sedimentation into what we can 
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call ‘common sense’. Common sense is not equivalent with 
the concepts of hegemony or ideology. The latter may be 
seen as a conscious intervention to try to shape common 
sense and make one’s own version of common sense the 
dominant way a society ‘thinks’ about all aspects of social 
life. Ideology is the political articulation of a series of social 
identities in order to create or maintain a social order. 
Hegemony is thus a politicisation of elements of ‘the social’, 
whereas common sense – on which successive hegemonies 
need to be based – is a process of depoliticisation of social 
relations, of ‘reality’.52  
 
Making sense of our conditions of existence: 
capital and common sense 
 
The concept of common sense 
 
In this section I conceptualise ‘common sense’ in 
capitalist societies in order to effectively use it in empirical 
research as the heuristic tool to understand and explain the 
formation of consensus in Italy in 1993. Common sense as a 
heuristic tool for the analysis of European varieties of 
capitalism has been applied by Bruff (2008; 2010; 2011) with 
reference to the Dutch and German cases of consensus-
formation.                                                          
52 Gramsci argued that the goal of hegemony is to develop “within the 
enwrapping of political society a complex and well-articulated civil society, in 
which the individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby 
entering into conflict with political society, but rather becoming its normal 
continuation, its organic complement” (cited in Thomas 2009: 188). This self-
government of the individual is crucially affected by common sense. 
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First of all, let us start by analysing the role of ideas 
in a neo-Gramscian framework. Ideas are understood by 
Cox as one of the three elements that form a historical 
structure or, within it, a mode of social relations of 
production (See Cox 1987: 22-27). However, Cox underlines 
that ideas within a historical structure are of two kinds.  
This is important because, as will be seen, sense is not only 
a weapon used in social and political struggle, but also the 
terrain that defines the ‘limits of the possible’, hence 
depoliticising certain issues or state policies. Thus, common 
sense forms the basis upon which political and social 
struggle takes place. ‘Intersubjective meanings’ are, for 
Cox, “shared notions of the nature of social relations which 
tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour” 
(Cox 1981:136). This kind of ideas is constitutive of the 
wider historical structure, as it forms the generally 
accepted beliefs that constitute the institutions on which a 
certain material power and set of productive relations are 
based.  These ideas develop the ‘limits of the possible’ in 
political terms, and “condition the way individuals and 
groups are able to understand their social situation, and the 
possibilities of social change” (Gill and Law 1988: 74).  
The other kinds of ideas active in a historical 
structure are the ‘collective images’ of social order held by 
different groups of people (Cox 1981: 136). These views 
differ from one another in their understanding of the 
nature of power relations, the ideas of justice and 
legitimacy of the social order and ethical concerns. Cox 
understands ‘intersubjective meanings’ as constituting the 
common ground of political discourse, while ‘collective 
images’ as elements that may be contrasting and whose 
synthesis is acquired only by a hegemonic project.  Ideas, 
for neo-Gramscians, are not simply an independent 
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variable that is analysed in addition to material factors. As 
Gramsci points out, “it is on the level of ideologies that 
men become conscious of conflicts in the world of the 
economy” (Gramsci 1971: 162).  What is emphasised is the 
‘material structure of ideology’: “only those ideas, which 
are (…) linked to a particular constellation of social forces 
engaged in an ideological struggle for hegemony, are 
considered to be ‘organic ideas’” (Bieler and Morton 2006b: 
24 ).53 These ideas do not emerge spontaneously or 
casually: they are authored for specific political projects by 
what Gramsci calls “organic intellectuals”, whose function 
is to graft a political project based on the universalisation of 
a certain class interest and worldview. In Gramsci, organic 
intellectuals have an internal relationship with the ‘popular 
masses’: everybody has the potential to become an 
intellectual in this sense, as ‘organizers of the masses of 
men’ (Torfing 1999: 111). A historic bloc thus crucially 
includes an important role for ideas as, if a situation of 
hegemony is reached, it indicates the integration of 
differing class interests that are expanded throughout 
society bringing about a unity of political, economic and 
moral objectives on a “universal plane” (see above).   
Within this framework, what is the role of ‘common 
sense’? I follow Bruff’s conceptualisation of common sense 
as “the basis for how humans make sense of the situation 
they find themselves in” (Bruff 2008: 47: for a discussion of 
common sense: 47-71). As a starting point for the 
discussion, it is important to recall that, for Gramsci, “all 
men are ‘philosophers’ because the only philosophy is 
history in action, that is, life itself” (Gramsci, citato in Bruff: 
50). However – according to Bruff - what is significant in a                                                         
53 On the material structure of ideas see also: Bieler 2001. 
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political economy approach, is when these philosophies are 
not merely subjective or individual, but acquire an 
intersubjective quality, that is, they become shared 
assumptions and ideas about the world. Crucially, the 
concept of common sense is for Gramsci intrinsically linked 
with a shared outlook on the part of groups in society: 
 
“each social stratum has its own “common sense” which is 
at heart the most widespread conception of life and morals. 
Common sense is not something that is rigid and 
unmoving, but is continually transformed, becoming richer 
with scientific notions and philosophical opinions that 
have developed into habits. Common sense is the folklore 
of “philosophy” and is placed between downright 
“folklore” and philosophy, science, the economics for 
scientists. “Common sense” builds future folklore, that is a 
more or less rigid phase of a certain time and place” 
(Gramsci cited in Liguori and Voza 2009: 759).  
 
From this excerpt of the Prison Notebooks four 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Each social class (or group) has its own version 
common sense, and thus different versions of 
common sense can coexist in a given society at the 
same time. 
2. Common sense can be defined as “the most 
widespread conception of life and morals” of a given 
group or social class. 
3. Common sense derives from the sedimentations of 
thought left over by previous philosophical currents 
(it is the folklore of philosophy). It is thus both path-
dependent and in continuous transformation – as 
Bruff argues (2008: 47-50). 
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4. Common sense is in continuous transformation, thus 
different versions of common sense follow one 
another chronologically. 
 
As will be seen in more detail below, common sense 
cannot be equated with the concept of ideology or that of 
hegemony or hegemonic discourse. The latter in fact, are best 
conceptualised – following Bruff (2008: 55) - as active and 
conscious interventions by social forces and organic 
intellectuals on the different versions of common sense in 
order to create a synthesis and to make one’s version of 
common sense the dominant one: “ideology is an active 
synthesis rather than a simple conglomeration of different 
ideas and conceptions” (Ibidem). 
Common sense represents the most commonly held 
ideas, which are often implicit within a social group. Thus, 
it relates dialectically with philosophy, that is with the 
highest expression of ideology, whose formulation is the 
task of the organic intellectuals of the different social 
groups. With the concept of common sense, Gramsci’s 
attention is on the element of popular ‘spontaneity’. There 
is a ‘quantitative’ difference between common sense and 
philosophy, not a ‘qualitative’ one: both are ‘organic’ ideas 
linked with the emergence and development of social 
forces. However, common sense represents a more rigid set 
of popular beliefs that are incoherent and inconsequential 
but nonetheless shared among the masses. Often, Gramsci 
implied that the nature of common sense was inherently 
conservative: through common sense people are “brought to 
believe that what exists today has always existed” (Gramsci 
cited in Liguori and Voza 2009: 760).  Although Gramsci 
tended to hold a negative opinion of common sense, he 
never neglected the fact that any kind of political project 
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(whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic) had to engage 
with this terrain in order to be successful.  
Thus, common sense is the “philosophy of non 
philosophers” (Gramsci cited in Liguori and Voza 2009: 
760), that is the conception of the world which has been 
passively absorbed by the different social strata in which 
individual morality and worldview is developed.  “Its 
fundamental characteristic is that of being a conception of 
the world that is incoherent, inconsequential, adequate to 
the character of the multitude of which it is the 
philosophy” (Ibidem).   
In this passive absorption of conceptions of the 
world we can see the element of depoliticisation, the taken-
for-granted aspects of everyday life. As argued above, 
social relations are shaped in and by political struggles and 
are not part of a pre-political economic realm. This political 
origin tends to be ‘forgotten’, removed, and the more this is 
done, the more these social power relations become 
sedimented and normalised, the more they seem to have a 
life of their own which is independent of human activity 
(similarly to the concept of commodity fetishism). Thus, the 
quasi-objectivity of the flow of capital also rests upon the 
internalisation of the power relations that are constitutive 
of capital as a social force. As Stuart Hall argues, “we 
should not be surprised that over time this (i.e. capitalism) 
comes to be taken for granted and viewed as somehow 
natural, for the ‘market’ experience is the most immediate 
daily and universal experience of the economic system for 
everyone” (Hall 1996: 38 cited in Bruff 2011: 9). However, 
“we must remember that the political ‘origin’ of the 
relatively enduring social institutions is repressed (in the 
psychoanalytical sense of being kept at another place) and 
not eliminated. Hence, it can be re-activated when these 
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institutions are put into question” (Torfing 1999: 70). 
Common sense can thus refer to ideas that tend to 
eliminate of the traces of the origins of institutions and 
norms that are part of everyday life. This effacement, as 
well as the potential re-activation of the political ‘origin’, is 
itself the result of a political process. In this respect, 
Blumenberg reminds us that the primacy of politics “does 
not consist in the fact that everything is political, but rather 
in the fact that the determination of what is to be regarded 
as unpolitical is itself conceived as falling under the 
competence of the political” (Blumenberg 1986: 91). 
However, common sense, defined by Bruff as being 
“the basis for how humans make sense of the situation they 
find themselves in” (Bruff 2008: 47), following a neo-
Gramscian approach, cannot escape the material conditions 
in which men find themselves. Cox states that “the ways in 
which human efforts are combined in productive processes 
affect all other aspects of social life” (Ibidem: 51) and thus 
common sense must include references to the way 
production is organised.  As Stuart Hall usefully 
formulates, we must posit “the economic in the first 
instance” (1996: 45), meaning that we cannot deny that our 
forms of thought are linked to the way production is 
organised and to the power relations inherent in the mode 
of production, because the need for food, drink and shelter 
must be considered to be universal human characteristics 
and thus shape, without determining, our way of thinking. 
The economic shapes our forms of thought, it creates limits 
of the possible, without however determining ideas. Hence, in 
contrast to Althusser’s ‘economic in the last instance’, what 
is stressed here is the economic in the first instance. This is 
what Gramsci referred to as the ‘decisive core of economic 
activity’. One can thus say that although the need to 
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produce is a universal aspect of human existence, social 
practice is also and fundamentally influenced by the modes 
of thinking, norms and ideas that are part of any 
organisation of production. 
 Common sense is seen by Bruff as a form of culture 
(2008: 47) as it embodies conceptions of the world and of 
life that are commonly held by people of a certain social 
class.  Common sense can thus be represented as the way in 
which capitalist social relations appear to a certain group of 
society, how that group ‘makes sense’ of its position in 
society. This group can be a class or – significantly – also a 
nation, that is the horizon of the “we” in which political 
projects are inherently inscribed. The process of common 
sense development also reflects how ‘the international’ is 
internalised into ‘the national’ (see more on this below): 
how the international economy is seen as determining 
certain ‘rational’ or ‘realistic’ choices for ‘us’. The previous 
political construction of the nation-state as ‘us’ is a 
fundamental prerequisite of any discussion of the coupling 
of ‘the national’ and ‘the international’.54 By presenting the 
nation-state as the horizon within which political projects 
are to be developed, the conditioning of the capitalist 
‘external constraint’ is an issue that must be faced by any 
political programme for the governing of the country. It can 
be added that as subaltern classes are historically 
incorporated politically and culturally in national historic 
blocs of forces and into the national political framework, 
the state itself is increasingly perceived as a neutral entity 
standing above society, and thus becomes effectively 
naturalised as ‘we’.  
                                                        
54 On this see: Anderson 1991. 
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As an example of the internalisation of ‘the 
international’ consider Italy’s dependence on ‘the 
international’ for raw materials, energy and exports. As the 
empirical chapter details, this is a real constraint that is seen 
as conditioning capitalist development in the country and 
necessitating certain commonsensical measures and policies 
that thus become internalised (more on this below). As 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, for Marx real 
phenomena and ideological ones are not contrasting to each 
other: capitalist social relations and the commodity 
fetishism that accompanies capitalist accumulation – with 
its inversion of the subject and the object – are not illusions, 
they are real phenomena that originate from men’s concrete 
relations in the labour process. So, the external constraint is 
not merely an ideology, or an illusion that is used to ‘trick’ 
the masses: it is a material constraint for capitalist 
development that affect how human beings, organic 
intellectuals and social forces reflect upon their own 
position in the global capitalist totality. As pointed out 
above, ideology is, in Marx’s original view, not an external 
conditioning. On the contrary, referring to Marx’s 
description of the commodity, ‘reality’ as such is not the 
‘sensible thing’ but also the ‘supersensible thing’. The 
conditions of existence of the very subjects of ideology are 
reproduced through forms of thought, that are thus no 
simple illusions in the context of a market society. 
How capitalist social relations appear from a 
particular standpoint in space and time in turn contributes 
to the constitution of capitalist social relations themselves, 
which should not be seen as standing outside of the political 
sphere, but as coextensive with it – as the above discussion 
of the relationship between the base and superstructure (or 
civil society and political society) in Gramsci makes clear. 
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So, our transhistorical need for means of subsistence 
conditions our forms of thought, which – in turn – act back 
upon our social relations. As Tronti reminds us, culture, 
like the law for Marx, “is always mediations of conflicts 
and its resolution in something else. If culture is the 
rebuilding of the totality of man, the quest of its humanity 
in the world, vocation at keeping united what is divided, 
then it is by its very nature reactionary” (Tronti 1966: 245).  
For the purposes of this research, one can go a step 
further from this highly political reflection by Tronti, and 
argue that more than culture tout court, it is national culture 
that aims at keeping united what is divided, and hence 
present social relations in a given society in a tendentially 
consensual manner as the embodiment of a certain national 
trait or nature that is seen as encompassing the whole of 
society, beyond its class divisions. The state, and the 
hegemonic discourses and common sense assumptions 
incorporated in it, can be seen as the sedimentation or 
crystallisation of relations between classes in civil society. 
Hence, as classes ‘nationalise’ themselves, the common 
sense assumptions are also projected on the state, and 
hence the relationship with the ‘international’ becomes a 
defining feature of any version of common sense, and of 
how political projects seek to face the country’s insertion 
into ‘the international’ (its socio-economic policies, for 
instance). Therefore, as common sense ‘nationalises’ itself, 
it reflects how social relations look from a certain national 
perspective (see below for more on the 
national/international relationship). The state itself 
represents – as a nationality – the total historical catalogue 
of all the victories and defeats that have been achieved by 
the social forces within that state. All history is history of 
class struggle, but every nationality condenses that 
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particular history in a particular way. Ultimately, the state 
is a container in which certain compromises between social 
forces are achieved and turned into law (in fact, each 
country’s legislation can be seen as a catalogue of all the 
struggle that have historically taken place) (Van der Pijl 
2011b). 
As stated above, these common sense conceptions 
are both path-dependent and in continuous transformation. 
They are path-dependent because they cannot escape the 
socially and nationally specific ways in which social classes 
have ‘made sense’ of their conditions of existence from 
their point of view in the mode of production, and they are 
in continuous transformation as the historical structure 
changes dialectically and incorporates new philosophies 
that go hand in hand with transformations in social 
relations of production, forms of state and world orders. 
This modifies the forms of intersubjective common sense, 
embodied in relatively stable patterns of human activity 
and thought.  
As seen above discussing Thomas’ reading of 
Gramsci, political and civil society are dialectically linked 
as political society creates the bases upon which civil 
society can arise and in turn acquire conscience of the 
‘political’ as a separate sphere from itself. Social and 
political society are conceptualised by Gramsci as being 
dialectically connected in the form of the integral state, 
while at the same time being analytically distinct as objects 
of study. It can be argued that common sense arises in civil 
society and then is gradually incorporated in political 
society as we move closer to the institutional realm, 
focusing on common sense at the state level (see below). In 
line with Bruff, common sense must be seen not only as a 
tool of political and social struggle, a product of it and a 
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terrain upon which such struggle takes shape, but see it as 
constitutive of all human social practice in all areas of 
society (Bruff 2010: 2-3; 8-9), Common sense is thus seen by 
Bruff not as something that is only fought over by and thus 
produced and reproduced over time by different groups in 
order to entrench their version of common sense, but is also 
the precondition for such production and conflict to take 
place at all. 
As such, common sense conceptions of the world are 
held by humans in society at large and – clearly – also by 
humans within institutions (such as trade unions, 
employers’ organisations and political parties) (Bruff 2008: 
53-57). The latter’s actions and thoughts are informed by 
common sense assumptions like those of the public at large, 
with the only difference being that their versions of 
common sense are more coherent and relatively unified. 
This is because the very task of these institutions is to 
devise political projects from a certain standpoint and 
hence give direction to social change. People within 
institutions are also placed within a certain perspectival 
position in society, with its corresponding common sense 
assumptions. They thus do not possess a complete 
‘structural literacy’ in the sense of consciously guiding 
capitalist development from above. These three institutions 
– following Bruff – can be seen as being collective organic 
intellectuals, which aim at shaping and moulding the 
common sense assumption of human beings in that society 
and translating them into a political project and thus a 
certain set of state policies, thus aiming at organising and 
shaping the masses from a certain political and social 
standpoint.  
Bruff has underlined how it is inappropriate to 
attempt to fix the versions of common sense in a unitary 
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manner, in order to attribute one and only one version of 
common sense to a certain actor. He states that it is more 
appropriate “to state that it is possible to identify certain 
asymmetries, tendencies and repetitions within any one 
version of common sense, without needing to fix, 
homogenize and universalize this version across space and 
time. A key example of this is the fundamental asymmetry 
within our modes of thinking about the world towards the 
material basis for our existence” (Bruff 2010: 10). Moreover, 
common sense “should be viewed holistically rather than 
as a sum of ideas that we can disaggregate cleanly into 
constituent parts which can be, as variables, added to and 
removed from the analysis as and when appropriate” 
(Ibidem).  
 
Common sense and ideology 
 
The concept of common sense – as hinted at above – 
should not be confused with that of ideology. As pointed 
out, ideology is the active shaping and moulding of 
common sense for reasons of political and social struggle. 
However, one should not lose track of the fact that capital, 
as a social force and a discipline over society and nature, 
connects individuals often in an invisible away, linking 
them without they being aware of it, through the market. In 
fact, typical of social relations within capitalism is that they 
often involve no personal relationship at all. Nevertheless, 
people’s conditions and – most importantly – their 
labouring activity are dependent upon one another and 
connected through the world market. This is indeed Marx’s 
concept of market socialisation, which is closely linked to 
the concept of commodity fetishism:  
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“the social relations between their (i.e. the workers) private 
labours appear as what they really are, i.e. they do not 
appear as direct social relations between persons in their 
work, but rather as material relations between persons and 
social relations between things” (Marx 1976: 165-6). 
 
It is useful to better understand Marx’s concept of 
commodity fetishism before delving into a discussion of 
common sense and hegemony, lest we forget that in 
capitalism, ideological forms are not mere illusions or 
simple ‘false consciousness’. They operate within and 
through the very fabric of the social relations, and they are 
constitutive of these relations. 
Once the worker has been separated from the means 
of production and hence from the relations of personal – 
directly political, and not economic – dependency that were 
characteristic of pre-capitalist societies, the ‘objective’ 
conditions of the market become “independent of the 
individual and, although created by society, appear as if 
they were natural conditions, not controllable by 
individuals” (Marx 1973: 164). Individuals are then re-
connected through the market, but this link appears as 
being the result of the things themselves, as constituted by 
impersonal relations over which they have no control, by a 
mechanism that escapes their will. As recalled above citing 
Colletti, the independence enjoyed by humans in a liberal 
society masks the dependence of each from a social power 
that escapes their control, capital – ‘the market’. 
Constitution is separated from genesis. The appearance is 
that of dealing with a simple relationship between things 
that are exchanged: and this is the real illusion Marx is 
talking about. Thus, what appears to be a relationship 
between things is in fact the determinate social relationship 
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between men: the objectivation of the subject and the 
subjectivation of the object. 
What the world market appears to develop is a 
“spontaneous interconnection, a material and mental 
metabolism which is independent of the knowing and 
willing of individuals, and which presupposes their 
reciprocal independence and indifference”(Marx 1973: 161). 
As Marcuse noted, “the constitution of the world occurs 
behind the backs of individuals, yet it is their work” 
(Marcuse 1988: 151 cited in Bonefeld 2006: 54-55). This is, in 
a nutshell, Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism: the idea 
that commodities exert a fetishistic domination over men, 
which are victims of the illusion that the commodity is only 
a thing, and not the product of their social labour. At the 
same time, in the production of commodities, social 
relations acquire the phantasmagorical form of relations 
between things, socialisation is fetishised as a relation 
between commodities and capitalist society presents itself, 
in its totality, as a society of commodities and of markets, of 
which men are but the intermediaries, the means for the 
functioning of markets, for the circulation and 
accumulation of capital, to which they must subdue 
themselves in order to survive. For instance, within 
neoliberalism, governments approach the ups and down of 
the world economy or of stock markets as almost 
supernatural signs that one may hope to placate but never 
should seriously challenge.55 
                                                        
55 Van der Pijl has linked the concept of commodity fetishism with the 
anthropological concept of taboo. The latter means that “if there is direct contact 
with what is sacred, feelings of awe and fear will be awakened which narrowly 
circumscribe the behaviour that is considered appropriate” (Van der Pijl 1998: 
13).  
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In The German Ideology, Marx maintained that “in 
imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance 
of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of 
life seem accidental” (Marx 1968: 35). They think that they 
are acting in unconditioned freedom, which derives from 
the absence of relations of personal dependence. However, 
in fact they are subordinated to an objective force, “they are 
less free, because they are more subjected to the violence of 
things” (Ibidem), which was born out of their own activity 
and has become autonomous up to the point of dominating 
them in an impersonal fashion: “the principal agents of this 
mode of production itself, the capitalist and the wage 
worker, are to that extent merely personifications of capital 
and wage labour. They are definite social characters, 
assigned to individuals by the process of social production” 
(Marx 1976: 1025). The worker is forced to work in order to 
survive, while the capitalist is constrained as he is forced to 
act within the coercive laws of competition, lest he faces the 
risk of falling into the conditions of a wage-labourer. The 
true subject is here capital itself, which subordinates 
individuals in order to valorise itself: the subordination of 
man to the thing.  One of the consequences of this view, on 
which in fact Marxist literature has not focused extensively, 
is the fact that within a capitalist mode of production, 
authority is vested in the capitalists, the bearers of capital, 
“only as a personification of the requirements of labour 
standing above the labourer. It is not vested in them in 
their capacity as political or theoretical rulers, in the way 
that it used to be under former modes of production” 
(Ibidem: 1027). Thus, one of Marx’s lessons is that, on an 
abstract level, within capitalism there is no ‘free’ class that 
consciously exploits the other class; on the contrary, all 
classes act within the production process not knowing what 
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they do, personifications entrapped within a mode of 
production in which it are not single individuals who are 
placed in conditions of freedom but capital as a social force.   
 As Giddens usefully summarises, “the taken-for-
granted cannot inevitably be equated with the accepted-as-
legitimate” (Giddens 1981: 65-66 cited in  Burnham 2006: 
38). There is thus a difference between the ideological order 
that is propagated by the historic bloc and condensated 
into the integral state and the practices and actions 
sustained daily by human beings in that society, often 
depoliticised as pressures emanating directly from ‘reality’, 
from ‘natural necessities’ (the taken-for-granted). One must 
keep in mind that, as Marx reminds us, capitalist 
production and reproduction is achieved also through the 
“silent compulsion of economic relations” (Marx 1976: 899) 
that are difficult to grasp simply by referring to ideological 
apparatuses. Of course, “direct extra-economic force is used 
but only in exceptional circumstances. In the ordinary run 
of things, the worker can be kept in the ‘natural law of 
production’, i.e. it is possible to rely on his dependence on 
capital, which springs from the conditions of production 
themselves, and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them” 
(Ibidem).  
 Common sense can be understood as the way in 
which these ‘objective’ conditions of production are 
internalised from a particular social and geographical 
perspective; as the depoliticised assumptions that 
individuals and classes in specific countries develop as “the 
basis for how human beings make sense of the situation 
they find themselves in” (Bruff 2010: 9).  As noted above, 
these conceptions cannot escape the material conditions of 
existence, and hence must contain references to how 
capitalism appears from a particular national and class 
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perspective. This is also relevant in our later discussion on 
the relationship between ‘the national’ and ‘the 
international’: our conceptions of ‘the international’ “are 
rooted in how ‘the international’ appears to us” (Bruff 2010: 
3).  
Forms of power such as the law can be seen as both 
an instrument by which property relations are enforced 
and reproduced in society, and as the embodiment of a 
historic bloc (whether hegemonic or not) that is related to 
certain norms that represent a mediation of class relations 
within a historical bloc, the concessions the dominant class 
to the subordinate ones: “Productive relations are therefore 
in part meaningful through their very definition in law” 
(Thompson 1975_ 261 cited in Morton 2006: 68). Hence, 
ideology is not a separate realm from production relations, 
but is part and parcel of the fabric of the world of 
production.  
The concept of ideology is useful when looking at 
the state and how the state produces and reproduces the 
hegemony of a particular historic bloc, and how the 
transformations at the level of the state take place. But 
capital as a social force, as a discipline over society and 
nature, operates on a level that largely transcends the 
national state, and connects individuals without their being 
aware of it (see above). The compulsion to sell one’s labour-
power is difficult to understand in terms of ‘ideology’. It is 
more an imperative that has followed capital’s stretch 
worldwide, and has become partly and differentially 
internalised as ‘common sense’. This compulsion and thus 
– in a capitalist economy – the submission to capitalist 
control of the labour process, is not an ideology in the sense 
of an idea that is accepted as legitimate, but it is taken for 
granted, in the sense that the material basis of our 
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existence, that is, the need for water, food and shelter, 
obliges humans to look for employment in order to satisfy 
these needs. Common sense is also the way human beings 
have ‘made sense’ of this necessity and its changing nature 
throughout the history of capitalism. Common sense is 
much more path-dependent than ideology and refers to the 
taken-for-granted more than to the accepted-as-legitimate. 
It is largely implicit rather than explicit and refers to the 
depoliticised assumptions about the ‘facts’ of ‘reality’. 
 The concept of common sense refers to the terrain on 
which ideology, as the conscious grafting of a hegemonic 
project, is predicated. Ideology does not reflect, “it 
constructs a ‘unity’ out of ‘difference’” (Hall 1991b: 120 
cited in Bruff 2008: 55). Common sense assumptions as both 
path-dependent and in continuous transformation are 
important in determining whether a certain political project 
has success or not, and it is based also on these common 
sense assumptions that political projects are developed in 
the first place. These political projects are not created out of 
nowhere, but they can become hegemonic precisely 
because they are able to create a synthesis between 
different versions of common sense in a given society. 
However, there is no determinism involved, as there is no 
fixed outcome of struggle: new ideas can be incorporated in 
different ways in different political projects, which can be 
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic. Each social group will 
attempt to secure the process of transformation for itself, 
also linking this project with non-economic issues that have 
ascended in society.  
Crucially, as Bruff argues, “in capitalist conditions of 
existence our thoughts about the world are skewed 
towards capital’s rather than labour’s dependence on the 
market” (Bruff 2011: 10). The point is that human beings 
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are materially dependent from the market for their own 
means of subsistence. Quoting Harvey extensively: 
 
“capital is the lifeblood that flows through the body politic 
of all those societies we call capitalist, spreading out, 
sometimes as a trickle and other times as a flood, into every 
nook and cranny of the inhabited world. It is thanks to this 
flow that we, who live under capitalism, acquire our daily 
bread as well as our houses, cars, cell phones, shirts, shoes 
and all the other goods we need to support our daily life. 
By way of these flows the wealth is created from which the 
many services that support, entertain, educate, resuscitate 
or cleanse us are provided. By taxing this flow states 
augment their power, their military might and their 
capacity to ensure an adequate standard of life for their 
citizens. Interrupt, slow down or, even worse, suspend the 
flow and we encounter a crisis in capitalism in which daily 
life can no longer go on in the style to which we have 
become accustomed” (Harvey 2010: vi).  
  
Thus, it is difficult to neglect that this material 
dependence must shape our forms of thought and skew 
them towards capital’s (instead of labour’s) dependence on 
the market and its continuous quest for surplus labour, and 
thus towards creating favourable conditions for capital 
accumulation. The fact of living within a capitalist mode of 
production poses heavy constraints on our thoughts about 
society and on the need to produce and how to organise it. 
Discussing common sense generally, Seale argues that it is 
“social practices rather than perceptions are the site where 
common sense operates” (Seale 2004b: 97): common sense 
is thus related to what people are doing rather what they 
are thinking. And in a capitalist society, their labouring 
activity – what they are doing – is subsumed under capital’s 
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process of valorisation. Marx was constantly aware that 
ideas – and, in particular, dominant ideologies – arise from 
people’s daily practices and therefore, if one is interested in 
analysing what people really believe in, one must look at 
what people are doing rather than what they are saying. 
What Marx saw as one of the defining characteristic 
of a capitalist mode of production, namely the separation of 
workers from the means of production, must surely affect 
our forms of thought. Workers within capitalism are 
compelled to sell their labour-power on the market, and 
thus are dependent on the latter for their own survival. 
Capital is also dependent on the market for its own 
valorisation. Both rely on the market, but clearly in an 
unequal way: workers are dependent on the market in 
order to gain means of subsistence, and are thus 
economically (not politically) forced to sell their labour-
power. The process of capital accumulation, on the other 
hand, is based upon the subsumption of labour within the 
production process in order to acquire profit.  Thus, capital 
needs labour and viceversa, yet this relationship is unequal. 
As any mode of production, capitalism is thus a 
relationship of power, exploitation and resistance.  
Therefore, “the pressures and limits of what can 
ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political and 
cultural system (capitalism) seem to most of us the 
pressures and limits of simple experience and common 
sense” (Williams 1977: 110 cited in Bruff 2011: 9).  As Bruff 
states, “if the material conditions of life are accessed 
through the capitalist market, then it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the efficient functioning of this system of 
production will generally take a higher priority than 
transforming it into a more equitable set of arrangements” 
(Bruff 2011: 9). Precisely because there is an asymmetry 
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within our conceptions of the world towards the need to 
produce, within capitalism these ideas will surely be 
skewed towards capital’s dependence on the market (for 
valorisation and further accumulation), rather than 
labour’s. And this is because workers access means of 
subsistence by selling their labour-force and receiving in 
exchange a salary that can buy commodities. For instance, 
situations of crisis in capitalist accumulation create 
unemployment (therefore threatening the ability of 
workers to acquire means of subsistence), and thus the 
commonsensical thought is that one must create favourable 
conditions for capital accumulation in order to ‘solve’ the 
crisis.  
A crucial element is that there need not be positive 
acceptance of an assumption or an idea for it to be 
embodied in the state. The very idea of the market and of 
both capital and labour’s dependence on it generates 
assumptions about what is the ‘hard truth’ of reality that 
cannot be modified. Witness how the reactions to the 
economic and financial crisis that erupted in 2008 
concentrated mainly on the need to re-create a ‘suitable’ 
economic environment for capital accumulation. This may 
not be considered positively by large parts of the 
population, but it is presented as an unavoidable fact of 
life: the only way to get out of the crisis is to ‘swallow the 
bitter pill’.  
 
Common sense, class struggle and the state 
 
Social and political struggle involves attempts by 
different social groups to make their version of common 
sense the foundation for the way in which human beings 
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think and act in a particular society (Bruff 2008: 57-61). 
There may be several and contrasting versions of common 
sense in a particular society, and it is an empirical question 
to find out which version of common sense has become 
dominant, and has thus been incorporated within the state 
apparatus. Such attempts can be successful only if they 
build on the “sedimentations of common sense left behind 
by previous philosophical currents” (Bruff 2008: 47). Thus, 
as argued above, the dominant version of common sense is 
both relatively rigid and potentially in transformation.  As 
a result, it is possible to conceive theoretically and observe 
empirically both the changes taking place in the given 
society and the path-dependent elements that distinguish 
one society from another.  
The state, as the locus of formally ‘political’ power in 
society, is the institutional terrain of the outcomes of social 
struggle, and its status as the (only) sovereign entity gives 
the historic bloc of forces supporting a particular version of 
synthesis of common sense – or its moulding into an 
ideology – a position from which it can effectively 
implement this version and entrench it into the state by its 
very definition in law within the legal framework. 
However, the sphere of politics cannot be confined to the 
state apparatus, a specific institutional sphere of the 
‘social’, because it constitutes an all-pervading dimension 
of society, as it shapes all social relations. Thus, the state 
cannot be seen as ‘the realm of politics’, but must be 
conceived as a ‘region’ of society that has been constructed 
“as a privileged point of enunciation, permitting the 
hegemonic forces to speak in the name of society” (Torfing 
1999: 71). It is in this role that the state is the target of 
political and social struggle, and the point from which 
hegemony is propagated throughout society.  
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 The role of organic intellectuals is to attempt to 
shape common sense in a certain direction. As argued 
above, for Gramsci not every form of thought that is 
widespread in society is relevant, but only those ideas that 
“organise human masses, and create the terrain on which 
men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle” (Bieler 2006: 36). To become relevant in political 
economy, ideas need to develop a dialectical relationship 
with the relations of production and thus connect to 
specific social forces. Thus, ideologies are coextensive with 
class struggle, and therefore are connected organically with 
struggles at the level of the economic structure. It is the role 
of organic intellectuals, which emerge from and represent 
social forces, to link the world of production with the 
formally political realm (Ibidem). Their task is to develop 
political projects within a constellation of social forces (the 
historic bloc). They thus develop what have been called the 
‘intersubjective meanings’ and the ‘collective images’ of 
specific groups. 
Since common sense is more coherent and unified at 
the state level, it has been argued above (following Bruff) 
that common sense can be most effectively studied at the 
élite level (the organic intellectuals). I therefore focus on 
trade unions, employers’ associations and political parties 
as organic intellectuals that possess a certain common sense 
view of the world and also attempt to mould and modify it 
in order to suit particular political projects. The empirical 
chapter will focus on these three actors, for they are the 
“institutional frameworks within and through which 
different class fractions (or components) of capital and 
labour attempt to establish their particular interests and 
ideas as the generally accepted, or ‘common sense’ view” 
(Bieler 2000: 13 cited in Bruff 2008: 54). Organic intellectuals 
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give direction and coherence to the fragmented and 
incoherent forms of common sense held by the population 
at large, but their ability to develop an ideology is also 
constrained by these forms of common sense, which form 
part of how they themselves see the world (there is therefore 
no need to introduce categories such as ‘manipulation’). 
Gramsci himself emphasised the necessity, in order for 
hegemony to be attained, to move beyond the contradictory 
forms of common sense “into a more coherent political 
theory or philosophical current. This ‘raising of popular 
thought’ is part and parcel of the process by which a 
collective will is constructed, and requires extensive work 
of intellectual organisation” (Hall 1996c: 432 cited in Bruff 
2008: 48). It is this ‘raising of popular thought’ that is 
studied here, as the way classes (through ‘their’ organic 
intellectuals) in society have ‘made sense’ of their 
conditions of living.  
Bruff argues that any version of common sense that 
predominates in a given society must have come in contact 
with earlier versions of common sense that had led that 
society. “Thus, any social group seeking to attain societal 
hegemony must engage with the sediments of thought 
which have built up over time in that society, in order to 
gain support vis-à-vis other groups” (Bruff 2008: 10). Thus, 
following Bruff, one can argue that the way in which a 
version of common sense can come to predominate is 
through its connection to a social group who promotes 
such a version. Referring to our previous discussion, let us 
recall here that hegemony is a practice that is able to 
transcend a class’ core economic interests and construct a 
worldview that takes into account the ‘popular and 
democratic’ aspirations of the people, which do not 
necessarily have a class character by articulating them 
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together into a political project. The crucial point is when a 
particular version of common sense is institutionalised 
within the state apparatus, in this way appearing as 
‘natural’. The state therefore becomes the locus from which 
the historical bloc projects its hegemony, which however 
was previously attained within civil society. As Cox 
underlines, by “entrenching societal leadership in the legal 
framework, the historical bloc has the opportunity to frame 
and thus circumscribe action and thought in accordance 
with the version of common sense that it supports. This 
enables its hegemony to appear natural” (Cox 1996: 517-519 
cited in Bruff 2008: 60).  
Entrenching one version of common sense in the 
legal framework means moving from civil society to 
political society and achieving the status of political 
hegemony (see the previous discussion of societal and 
political hegemony). However, any social group that does 
so must necessarily face the sediments of common sense 
entrenched in existing sector of the state and institutional 
arrangements that have developed over time. It is in this 
sense that the state is the embodiment of the historical bloc 
leading that society, which must engage with previous 
sedimentations of ideas that have consolidated at the state 
level 
Common sense must thus refer to the state as the 
locus of formal political power and activity, as the sphere 
where political projects and formulas are grafted. However, 
as made clear earlier, the state here refers to Gramsci’s 
integral state, and therefore the sphere of the administrative 
apparatus of the state, political society, as well as civil society. 
Capital as a social form acts through these two spheres and 
their apparent separation in capitalism. Common sense 
develops as a crystallisation of previous forms of social 
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relations of production and hegemonies, and can be seen as 
a condensation of how human beings have historically 
‘made sense’ of human activity. Cox states that “the 
language of consensus is a language of common interests 
expressed in universalist terms, though the structure of 
power relations underlying it is skewed in favour of the 
dominant groups” (Cox 1996: 421). What is achieved with 
hegemony is therefore not outright domination on the part 
of the dominant group, but “constantly shifting, yet 
constantly unequal, relation of power within the formation 
(Bruff 2008: 59). These different versions of common sense 
manifest different degrees of resistance to, or acquiescence 
to, the dominant version, as some common sense sediments 
may have accumulated more strongly than others, 
depoliticising more deeply the assumption regarding a 
particular sphere of state policy (Ibidem: 63).  
As Bruff argues, each state branch constitutes the 
power base of a fraction of the bloc, and thus the 
concession on the part of the dominant group, condensated 
within a certain part of the institutional apparatus, are 
“detracting from state unity but guaranteeing the (temporary) 
unity of the historical bloc through strategic (but not 
fundamental) adjustments to the hegemonic project” (Bruff 
2008: 62). This is also a useful way of containing the 
potential formation of counter-hegemonic projects by 
neutralising or incorporating other social groups. Although 
it is clear that there are contradictory tendencies within a 
historical bloc that makes it difficult for the state to act in a 
coherent and unified way, the key issue is “the extent to 
which the leading social group is able to use privileged 
centres of power within the state’s administrative 
apparatus – such as the economic ministries – to impose its 
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will on resistant parts of the state apparatus” (Bruff 2008: 
63).  
 Here however I would like to note a point of 
disagreement with Bruff’s account of common sense’s 
entrenchment in the legal apparatus. Bruff distinguishes 
himself from other neo-Gramscian authors (such as Bieler 
and Morton 2006c) who talk about the ‘relative autonomy’ 
of the state from society. Their argument is that the state 
looks after the long-term interests of capital as a whole, 
acting in a relatively autonomous way with respect to the 
groups vying for societal leadership, thus imposing short-
term concessions in order to re-impose long-term 
domination. Bruff, on the other hand, stresses that “this 
comes about not through a notion of imposition but 
through the necessities of social and political struggle and 
accompanying power relations” (Bruff 2008: 64). The 
author then goes on to argue that capital does enjoy a 
privileged position, but “in the first instance this is through 
the greater power it enjoys vis-à-vis labour in capitalist 
societies. The state is thus the moment of condensation, the 
materialisation of unequal power relations in the form of 
institutional configuration and policies” (Ibidem). On the 
contrary, I would stress that it is the very existence of the 
state as a capitalist state, the division of private from public 
and ‘economic’ from ‘political’ that is constitutive of the 
capitalist mode of production, which entrenches capital’s 
power in the state. The state’s constitution as such is the 
expression of a capitalist mode of production, for instance 
in its dependence on fiscal revenues or financial markets 
for the financing of state spending. The liberal state is a 
limited form of state that is ultimately subordinate to 
interests in civil society: private property rights and 
freedom on contract – the legal basis of the capitalist mode 
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of production – are written into the very constitution as 
rule of law (Gill 2002: 163-164). Once again, capital does not 
have power, it is power, and creates the apparent division 
between itself and the formerly political sphere of the state. 
The state is not an empty shell. Of course, societies can be 
capitalist in very different ways, which depend on the 
different social content of the state.  
 
Common sense and ‘the international’ 
 
In this section, I discuss the relationship between 
‘the national’ and ‘the international’. Here, I follow closely 
Bruff’s conceptualisation (Bruff 2010). As Morton 
underlines, every state’s national content is the spatially 
and historically specific outcome of social and political 
struggle as it is conditioned by the international (Morton 
2007a: 170). Bruff starts from this assertion in order to claim 
that such interplay between the ‘vertical’ and the 
‘horizontal’ forms the basis of national varieties of 
capitalism. The direction of the state, its social content or 
raison d’état is therefore the outcome of the way in which 
‘the national’ and ‘the international’ intertwine within a 
given territory. Bruff notes that ‘the national’ and ‘the 
international’ are not two discrete and autonomous levels – 
as is often postulated by mainstream social science in the 
classic International Relations/Comparative Politics 
division – but the focus is on their intertwining, the way in 
which they are “simultaneously related and 
methodologically distinctive” (Bruff 2010: 9). As Gramsci 
states, “particular histories exist only within the frame of 
world history” and thus ‘the national’ is seen as a point of 
arrival within ‘the international’ (Gramsci cited in Morton 
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2007b: 615). In criticising the conventional distinction 
between international relations and comparative politics, 
Van der Pijl points out that they assume that “societies 
develop on their own, engaging in foreign relations only 
after they have effectively constituted themselves – what 
may be called the ‘comparative politics fallacy’” (Van der 
Pijl 2007: 20). The author adds that 
 
“the idea of international relations in fact is based on this 
assumption. It presumes that the foreign has been 
exteriorised, and that a homogeneous community has been 
established as a result. Usually this homogeneity is then 
projected back into history, and what Benedict Anderson 
(1991) calls the ‘imagined community’, with hindsight 
endowed with a capacity to develop on its own” (Ibidem). 
 
 However, the nation is not simply an ‘imagined 
community’. Through the functioning of the state 
apparatuses, it gives materiality to capitalist social relations 
by projecting a ‘we’ onto the state. Moreover, the different 
and contrasting national belongings tend to present the 
world as a world of nation-states, and make it function as a 
world of nation-states. Thus, by virtue of the ideological 
power of national belonging shaped by history and the 
construction of a capitalist unity of antagonistic classes, the 
nation-state “tends to unify the ‘internal’ that is the 
national and demarcate and distinguish it from the 
‘external’ that is the non-national’” (Milios and 
Sotiropoulos 2009: 107). This framework of nation-states as 
the realm of international relations in turn is part and 
parcel of the effective reproduction of capital on a world 
scale, with the corresponding practice of competition 
among different national capitals in the world market 
(Ibidem: Part III).  
186   
With reference to the concept of common sense, and 
keeping in mind the conditions of existence that shape – 
without determining – our thoughts, it is clear that our 
conceptions of ‘the international’ are rooted in how ‘the 
international’ appears to us, how the complexity and the 
differentiated nature of the capitalist mode of production in 
its worldwide reach is understood, how it generates 
assumptions about economic ‘facts’ within different 
versions of common sense (Bruff 2010: 3; 16). This is 
because – as argued above – social practice is necessarily 
perspectival, as humans are unable to grasp the complexity 
of the world in its totality. Social practice  - including 
common sense – is based upon a certain national or social 
point of view that shapes thought and action so that our 
common sense is also constituted by national-international 
articulations, and must make reference to how the social 
world is understood from a particular territorial 
standpoint.  
 Let us briefly sum up the argument thus far. In all 
national political economies, there are specific dominant 
versions of common sense that shape human social 
practices within the confines of the national territory. This 
common sense is the way in which humans and social 
forces (through organic intellectuals) have understood and 
‘made sense’ of their position within the global capitalist 
production system, and thus incorporates a specific 
national and class standpoint. As our common sense 
assumptions are skewed towards capital’s dependence on 
the market more than towards labour’s, these tend to give 
precedence to meeting human being’s transhistorical need 
for means of subsistence by privileging the creation of 
favourable conditions for capital accumulation. Therefore, 
all national dominant versions of common sense 
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incorporate, in one way or another, the idea of an ‘external 
constraint’. This is nationally specific according to the 
particular national insertion into capitalism, but is 
nevertheless always present, as, ultimately, all nation-states 
are materially dependent on other nation-states for their 
capitalist development. 
 
In this remaining part of the chapter, I briefly argue 
against Bruff’s critique of the transnational capitalism 
literature, claiming that the latter is a useful starting point 
for thinking about restructuring within national political 
economies. Although I do not take on board Bruff’s critique 
of the transnational capitalism literature (Bruff 2010) this 
does not warrant a neglect of the importance of continuing 
to use the national/international distinction in order to 
make sense of national trajectories. However, I integrate 
Bruff’s analysis within Kees Van der Pijl’s Lockean 
heartland/Contender state geopolitical framework.  
 Van der Pijl has developed the heartland/contender 
state structure as a framework for thinking about 
geopolitical rivalry and capitalist transformation since the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Van der Pijl 1998; 2006). The 
heartland/contender state structure has its origins in the 
first rivalry of the capitalist era, that between France and 
England in the 17th century. The capitalist world is seen as 
including a ‘Lockean heartland’ consisting of the leading 
capitalist countries (The UK, the USA and the Anglo-Saxon 
world generally) and ‘Hobbesian’ contender states, which 
aim at catching up with the heartland. In the Lockean 
state/society complex, it is the bourgeoisie that directly 
shapes institutions that also allow it to expand 
transnationally and build a transnational civil society. The 
‘Hobbesian’ reaction, on the other hand, tends to develop a 
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centralised state that guides development from above, 
through command economies guided by a ‘state class’, 
often first put in place by revolutions. England is the 
prototype of the first model, while France fits the second.  
Thus, France adopted a version of capitalism that clung to a 
strong state. From that moment on, the Lockean heartland, 
with their liberal ideologies, and ‘contender states’ have 
overdeteremined geopolitical rivalry and capitalist 
development. 
Throughout history, the Lockean heartland has been 
challenged by generations of contender states (France, 
Germany, the USSR, Japan) driven by revolutions from 
above.  This framework should not be mistaken as 
determinist. However, the constraints posed on the state 
willing to catch up were so strong, that there was little 
freedom in terms of the model chosen to develop: 
 
“precisely because France happened to be closest to the English 
experience in time and space, it could not stray away from the 
lead given by the British. In an embrace as close as the one 
between these two countries, there is very little freedom for 
the weaker party to experiment in terms of ends; although 
it will be forced, by the same logic, to rely on different 
means. It must perforce close the gap with the ‘first mover’ 
in order to prevent being dispossessed and subjected, and 
it did so by a revolution from above, using the state as a 
lever to accelerate social development” (Van der Pijl 2006: 
9-10, italics in original.). 
 
Bruff states that within the transnational capitalism 
literature56, “the determining logic of the transnational                                                         
56 Apart from Van der Pijl’s work cited above, the transnational historical 
materialism literature includes, among others, Van Apeldoorn 2002; 2004, 
Overbeek 1993; 2003; 2004; Gill 2003; Cafruny and Ryner 2007. 
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subsumes the national” (Bruff 2010: 2). However, within 
the Lockean heartland/Contender state divide, there is no 
such ‘swallowing up’, but rather ‘the national’ is positioned 
within a wider geopolitical scheme that seeks to explain the 
historical spread of capital as a social force worldwide and 
the reactions it engenders in peripheral and semi-
peripheral countries. 
I claim that Bruff’s conceptualisation can be 
incorporated within this framework. I also agree with 
Bruff’s assertion that in the last 30 years there has been a 
rebalancing of the national/international relationship in 
favour of the latter (Bruff 2008: 67). Clearly, however, a 
country’s positioning within this framework, and 
nationally specific characteristics of specific state/society 
complexes generate a differential reception of the 
transnationalisation of production and finance, that is one 
of the most important elements of neoliberal hegemony. As 
Bruff notes, “such rebalancing (of the 
national/international relationship) is spatially specific in 
terms of which institutional ‘spaces’ or parts of the state 
apparatus have been more or less affected (…) It is also 
temporally specific for different countries and different 
institutional spaces will evolve at variable rates” (Ibidem). 
This rebalancing however can be fruitfully studied and 
understood when placed within the Lockean 
heartland/Contender state framework. Therefore, there is 
no neglect of the national within the transnational, as Van 
der Pijl notes (1998: 64): “all social action is simultaneously 
structured by the tendency towards global unification 
represented by capital, and by the fact that every concrete 
state/society complex is ultimately held together by a 
specific structure of power and authority mediating with 
other such complexes”.  
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I thus follow Bruff’s conceptual framework that 
focuses on the distinctive national trajectories of European 
political economies under the ‘conditioning of the 
international’, as described above. However, I stress that 
this is not in contrast to those authors who emphasise the 
transnational dimension and processes of restructuring. In 
fact, the concepts of ‘national’ and ‘international’ continue 
to have relevance once the object of study is a national 
political economy, but this does not warrant a discarding of 
the transnational processes and the agency of transnational 
forces within national forms of state or of the recognition of 
the transnational logic within global geopolitical relations. 
Stressing the transnational dimension does not diminish 
the importance of analysing the specific ways national 
forms of state interact with these processes, and does not 
subsume the national under an ineludible transnational 
logic.  
Bruff argues that the unspoken assumption of the 
analysis of European integration on the part of the 
‘transnational capitalism’ literature is its ‘institutional 
isomorphism’: “the implicit argument is that this 
transformative project, once formulated at the European 
level, is able to penetrate the member states in a uniform 
manner because the national units fall into line with what 
the supranational unit dictates” (Bruff 2010: 4). It seems 
that Bruff’s reference here is to Van Apeldoorn’s analysis of 
the process of European integration since the 1980s (2002), 
which is seen by the latter from the perspective of the need 
on the part of transnational capital to impose a neoliberal 
macroeconomic policy. This was done through the 
institutionalisation of an “embedded neoliberal” hegemony 
at the European level, which sought to enforce a policy of 
‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill 1998). Bruff argues that within 
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this account “a circular logic is erected: any modifications 
in the national varieties of capitalism are due to the 
entrenchment of neoliberalism at the EU level at the behest 
of transnational capital”  (Ibidem: 5) and that what is 
neglected is that “transnationally-oriented fractions of 
capital remain rooted in their national contexts, which in 
turn underlies the intra-class conflicts that take place within 
transnational capital” (Ibidem).  
 I argue that this critique is misplaced. Van 
Apeldoorn’s account does not subsume the national under 
the determining logic of the transnational. On the contrary, 
he stresses that although the ‘embedded neoliberal’ 
hegemony at the European level aims at ‘disembedding’ 
the economy from society, the remaining corporatist 
structures which embody the different national class 
compromises and historical blocs, continue to be in place. 
In fact, in a later work, it is claimed that it is their (national 
institutions’) duty to maintain forms of class compromise 
and at the same time to adhere to the deflationary and 
deregulatory bias of EU policies (Van Apeldoorn 2008). 
Thus, the national/international articulation remains 
central and transformations within national forms of state 
are not simply subsumed under a constraining 
transnational hegemony or logic. As Van der Pijl points 
out, transnational social forces act within the national (Van 
der Pijl 1998: 64-97, 2006a: 1-32), not above or beyond it. 
Thus, I would not stress the difference between the 
transnational capitalism literature and the more nationally-
oriented one (the works by Bieler and Morton), as their 
object of analysis is slightly different. The 
national/international relationship that is used here can be 
incorporated within both approaches.  
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 In conclusion of this theoretical section, I wish to 
clarify that the conceptualisation of common sense 
advanced and the whole theoretical edifice that supports it, 
while incorporating an attention to the discursive 
construction of reality and the role of ideas, nonetheless 
distances itself from both social constructivist and post-
structuralist analyses. The kind of critical theory adopted 
here retains a historical materialist (thus, historicist) 
dimension, refusing to postulate a continuous struggle 
among discourses – that aim at attaching different 
meanings to freely floating ‘signifiers’ – as the form of 
politics per se. To the contrary, one of the aims of the 
approach is to unmask the dominant discourse and common 
sense assumptions as grounded in a set of social relations 
marked by capitalist exploitation. As hopefully the above has 
made clear, the way man understands the world around 
him is not independent from how man organises the 
production of the goods (use-values) that are essential for 
its survival, and thus it is not the case that any meaning can 
be attached to a ‘signifier’ within a given mode of 
production. Armed with these insights, the next chapter 
clarifies the methodological choices taken for this research.  
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3. The Analysis: Methodology and Empirical 
Research Process 
 
In this chapter I discuss the methodological choices 
made and the research process as it was empirically carried 
out, justifying the choice of qualitative methods such as 
interviews and going through all the stages of the interview 
research. It is divided into four sections. In the first one, I 
discuss general methodological choices, including the 
choice for a qualitative method and sampling; the second 
section looks in more detail at the research process, 
covering issues of research design and structure, and 
interview questions; in the third part, I consider the themes 
of reliability and validity of research; and in the last section 
I list the actual interviews carried out. Moreover, the link 
between the choices taken and the theoretical stance 
adopted will be discussed, giving it further credibility. 
The neo-Gramscian approach proposed in the 
previous chapter highlighted how the best way to 
effectively study the common sense assumptions that 
underpin the quest for consensus is to examine them at the 
élite level, the level of organic intellectuals, whose function 
is to guide and provide direction to particular social forces 
or historical blocs of social forces around a political project. 
Knowledge, within a historical materialist approach, as has 
been argued above, is always situated, perspectival 
knowledge. The goal of the project is to uncover how 
consensus was reached through the overlapping of different 
versions of common sense on the need to produce and how 
to organise it, on what different actors perceived the ‘hard 
facts’ of economic reality to be (including Italy’s insertion 
into capitalism). 
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The project seeks to provide an explanation for how 
consensus was achieved in Italy on the ‘Ciampi protocol’ 
signed in 1993 and on the subsequent reforms of the 
welfare state. This will be done by studying ‘common 
sense’ conceptions as they have been developed by 
different social forces within the Italian political economy. 
As the last part of the previous chapter argued, the impact 
of the economic sphere - capitalist social relations as they 
have been ‘nationalised’ in different settings according to 
their specific national historical experience – can be seen by 
observing how the fundamental basis for human activity 
and subsistence shapes conceptions of it. Hence, common 
sense conceptions of the political economy are in turn 
shaped by the political economy itself, because ideas are 
not an independent reality but dialectically linked with 
how production is organised – the mode of production. 
Theoretically, what is claimed is that common sense is 
inherently shaped by (although not determined by) the 
way production is organised and thus the way people gain 
access to the means of subsistence. Within capitalism, it is 
through the market that this takes place. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the clearest observation of the common 
sense conceptions within a national political economy can 
be seen at the state (élite) level, because here they become 
more coherent and less fragmentary. Common sense is not 
merely an idea: social practices rather than mere 
perceptions are the site where common sense operates, and 
all knowledge is considered as an aspect of social practice. 
As in Marx’s famous definition of ideology as “they don’t 
know it but they are doing it”, the focus is on what people 
are doing rather than upon what they are thinking they are 
doing. 
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I will argue that qualitative methods, and in 
particular interviews with members of the élite in 
institutions and organisations (employers’ associations, 
trade unions, political parties and more ‘neutral’ external 
observers in academia) are the best way to gain insight into 
common sense perception, because they attempt “to 
understand the world from the subject’s point of view, to 
unfold the meaning of their experiences, to uncover their 
lived world prior to scientific explanations.” (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 1) Interviews are a privileged means to 
gain access to common sense because they shed light on the 
assumptions underlying the worldview of the interviewee. 
The interviewees can be described – within a neo-
Gramscian approach - as ‘organic intellectuals’ of different 
social forces, and hence their thoughts and ideas inherently 
incorporate a class perspective on society.  
Methodological choices 
 
Methodology is a general approach to the study of a 
research topic, establishing how one will go about studying 
a phenomenon. One’s methodological stance (or research 
strategy) is not only linked to the research question, but 
also to the ontological and epistemological approach used. 
Methods, on the other hand, are specific research 
techniques, such as – in the case of qualitative research – 
observation, surveys or interviewing. 
In a positivist understanding of social sciences, there 
is no methodological difference between the natural and 
the social sciences. What is presupposed is thus the unity of 
the sciences (Hollis 1994: 41), and thus the view that the 
foundation of knowledge is built on the discovery and 
testing of general laws (Delanty 2005: 11) by following 
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general methodological rules that are largely independent 
of the content and context of the investigation. In this 
understanding, the researcher must begin his study with 
some theory in his mind and formulate hypotheses to be 
proved or disproved. The idea is that scientific statements 
should be based solely on observable data: “the observation 
of the data and the interpretation of their meanings were to 
be strictly separated.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 57) 
Moreover, “scientific facts were to be unambiguous, intra-
subjectively and inter-subjectively reproducible, objective 
and quantifiable” (ibidem), generating value-neutral scientific 
statements and separating values from facts. 
From the previous discussion on the difference 
between what Cox called problem-solving theory and critical 
theory (Cox 1981), it is clear that a neo-Gramscian approach 
does not rely on a positivist mode of inquiry. It is claimed 
that value-neutrality cannot exist in the social sciences, as 
any theory is unavoidably “for someone and for some 
purpose”, hence perspectival, based as it is on a certain 
standpoint in space and time which shapes the 
identification of the “facts” one looks for and the very 
ontological building blocks one sees in ‘reality’. On the 
other hand, this research project is nonetheless grounded in 
a historical materialist approach and thus rejects the notion, 
that is dear to post-structuralist approaches (see Torfing 
1999), that the social world is but a ‘discourse’ that is 
formed by freely-floating ‘signifiers’ whose meaning is 
continually fought over by alternative narratives and 
political projects. The post-structuralist approach stresses 
the totally contingent nature of ‘politics’. On the other hand, 
a neo-Gramscian approach, while according a due role to 
discourse, emphasises that discursive constructions cannot 
be independent from the materiality of human life. As 
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argued at length in the previous chapter, the transhistorical 
need humans have for means of subsistence shapes without 
determining thoughts about the social world, and crucially 
on the political economy.  Therefore, the theoretical and 
ontological perspective advanced here is neither positivist 
not post-structuralist, but historical materialist.  
 
Why qualitative research? 
 
The choice of methodology depends both on the 
ontological and epistemological stance adopted and on the 
nature of the research problématique to be explored. A neo-
Gramscian approach, with its focus on ‘historical 
structures’ and the interrelationship between ideas and 
material capabilities, is more attuned to qualitative research 
methods. As Kvale and Brinkmann argue, “we should 
consider what we want to know before determining our 
ways of knowing it” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 305). 
Hence, our choice between qualitative and quantitative 
methods should be grounded also on the nature of the 
subject matter under scrutiny: “In practice, the choice of 
methods is often largely determined by the demands of the 
research questions facing the researcher and the 
appropriateness of methods to those questions” (Devine 
and Heath 1999: 204). In short, we should pragmatically 
“let the subject matter and research purpose decide the 
application of qualitative or quantitative approaches in an 
investigation” (Ibidem: 306). As the goal of this project is to 
uncover the assumptions underlying the opinions 
expressed, in order to gain insight on the ‘common sense’ 
conceptions, qualitative research methods, with their focus 
on interpretation, meaning and analysis of underlying 
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assumptions, are the most conducive to attaining these 
objectives. 
Having outlined an anti-positivist epistemological 
stance in the previous chapter, it is clear that only a 
methodology that is able to capture the “dynamic 
constructed and evolving nature of social reality” (Ibidem: 
201-202) is appropriate to this research. The aim is thus to 
understand the social world through the eyes of those 
being studied, to uncover the social meanings of events or 
experiences rather than reconstructing ‘factual’ accounts of 
events, grounded in the objective and tangible (Ibidem: 207). 
Although arguing from a slightly different theoretical 
angle, Somers and Gibson offer a good description of how 
people create meaning in social reality: “people make sense 
of what has happened and is happening to them by 
attempting to assemble or in some way to integrate these 
happenings within one or more narratives (…); people are 
guided in certain ways and not others on the basis of the 
projections, expectations and memories derived from a 
multiplicity but ultimately linked repertoire of available 
social public cultural narratives” ( Somers and Gibson 1994: 
38-39, cited in Lawler 2002: 243). 
As Bryman argues, one of the central motifs of 
qualitative research is to uncover “the way in which people 
being studied understand and interpret their social reality” 
(Bryman 1988: 8, cited in Snape and Spencer 2003: 3). In a 
way that resembles the dialectical approach between 
structure and agency that has been outlined above, Gerson 
and Horowitz argue that “whether the method is 
interviewing or observation, direct engagement in the 
social world focuses the (…) eye on the interaction between 
structure and action – on how people are embedded in 
larger social and cultural contexts and how, in turn, they 
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actively participate in shaping the world they inhabit” 
(Gerson and Horowitz 2002: 203). Thus, qualitative 
research is particularly well-suited for analysing the way 
people construct, interpret and give meaning to experience.  
A second crucial aspect of qualitative research is its 
ability to analyse issues in depth and understand the 
assumptions behind people’s understanding, offering the 
opportunity to “unpack issues, to see what they are about 
or what lies inside, and to explore how they are understood 
by those connected with them” (Ritchie 2003: 25). 
Qualitative research thus provides an opportunity to gain 
access to what lies behind or underpins a decision, attitude 
or behaviour, also allowing “associations that occur in 
people’s thinking or acting – and the meaning these have 
for people – to be identified.” (ibidem: 28). Common sense 
assumptions about the political economy can thus be 
accessed precisely by analysing how people understand 
and interpret a certain issue.   
 
Why interviews? 
 
Qualitative research methods are characterised by 
interactive data collection methods which usually “involve 
close contact between the researcher and research 
participants” (Snape and Spencer 2003: 3), and chief among 
these is the research interview, commonly defined as 
“conversation with a purpose” (Legard, Keegan and Ward 
2003: 138). The latter is particularly well-suited for attempts 
to understand the world from the subject’s point of view, 
“to unfold the meaning of their experiences, to uncover 
their lived world prior to scientific explanations.” (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2003: 1). That is, it takes an ‘emic’ 
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perspective, that is one which takes the perspective of the 
people being studied by penetrating their frames of 
meaning (Ibidem: 4).  
There seems to be a general agreement in the 
qualitative research literature that interviews are useful for 
exploring single issues in depth and detail (see Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009; Williams 2002). Interviews are a form of 
generated data which, “in contrast to naturally occurring 
data, give insight into people’s own perspectives on and 
interpretations of their beliefs and behaviours – and most 
crucially an understanding of the meaning that they attach 
to them.” (Ritchie 2003: 36). Moreover, the medium of 
language is in itself crucial in illuminating meaning: “the 
expressive power of language provides the most important 
resource for accounts. A crucial feature of language is its 
capacity to present descriptions, explanations and 
evaluations of almost infinite variety about any aspect of 
the world including itself.” (Hammersley and Atkison 
1995: 126) 
Interviews are thus adequate to the research goal 
because they shed light on the meanings attached to 
particular issues, themes or events. In this case, they can 
explore the meanings attached to the political economy and 
hence uncover the assumptions underlying the opinions 
expressed. In fact, one of the main critiques of interview 
research is precisely that it is not scientific but only “reflects 
common sense” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 168). This, in 
the case under study here, can be turned on its head: the 
goal of this research is precisely to uncover the common 
sense ideas on the political economy, hence interviews are 
considered to be the best method.  
Another possible source of data would have been 
official documents. Although these have been used as a 
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means of validation of the interviews and to verify the 
information given during the conversations (the 
information was cross-checked also using information from 
other interviews and secondary literature), documents tend 
to state only the outcome of a debate or a policy suggestion, 
neglecting the forethought or assumptions underlying it 
(Bieler 2006: 5). This is hardly useful for unearthing the 
internal reasoning, which expresses the common sense 
assumptions on the political economy. Interviews, in this 
respect, have the unique advantage of providing an insight 
into the debates and ideas circulating internally to the 
organisations under scrutiny.  
As has been argued, one of the compelling reasons 
for carrying out research interviews is that they offer a way 
of exploring how actors interpret the world and their place 
and action within it. As these interpretations are often 
nuanced and in themselves contradictory (reflecting a 
contradictory social reality), it would be difficult to access 
them through other means. As Lawler argues, it is not only 
that people often produce “‘storied’ accounts of themselves 
and their relation to the social world but also the social 
world is itself ‘storied’” (Lawler 2002: 242). There is thus a 
“rehabilitation of the lebenswelt – the life world – in relation 
to the world of science.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 29). 
This is crucial, as it reinforces the view outlined above that 
there is no such thing as a neutral scientific approach to 
social science, but that every approach has its origin in a 
specific standpoint in space and time. Unearthing the way 
the standpoint of the different actors reflects (similar or 
different) versions of common sense and ideas is therefore 
fundamental in understanding the construction of ideology 
and hegemony, which often presents itself in (and is 
masked by) neutral scientific approaches. The approach 
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adopted here is more attuned to a knowledge-construction 
process of interviewing and understanding of interview 
knowledge rather than a knowledge-collection one. 
Kvale and Brinkmann propose a distinction between 
two different conceptions of interview knowledge, which 
in turn influence the way interviews are constructed. The 
first is the idea of the interviewer as a miner, in which 
interviewing is a process of knowledge collection. 
Knowledge is here understood as “waiting in the subject’s 
interior to be uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner. 
The interviewer digs nuggets of knowledge out of a 
subject’s pure experiences, unpolluted by leading 
questions. The nuggets may be understood as objective real 
data or as subjective authentic meanings” (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 48). On the other hand, in the traveller 
metaphor, “the potentialities of meanings in the original 
stories are differentiated and unfolded through the 
traveller’s interpretation of the narratives he or she brings 
back to home audiences (…). The journey might instigate a 
process of reflection that leads the traveller to new ways of 
self-understanding, as well as uncovering previously 
taken-for-granted values and customs in the traveller’s 
home country” (Ibidem: 48-49). This research adopts the 
latter idea of the interviewing process and of interview 
knowledge. Holstein and Gubrium similarly stress that the 
researcher is not simply a pipeline through which 
knowledge is transmitted. They too see knowledge as 
constructed in the interview, through the collaboration 
between interviewee and researcher (Holstein and 
Gubrium 2004 see also Mason 2002: 226 for a similar 
distinction). 57                                                          
57 Seale (1998; cited in Rapley 2002: 16) also identifies two major traditions on 
which the construction of interview research and the analysis of interviews is 
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In this regard, Kvale and Brinkmann emphasise 
seven key characteristics of both interview knowledge and 
the objects that interviews are able to give us knowledge 
about (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 53-56). Knowledge, as 
well as the lived social and historical world of human 
interaction, are thus relational, conversational, contextual, 
linguistic, narrative, pragmatic and action-oriented. Let us 
describe at least two of these characteristics. First of all, 
viewing knowledge and interviews as conversational, it is 
highlighted that with the loss of faith in an objective reality 
that can be mirrored and mapped in scientific models 
(which goes hand in hand with the abandonment, in 
philosophy, of the quest for ‘true’ meanings), “attention 
must be paid to discourse and negotiation about the 
meaning of the lived world” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 
54).58  Viewing knowledge as conversational also points to 
the fact that “the certainty of our social knowledge is a 
matter of conversation between persons rather than a 
matter of interaction with a non-human reality.” (Ibidem: 
302). Moreover, and in line with the historical materialist 
approach outlined above, human reality is made and 
reproduced by human beings themselves also through 
conversations: “human reality may on an ontological level 
be understood as persons in conversation. We are 
conversational beings for whom language is a fundamental                                                                                                                          
centred: interview data as a resource and interview data as a topic: as a 
resource, the interview data collected is viewed as reflecting the interviewees’ 
reality outside the interview. As a topic, on the other hand, the interview data 
is seen as reflecting a reality which is jointly constructed between the 
interviewer and the interviewee.  
58 The goal is to understand “social phenomena from the actors’ own 
perspectives” and describe “the world as experienced by subjects, with the 
assumption that the important reality is what people perceive it to be”. The 
interview is seen as “the experienced meaning of the subjects’ life world” 
(Kvale, and Brinkmann 2009: 26). 
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reality” (Ibidem: 302), and thus the human world itself is 
also a conversational reality. 
Secondly, the idea of knowledge as narrative points 
to the fact that human being’s tendency to tell stories about 
their lived world is not to be seen as a subjective distortion 
of a world made of objective facts but as a perspectival way 
of understanding the social world, in the case of this 
research, the political economy. As the goal of this study is 
to uncover the ideological assumptions that form the basis of 
common sense, it is important here to once again recall 
Zizek’s conceptualisation of ideology as a form of neutral 
knowledge, which detaches itself from ‘mere ideology’ (see 
Chapter 3). For the Slovenian philosopher, ideology’s 
founding element is precisely the distinction between the 
meanings attached to their experience by ordinary people 
and the theory advanced by the social scientists who 
supposedly see the world ‘as it really is’.  The latter’s view 
is ideology at its purest.  
 
Research questions and hypotheses 
 
It should be emphasised that the type of research 
carried out was not of the hypothesis-testing approach. 
While extensive reading on primary and secondary 
literature on the subject theme did generate working 
hypotheses, these did not function in the standard 
hypothesis-testing research, where hypotheses are put to 
the test with empirical data, but they functioned as guiding 
instruments during both the interview and analysis stages. 
Lewis claims that qualitative research does not usually use 
the deduction model of a priori development of hypotheses 
to be tested through data collection. (Lewis 2003: 48) 
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“Qualitative researchers have hunches and working ideas, 
but they need to remain open to emergent concepts and 
themes, and it is not helpful to go into the data collection 
burdened with preconceived (…) ideas.” (Ibidem: 49). In 
fact, the qualitative interview researcher must “be open to 
the possibility of change” because “there is no reason to 
conduct a study if the answers are known from the start.” 
(Gerson and Horowitz 2002: 211).  
The aim of the research was thus not to prove or 
disprove a pre-configured hypothesis, but to gain insight 
into the common sense assumptions on the political 
economy that formed the basis of the achieved consensus. 
As Kvale and Brinkmann point out of interview research 
generally, “the research questions are generally open. If 
hypotheses are stated at the beginning, they may be 
modified or dropped as the project proceeds”. (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 103). No fixed hypotheses were 
generated. However, the interviews were analysed 
according to what can be termed ‘theoretical expectations’, 
based on the literature on the political and economic 
history of Italy, presented in the next chapter. A careful 
analysis of the interviews was therefore conducted based 
on these frames of reference that served as guiding 
elements to pinpoint the recurrent themes emerging from the 
interview data.  
 
Interview sampling 
 
Selecting the interviewees is a fundamental step of 
interview research, as it involves “identifying those which 
in virtue of their relationship with the research question, 
are able to provide the most relevant, comprehensive and 
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rich information.” (Lewis 2003: 50). It is thus required and 
essential to justify the reasons behind the choice of persons 
to contact. In this section I will show how my choice of 
interviewees is theoretically grounded in the neo-
Gramscian approach outlined above, and thus is 
scientifically valid for what is termed ‘representational 
generalisation’ (see below).  
First of all, one must distinguish between probability 
and non-probability sampling (Devine and Heath 1999: 10). 
Probability sampling is commonly held to be the most 
rigorous approach but is inappropriate for qualitative 
research (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam 2003: 77). Non 
probability-sampling is based on the deliberate selection of 
certain features of persons within the wider population, 
and the sample is not intended to be statistically 
representative. What has been adopted is what Mason calls 
a type of purposive sampling, (Mason 2002a) in which the 
sample units are chosen because they hold specific features 
or characteristics which enable detailed understanding and 
exploration of the central themes of the research, that is, the 
versions of common sense developed by social forces. 
Among the sampling strategies identified by Mason, it has 
been deemed appropriate to apply the one which develops 
samples based upon a range of units “related to a ‘wider 
universe’ but not representing it directly”, in which “a 
decision must be made as to what will count as 
representative cases, or relevant units.” (Mason 2002a: 92-
93). 
As Gerson and Horowitz point out: 
 
A theoretically-focused study needs to choose a carefully 
targeted sample that is well situated to illumine the issues under 
analysis. The sampling strategy must provide an efficient way to 
answer large questions with a comparatively small group of 
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people (…). In choosing a sample, the goal is to select a group of 
respondents who are strategically located to shed light on the 
larger forces and processes under investigation.” (Gerson and 
Horowitz 2002: 204) 
 
The units selected are relevant because of their 
ability to ‘symbolically’ represent the sample population: 
“units are chosen because they typify a circumstance or 
hold a characteristic that is expected or known to have 
salience to the subject matter under study (…). A unit is 
chosen to both ‘represent’ and ‘symbolise’ features of 
relevance to the investigation.” (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam 
2003: 83) 
From a research design perspective, including the 
choice of interviewees, ‘common sense’ is a difficult 
concept to operationalise. As has been argued in the 
previous chapter, common sense is a diffused phenomena 
within society, as according to Gramsci every individual is 
a philosopher, because everyone holds conceptions about 
the world. Common sense has been defined as “the basis 
for how humans make sense of the situation they find 
themselves in” (Bruff 2008: 47), and as being both relatively 
rigid and in continuous transformation. Every individual in 
a society frames his thoughts with one or several versions 
of common sense, which represent his own ‘philosophy’. 
However, in order to study the transformations in a 
national political economy, it is claimed that one must 
move closer to the state level (thus studying common sense 
within trade unions, employers’ associations and political 
parties), where forms of common sense become more 
coherent and unified. Common sense conceptions are held 
by people both in society at large and within institutions 
and, as Bruff argues, “while élite common sense is 
analytically distinct from everyday common sense, they are 
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two ends of the same continuum rather than separate 
categories.” (Bruff 2008: 12) 
The élite’s actions and thoughts are informed by 
common sense sedimentations like those of the population, 
with the only difference being that their versions of 
common sense are more coherent and relatively unified, 
and that they often hold the power to shape the ideology of 
the population, and  attempt to modify their common 
sense. Common sense is therefore shaped and moulded by 
the interventions of this group, which Gramsci calls 
‘organic intellectuals’, as they have an internal relationship 
with the social forces.. The task of organic intellectuals to 
“clarify, renovate and shape” the fragmented, ‘incoherent 
and inconsequential’ versions of common sense of the 
everyday life of the population at large into coherent 
syntheses of ideas with which to mobilise and rally society 
behind a political project (Bruff 2008: 11) 
Moreover, although it would be empirically possible 
to study ‘everyday’ common sense, élite common sense is 
more easily accessible. It will therefore focus on trade 
unions, employers’ associations and political parties as 
organic intellectuals that possess a certain common sense 
view of the world and also attempt to mould and modify it 
in order to suit particular political projects. I will focus on 
these three actors, for they are the “institutional 
frameworks within and through which different class 
fractions (or components) of capital and labour attempt to 
establish their particular interests and ideas as the generally 
accepted, or ‘common sense’ view” (Bieler 2000: 13). 
Organic intellectuals give direction and coherence to the 
fragmented, ‘incoherent and inconsequential’ forms of 
common sense held by the population at large, but their 
ability to develop an ideology is also constrained by these 
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forms of common sense, which form part also of how they 
themselves see the world. Gramsci emphasised the 
necessity, in order for hegemony to be attained, to move 
beyond the contradictory forms of common sense “into a 
more coherent political theory or philosophical current. 
This ‘raising of popular thought’ is part and parcel of the 
process by which a collective will is constructed, and 
requires extensive work of intellectual organisation” (Hall 
1996c: 432 cited in Bruff 2008: 48). Each version of common 
sense has a chance of providing a direction, to lead the 
society the more successfully it moves “from fragmentary, 
contradictory, uncritical everyday conceptions of the world 
in society to the opinions expressed and promoted by élite 
actors at the level of the state” (Bruff 2008: 11), a process 
driven by organic intellectuals.  
 Gerson and Horowitz argue that  
  
“within a specified group it is nevertheless important to 
interview people who vary in their social resources and in their 
responses to change. (…) The challenge is to choose a sample that 
can expose how different social locations pose different 
dilemmas, offer unequal resources and create divergent 
opinions.(…) The aim is to discover how similar social changes 
are experiences by different social groups.” (Gerson and 
Horowitz: 205) 
 
 In this research, the focus on élites goes hand in 
hand with an attention to how different élites, representing 
different class positions ‘make sense’ of their situation and 
of the political economy more largely.  
 Another issue to discuss in this sampling section is 
that of so-called representational generalisation (Lewis and 
Ritchie 2003: 264-267). The latter can be defined as whether 
what is found in a research sample can be generalised to, or 
held to be equally true, of the parent population from 
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which the sample is drawn. This is also known as the 
sample’s representativeness – defined by Devine and Heath 
(1999: 10) as the degree to which the sample accurately 
reflects the characteristics of the broader population. As 
Lewis and Ritchie note, qualitative and quantitative 
research differ in the basis for representational 
generalisation, as the former cannot be generalised on a 
statistical basis: “it is not the prevalence of particular views 
or experiences, nor the extent of their location within 
particular parts of the sample, about which inference can be 
drawn. Rather, it is the content or ‘map’ of the range of 
views, experiences, outcomes or other phenomena under 
study and the factors and circumstance that shape and 
influence them that can be inferred to the researched 
population. It is at the level of (…) explanations that 
generalisation can take place.” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 
267) Thus, if the above argument that élite common sense is 
the embodiment of the common sense that is present in the 
wider population is accepted, then representational 
generalisation is theoretically justified. 
 As the consensus achieved in Italy was grafted 
between the trade unions, the employers’ organisations and 
the government, it is essential to interview members from 
these groups. These organisations participated in the 
implementation of the content of the consensus and in 
paving the way for Italy’s road to EMU. In the next chapter 
I will include an overview of the historical events up to the 
late 1990s. The building of consensus – the basis on which 
hegemony is achieved –  makes the direct use of power less 
visible. Thus, a focus of the language used is all the more 
important, as the differences between the various élite 
opinions may not be that stark. This is why, in addition to 
the three above-mentioned groups, it was deemed essential 
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to gain a more detached perspective by interviewing two 
respected academics which were asked to give a broader 
overview of the historical period and on the general 
conditions for consensus to be achieved. This makes the 
identification of the differences between the élite actors 
more easy, and allows for a contextualisation of their 
position.  
 In the appendix a list of all the contacted persons is 
provided. The first step of the empirical part of the research 
was thus to contact the trade unions, employers’ 
organisations and political parties. As in this research is 
focused more specifically on the evolving common sense 
assumptions of labour and the centre-left (as defined in the 
introduction), most interviewees are representatives of the 
currently major centre-left political party (PD) and trade 
union representatives. Here it was deemed desirable but 
not compulsory to speak to people directly involved in 
decision-making or in debates surrounding them.  The 
second step was to contact three high-standing political 
figures that played a key role in the reaching of consensus 
in the 1990s: Romano Prodi, Giuliano Amato and Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi. However, it has been impossible to 
interview the latter. The third step was to contact and 
interview the academics with expertise on the Italian 
political economy, who were asked to provide comments 
on the opinions expressed by the other interviewees and 
provide a wider historical overview. As can be seen, in this 
way it was possible to hear quite different opinions that 
provided the opportunity to grasp the extent of the 
consensus achieved in the 1990s. 
 
212   
The Research Process 
 
Interview design and strategy 
 
The interview can be defined as a “conversation with 
a purpose” (Mason 2002b: 225).  In Kvale and Brinkmann’s 
outstanding book on interview research, which provides 
key practical guides on the design and implementation of 
interview research, there is a focus on interviewing as a 
craft and not as a method (see Kvale and Brinkmann 2009 
Ch.5). They stress that there are few standard rules or 
methodological conventions in qualitative interview 
research. While there are surely many methodological 
decisions to be taken, the two authors point out that these 
often have to be made on the spot. This requires “a high 
level of skill on behalf of the interviewer, who needs to be 
knowledgeable about the interview topic and to be familiar 
with the methodological options available, as to have an 
understanding of the conceptual issues of producing 
knowledge through conversation” (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009: 15). This view of interview as a craft clearly contrasts 
with a methodological positivism in the social sciences, 
with its idea of research as a strict following of 
predetermined rules and steps.  
The approach used for interviewing must 
nonetheless be rigorous and based upon some key elements 
that are outlined below. What must be kept in mind is that 
the research instrument of an interview research is the 
researcher himself and his skills. This does not imply a 
neglect of technique: “a mastery of methods and theories is 
important for the craft of research interviewing, but should 
not become an autonomous fetish of scientific inquiry.” 
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(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 84). This means that the goal is 
not – as a positivist approach would advice – to eliminate 
the impact of the researcher on the interview, but on the 
other hand to be aware of it and to use it as a research 
instrument in order to gain useful knowledge.59  
Thus, the subjective bias of the researcher is an 
unavoidable element of any interview research (perhaps of 
any research, as the section on critical theory has 
explained). Any research is by necessity a subjective and 
partial analysis of a social world that is potentially infinite 
of detail and information. Which features of the social 
world we decide to inquiry upon is obviously a subjective 
choice, and this subjectivity should be fully taken account 
of and accepted, instead of neglecting it as unscientific. The 
researcher should check the information gathered through 
the interviews against itself, that is against opinions and 
comments made in other interviews.  
The interviews followed a few broad guidelines, and 
were conducted with the same agenda and often asking the 
same type of questions. These questions concerned less 
what happened and more an exploration of the significance 
of the event.60 The interviews themselves were semi-                                                        
59 As Kvale and Brinkmann explain, “interviewing as a craft is not some mere 
prescientific method that needs to be developed into a formalised rule-
governed method to become a legitimate scientific method. The very personal 
interaction of the interview, and the interpersonal skills required of the 
interviewer, defy any formalisation into impersonal methodic procedures.” 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 87). 
60 “From this perspective, conceptualising interview accounts in terms of 
narrative can be seen as a means of confounding the false dichotomy by which 
a interviewee’s account is conceptualised either as an unproblematic reflection 
of lived experience or as a distorting screen that always projects experience out 
of its own categories (…). It is not that ‘the facts do not matter’; nor is it the case 
that ‘only the facts matter’. Rather, facts (or experience) and the interpretation 
of those facts (or that experience) are envisaged as necessarily entwined” 
(Lawler 2002: 242). 
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structured, meaning that a few key questions were asked 
each time. Semi-structured interviews, according to Kvale 
and Brinkmann, are carried our primarily by focusing on 
certain key themes, without however preparing specific 
questions for each interview, thus allowing for flexibility 
and prompts in order to allow the researcher to uncover 
each interviewee’s opinions.  In contrast to the 
unstructured interview, the semi-structured interview is 
characterised precisely by the structuring of the interview 
around certain key themes and questions (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 30). The interview is neither strictly 
structured nor entirely non-directive, but through open 
questions the interview focuses on the topic of research.  
Some probing for further information is also carried out, 
but this probing is more limited than in the unstructured 
interview (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 111).  
Importantly, it must be reminded that the task of the 
interview is not to end up with unequivocal and 
quantifiable meanings of the themes under scrutiny. As 
Kvale and Brinkmann point out, “the task of the 
interviewer is to clarify, as far as possible, whether the 
ambiguities and contradictory statements are due to a 
failure of communication in the interview situation or 
whether they reflect genuine inconsistencies, ambivalences 
and contradictions in the interviewees’ situation. There 
may be objective contradictions in the life world.” (Kvale 
and Brinkmann: 30). We can say that a dialectical approach 
focuses on the contradictions of a statement and their links 
with the contradictions of the social and material world.  
All the interviews were preceded by considerable 
planning because a theoretically-oriented research needs to                                                                                                                          
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incorporate the project’s aims into all the interviews 
conducted in order to carefully uncover the assumptions of 
the interviewees. The approach was however highly 
flexible, although there was always a focus on the project’s 
goals. The latter were included in an interview guide, 
which was used during all the interviews (see Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 124-130). The guide was intended as an 
aide-mémoire of all the themes potentially under discussion 
and ranked according to the their relevance for the study. It 
also included some suggested questions. The function of 
the guide is to ensure that the relevant issues are covered 
systematically while still allowing flexibility. (Arthur and 
Nazroo 2003: 115) The topic guide acts as a sort of check-list 
that the interviewer can make reference to when deciding 
what to turn to next as the interview proceeds. The 
interview guide included topics that dealt with the 
interpretation of the consensus reached with the Ciampi 
protocol, the goals each organisation wanted to achieve, as 
well as the wider reform process of the 1990s.  
The questions were structured in order to penetrate 
beyond the surface opinions expressed by the interviewees 
and to discover why they were expressed and how the 
interviewee justified that comment. In this context, the use 
of leading questions was deemed necessary. Even if their 
employment in interviews is a debated topic, Kvale and 
Brinkmann argue that “in contrast to common opinion, the 
qualitative research interview is particularly well-suited for 
employing leading questions to repeatedly check the 
reliability of the interviewees’ answers, as well as to verify 
the interviewer’s interpretations.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 
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2009: 172).61 In an anti-positivist approach to interviewing, 
“the decisive issue is not whether to lead or not to lead, but 
where the interview questions lead, whether they lead to 
trustworthy and worthwhile knowledge.” (Ibidem: 173).  
Moreover, the questions asked tended to be specific 
rather than abstract and general. This is because we assume 
that common sense is not simply an idea, but a process and 
a practice. Common sense operates only through practices, 
people’s conceptual actions and reasoning. As Mason 
notes, “specific questions about people’s own experience 
can make a much better job of enabling us to analyse 
whether and how people use abstractions (…) in their 
practices, than can abstract questions themselves.” (Mason 
2002b: 229). The interviews – all conducted in Italian – were 
transcribed as soon as possible after the interviews.62  
Regarding the issue of informed consent, all the 
participants were informed about the general purpose of 
the study and the main features of the design. The 
voluntary participation of each interviewee was confirmed 
at the beginning of each interview, as well as their right to 
withdraw from the project at any time. As regards issues of 
confidentiality, the interviewee was assured that nobody 
except the researcher would have access to the interview. 
Moreover, following Bruff’s similar study on the                                                         
61 In fact, as Kvale argues, “the fact that the issue of leading questions has 
received so much attention may be due to the prevailing empiricist and 
positivist conceptions of knowledge.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 173)  
62 Kvale argues that the questions regarding the correct validity of the 
transcription cannot be answered. “There is no true objective transformation 
from oral to written mode” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 186). The two authors 
see the transcript itself as a ‘bastard’. However, since this is not a sociological 
research which aims at uncovering the strictly personal reactions or nuances, 
such as non-body language, and this study does not cover emotional or 
sensitive personal topics, a standard literary style of transcription was carried 
out.  
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Netherlands and Germany, it was deemed necessary to 
protect the identity of the interviewees (except, of course, 
the interviews with Prodi, Amato and Ciampi). The 
intention – as in Bruff’s ground-breaking study – was to 
“provide a faceless representative of each organisation, 
allowing the reader to concentrate wholly on the content of 
their comments.” (Bruff 2008: 12)  
A last issue needs to be discussed before I turn to a 
description of the interview analysis stage, and that is the 
particularities of élite interviewing. In general, research 
interviews tend to be characterised by a power asymmetry 
in favour of the interviewer. This is not the case with 
regards to élite interviewing, as élites are used to being 
asked about their thoughts and opinions, creating the 
conditions for a more conversational interview, that is an 
interview in which the interviewer may at times challenge 
the interviewee’s opinions more directly (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 147) in order to gain access to the 
assumptions underlying it. Forethought was given to each 
interview, following Kvale and Brinkmann’s advice on élite 
interviewing that “the researcher should be knowledgeable 
about the topic of concern and master the technical 
language, as well as be familiar with the social situation 
and biography of the interviewee”(Ibidem: 147). 
 
Interview analysis 
 
A common objection to qualitative interview 
analysis is that the interview is not a scientific method 
because different interpreters discover different meanings 
in the same interview. This objection assumes a demand for 
objectivity in the social sciences, in the sense that each 
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statement has only one true objective meaning that must be 
discovered. Kvale and Brinkmann argue that in contrast to 
such positivist requirements, interview analysis – 
particularly in a world increasingly influenced by 
hermeneutical and postmodern thought – “allow for a 
plurality of interpretations.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 
211). If this is accepted, the two authors continue, then it is 
meaningless to pretend strict requirements for interpreting 
statements: “what then matters is to formulate explicitly 
the evidence and arguments that enter into the 
interpretation, in order that other readers can test the 
interpretation” (Ibidem: 212). 
Thus, it is agreed that different interpretations can be 
attached to the same ‘data’ (the interviews). However, 
unlike quantitative analysis, in qualitative research there 
are no clearly agreed rules or procedures for analysis 
(Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor 2003: 200). Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009) identify three broad contexts of 
interpretation in qualitative analysis: self-understanding 
(where the researcher attempts to formulate in condensed 
form what the participants themselves mean and 
understand); critical common sense understanding (where 
the researcher uses general knowledge about the context or 
statements to place them in a wider arena) and the 
approach that is used here, theoretical understanding 
(where the interpretation is placed in a broader theoretical 
perspective).  As Kvale and Brinkmann point out, “when 
doing interviews from a discursive or dialectical viewpoint, 
one is interested in the contradictions that individuals 
articulate not as aspects of concrete individuals per se but 
rather as aspects of historical discursive practices” (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 226). 
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Instead of the quantitative causal logic (X causes Y), 
qualitative researchers use a different logic, in which 
variables are not isolated and then mechanically linked, but 
the analyst attempts to build an explanation based on the 
way in which “different meanings and understandings 
within a situation come together to influence the outcome” 
(Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor 2003: 216).  The nature of 
the interrelationship of different factors needs to be made 
clear so that others can view the sources and the logic of the 
argument, “judging for themselves the ‘validity’ and 
‘credibility’ of the findings” (Ibidem: 216). 
Practically, a specific method for ordering and 
synthesising data and offering explanatory accounts was 
used, albeit modified in order to suit the project’s aims. 
This method is what Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor call 
‘Framework’, a matrix-based method for analysing 
qualitative data. (see Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 2003 
for an overview and advice for the application of the 
method). The first step is the construction of a ‘thematic 
framework’ is used to classify and organise data according 
to key themes and categories. These themes are then sorted 
under a smaller number of broader, perhaps more abstract, 
categories (‘thematic charting’). The original method also 
involves the construction of typologies. However, this step 
is not deemed to be necessary for this research, as the aim is 
not to separate the data into different categories, but to look 
for the common assumptions behind the interviewee’s 
stated opinions.63 The second step in the ‘Framework’                                                         
63 Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor (2003) themselves argue that typologies “are 
not always appropriate or required. Not every qualitative study will lend itself 
to the creation of a typology, and it is possible to waste a lot of precious time 
searching in vain for tenuous links between groupings of phenomena. Put 
simply, there is no value in creating a typology just for the sake of it.” (Ritchie, 
Spencer and O’Connor 2003: 248) 
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develops descriptive and explanatory accounts of the key 
themes identified. 
 
Issues of reliability and validity  
 
Many qualitative researchers have tended to dismiss 
issues of reliability and validity as merely ‘positivist’ 
concerns. On the other hand, there has also been a 
movement in the other direction since the anti-positivist 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s (see for example Denzin 
1983), as these concepts have now been imported into 
qualitative research losing their positivist interpretation.   
The point is that there is no single authoritative 
definition of science, according to which interview research 
can be categorised as scientific or unscientific. A useful 
definition of science may be “the methodical production of 
new systematic knowledge” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 
168), according to which – as the following discussion will 
show – qualitative interview research may be judged to be 
scientific. As has been argued above, knowledge – like the 
social world – is also narrative, meaning that people’s 
tendency to tell stories about their lives and experience 
should not be regarded as a “subjective distortion of 
objective facts” (Ibidem: 303). Quite to the contrary, 
important parts of human experience are storied, meaning 
that a narrative expression and analysis is necessary in 
order to capture its essential features. (see above for a 
discussion on ideology as both a set of ideas and a set of 
practices). This also means that interview research is best 
conceived less as a methodological rule-following with 
methods acting as the true guarantee and more as a craft, 
where the quality and value of the knowledge produced is 
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the true criterion. Within a neo-Gramscian approach, the 
status of the knowledge produced is not and can never be 
value-free, as “theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose.” (Cox 1983) Hence, the knowledge produced will 
always be suffused with the perspective both in space and 
time and in terms of class that has been adopted. As 
Merleau-Ponty argues, 
 
“all my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is 
gained from my own particular point of view, or from some 
experience of the world without which the symbols of science 
would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built 
upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject 
science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise 
assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by re-
awakening the basic experiences of the world of which science is 
the second-order expression” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 8). 
 
Turning to issues of reliability and validity, the issue 
is: how to get beyond the extremes of an absolutist quest 
for the one and only ‘true’ objective meaning and the 
relativist subjectivism of post-modernism, at the same time 
taking the issues of reliability and validity of research 
seriously? This is possible only by incorporating a different 
definition and application of the latter concepts (from the 
positivist interpretation of them), in order to reflect the 
particular nature of research interviewing and knowledge-
production. The argument is that the validity and reliability 
of the research must be sought in the craftsmanship of the 
researcher’s interviews and analysis and in the quality of 
interpretation. The quality of the research does not depend 
on a positivist notion of ‘objectivity’, as any research 
involves a bias in the very selection of the aspects of the 
social world which merit attention, but on the strength and 
stringency of the argument, as well as on the fit between 
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the research questions and the methods and analysis 
proposed. 
 
Objectivity of interview knowledge 
 
Can interview knowledge be objective? Here I follow 
Kvale and Brinkmann, who argue that objectivity is a 
somewhat ambiguous term and thus we have to 
distinguish between different meanings of objectivity: as 
freedom from bias, as reflexivity about one’s 
presuppositions, as intersubjective consensus, as adequacy 
to the object, and as the object’s ability to object.  (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 242). Interview knowledge can reflect 
all these meanings of objectivity. Firstly, objectivity as 
freedom from bias is respected if knowledge is checked and 
controlled. Secondly, objectivity must also be reflexive, in 
the sense that the researcher needs to strive “for objectivity 
about subjectivity” (Ibidem). Thirdly, objectivity also refers 
to the dialogue among researchers on the quality of the 
knowledge produced. Fourthly, and perhaps more 
importantly, objectivity is held to signify the reflection of 
the nature of the object studied, “letting the subject speak, 
being adequate to the object investigated, an expression of 
fidelity to the phenomena” (Ibidem). 
 
Reliability  
 
Reliability refers to how consistent and trustworthy 
the results are. It is often treated with regards to the issue 
of whether a finding is reproducible at other times and by 
other researchers. In relation to this, a common critique of 
interview research concerns the subjective nature of the 
223   
‘data’ produced. It is claimed that it is unlikely that the 
research can be fully replicated.   
Moreover, there are those who believe that 
qualitative research can never be, or never should be, 
repeated (Holstein and Gubrium 1997). However, here it is 
claimed, with Ritchie and Lewis (Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 
270) that there nevertheless needs to be some certainty with 
regards to the representativeness of the data (see above) 
and also in relation to “whether the constructions placed on 
the data by the researcher have been consistently and 
rigorously derived” (Ibidem). However, a strong focus on 
reliability may “counteract creative innovations and 
variability”, which are most likely to follow when 
interviewees “are allowed to follow their own interview 
styles and to improvise along the way” (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 245). 
Interview research can be equally rigorous by for 
instance acquiring background knowledge on the topic, 
carefully selecting the people to be interviewed and 
permitting an assessment of the interpretation and data by 
the research community (Devine 2002). It is also good 
practice to show the reader as much as possible of the 
procedures that have led to a particular set of conclusions 
(Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 270). Issues of reliability have 
informed the study in two ways, First of all, the importance 
of internal checks on the quality of the data and its 
interpretation has been acknowledged. Secondly, the 
information on the sample design and the consistency of 
the analysis proposed are there for the reader to judge the 
reliability of the work.  
A crucial point to discuss in relation to reliability is 
also is the role of the researcher, which has been partly 
considered above. Qualitative interview research has been 
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criticised because of the its subjective bias, that is because 
of the impact the researcher can have on the research 
process and the results it generates. Instead of neglecting 
this bias, one should accept it and go one step further 
arguing that all research is subjectively biased. The best 
approach is not to pretend to be value-neutral but “to be 
honest about one’s perspective on any given research topic 
and to then seek to represent the data in as objective a way 
as possible” (Devine and Heath 1999: 27).  The researcher’s 
role influences the choice of research theme, the means of 
information gathering and the analysis of findings. There is 
now an agreement that such effects are integral to social 
science research and cannot be eliminated in the quest for 
an objective science (Ibidem: 6). As highlighted above, there 
is nonetheless an increasing awareness to be reflexive about 
the way in which different forms of bias affect research.  
The validation of interview research – in a 
conception of interview quality based on the craftsmanship 
of the researcher – is the researcher’s ability to continually 
check, question and theoretically interpret the findings 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 168).  Moreover, in a neo-
Gramscian perspective it is does not matter if the data 
reflects the subjectivity of comments and opinions; what is 
more important is the relevance of these comments and 
opinions. As argued above with regards to other aspects of 
the research, the objectivity of the data is linked to the 
research question.  
 
Validity 
 
Validity in social science research means whether an 
interview study investigates what it is intended to 
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investigate. (See Kvale and Brinkmann 2009 ch.15). Again, 
in a methodological positivist approach, validity was 
limited to measurement. In a broader meaning, validity 
came to mean whether a method examines what it is 
intended to examine “to the extent to which our 
observations indeed reflect the phenomena or variables of 
interest to us (Pervino 1984: 48 cited in Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 246).  
Positivist social science envisaged a so-called 
correspondence theory of truth, whereby the criteria to 
judge a knowledge statement is whether it corresponds to 
the objective world. Karl Popper has changed paradigm 
from the quest for absolute, certain knowledge to a 
conception of defensible knowledge claims: “validation 
becomes the issue of choosing among competing and 
falsifiable interpretations, of examining and providing 
arguments for the relative credibility of alternative 
knowledge claims” (Ibidem). We must however go one step 
further and argue that the very separation between facts 
and theories that Popper retains is now untenable. The very 
facts are preconstituted by theory  and as Kuhn taught us, 
there aren’t any ‘facts’ independent of the ideas we use to 
describe them (Seale 2004a: 410). 
There is thus no absolute foundation for knowledge. 
Yet this should not warrant an ‘anything goes’ approach, 
because validity still relies on a commitment to quality of 
craftsmanship and transparency of data gathering, 
management and analysis. Kvale and Brinkmann argue 
that validation, the check for validity, pertains to the entire 
research knowledge produced. For instance, in 
interviewing, “validity pertains to the trustworthiness of 
the subjects’ reports and the quality of the interviewing (…) 
and a continual checking of the information obtained as a 
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validation in situ.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 248) The 
crucial question is: “are the steps in the research process 
each reasonable, defensible, supportive of what the 
researcher concludes?” (Ibidem: 248). Hammersley argues 
that “an account is valid or true if it represents accurately 
those features of the phenomena that it is intended to 
describe, explain or theorise” (Hammersley 1992: 69 cited 
in Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 274). 
“Validation comes to depend on the quality of 
craftsmanship during an investigation, on continually 
checking, questioning and theoretically interpreting the 
findings. “ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 246) Qualitative 
researchers must also answer the question: “are we 
accurately reflecting he phenomena under study as 
perceived by the study population?” (Lewis and Ritchie 
2003: 274). Here, the check is a check on methods (sample 
coverage – see above - , capture of the phenomena, 
identification and naming, interpretation). Validation here 
rests on a constant checking of accuracy of fit (Ibidem: 275), 
considering questions such as: was questioning effective? Is 
there sufficient evidence for the explanatory accounts that 
have been created? Validity must be judged on the quality 
of the evidence given in support of the phenomena and 
argument being described (so that the reader can verify by 
himself the conclusions reached), instead of abiding by a 
completely and reliable access to ‘reality’. The, even if 
“there can never be a final, accurate representation of what 
was meant or said – only different textual representations 
of different experiences” (Devine and Heath 1999: 205), 
checks on quality and transparency that lend validity to the 
phenomena and conclusions must be taken in due 
consideration.  
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Generalisability 
 
In methodological positivist research, the aim of 
social science is seen as producing laws of human 
behaviour that can be universally generalised. A 
humanistic view on the other hand implies that every 
context is unique and thus that every situation has its own 
structure and logic. However, as Kvale and Brinkmann 
emphasise, increasingly “the quest for objective knowledge 
as well as the cult of the individually unique is replaced by 
an emphasis on the heterogeneity and contextuality of 
knowledge, with a shift from generalisation to 
contextualisation” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 260). 
A common critique of interview research is that the 
findings are not easily generalisable because there are too 
few subjects. However, as Kvale and Brinkmann note, “the 
number of subjects necessary depends on the purpose of 
the study” (Ibidem: 168) and on the sample design. This 
request for a more scientific method is missing the point 
about the nature of qualitative research interviewing, 
because it can be argued that the data that qualitative 
researchers are looking for is different from quantitative 
data.  
A first reply to this objection is: why generalise? If 
knowledge is conceived as socially and historically 
contextualised mode of acting in and understanding the 
social world, then the demands for the production of 
generalisable knowledge “may involve an assumption of 
scientific knowledge as necessarily universal and valid for 
all places and times.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 260). 
The very focus on the context prevents qualitative 
researchers from generalising, and they may not seek to do 
so. Moreover, as Stake notes, intrinsic case studies are 
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worthwhile in their own right, an idea that is widespread 
in the humanities, where the need of better understanding 
someone’s work is never questioned (this is what has been 
called an ideographic approach, in contrast to a nomothetic 
one64) (Stake 2005). Weber himself argued that the social 
world is such that in social science one needs both the 
richness of interpretation and the ability to move beyond 
this to make claims about processes and structured (citato 
in Williams 2002: 138). 
Kvale and Brinkmann also point out how there has 
been a shift from the goal of generalisation to 
“transferability of knowledge from one situation to 
another, taking into account the contextuality and 
heterogeneity of social knowledge.” (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009: 168). Thus, the knowledge produced here may be 
taken on board by other studies focusing on common sense 
assumption in European political economies, but that does 
not mean that the this knowledge is generalisable.65  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
64 An ideographic account is an interpretation by the researcher of a never to be 
repeated event or setting. This implies that generalisability is not possible.  A 
nomothetic account on the other hand, is one that seeks to generalise and 
develop law-like statements as a part of the typical explanation-prediction 
schema.  
65 Williams talks about the concept of ‘moderatum’ generalisation: “if 
characteristics point to particular structures in one situation, then one can 
hypothesise that the existence of such structures in a further situation will lead 
to at least some similar characteristics” (Williams 2002: 137). 
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The Interviews 
 
 As argued in the previous chapter, people within 
institutions are as conditioned by common sense 
assumptions as the population at large. However, the 
former attempt to give coherence and direction to thoughts 
about the political economy, attempting to make their 
version of common sense the dominant one in which 
society thinks (and acts). Therefore, their version of 
common is expected to be more coherent, acting as a 
synthesis of the diffused common sense assumptions in 
society at large. Moreover, due to limited resources, the 
choice of interviewing members of institutions was made 
also because of their greater accessibility.  
 When seeking to analyse common sense 
assumptions, it is necessary to interview people from 
different institutions, as well as to gather the views of 
scholars in the field. This choice was made also keeping in 
mind Italy’s historical evolution. The country has 
historically lacked an institutionalised system of consensus-
formation such as tripartite neo-corporatism (that was 
frequent in other European cases), and was marked by a 
 historical lack of consensus on socio-economic policy, 
as well as by a polarised political system and a conflictual 
‘model’ of industrial relations. However, in the post-war 
decades, the country has been largely led by coalition 
governments that carried out ‘consociational’ practices by 
incorporating – in a selective manner – even opposition 
parties and, at times, sectors of organised labour, into the 
decision-making process. Moreover, in the 1990s, the role of 
the social partners (trade unions and the employers’ 
association) was enhanced, as most of the reforms of the 
welfare state and the economic policies generally were 
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negotiated with them and thus achieved for the most part 
in a consensual manner. Therefore, the evolution of 
common sense is a more gradual process and necessitates 
the consent of a wider array of groups and social forces 
than in countries such as the United Kingdom (where the 
first-past-the-post ‘Westminister’ model gives the winning 
party a much greater power to implement reforms 
unilaterally). Therefore, the claim is that the evolution of 
common sense can be fruitfully studied by interviewing 
representatives of several institutions that manifested their 
consent to the reforms.  
 As stated in the introduction, I carried out most of 
the interviews analysed were carried. However, reference 
was also made to a series of interviews carried out by 
Mania and Orioli (Mania and Orioli 1993). The latter were 
conducted with the signatories of the interviews: the 
leaders of the three trade union confederations, 
representatives from the employers’ association and the 
Minister of Labour Gino Giugni. They were included in the 
research both because of the added value of interviews 
with the direct protagonists of the deal and because the 
interviews were carried out in 1993, just after the signing of 
the deal. Thus, these interviews can possibly provide 
further insights on the common sense assumptions at the 
time. Also Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was contacted for an 
interview, but no answer was received.  
 The following is a list of the interviews carried out: 
 - Partito Democratico 
o PD♯1; PD♯2; PD♯3 
 - Democratici di Sinistra 
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o DS♯1. This interviewee has been a member 
of the national secretariat of the CGIL until 
1996 and then joined the PDS (Partito 
Democratico della Sinistra – later DS). He was 
under-secretary in the centre-left 
governments until 2001. In 2007 he refused to 
join PD. For the purposes of this research, I 
consider him both a representative of CGIL 
and of PDS.  
 - Confindustria (employers’ association) 
o Confindustria♯1 
 - CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) 
o CGIL♯1 
 - UIL (Unione Italiana Lavoratori) 
o UIL♯1 
 - Romano Prodi, Prime Minister (1996-1998) 
 - Nerio Nesi, former director of Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro and member of parliament for Partito della 
Rifondazione Comunista (1996-1998) and Partito dei 
Comunisti Italiani (1998-2001) 
 - Prof. Sergio Cesaratto 
 - Prof. Vincent Della Sala 
 - Prof. Leonardo Paggi 
 - Prof. Umberto Romagnoli 
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 - Prof. Luca Michelini 
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4. Political history I: Italian capitalism 
from the post-war decades to the 1990s 
 
Presenting an even brief history of the evolution of 
Italian capitalism is not a feasible task within the confines 
of this research.66 The aim of this section is therefore not to 
analyse Italian economic history in detail, but rather to 
pinpoint a few key points drawn from the relevant 
literature on the political and economic history of the 
country. These elements have served to generate 
hypotheses on common sense and thus have guided the 
analysis of the interviews. The evoking of the economic 
vulnerability of the country and of the ‘external constraint’ 
has been an element that repeated itself in Italian economic 
history, and has often – particularly in times of economic 
‘emergency’ (such as the late 1970s, the early 1990s and – 
arguably – the current moment) – been accompanied by the 
trade unions’ acceptance of asymmetrical exchanges 
involving largely unilateral concessions of wage restraint. I 
thus approached and analysed the empirical material with 
the hypothesis that this stance must be related with 
common sense assumptions on the political economy. The 
recurrent themes in the interview data that are identified 
and presented in the next chapter are the outcome of this 
analysis. In this chapter, I will thus attempt to identify the 
historical origin of the common sense assumption of 
economic vulnerability and wage restraint as the standard 
‘adjustment mechanism’ of the national economy to 
economic change and to the ‘external constraint’. I will 
present the notion of trasformismo as a heuristic tool with                                                         
66 For useful analyses of Italian capitalist development see: Graziani 1989; 1998; 
Locke 1995. 
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which to analyse the relationship between the state, capital 
and labour. I will then look at the evolution of the left’s 
ideology in the 1990s and conclude by describing the 
welfare state reforms of the decade. In the next chapter, I 
look more specifically at the ‘moment of capital’ of 1993 
and the consequences of the 1993 pact.  
 
The origins of the Italian state 
 
 Let us start this section with a quotation from Karl 
Marx, which sets the terrain on which capitalist 
development outside of Britain takes place: “on the 
continent of Europe, after Colbert’s example, the process 
was much simplified. The primitive industrial capital, here, 
came in part directly out of the state treasury” (Marx 1976: 
922). Thus, in contrast to the British experience of a violent 
primitive accumulation that was guided by an emerging 
bourgeoisie in continental Europe the role of the state in 
creating the conditions for, and then guiding capitalist 
development has been prominent.  
This element is remarked also by Van der Pijl, and it 
is precisely on the unique characteristic of capitalism in 
Britain that he builds his theory of the relationship between 
the Anglo-Saxon Lockean heartland and the contender state 
experiences (Van der Pijl 2006). According to the Dutch 
author the rivalries apparent in contemporary history are 
part and parcel of the unifying drive of capitalist 
‘globalisation’. However, his argument is that these drives 
are not random or simply follow the expansionary drive of 
capitalist accumulation, but evolve and are refracted 
through the relationship between a capitalist-imperialist 
‘West’, the Lockean heartland – a transnational structure that 
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first emerged with the development of a liberal English-
speaking, Protestant-Christian world created through 
overseas settlement and trade in the 17th century – and 
generations of contender states. As Van der Pijl points out,  
 
“in the Atlantic heartland, the capitalist class became the 
ruling class as an already transnational force, maximising 
its freedom under the liberal state theorised by John Locke. 
In a society like France, on the other hand, a state class 
imposed itself on society; from Colbert to Napoleon (or 
even, some would say, De Gaulle) it demarcated a 
concentric unit developing under a rationalistic planning 
doctrine” (Van der Pijl 2006: xi). 
 
In this view, continental European countries (as well 
as non-European states) can be understood as historical 
counterparts to an expanding Lockean heartland, an 
historical ‘West’ including the English-speaking world and 
gradually incorporating in an uneven fashion other 
European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and 
even – albeit in a contradictory manner – France. Locke 
envisaged the state as serving an essentially self-regulating 
and self-governing civil society by upholding the structures 
for private association under the law and guaranteeing 
private property, thus creating an ideal framework for 
capital accumulation. As Van der Pijl extensively argues in 
Global Rivalries (2006), the ‘West’ has launched a series of 
‘offensive waves’ aiming at expanding transnational 
capitalism and the Lockean state/society pattern against 
Hobbesian contender states (France, Germany, Russia, 
Japan and others). In the Lockean ‘state/society complex’ (a 
reformulation of Gramsci’s ‘extended state’), the 
bourgeoisie develops an institutional framework based on 
a clear demarcation between the sphere of the ‘state’ and 
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that of ‘civil society’, anchored in the liberal idea of creating 
a ‘level playing field’ for individual exchange in the realm 
of circulation and thus for the expansion of capitalist 
accumulation. This framework has developed in tandem 
with a great industrial development that has then 
expanded outside of the Lockean heartland. Though at 
times the state has played an autonomous role in bringing 
about economic development also in the Lockean 
heartland, as with the New Deal experiment, it is capital – 
private interests – that have been the propelling force of 
society.  The strength of the ‘West’ is also based on its 
control of the financial system, worldwide energy flows 
and military-industrial development (Ibidem: 15).  
 On the other hand, the contender state has aimed at 
challenging the pre-eminence of the ‘West’ in the 
commanding heights of the world economy. In the 
Hobbesian state/society complex, it is the state that leads 
development of the economy and society in a catch-up 
effort led by a state class often forged in revolutionary 
upheavals (whether bourgeois, as in France, or ‘from 
above’ as in Japan or Germany). In its first approximation, 
and summing up a quite complex argument, the Hobbesian 
state is characterised by: concentric development; a 
‘revolutionary’ ideology mobilising its social base; and a 
foreign policy backing up the claim of sovereign equality 
by a powerful military (Ibidem: 7).  
 This argument might seem distant from my object of 
research. However, I believe it is important in order to 
stress from the beginning the transnational dimension of 
capitalist expansion from the Lockean heartland. It were 
external pressures, and their relationship and coupling 
with local economic forces, which have induced countries 
to attempt to catch up with capitalist development in the 
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heartland, and to do so in a Hobbesian fashion. However, it 
is crucial, in order to avoid any kind of determinism, to 
understand how different countries have reacted 
differently to similar challenges. The two structures 
(Hobbesian and Lockean state/society complexes) are 
related through the development of capital on a world 
scale, as an objective yet impersonal social force, that by 
preference seeks to occupy the spaces between the formal 
jurisdictions of nation-states. Crucially, this serves to 
enhance its structural power, as the transnational sphere is 
not subjected to any kind of democratic control.  
Ernesto Gallo (2008), who has applied this 
framework of analysis to the Italian case, argued that Italy’s 
path followed three successive stages: A ‘long march’ in the 
direction of the heartland, brought forward by the state 
following an essentially Hobbesian pattern (but 
maintaining close links with the heartland); a strong 
Hobbesian reaction, with the emergence of fascism; the 
incomplete inclusion into the heartland, after the second 
world war.  
As Gallo has convincingly argued, Italy represents a 
hybrid between a straightforward Hobbesian development 
and a more Lockean configuration, which was promoted 
via a strong relationship with the heartland. Primitive 
accumulation in Italy was not wholly ‘imported’ through 
the reaction from capitalist development elsewhere in 
Europe or the incorporation of the territory into capitalist 
expansion from the heartland, but could count on a solid 
base in an early accumulation of local capital. Thus, while 
in several regions, especially in Lombardy, surpluses from 
agriculture and trade allowed for the rise of local patterns 
of capitalist development linked to international markets 
(centered mainly in silk and wool), a relatively strong 
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Hobbesian state/society relationship emerged with Italian 
unification. As Gallo points out, “Italian unification has 
been strongly supported by transnational capital and the 
connection between Cavour, Italian bankers (such as 
Bastogi in Livorno) and speculators and their powerful 
counterparts in Paris (Rotschild, Perèire) and London” 
(Ibidem: 4-5). The new state is seen as the outcome of 
convergent interests between European capital, commercial 
landowners, merchants and a politically moderate state and 
intellectual class.  
In Gramsci’s famous analysis, the Italian 
Risorgimento was conceived not as a liberal bourgeois 
revolution, but as the result of a passive revolution (Gramsci 
1949; 1972) as it embodied a compromise between the 
northern industrialists and the southern landowners. The 
weak legitimacy of the Italian state carried with it a whole 
series of problems linked with the opposition to the state of 
many social forces and groups: the church; the southern 
peasants; the northern workers; strong regionalist 
groupings that did not feel part of the Italian ‘imagined 
community’. During Giovanni Giolitti’s rule, the state 
consolidated its legitimacy by allying itself with particular 
groups in a clientelistic fashion, inaugurating the policy of 
trasformismo that has hitherto characterised the principal 
way the ruling class has sought to integrate the centrifugal 
forces in society and prevent the emergence of a counter-
hegemonic bloc. 
As noted above, capitalist development in the 
Lockean heartland cannot be equated with the forms of 
development from above that have characterised the 
experience of other European nation-states. Therefore, the 
assumption that there is somehow a ‘pure’ form of 
capitalist development  - characterised by the strict 
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separation between economics and politics within a liberal 
state that in turn guarantees a ‘level playing field’ for 
capital and is politically and culturally hegemonic – against 
which other experiences must be compared and their 
‘degree of modernity’ measured, is problematic. Capitalist 
development is, since its inception, world capitalist 
development. As Marx famously argued in the Grundrisse, 
“the tendency to create the world market is directly given 
in the concept of capital itself” (Marx 1973: 408). The logic 
of the world market is thus inscribed in the very 
development of the capitalist mode of production. 
However, capitalism as a mode of production, in its global 
expansion, produces ‘uneven and combined development’. 
This is to say that capitalist ‘modernity’ is part and parcel 
of the form that capital takes both at the centre (the 
Lockean heartland) and at the periphery at a particular 
phase of its development, and with all the mediations that 
particular state/society complexes develop (conditioned by 
their own historical development, insertion into the 
capitalist market, nature of state formation, etc.…).  Leon 
Trotsky claimed that different countries developed 
independently of each other according to their own 
national and class peculiarities. However, different 
countries did not exist in isolation from each other, 
developing interdependently as parts of world economic 
and cultural development (see Morton 2010, also for an 
interpretation of the Gramscian notion of ‘passive 
revolution’ as the cornerstone of capital’s uneven and 
combined development). In this context, Gramsci argued 
that a situation of ‘passive revolution’ is one in which 
 
“the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local 
economic development…but is instead the reflection of 
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international developments which transmit their ideological 
currents to the periphery – currents born of the productive 
development of the more advanced countries” (Gramsci 
1971: 116-117 cited in Morton 2010: 219). 
 
Keeping this in mind, hegemony must not be 
equated simply with liberalism acquiring dominant status, 
or with liberal social relations and state institutions 
becoming more and more legitimised. Hegemony is a form 
of rule in which subordinate subjects accepts their position 
within the social formation as legitimate. Trasformismo, a 
central category with which to analyse Italian historical 
development (see below) is therefore not to be equated with 
the absence of hegemony. Trasformismo is a form of 
development in which active elements of diverse social and 
political groups – including those that may potentially be 
hostile to the dominant class and thus develop a counter-
hegemonic project – are incorporated and absorbed in a 
strategy of negative integration. The ultimate aim is to 
disunite the masses and prevent the emergence of a 
counter-hegemonic bloc.  It is thus a form of hegemony, not 
its negation or its corruption (see Paggi and d’Angelillo 
1986).  
The view of the strategy of trasformismo pursued by 
the dominant parties in Italy as signalling a situation of lack 
of hegemony and bourgeois weakness (in particular in the 
so-called ‘First Republic’) was the dominant view held by 
the PCI. According to Paggi and D’Angelillo, such a view is 
problematic in the sense that it does not capture the 
inherently exclusionary dynamic vis-à-vis the working class 
(in the sense of refusing its political legitimation) that the 
notion of trasformismo captures. In their view, the goal of 
trasformismo is not to govern in the absence of modernity, 
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but to modernise against the working class, avoiding in this 
way that the main partner of an advanced capitalist society 
attains full and definitive legitimacy and equal dignity in 
the political system (Paggi and D’Angelillo 1986: 66-67). 
The fight against the potential autonomy of the working 
class is thus a negation of the possibility of political 
alternation in government.  What was hegemonic in Italy 
was thus not liberalism but the exclusionary logic of 
trasformismo itself (see more on trasformismo below).  
An apparently paradoxical element that runs 
through the whole of Italian economic development is that 
even though the state has often taken the initiative to 
organise civil society, the latter retained a relative economic 
and political (and hence cultural) strength (owing to the 
early accumulation of capital referred to above). This, 
coupled with the state’s weak legitimacy – due to its 
limited social base and its dependence upon European 
powers for its very creation – has often undermined the 
state’s capacity to create an efficient framework for 
capitalist development.  Moreover, Italy’s lack of raw 
materials further extended the dependence of the Italian 
state on foreign capital. According to Gallo, at the 
beginning of the century Italy entered the Lockean 
heartland, though maintaining some distinct Hobbesian 
elements (Gallo 2008: 6). While failing on the one hand to 
create a ‘level playing field’ for capital, the state also lacked 
the ability to forge development from above as France did 
(Van der Pijl 2006: 9-12).  
Suffrage was extended only very slowly, and as Italy 
marched towards the mass politics of the 20th century, the 
ruling class perceived its weakness. The shock-like reaction 
of the country to the First World War (the biennio rosso and 
the dislocations caused by the war entailed a surge of 
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political mobilisation) led to fascism. While initially the 
regime remained anchored in the heartland (with low fiscal 
imposition, international distension and loans from JP 
Morgan), in the late 1920s it shifted to a Hobbesian 
concentric development (Gallo 2008). 
After the Second World War, the regime of Pax 
Americana (Cox 1987: 211-272) and American hegemony 
(Rupert 1995) expressed a liberal internationalist version of 
the Lockean complex based on the Bretton Woods regime 
of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982). In Italy this had 
quite peculiar characteristics, as the dominant political 
party until the early 1990s, the DC, based both its political 
legitimacy and its economic policies on a ‘historic bloc’ 
essentially based on petty bourgeois elements (see below). 
This social base was mobilised with reference to an 
essentially catholic version of anti-communism (in contrast 
to its neoliberal version, which emerged in the late 1970s - 
see Paggi 2003). Capitalism – as an ideology, as a way of 
life, as a set of values – continued to lack a secure basis, also 
due to the weakness of the ‘bourgeois revolution’ that we 
have described above.  The population swiftly divided into 
two dominant subcultures, the (essentially anti-modern) 
Catholic one and the (essentially anti-capitalist) Marxist 
one, and there was a weakness of liberal or social-
democratic subcultures which tend to legitimise the values 
and categories of a capitalist industrial society (Chiesi and 
Martinelli 1989: 132). Capital as a social and ideological 
force was thus weak and had to base its support on the DC, 
a very peculiar political party that was not totally receptive 
to the requirements of capital (see below). Since the end of 
World War Two, Italy has been governed by mainly 
coalition governments, all led by the dominant party, the 
DC – in fact the DC was in government for the 49 years 
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following the war, and a DC Prime Minister was in power 
for 43 years. 
In order to understand the genesis of ‘common 
sense’ assumptions on the ‘economic facts of life’, one 
element is particularly important: Italian industry has been 
consistently dependent on the international cycle of 
demand. Tarrow notes that “the economy had a small 
internal market that made it susceptible to recession at 
every international downturn” (Tarrow 1990: 319). This 
element in central in understanding the ‘common sense’ 
assumption of economic vulnerability which constituted 
the terrain over which social actors found consensus, as I 
will argued in the next chapter.  
Let us dwell briefly on this point. As Tarrow points 
out, the state’s inability to pursue a coherent capitalist 
(Keynesian or liberal) project, and its subordination to the 
DC’s political clientele, did not prevent it from intervening 
at all in the economy. It did so by providing free export 
loans to industry, supporting a rapidly growing public 
sector and, crucially for the aim of this research, by 
“constraining internal demand whenever a general rise in 
wages threatened to overheat the economy” (Tarrow 1990: 
320). Tools such as increasing employment (as well as the 
political guarantee of full employment) or supporting 
domestic demand through Keynesian demand 
management and fine-tuning were not employed (Ibidem). 
Whenever there was a wage push which generated 
inflation, a strong deflationary move (either monetary or 
fiscal) set in, a phenomenon which, coupled with the failure 
to create a formal industrial relations system, signals the 
marginalisation of working class interests as a political 
counterpart and as legitimate conflictual interests to capital. 
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This also heightened the country’s dependence on external 
markets.  
What is of interest for this research is how the 
dependence on the ‘international’ has been internalised in 
‘common sense’ assumptions on the economy. ‘Italy’ was 
dependent on the ‘international’ for its supply of raw 
materials and for demand for goods. This last feature was 
exacerbated by the path of economic development followed 
in the post-war period, lacking as it was of Keynesian 
demand management techniques employed elsewhere in 
Europe, and initially characterised by an industrial 
specialisation based on ‘luxury’ goods for which there was 
not enough internal demand. Thus, Italy was highly 
vulnerable to recession at every international downturn. 
Moreover, the general perception of a ‘weak’ state also 
reinforced the ‘disciplining’ power of ‘the international’, in 
the form of ‘international markets’, the European Union, or 
political, economic and cultural trends that originate 
elsewhere, internalised also by praising foreign efficiency 
and rationality (this emerged as a leitmotiv in many of the 
interviews I conducted). Perhaps it is also through this 
general perception that the long-standing Italian xenophilia 
(the tendency to view favourably foreign politics and 
culture, and thus to look down upon the idiosyncrasies of 
the Italian state and culture) emerged. The economist 
Pivetti argues that the call for the necessity of discipline 
and the traditionally pro-European sentiment of the Italians 
is to be linked with the inefficiencies and inequalities of the 
fiscal regime and with the practices of clientelism. The 
unbalanced functioning of a fiscal system that 
systematically favoured tax evasion and focused 
excessively on taxing labour incomes generated a high 
savings rate (also because of a feeling of economic 
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insecurity) that is to be seen as the counterpart of the rising 
Italian debt in the 1970s and 1980s. According to the 
economist, it surely contributed to the genesis of deep yet 
unconfessed aspirations for a sort of ‘international 
protectorate’ (Pivetti 2011).  
Consider this short remark by Michele Salvati (one 
of the exponents of the left-wing liberalism that I will focus 
on below) on the Italian experience: 
 
“the experience of a country where the forces making for 
continuity and stability are weaker, where the ruling elite is 
less unified, the state apparatus less competent and 
efficient, political allegiances less deeply rooted and 
ideological conflict more pronounced, and where regional 
differences are more extreme” (Salvati 1995: 4).  
 
As I will argue below, this perception of Italy’s 
historical ‘weakness’ or ‘backwardness’ is shared in the 
Italian liberal élite, with a strong anchoring in the left-wing 
political spectrum (Michelini 2008). This stance implies 
political programmes that are based on the need for a 
constant race to catch-up with the forms of development 
that are considered to be more modern, efficient or 
coherent. Interestingly, and this is a central argument of 
this research, this kind of xenophilia was and is quite 
popular in the centre-left political and cultural élite, that 
sees the centre-right political spectrum in the country as the 
bearer of corporatist interests linked with the most 
‘backward’ elements of Italian capitalism. The links with 
the transnational capitalist class and its hegemony have 
been translated into Italian political life most prominently 
by the centre-left political élite that “enjoys deeper links 
with the transnational and European business élite” (Gallo 
2008: 13). Perhaps it is not a chance that of the four 
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'technical' or centre-left Prime ministers of the 1990s, two of 
them came from the Bank of Italy (Ciampi and Dini), one of 
them was an economics professor (Prodi) and the fourth 
(Amato) was a staunch critic of the ‘consociative’ political 
system of the First Republic and of the ‘political’ 
interferences into civil society (see Amato 1992).  
Italian industrial development in the post-war years 
has been characterised since the beginning by a strong 
openness to foreign trade. In fact, as the economist De Vivo 
underlines, this trade liberalisation has been faster and 
more extensive than in other European countries (France, 
Great Britain, Sweden) since the early post-war years: the 
author notes how even the Economic Commission for 
Europe had expressed surprise on Italy’s insistence on 
eliminating external and internal controls and, “by 
terminating rationing and relaxing control on imports”, 
abandoning “the two instruments that experience suggests 
are necessary in facing structural problems of this nature” 
(De Vivo 1990, cited in Barba 2011: 68). Paggi and 
d’Angelillo also highlight the extraordinary pace (in 
comparison to other European countries) with which 
Italian governments in the 1940s carried out trade 
liberalisation. This element, an essentially deflationary 
policy and the priority given to monetary stability, were the 
main components of Italy’s economic policy in the post-war 
years (Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986: 134).  
Barba argues that the technique of the ‘external 
constraint’ was a “constant in the life of the Republic, in 
which internal conflicts are resolved, or better avoided, by 
making use of an external constraint which depoliticises 
them transforming them in non-choices, ‘facts of life’ 
outside of our control” (Barba 2011: 67). This statement is 
highly relevant for our purposes, because it reveals that the 
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domestic use of the vincolo esterno was an important aspect 
of the dominant ‘common sense’ assumptions of Italy’s 
insertion into ‘the international’, and as we will see, it was 
diffused across the political spectrum, resurfacing among 
the left-wing political élite in the 1990s. 
One of the most detailed analyses of Italy’s path 
towards EMU, referred to in the previous chapters, was 
revealingly entitled Rescued by Europe? (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004), thus signalling the idea of a country that 
needs to be constantly saved from itself, from its 
inefficiencies and ‘political’ backwardness, or ‘uncivicness’ 
of political culture (Ibidem: 5). The last chapter of the book, 
moreover, is entitled ‘rescued, but still free to harm itself’, 
indicating once again the view of the ‘irresponsibility’ of an 
Italian political and economic élite that must be disciplined 
in order to adopt the ‘correct’ economic policies. As an 
aside, the two authors, reflecting on the reasons of the 
consensual approach to economic reform in the 1990s, 
argue that (Ibidem: 130) “from a substantive point of view, 
the first step consisted of the elaboration of a correct 
diagnosis of the new problems originated by the shocks of 
the 1970s, acknowledging the failure of the status quo in 
various sectors of public intervention”. This quotation is in 
itself revealing of the kind of logic that permeates this (and 
other) work: the normative ascription of the status of 
‘correct’ diagnosis on the nature of the problems, a 
diagnosis that then – according to the two authors’ 
reasoning – needed to be presented to the country and the 
social partners, who in turn ‘learn’ to accept it as the only 
alternative. In fact, as the analysis of the interviews will 
show, this ‘common sense’ assumption of Italy’s weakness 
and backwardness vis-à-vis a supposed external constraint 
that is perceived to be a beneficial disciplinary force to 
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which Italy must adhere, resurfaced strongly in the 1990s, 
and was an important element in subordinating labour to 
capital’s hegemony. 
Thus, an early trade liberalisation, a weakly 
developed internal market, an economy based on 
comparatively low wages and the fact that Italian industry 
lacked adequate technological development (Graziani 1989: 
9) and therefore was constantly under competitive pressure 
from abroad, can be considered as central elements in the 
country’s economic development. Moreover, Graziani 
stresses that, as any small economy lacking natural 
resources, Italy had to acquire raw materials from above, 
and in order to pay for these had to generate a constant flux 
of exports. Graziani points out that, lacking a 
technologically advanced industry, an export market could 
be conquered only by competing on prices rather than on 
quality, a feature that generated a constant increase in 
productivity levels, which did not match wage increases 
(Ibidem). This element was at the root of the Italian 
economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s, characterised by a 
strong currency (the Lira was awarded the prize of 
strongest currency of the year in 1958), high capital-
intensive investments, price stability and equilibrium in the 
balance of payments (until the late 1960s shock). The 
counterpart of this period of stability was the strong 
containment of wages, repression in the workplace and the 
marginalisation of trade unions (Graziani 1998 ch.1-3). The 
low wages of Italian workers and the high propensity to 
save had penalising effects on the growth of the internal 
market. As Fumagalli (2006: 61) argues 
 
“the chances of the Italian economy to grow were entrusted 
more to the growth of external demand than that of 
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domestic demand. The Italian trade exchange with the 
outside increased from 10% in the early 1950s to almost 
30% at the end of the 1960s, thanks also to the lower 
relative cost of production and thus the lower prices of 
Italian goods. Italy is thus an excellent example of how a 
moderate dynamic of domestic demand, caused by the fact 
that wages did not adjust to productivity, has been more 
than compensated by the growth of external demand”.  
 
This line of action, as Graziani (1998: 10-18) and 
Vianello (1979: 22-25) underline, maintained a high level of 
unemployment and ruled out a whole set of strategies to 
achieve full employment (effectively used in other 
countries).  Graziani argues that it is precisely because of 
the fact that the Italian economic miracle was based on 
increasing productivity while maintaining low salaries that 
the country experienced structural unemployment all 
through the post-war decades. Perhaps this fact and the 
dependence on a foreign demand market can contribute to 
explain the state’s anti-Keynesian bias, which was also 
rooted in the need to maintain the support of the DC’s 
social base (Amyot 2004). Apart from the organisation of 
work, in all other major respects the Italian economy was 
not Fordist67 up to the 1960s. However, it did rely on a 
‘Fordist circuit’ in which it produced consumer durables 
for other markets (Amyot 2004: 21-23). On the other hand,                                                         
67 The regulation school theorises a correspondence between a ‘regime of 
accumulation’, such as Fordism, whose technology and work practices were in 
place in Italy, and a ‘mode of regulation’, the political and social framework. 
However, it states that this correspondence is not guaranteed but crucially 
depends on political factors. Fordism is seen as characterised by the mass 
production of consumer durables using Taylorist work methods, and a mass 
market of consumers with enough purchasing power to buy these products – 
that is, a relatively high wage economy. The latter requires some form of 
corporatism among the social partners (see Lipietz 1986).  
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Graziani notes how the important economic policy 
decisions undertaken in the post-war decades were all 
aimed at mitigating the effects of structural unemployment 
– through emigration and ‘clientelistic’ social policies – 
while maintaining Italy’s competitive edge in order to 
guarantee an export market. 
An element that I believe is important in 
understanding both Italy’s economic development and the 
‘common sense‘ assumptions that accompanied it until 
today is the way the ruling class has responded to labour 
militancy and class struggle from below. Being aware of the 
impossibility to separate ‘economic’ from ‘political’ 
developments if not methodologically, we must link this 
‘economic’ reaction to the ‘political’ exclusion of the 
working class. This marginalisation manifested itself not 
only in the fact that a working class party never acceded to 
government, but also that it lacked the political and social 
legitimacy as a counterpart to capital that it enjoyed in 
other European countries. Moreover, unlike other 
European countries, Italian industrial relations were not 
characterised either by consensus or by an institutionalised 
or formalised system of negotiation (see below).  
The class struggle explosion of the late 1960s was 
therefore also a response to the repression of workers and 
labour organisations, which was standard practice in the 
relationship between the social partners in the 1950s and 
1960s. The first worker struggles, which managed to 
achieve some results, took place in 1963, when higher than 
average wage increases were won by the industrial trade 
unions. The response was a deflationary move that 
increased unemployment and allowed for a first internal 
restructuring of Italian industry, a strategy that was 
pursued again after the 1969 ‘hot autumn’ (Graziani 1998 
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ch.3), when a strategy of decentralisation was carried out. 
The point to keep in mind, however, is that deflationary 
measures were the standard response to labour militancy, 
in contrast to other European experiences, where labour 
was integrated both politically and socially into the 
political system and socio-economic decision making 
(Paggi and D’Angelillo 1986 ch.2). This is a point to keep in 
mind, and to which I shall return to below.   
 
The DC regime 
 
The social base, or ‘historic bloc’, of support for the 
DC came from a series of groups, most of them petty 
bourgeois: the commercial petty bourgeoisie; large sectors 
of the public employees, who have been recruited also 
thanks to clientelistic practices in the South and which 
owed their position to the party; the white-collar 
bourgeoisie (professional cadres such as lawyers and 
doctors); the landowners in the countryside, organised in 
the powerful Coldiretti; sectors of labour itself, organised in 
CISL (Amyot 2004: 96-105). As Amyot argues, 
 
“for a party which owes its strength to its control of the 
state, the most natural social basis is the petty bourgeoisie. 
This class, though it often espouses anti-statist ideologies, 
today depends on the state for its very survival as a class: 
without subsidies, protective legislation, tax exemptions, 
and other types of assistance, it would be defenceless 
against the tendency towards concentration inherent in 
modern capitalism. And in Italy, the self-employed petty 
bourgeoisie are particularly numerous – they still represent 
29 per cent of the employer population, far more than in 
any other G7 country” (Ibidem: 98).  
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 This social base was supported through a series of 
means that were, from capital’s perspective, partly 
inefficient: patronage, clientelistic practices in the South68, a 
huge tax evasion (perhaps the single most important 
‘measure’) that favoured the petty bourgeoisie. In the 
Mezzogiorno (the South), a wide clientelistic network 
emerged based on institutions such as the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno (the funding agency for infrastructural and 
industrial projects in the South), the Coldiretti and 
Federconsorzi (associations of farmers). All these institutions 
distributed funds and benefits based largely on political 
links and thus generated support for the DC regime and 
alleviated the huge social problems of the Southern regions, 
and the tensions generated by an economic policy not 
geared toward full employment (see below) (Vianello 1979: 
22-23). 
This base of support made it impossible for the DC 
to develop – as was being done all across Western Europe – 
a ‘Keynesian’ welfare state and demand management 
techniques: measures to sustain the purchasing power of 
the working class, income policies, support for collective 
bargaining and a comprehensive welfare state. Even if the                                                         
68 Allen and MacLennan (1971) identify in the Cassa del Mezzogiorno (the fund 
for the South) a significant pacifying tool: subsidies were more efficient in 
creating clientelistic networks than economic growth. On the other hand, this 
phenomenon must be seen against the background of a political economy that 
did not guarantee full employment and did not function according to the 
demand management techniques that were being deployed in other European 
countries. The resulting structural unemployment thus created considerable 
social tension, and the distribution of state funds to poorer regions of the 
country according to clientelistic networks provided a much needed 
containment of economic marginalisation and social unrest. Disability pensions 
– acting as a sort of unemployment benefit in disguise – increased from 1.5 to 
3.8% of GDP from 1961 to 1990 (Amyot 2004: 150).  
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Italian economy was incorporated into the wider ‘Fordist’ 
and ‘Keynesian’ development that was dominant in 
Europe, compared to other European experiences, trade 
unions were weak and marginalised, and the Italian 
economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s was based 
essentially on low wages and export, as internal demand 
was still quite low. No explicit form of concertation or 
social compromise was sought – although informal 
channels were used – and Italy appeared to be an exception 
among the Western European states in its lack of typically 
‘Fordist’ policies (see Amyot 2004 Ch. 6 and 9). Although 
some welfare reforms were in fact approved in the late 
1960s ad in the 1970s (pensions, social benefits, the 1970 
Workers’ Statute), and in 1975 the wage-indexation 
mechanism was revised, “Italy did not develop a truly 
corporatist form of wage bargaining” and the “progress 
toward Fordism was still limited by several factors, in 
particular the weight of the petty bourgeoisie” (Ibidem: 25).  
What is interesting about the Italian state is that, as 
Tarrow has noted, even if “business had ready access to 
political influence, there was no central vision of an identity 
between business and government, nor even a mechanism 
for formulating politically the interest of capital” (Tarrow 
1990: 320). The inefficiency of the state and its not always 
receptive attitude towards the interests of capital has 
enhanced the role of the Bank of Italy, which is an efficient 
institution that enjoyed considerable prestige and was 
autonomous both from the DC and from social forces. As 
Amyot shows, in the 1980s the bank used its autonomy to 
further the long-term interests of capital, but often in 
contrast to the immediate interests and demands expressed 
by capital (Amyot 1995: 158).  
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This development conditioned the nature of the 
Italian welfare state, in itself a belated and incomplete 
creation dating from the late 1960s and 1970s (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004; Della Sala 2004a). The lack of an explicit 
'Keynesian' compromise meant that there was no 
commitment to full employment and little protection 
against unemployment. The conservative nature of the 
welfare regime can be seen in the classic 'male bread-
winner' model and in the fragmented development of the 
social insurance and pension systems, which differentiated 
entitlements according to different categories, placing the 
Italian welfare model at odds with the universalistic notion 
of 'welfare state'. Starting from the late 1960s - and mostly 
as a consequence of pressure from below - state spending 
gradually increased to European standards. The problem, 
however, was that this increase was not matched by a 
corresponding rise in revenues (see below). 
The model of capitalism on which this welfare state 
was founded has been termed ‘dysfunctional state 
capitalism’ (Della Sala 2004b), a sui generis system that is 
distinct from both the Coordinated Market Economy and 
the Liberal Market Economy models, as it is crucially 
marked by political forces which ‘capture’ the state. A 
useful characterisation of the DC regime is that offered by 
Tarrow (1990), who talks of a ‘soft hegemony’ characterised 
by: a “pattern of political relationships based on a flexible 
centrist governing formula, an interclass social base, 
closeness to business but solicitousness to marginal groups 
and a governing style heavily based on distributive policy” 
(Ibidem: 308). According to the author, clientelism and 
corruption are only the extreme manifestations of a system 
of governance based on political compromises and weak 
executives. Rhodes and Bull (1997: 3) describe it as a system 
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based on the ‘privatisation of the public sphere’, while 
Della Sala highlights the open consensual decision-making 
process that characterised Italian policy-making starting 
from the 1960s: “in many cases, parts of the state were 
parcelled out to these interests and the political parties that 
represented them” (Della Sala 1997: 18-19).69 In this way, 
governing parties maintained and developed clientelistic 
ties with their electoral constituencies, a practice that often 
degenerated into plain corruption (Newell and Bull 1997: 
92). 
Behind the DC’s interclassism (the construction of a 
broad constituency including sectors of all social classes) 
there was thus the marginalisation of the autonomous 
political stance of the working class. As Tarrow notes, 
“Italy’s political economy was not organised along the 
classical lines of business versus labour, because such an 
alignment would have been disastrous to the DC’s 
hegemony, and second because the party was trying to 
contest many sectors of social terrain with the left for 
votes” (Tarrow 1990: 319). Using the concept of 
trasformismo, as will be shown below, we can make sense of 
this phenomenon as well as understand the development of 
a ‘common sense’ based on economic vulnerability and 
wage restraint. 
 
 
 
                                                        
69 Rhodes (1997), moreover, sheds light on a further element of the DC regime 
and of the functioning of the Italian political economy: the manipulation of 
political parties via close clientelistic relations, as well as the routinised and 
institutionalised nature of corrupt political funding.  
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The fiscal system’s reverse redistribution 
 
A further manifestation of the strategy of trasformismo is - in 
my view - to be found in the regressive nature of the Italian 
fiscal system. According to Paggi (2011a: 28) "the debt is 
not a problem of national accounting, but refers to the very 
manner in which government social blocs were formed". In 
a recent article, the economist Aldo Barba (2011) points out 
that the Italian fiscal system carried out (and continues to 
do so) a reverse redistribution. The driving force of this 
process is public debt, whose accumulation is generated by 
insufficient revenues. Barba (2011: 60), as well as other 
authors (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 44.; Graziani 1998: 175; 
Amyot 2004; Paggi and D’Angelillo 1986: 36-37) stress that 
the common idea that the origin of the high Italian public 
debt is to be found in an excess of spending is wrong: in 
fact, state spending in Italy has traditionally been in line 
with its European counterparts. The Italian anomaly is thus 
all in the level of revenues, and in the fact that the fiscal 
system tends to favour possessors of public debt. The 
revenue deficit was covered not by printing money – even 
more so since the ‘divorce’ of the Bank of Italy from the 
treasury in 1981 – but by borrowing from those same 
sectors of society that benefited from an unbalanced fiscal 
regime.70 As interest rates soared starting from the early                                                         
70 It is thus naïve to analyse public debt as a simple ‘clearance’: wage labourers, 
who have been called upon to support a fiscal system centered upon taxes on 
wage, have always possessed a modest share of public debt. On the other hand, 
people whose revenues had other origins benefited most from the interest on 
debt. For instance, capital incomes are taxed at the low rate of 12.5% (in other 
European countries, it reaches levels that are double this figure) and there is no 
progressive taxation, and often no taxation at all, for incomes from agriculture, 
possession of real estate and from real capital gains (Barba 2011: 15). So, all 
incomes from property have a preferential treatment in the fiscal system. 
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1980s - as a consequence of the autonomisation of monetary 
policy from the government - public debt became even 
more the instrument of a reverse redistribution of income. 
The economist Spaventa, playing on the word ‘sviluppo 
senza fratture’ (development without fractures) that 
according to a common view has been at the origin of the 
industrial district’s economic success based on territorial 
cohesion and lack of conflict, has coined the term ‘sviluppo 
senza fatture’ (development without invoices) (Vaciago cited 
in Acquaviva 2005: 90).  
The author shows how the level of fiscal revenues 
was overall 10% lower than France and Germany all 
through the 1980s. Moreover Barba demonstrates how 
although the Italian fiscal system is indeed based mainly on 
indirect taxes, these are heavily skewed against revenue 
obtained through wages vis-à-vis other sources of revenue 
(profits, rent) (Ibidem: 75). The system was thus wage-
centric: only wages were subject to progressiveness and 
were increasingly paying the bill, so that in 1997, taxes on 
labour were as high as 50% of income (5% more than 
Germany) (Ibidem).  
Starting from the 1980s, in line with a general trend 
all across Western Europe led by neoliberal restructuring, 
relative wages diminished markedly. The distributive 
quota of dependent labour in national wealth from 1970 to 
1997 decreased from 72% to 57%, and the decrease took 
place entirely starting from the 1980s, mainly as a 
consequence of the fact that wages did not keep pace with 
productivity growth, which thus went entirely to the 
benefit of profits (Ghiani and Binotti 2011: 172). Thus, the 
state’s intervention becomes the lever of a strengthening, 
instead of a contrast to, the unfavourable trends in the 
primary distribution of income (distribution according to 
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the production factors) between capital and labour. Barba 
argues that in a system in which the possession of public 
debt is concentrated at the top of the income hierarchy71 
and the fiscal system is not progressive, the choice of 
financing public debt via loans over financing via higher 
taxes (changing the current fiscal regime) represents a key 
political choice that reflects different class perspectives 
(Ibidem: 76). 
 Barba’s conclusion points to two further 
determinants of the attack on wages: privatisations and the 
transformation of domestic debt into foreign debt (the 
consequence of the loss of monetary policy autonomy). The 
pension reforms of the 1990s (see below), as well as the 
liberalisation of the markets for many goods and services, 
which has on average increased prices (Ibidem: 80) are seen 
by the author as an attack on differed wages and indirect 
wages, which must be added to the curtailment of both net 
and gross wages (Ibidem: 81). 
 
The transnationalisation of Italian capital 
  
Irrespectively of the previous divisions within its 
ranks (see Amyot 2004: 128-138; 143), in the 1980s and 
1990s Italian capital in general went through a deep process 
of transnationalisation. Exports as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 13,4% in 1973 to 15,4% in 1987 and 21,3% in 
1995 (about the same figure as France and the UK) (see 
Amyot 2004: 83). Although capital that relies on export 
does not necessarily favour a fixed currency, for sure it is                                                         
71 Barba (Ibidem: 77-78) reports data showing that 80% of public debt is 
concentrated in the richest 40% of families. The mechanism at work thus 
redistributes funds from the poorest taxpayers to the richest. 
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against a highly oscillating one, as was the Lira in the early 
1990s. Moreover, as a result of EC regulations, exchange 
controls were eliminated in May 1990, thus allowing for an 
increase in foreign holdings of government debt.72  If one 
looks at the data on FDI stock, that is a better measure of 
transnationalisation than FDI flows – as it measures the 
actual consolidated  interdependence between Italy and the 
rest of the world, rather than the yearly flows – 
transnationalisation is clearly visible. While in 1980 the 
stock of inward FDI was about 8 million Liras, and that of 
outward FDI was almost 7 million, by 1985 the figures 
reached 31 million and 28 million respectively. However, 
an even larger increase was registered in the following 
years: in 1990, the figures were 67 and 68 million, reaching 
91 million and 138 million in 1993, the year of the social 
pact. By the end of the 1990s (1998), inward FDI stood at 
179 million Liras while outward FDI was 292 million (data 
are drawn from UNCTAD73). Between 1993 and 2001, 
moreover, the total stock capitalisation increased by 361% 
and in 2000 it represented more than 70% of Italian GDP 
(Mucchetti 2003: 25), signaling an increasing 
financialisation of the economy. Equity markets also 
increased dramatically to 14.4% of financial wealth in 1995 
and 27.6% in 2000 (a figure higher than that of France and 
Germany) (Della Sala 2004b: 1046-1048). 
This increasing transnationalisation of Italian capital 
created further interdependence between the Italian 
economy and the European one. Italian capital was                                                         
72 To this one could add the pro-rentier policy pursued by the Bank of Italy in 
the 1980s (by maintaining high interest rates and thanks to the government’s 
policy of financing its deficit through borrowing, the rentiers reaped large 
profits).  
73 See: http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_cp_it_en.pdf ; 
accessed on 27 August 2011.  
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increasingly dependent upon a stable macroeconomic 
environment vis-à-vis the European economies. Within 
Confindustria, the industrial employers’ association, the 
‘good salon’ - the large enterprises that have historically 
dominated Italian capitalism - has always sought to 
mobilise the SMEs under its hegemony (see Amyot 2004 
ch.6). Commenting on the Bank of Italy’s tight money and 
strong currency policy in the 1980s – stemming from Italy’s 
membership in the EMS – Amyot notes how “the available 
evidence points to business opposition to this policy in the 
first half of the 1980s. After 1985, this opposition softened 
as most firms’ position improved and many realised the 
long term benefits that flowed from the Bank’s policy” 
(Amyot 2004: 135). So, the resistances to European 
monetary integration on the part many employers were 
gradually overcome. The increasing transnationalisation of 
Italian capital modified the ‘material basis for existence’ for 
capital, as it had more of an ‘exit’ option and the Italian 
economy became materially more dependent upon the 
creation of a stable macroeconomic climate with the 
European one. Arguably, this element made capital more 
and more critical of the public debt problem and of the 
strategy of devaluation of the national currency.  
A further division among capital emerged in the late 
1980s with the fraction led by De Benedetti promoting a 
more ‘Anglo-Saxon’ version of capitalism, pushing for 
more power to shareholders and arguing for a less 
confrontational stance vis-à-vis the unions and the left (De 
Benedetti also controls the progressive newspaper ‘La 
Repubblica’) (Amyot 2004: 39-42).  In the 1990s, it seems 
that the DC ‘historic bloc’ has switched to the centre-right 
and the Lega Nord, and this would explain the fact that the 
Berlusconi government has been largely unwilling to tackle 
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the interests of the petty bourgeoisie (SMEs and self-
employed), the social base of this coalition.  In fact, it was 
precisely the latter that most feared some of the 
consequences of EMU such as the possible tightening of 
regulation, greater liberalisation, greater efficiency of tax 
collection and an end to the closed bidding lists for public 
contracts, and to many subsidies to industry.74  As Amyot 
points out,  
 
"this schizophrenic attitude to the state is typical of the 
petty bourgeoisie, which subscribed to free-market, laissez-
fair slogans as ideology, while demanding that the state 
interfere with the same market to protect them” (Ibidem: 
110-111). 
 
In fact, it is perhaps for this set of reasons that the 
centre-right governments have been less focused on 
meeting the Maastricht criteria to join EMU among the first 
group of countries, fearing that they might lose sectors of 
their own constituency and that the fixed exchange rate 
would reduce the ability of many SMEs from the ‘Third 
Italy’ to compete on price.75  
While Fiat and the ‘good salon’ of Italian capital 
historically had not showed a consensual stance in 
industrial relations and have often adopted repressive 
actions in the 1960s and 1970s, this fraction of capital has                                                         
74 Moreover, as Brancaccio also points out, many SMEs are in fact partly 
dependent upon state spending, and so are not in principle favourable to harsh 
fiscal austerity measures. On the other hand, they tend to favour strategies of 
labour cost compression (Brancaccio 2008: 18).  
75 It is interesting to point out that Lamberto Dini, a former IMF official and 
general director of the Bank of Italy, decided, after having been a member of 
Berlusconi’s government and having himself been Prime Minister in 1995, to 
join the centre-left coalition in 1996 because its policies were more akin to his 
views. 
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also developed a broad strategic view of its problems, and 
has been at times prepared to cooperate with the unions. In 
the 1990s, considering the political and economic 
emergency, as well as the low legitimacy that business 
shared with the political parties because of the revelations 
of Tangentopoli, big capital welcomed a more compromising 
attitude. A neo-Gramscian approach stresses that 
hegemonies are built precisely by taking into consideration 
the interests and viewpoint of the subordinate classes, and 
including them into a wider compromise which however is 
skewed towards the interests of the dominant class. The 
1993 deal can be seen as an element in the new hegemony 
of transnational capital, which was being built across 
Europe. In 1993 the trade unions acquired legitimacy, 
maintained the traditional bases of their power and even 
gained weight in decisions regarding welfare reform. 
However, the consensus was part and parcel of the 
hegemonic project of ‘embedded neoliberalism’, which 
sought to lock in largely neoliberal policies at the European 
level (van Apeldoorn 2002).  
 
Economic vulnerability, wage restraint and 
common sense 
 
Turning to the notion of ‘common sense’, as I will 
flesh out in more detail in the following chapter, my 
argument is that the assumption of economic vulnerability 
and the assumption on the need to maintain low real wages 
were gradually internalised by both the unions and the left. 
Through the assumption of economic vulnerability, the 
social actors internalised the country’s dependence on the 
outside for raw materials, and thus the need to maintain a 
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high level of exports in order to pay for imports. This has 
conditioned Italy’s capitalist development as well as the 
country’s welfare arrangements. This element has been 
confirmed by all the economists and political scientists 
interviewed for this research (Paggi, della Sala, Cesaratto, 
Michelini). Cesaratto gives perhaps the clearest enunciation 
of Italy’s position of dependence:  
 
“we are a country that depends on the outside for oil 
imports, for technology, for energy…the unions 
internalised the idea that higher real wages are 
incompatible with the Italian economy, and this is an old 
incompatibility. There is no doubt that Italy has an external 
constraint. What is the real constraint on the increase of 
real salaries? It is the external constraint. That is, an 
increase in real salaries turns into an increase of 
consumption and thus of aggregate demand and then Italy 
has to face the fact that imports increase. So, 
fundamentally, it is not that such a constraint does not 
exist.” 
 
Cesaratto himself notes that this constraint can be 
‘attacked’ in different ways, so there are alternatives to 
wage moderation. He cites, for instance, a coordinated 
European or global policy of fiscal expansion or a national 
supply-side policy of industrial restructuring and 
conversion, or attempts to limits energy dependence. 
However, the left and the unions have been rather hesitant 
to propose these kinds of policies. The unions and the left 
have “internalised the constraints without having an 
adequate proposal to overcome these constraints. These 
constraints can be overcome, it is difficult but it can be 
done” (interview with Cesaratto). What I wish to underline 
here is not the alternatives that could feasibly be 
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developed, but to stress the internalisation of the external 
constraint, that in turn generated the assumption that high 
real wages are incompatible with the Italian economy. This 
is the crucial point in my analysis of ‘common sense’.  
As I attempted to show in the theoretical section, the 
realm of ideas – including ‘common sense’ – within a 
capitalist society is not the sphere of mere illusions, 
separated from the materiality of social relations. It 
contributes to the very constitution and reproduction of those 
same relations. Ideology – following Marx – is not in what 
we think, but in what we do. This is how, I believe, the oft-
quoted Marxian definition of ideology – “they don’t know 
it but they are doing it” – should be interpreted. Thus, as 
Cesaratto himself noted, this ‘external constraint’ was, 
within the confines of a national capitalist economy, ‘real’, 
in the sense that ‘Italy’ was actually dependent on imports 
from the outside in order to promote capitalist 
development (see also the quote by Fumagalli above). The 
economist Graziani explicitly argued (see the quote below) 
that the choice for Italy in the post-war years was between 
capitalist development in an open economy or the 
renunciation to capitalist industrial development tout court. 
Capitalist development in Italy was thus materially 
dependent on the outside, a feature that has left marks in 
the trajectory of the political economy and in national forms 
of consciousness and common sense on the political 
economy and the alternatives (or lack thereof) perceived by 
the actors: 
 
“the road of progressive liberalisation represented in some 
way a forced road. Italy was characterised by a traditional 
scarcity of raw materials; all the natural products that had 
from time to time been at the basis of industrial 
development (wood, coal, iron, oil, uranium) are absent 
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from the soil and the subsoil of the country. For the Italian 
economy, industrial development was thus means the 
development of imports, as industry necessarily needed 
foreign raw materials and mineral resources. In turn, the 
development of imports requires a parallel development of 
exports and so a growing trade openness. The alternative 
facing the country, therefore, was not between 
development as a closed economy and development as an 
open economy, but rather that between industrial 
development as an open economy on one side and 
renouncing, at least initially, to industrial development” 
(Graziani 1998: 25-26). 
 
Consider also this 1947 statement by former FIAT 
manager Vittorio Valletta: “in Italy the mechanic industry 
in general, and the auto industry in particular, even if they 
experience a lack of raw materials, can count on a cost of 
the workforce that is lower than elsewhere, and for 
decades: if conditions of life improve, this will be a general 
improvement and the difference between us and the others 
will remain” (cited in Vianello 1979: 21). This statement is 
telling of the strategy pursued by Italian capital and of the 
way the Italian economy integrated into the European and 
global market, and therefore on the ‘common sense’ 
assumptions that accompanied it.  
The economist Vianello (1979) points out that the 
weakness of the unions and their marginalisation up to the 
1970s, a distribution of income that was unfavourable to 
labour, the clientelistic distribution of state spending by the 
DC regime and the nature of the balance of payments are 
factors that must be understood as internally linked. Let us 
follow the main elements of his argument, as this reasoning 
is important in understanding the internalisation of the 
country’s weak position within the ‘international’.  
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Firstly, he argues that the proponents of the 
openness to foreign trade – that were dominant in the 
Italian political and economic élite – have always 
underlined Italy’s necessity to maintain a significant level 
of exports in order to pay for the much-needed flow of 
imports that was necessary in order to support industrial 
development in a country that experienced such a penury 
of raw materials (Vianello 1979: 22). In this situation, 
maintaining low wages was deemed by the ruling classes 
to be the only way of generating enough foreign currency 
to pay for imports. Moreover, clientelistic state spending 
was used as an instrument of social control: what emerged 
was a “logic that never ceased to characterise Italian 
capitalist development: on the one hand, the openness to 
foreign trade and the quest for the maximum ‘efficiency’ 
neglecting the problem of unemployment; on the other, the 
control of social tensions through the clientelistic use of 
public spending” (Ibidem: 23), a feature that managed to 
keep a potentially explosive social situation under control.  
The second important point of Vianello’s analysis 
that I wish to underline regards the consequences of the 
weakness of the working class movement up to the late 
1960s. After the 1948 elections, the working class was 
largely isolated, it was internally divided and suffered from 
both very high unemployment and heavy repression in the 
workplaces. This marginalisation, according to Vianello, 
explains many features of Italian capitalist development: 
the unequal distribution of income, the skewed 
composition of consumption (towards luxury goods), the 
great increase of exports based on low wages, and how an 
outstanding growth of the economy was made compatible 
with the balance of payments (Ibidem: 27).  
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How did this mechanism work? As wages grew 
systematically less than productivity growth and the fiscal 
system operated in an unequal fashion, general economic 
growth did not translate into significant real wage growth. 
Profits grew but also other forms of income benefited from 
economic growth: in particular, the traditional middle 
classes that supported the DC regime (the petty 
bourgeoisie, notables, landowners) were granted 
considerable privileges (Ibidem: 28). The author gives a 
good description of the strategy of trasformismo that was at 
the core of this settlement: 
 
“a large participation of the middle classes to the benefits 
of economic development was made not only possible but 
also indispensable by the ‘strong hand’ that was used 
against the working class (both in the work relationship 
and in the fact that its political representatives were 
confined in opposition). Precisely because consensus could 
not come from the working class, it had to rest upon on one 
hand the mass of farmers, and on the other the urban 
middle classes. What has been called the distortion of 
consumption was the outcome of a distribution of income 
that was equally distorted” (Ibidem). 
 
 This point goes to the heart of what is argued here. 
The strategy of trasformismo - the political marginalisation 
of the working class and thus the curtailment of wages - 
was not only the political means by which to maintain the 
power of a specific historical bloc, but also lied at the base 
of the economic strategy of the dominant classes, at least 
until the late 1960s. Vianello himself points out that the 
distortion in consumption was functional to high economic 
growth. The low costs of Italian products increased profits 
(also due to low wages), in turn generating high 
268   
investments for the expansion of productive activity, thus 
further decreasing costs and enhancing competitiveness in 
the export sector. Moreover, this mechanism strengthened 
the distortion of consumption, favouring a decrease in the 
cost of goods that the working class could not afford and 
thus increasing the relative price of basic necessities. The 
extraordinary increase in exports together with the 
“unequal distribution of income and the distortion in 
consumption contributed to a loosening of the balance of 
payments constraint. However, with the increase in 
investments and employment and the increase in wages, 
the problems would emerge” (Ibidem: 34). 
I argued above that historical materialism 
(particularly in its neo-Gramscian strand) is a perspectival 
approach to the world. It is a theory that explicitly 
recognises the particular point of view (that of labour and 
the critique of labour within a capitalist society) from 
which it is formulated. The theory also stresses that our 
conceptions of the capitalist world totality and its effects on 
us (and/or the state we live in) are rooted in how 
capitalism appears to us, how it generates assumptions 
about economic ‘facts’ from a particular standpoint in space 
and time, thus how the ‘international’ is internalised. This 
is so because human social practice cannot escape the 
particular position in which it finds itself and the 
standpoint it adopts. It is necessarily perspectival, since 
humans are unable to grasp the complexity of the world in 
its totality. Social practice is thus based upon specific 
national or social points of view that shape thought and 
action. These perceptions are in turn heavily conditioned 
by the ‘material basis for existence’, human beings’ need for 
means of subsistence and their dependence upon the 
market for their satisfaction. 
269   
Therefore, it can be said that the totality of the 
capitalist mode of production appears to the Italian actors 
(parties, unions, etc.) as signaling a particular weakness of 
Italy, and thus as generating the necessity to maintain real 
wages low in order to compete (and generate enough 
exports to pay for the much-needed imports). This was the 
basis of the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s, and 
therefore generated certain beliefs on what the country 
needs in order to achieve economic success. There is clearly 
no general rule, but I argue that it was a common sense 
assumption that tended to repeat itself and condition the 
way national social and political actors have ‘internalised’ 
the ‘international’ in their forms of common sense. This is 
the general proposition I am arguing.  
 
Trasformismo in the Italian political economy 
 
In this section, I present the concept of trasformismo 
as a heuristic tool to interpret Italian post-war history by 
reviewing the thrust of historians Paggi and D’Angelillo’s 
excellent work (Paggi and D’Angelillo 1986) on trasformismo 
as a form of historical development in Italy. I consider this 
category to be central in understanding the development 
and consolidation of versions of common sense on the 
political economy that resurfaced in the 1990s, but that 
were implicitly at work in the previous decades. 
The term trasformismo has often been equated simply 
with clientelistic practices of political co-optation (in a 
spectrum ranging from patron-client relationships to 
outright corruption), neglecting its class content. The 
standard conceptualisation of trasformismo, that has also 
been the dominant political interpretation of the concept, is 
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that provided by Italian economist and political theorist 
Vilfredo Pareto. According to him, collective movements, 
groups or political aggregations with their claims 
inevitably produce 'degenerations' into the 'natural' 
division between economics and politics. Trasformismo, in 
this understanding, is seen as the inefficient interference of 
political ‘arbitrariness’ into the rational automatisms of a 
market economy for the purpose of creating artificial 
consensus.   
In Pareto’s analysis (the following is based on 
Marshall 2007: 13-21), trasformismo is linked with 
clientelism, consisting in complex shifting networks of 
patron-client links between politicians in government and 
the masses via the mediating role of local political and 
economic élites. Crucially, apart from the traditional ‘grand 
electors’ in the Italy of Pareto’s times, the social theorist 
also included socialist and catholic labour organisations as 
a category of ‘collective grand elector’.  
 What emerges from the thought of this pre-
eminently elitist theorist is a deep mistrust of the realm of 
‘the political’, conceived as either arbitrary interventions 
into a pre-supposed neutral economic logic or as the 
fanatical quest for justice on the part of non-élites. 
Trasformismo is here seen as the attempt on the part of a 
ruling class to maintain social control precisely by 
clientelistic intervention into the laws of the economy.  
Moreover, it is seen as an inherently ‘anti-modern’ 
phenomenon, the clue of a society being backward in the 
route to progress. 
According to Paggi and D’Angelillo it is precisely 
this conceptualisation of trasformismo that has been 
dominant in Italy, particularly in the Italian left. 
Interestingly, the use of clientelistic and patronage 
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networks that were common practice in Italy’s history left 
in the Italian communist and socialist tradition a 
widespread anti-corruption sentiment and an idea of the 
state as inherently prone to ‘capture’ on the part of 
particularistic interests.76  
Paggi and d’Angelillo, following Gramsci, argue that 
trasformismo is not a deviation from a supposed natural 
path of modernisation (as in the many theories of 
modernisation), but a form of hegemony. It emerges in a 
situation where the problem for the ruling class is to 
manage a process of modernisation of the economy and 
society in line with the transformations in transnational 
capitalism, within a context of political stability. Moreover, 
in Gramsci, the organisation of consensus according to this 
scheme reflects a model of development that does not 
contemplate significant increases in domestic demand (see 
Liguori and Voza 2010). 
Paggi and D’Angelillo point out how, in contrast to 
an idea of trasformismo as simply a process of clientelism, 
corruption or patronage, Gramsci carries out two important 
innovations (Paggi and D’Angelillo 1986: 65): - The full acknowledgment of the perspective of a 
mass society. Trasformismo does not signal the 
manipulation of a pre-modern political élite, but the 
insertion within clear rules of the game of a network 
of mass-structured ‘interest groups’. - The idea that administrative apparatuses are in this 
context agents of a modernisation and 
industrialisation process that is aimed at the 
preventive control of social conflict.                                                         
76 Consider this quotation from Ignazio Silone: “the state always stands for 
swindling, intringue and privilege, and cannot stand for anything else” (Silone 
1950: 98 cited in Marshall 2007: 15). 
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What is at work is a system of hegemony of the 
dominant classes that, by using precisely strategies of 
trasformismo, aims at avoiding the construction of an 
autonomous political subject in the workers’ movement. In 
the last instance, the central point of hegemony is precisely 
the material and cultural-ideological subordination of the 
‘subaltern classes’ to a system of power. It would therefore 
be a mistake to equate capitalist hegemony with outright 
liberalism, as it must be related essentially to the strategies 
followed by the dominant classes and parties in Italy vis-à-
vis the ‘dominated’. It is clear from the above that 
trasformismo as a form of historical development is not at 
odds with modernisation, but rather represents its 
manifestation in a particular national state, with the 
objective of combining development with the political 
marginalisation of the workers’ movement. A quotation 
from Paggi and D’Angelillo explains this aspect:  
 
“…the problem at the root of trasformismo is not that of 
governing in the absence of modernity, but of modernising 
against the labour movement, therefore avoiding that the 
main social partner in an advanced industrial society could 
reach full and definitive legitimacy, thus equal dignity, 
within the political system. In this sense, we can say that 
trasformismo, in so far as it is characterised by the effort to 
reject or contrast the labour movement’s full attainment of 
the status of autonomous political subject acting within the 
rules of a liberal-democratic state, puts emphasis on the 
question of alternation in government” (Ibidem: 67).  
 
Capitalist development and modernity in Italy was 
therefore not somehow ‘lacking’ vis-à-vis other European 
experiences. Quite to the contrary, the notion of 
trasformismo allows for an understanding of the peculiar 
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nature of bourgeois hegemony in this country. Negative 
integration was the mechanism through which political and 
social hegemony was maintained. 
On the other hand, as the two authors stress (Ibidem: 
65), the dominant interpretation of the country’s 
development on the part of the PCI was based on the idea 
of a lack of bourgeois hegemony, a situation which was 
supposedly faced by the ruling classes precisely by using a 
strategy of trasformismo to try to contain a stronger working 
class movement (vis-à-vis other European states). This 
interpretation neglects, according to the authors, the fact 
that the labour movement’s party never acceded to 
government in Italy, quite unlike what happened elsewhere 
in Europe. Moreover, this view reflects once again an 
unspoken assumption of stages of ‘modernisation’: 
differences in capitalist development are interpreted as 
deviations from a supposed standard form of capitalism 
(usually identified with either the United Kingdom or 
France). Clientelism (and corruption as its extreme 
manifestation) are interpreted – also on the left – as undue 
political manipulations  of economic development in a 
situation of lack of hegemony.  
 
The DC regime and trasformismo 
 
Above, the nature of the DC ‘regime’ was briefly 
sketched, with the help of the relevant literature. Within the 
scheme of trasformismo proposed here, catholic 
‘interclassism’, meaning the extensive links maintained by 
the dominant political party with a whole series of interest 
groups from several sectors of society, can be seen as a 
form of negative integration of the political organisations of 
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the working class. There was thus formal legalisation of 
organised labour and the party of the working class, but 
substantial exclusion from government and their lack of 
legitimacy as autonomous political subjects.  
The idea of a strategy based on the constant political 
and socio-economic marginalisation of the working class 
(discernible within the political system, the fiscal system 
and the distribution of incomes – see above) is linked to a 
particular form of bourgeois rule. As Cesaratto argues the 
Italian bourgeoisie was unable to structurally switch to a 
form of contractual politics and has always answered in a 
conservative – if not outright “reactionary” – way to 
demands of social reform: from fascism to Berlusconi 
passing through the ‘strategy of tension’ of the 1970s (the 
political use of terrorism) (interview with Cesaratto). These 
developments have in turn affected the ‘maturation’ of a 
social-democratic left, a left that not only conceives its 
action as a conflictual stance within the confines of a liberal-
democratic polity, but also one that is fully recognised and 
legitimated as such by its political and social counterparts. 
In its place, as will be argued below, there is a left 
characterised by the combined and contradictory elements 
of socialist myth and hyperidentity on the one hand and 
economic moderatism on the other (trasformismo).  
The strategy in the post-war Republic was thus a 
more sophisticated stage from pre-war class rule: 
democracy ceased to be ‘subversive’. The real problem now 
was preventing the access to the government’s resources 
(state spending, organisation of the welfare state) by the 
labour movement (Ibidem: 68-69) - the ‘imperfect bipartism’ 
being the political expression of this exclusion. The strategy 
was one of political containment of the labour movement 
based on a particularistic logic. Paggi and d’Angelillo 
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highlight that the economic culture of Italian trasformismo 
was essentially economically liberal (‘liberista’77 – Paggi 
and d’Angelillo 1986: 69). In fact, the first post-war years 
were characterised in Italy by a series of choices that 
confirmed the liberal dominance in economic thinking and 
practice: extensive trade liberalisation, a politics of 
deflation and the main objective of maintaining monetary 
stability (Ibidem: 134; Graziani 1998; see above).  The main 
difference with the social-democratic experience is that 
Italy’s structural deficit in the balance of payments after the 
late 1960s was not seen (as in the practice of social-
democracy across Europe) as a national weakness that 
needed to be tackled by using industrial policy or other 
forms of state intervention including protectionism. 
Instead, this weakness was used as an argument in order to 
weaken the labour movement and constrain its claims, 
through a “deflative equilibrium” in external accounts 
(Ibidem: 55). 
In the previous section, I reported Vianello’s 
argument that the weakness of the Italian working class 
contributed to explaining many elements of Italy’s 
economic miracle: the unequal distribution of incomes, the 
composition of consumption (skewed toward high-quality 
goods that the working class could barely afford), the huge 
increase in exports. Cesaratto, in his interview, argues that 
in order to understand Italy after Maastricht one has to 
look precisely at these elements and the way the country 
emerged from the 1950s and 1960s miracolo. He argues that 
the first worker mobilisations in 1963 and the 1969 ‘hot                                                         
77 Unlike in the English language, in Italian there is a difference in meaning 
between the idea of political liberalism and that of economic liberalism. 
Liberalismo refers to the former, the idea of bourgeois political institutions, 
while liberismo refers to the idea of free competition between market forces.  
276   
autumn’ did not lead to a ‘northern European social-
democratic’ settlement, an Italian version of the social 
market economy, but to the conflictual decade of the 1970s. 
The interesting aspect to underline is that – according to 
Cesaratto – the reliance of the DC regime on a social basis 
formed by the petty bourgeoisie generated distortions that 
continue up to the 1990s. The major one, he points out, is 
the inflation-generating mechanism that has its origins in 
what Sylos Labini called the ‘mouse in the cheese’, that is, a 
series of groups that can take advantage of their 
monopolistic positions in the Italian economy to raise 
prices (Sylos Labini 1975), and that are identified largely in 
the commercial bourgeoisie. Thus, the persisting of an 
inflation rate that is higher than its trading partners in the 
1980s and 1990s has its origins – according to Cesaratto –in 
the power of a series of social groups including crucially 
the retailers and wholesalers that can set prices.  The attack 
on the salary, one of the goals of economic policy in the 
1980s and 1990s, thus went together with the maintaining 
of positions of (relative) power of these social groups 
(interview with Cesaratto). 
 
The PCI, trasformismo and economic liberalism 
 
 Italy has experienced a quite peculiar strategy of 
integration of the subordinate classes. The concept of 
trasformismo, and thus the particular relation between the 
ruling classes and the labour movement, has greatly 
conditioned the PCI’s stance and in its own 
conceptualisation of the problems of the country. Two 
elements, drawn freely from Paggi and d’Angelillo’s work, 
give a good idea of how the PCI  - and the CGIL, which 
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was in many respects the PCI’s natural extension into the 
labour movement – has positioned itself vis-à-vis this 
strategy of trasformismo, aimed at its marginalisation.  
The first element was the so-called ‘hyperidentity’ of 
the PCI (Ibidem: 100-103), the role played by the myth of 
socialism embodied by the Soviet Union, as well as the 
notion of ‘progressive democracy’, that went hand in hand 
with the ‘popular front’ strategy pursued by the PCI. One 
must keep in mind that the PCI, since the end of the Second 
World War, was not a revolutionary party. In fact, Togliatti, 
the secretary of the party in the 1940s and 1950s, claimed 
that the PCI’s role was not only to criticise but to propose 
‘concrete solutions’ to the country’s problems, entailing for 
instance a view of capitalist crises not as chances for a 
revolutionary break but as moments in which consensus 
needed to be found (see Amyot 1981). In its concrete 
practice, the PCI’s action was geared towards the 
consolidation and extension of the liberal-democratic 
framework (Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986: 102). However, 
Paggi argued (in his interview) that without the 
identitarian role of the Soviet Union, the PCI would have 
easily crumbled, because the myth of really existing 
socialism served a fundamental function, a constant 
reference point for local identities and antagonisms. In fact, 
the historian went as far as to argue that the 1993 protocol 
cannot be explained without making reference to the fall of 
the USSR.  
Paggi and d’Angelillo point out that the particularly 
conflictual stance of the Italian labour movement can be 
seen as the reflex of a lack of political recognition of the 
popular and workers’ movement; thus, as the expression of 
the necessity of its constant re-affirmation of identity, in 
order to gain political legitimacy (Paggi and d’Angelillo 
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1986: XIV – again, in contrast to the social-democratic 
experience of mutual recognition). The two historians also 
note that the decision taken by both the PCI and the trade 
unions in the late 1970s not to demand compensation for 
wage restraint was based on the belief that the intensity of 
social conflict in that decade was a sign of the strength of 
the labour movement. To the contrary, they argue that it 
becomes the “most tangible sign of the intransigence to 
which the unions are forced in a situation in which they 
cannot be fully recognised as an essential partner in 
economic policy, as has happened since some time in other 
European countries” (Ibidem: 14). Thus, conflicts and 
industrial unrest are not symptoms of strength, but of 
weakness, which in turn contributed to the strong 
identitarian element of the PCI and the CGIL. This 
weakness harks back to the 1950s, when the working class 
was isolated and divided, and constantly under the threat 
of ‘the sack’ due to a high rate of unemployment and a 
situation on the shopfloor characterised by paternalism and 
discrimination (Vianello 1979: 27 
A further element that is important in understanding 
the tradition of the Italian working class movement is what 
Regini (1991 cited in Hyman 2001: 155) calls ‘productivism’: 
an ideology – particularly strong within the CGIL – that has 
its origins in the craft working class, and referred to the 
idea that workers possessed the right and capacity to 
control production by themselves. It often went hand in 
hand with an austere work ethic. This element was revived 
in the 1980s in the unions’ willingness to share with 
management the decision-making over policies and 
strategies aimed at adapting the organisation of work to 
new competitive challenges (Hyman 2001: 155). Moreover, 
and linked to the above, Panzieri (1976) emphasises how 
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the confederal trade unions’ and the PCI’s position during 
the heyday of the economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s 
reflected what he called an ‘objectivism’ which ultimately 
accepted capitalist rationality at the firm level, tending to 
privilege political action at the level of the external sphere 
of consumption and salaries.78 According to Panzieri, the 
PCI and the CGIL leadership emphasised the positive 
benefits of technological change – rising productivity and 
the possibility of rising wages – generally downplaying the 
way in which the rise in the organic composition of capital 
was being used by capital to increase exploitation and 
reduce the relative strength of workers. The strong work 
ethic, that has always been a central aspect of Italian 
communist ideology, was the counterpart of the emphasis 
of the PCI on the critique of consumerism. It was often 
claimed by the PCI, particularly since the 1970s, that the 
main phenomenon to be contrasted in recent capitalist 
development was the diffusion of an individualist 
consumerism. Berlinguer even theorised austerity as a 
“chance to reform Italy” and as a liberatory act whereby the 
popular masses create new forms of solidarity (Berlinguer 
1977). 
The advantage of the socialist myth – providing a 
strong identity in a situation of constant threat to its 
legitimacy – was evident. The disadvantage was however 
that it contributed to continually put in doubt the 
democratic credentials and legitimacy of the PCI (Paggi 
and d’Angelillo 1986: 101). According to the Paggi and                                                         
78 In critiquing this position, Panzieri also quotes Marx stating that the sphere 
of circulation created by the process of exchange is a true “Eden of innate rights 
of men.” Workerist analyses of the ‘class composition’ in Italy and in specific 
firms are included in the Journal ‘Quaderni Rossi’ of the 1960s. In particular, 
see: Alquati 1963. 
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d'Angelillo, this generated an important difference between 
the Italian case and countries where social-democracy has 
acceded to government (Sweden, Germany, Austria, for 
instance): “while the social-democratic trade-off tends to 
exchange moderation in social conflict with direct or 
indirect increases of the real salary, the communist one 
always tends to see as an adequate compensation a wider 
recognition of its legitimacy” (Ibidem: 102). 
 Hyper-identity was also the result of the 
marginalisation of labour, constantly confirmed by a 
renewal of the threat to the very survival of the communist 
CGIL. Consider this quote from former CGIL secretary 
Bruno Trentin: 
 
“The 1950s CGIL was forced into isolation, most 
prominently by the public institutions and the state’s 
administration. It was a union that was fighting for its very 
survival, not only vis-à-vis the employers, which were 
practicing a harsh politics of discrimination, but also vis-à-
vis the governments. It was a union which had to face a 
harsh politics of ostracism and discrimination against its 
own members” (Trentin 1994: 218). 
 
 The second element is the notion of ‘progressive 
democracy’ (Ibidem: 110). The way the PCI interpreted the 
relationship between socialism and democracy was to 
conceive of the battle for democracy as a progressive path 
that would lead to socialism. ‘Democracy’ and ‘socialism’ 
were thus equated and went in hand in hand, in the eyes of 
the party cadres. In the background there was still an idea 
of a fundamental incompatibility between democracy and 
capitalism, inherited by the Third International 
(interestingly, the same incompatibility was theorised in 
the 1970s in the debate on the contradiction between capital 
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accumulation and its legitimation – see Crozier et al 1975). 
Democracy was still understood as a ‘subversive’ element 
within a capitalist society. What was lost in this kind of 
analysis was the logical and historical link between 
capitalism and democracy (based on the division between 
the political and the economic, and the extension of the 
egalitarian logic of the sphere of circulation, analysed 
above), so that the notion of democracy – in the PCI’s 
conceptualisation – became a political formation based on a 
general will, with the latter as the sole arbiter of history. 
From a Marxian perspective, liberal 'juridical 
freedom' and equality can be seen as idealised 
representations of exchange in the sphere of circulation. 
The capitalist values of freedom and individualism are 
linked with the realm of exchange. Therefore, in the terrain 
of political struggle, there is no ‘increase in democracy’ that 
can lead to socialism. Therefore, this understanding of the 
functioning of democracy as inherently antagonistic to that 
of capitalism is different from the social-democratic 
insistence on ‘welfare capitalism’ or the ‘welfare state’, 
within a perspective that embraces liberal democracy as the 
conceptual horizon of political action. In the 
socialdemocratic conceptualisation, the market plays an 
important role: it must be promoted because it can provide 
needed use-values, but at the same time there is a 
conflictual understanding of its basic operating 
mechanisms. So, at the basis of social-democracy is a 
conflictual understanding of society, of social relations 
within capitalism. Paggi and d’Angelillo argue that the 
dissociation between democracy and the market generated 
in the politics of the PCI a non-contractual perspective on 
the relations between classes, and thus “an idea of the 
general interest as something necessarily in contrast to 
282   
conflict” (Ibidem: 113). This vision significantly differs from 
classic social-democratic programmes, such as those based 
on Gunnar Myrdal’s work.79 Moreover, the authors stress 
how the ‘removal’ of the market as a frame of reference and 
thus of a ‘contractual’ understanding of social relations in a 
capitalist society, implies a position of weakness vis-à-vis 
the strategy of trasformismo outlined above.  
The problem of legitimation and thus that of the 
PCI’s identity noted above therefore weakened the capacity 
of the party to generate at autonomous programmatic 
position. This is visible in what the two authors consider as 
the one of the main political stances of the PCI throughout 
the post-war decades (Ibidem: 100-108). The first one was 
the party’s self-definition as a party of government, which 
goes hand in hand with the notion of national 
responsibility. This has played out in the availability of the 
party to be co-opted in large coalitions in the name of a 
national interest. In fact, due to the ‘K factor’ (the 
impossibility for the PCI to form a government in 
opposition to the DC, because of the internalisation of the 
divisions of the cold war), this possibility was envisaged as 
the only possible way of attaining governmental                                                         
79 Myrdal, perhaps the most influential social-democratic economist, heavily 
influenced the ideas and practices of the Swedish social-democratic party and 
was awarded the Nobel prize in economics in 1974. Myrdal’s theory was based 
on the assumption of structurally contrasting and conflicting interests in the 
economy, and thus on the idea of the state as the space of politics, mediation 
and compromise between them. What he refused was the inherently liberal 
idea of a harmony of interests in the economic sphere and thus of common 
assessments to the whole social body (that is, independently of the distribution 
of wealth and income of the social groups), and of the illusion of a non-
conflictual settlement. The whole of Myrdal’s work is therefore aimed at re-
establishing the theoretical and political legitimacy of the ‘point of view’ of 
specific social actors, in contrast to the liberal harmonic perspective. 
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responsibilities. One of the ways in which, therefore, the 
PCI subordinated itself to the model of trasformismo was in 
its incapacity to create alternative governmental coalitions 
to the centrist one, and therefore its insistence on the 
perspective of national unity or national solidarity with the 
other parties. 
Within this context it is easier to understand the 
second key proposition of the PCI (according to the two 
authors): the idea of the necessity of sacrifices on the part of 
the working class. The very idea of a political exchange was 
almost in principle refused: in fact, the authors stress how 
the PCI’s own understanding of the economic problems of 
the country was incorporated into the notion of hegemony 
which would in a way lead to national solidarity (Ibidem: 
103). A famous quote by Gramsci was often used to justify 
this position: “Hegemony means a search for compromise 
and requires also that the party makes corporative-
economic sacrifices”. However, if transferred to the Italian 
post-war situation, this political perspective ended up 
paradoxically justifying a position which interpreted the 
PCI’s participation in government not as an alternative to 
the model of trasformismo, but rather as a theoretical 
justification of a kind of molecular transformation from the 
inside, and thus the acceptance of some of its key tenets 
(Ibidem: 105), including the idea of a separation between 
economics and politics, which the PCI embraced anytime 
the possibility of forming government emerged (Ibidem: 
64).80                                                          
80 Harking back to the reconstruction period, we can see the origin of this 
moderation in economic affairs in the PCI’s aim of rendering evident the 
refusal of the politics of mass collectivisation adopted in the USSR, a strategy 
which soon turns into a subordinate position to the economic liberal 
perspective (Ibidem: 63). 
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The PCI’s sympathy for liberal economic thought 
was also due to the lack of a group of qualified Marxist 
economists. As Amyot argues, because of this “the PCI was 
to some extent left with the liberal economics of this group 
(i.e. the liberal wing of the intelligentsia around the former 
Action Party and the daily ‘La Repubblica’) as the most readily 
available alternative” (Amyot 2004: 158). Even Togliatti – 
who earned his degree in Turin with the liberal Luigi 
Einaudi – had participated in the cultural ‘anti-reformist’ 
climate fuelled by the liberal economists. In the 1940s 
dialogue within the PCI, Togliatti was opposed to 
economic planning, arguing that this could be done only in 
an already socialist country under workers’ control, and that 
in a capitalist country, a communist party like the PCI 
should not propose state planning as this amounted to an 
acceptance of the logic of planning capitalist development. 
This peculiar position can be seen as reflecting the 
combination of socialist myth and economic moderatism 
(trasformismo) of the PCI.  
These elements go a long way towards explaining 
the positions adopted by the PDS in the early 1990s.  In fact, 
the party was both able to create the consensus necessary 
for austerity policy and was arguably the political 
formation most committed to the goal of deficit reduction 
and meeting the Maastricht criteria.  As Michelini notes, the 
secretary of the PDS in 1990s, due to these cultural 
antecedents, felt that he could legitimise his policies of 
liberalisation and privatisation against state ‘parasitism’ by 
referring to Gramsci’s thought (Michelini 2008: 92). 
Therefore, the Paretian interpretation of trasformismo 
and clientelism had paradoxically found acceptance in the 
PCI’s interpretation of the DC regime. The idea of a 
backwardness and corruption of the Italian ruling classes 
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was accepted as a key element of analysis in the critique of 
the DC. This analysis was prone to a punitive politics vis-à-
vis the welfare state and labour interests. According to 
Paggi and d’Angelillo “within this framework of reference, 
we can conceptually explain the possibility that a harsh 
moral critique of the dominant party coupled with the 
support for a politics of ‘recovery’ (risanamento) which, 
although intentionally aimed at ‘cutting the enemy’s nails’ 
(deflate the DC), inevitably have the effect of weakening 
the contractual force of the labour movement” (Paggi and 
d’Angelillo: XIV). A further element that must be noted 
here is the affinity that the PCI had with the Bank of Italy. 
This stance can be explained by the fact that the Bank was 
one of the few institutions that was not controllable by the 
DC regime (Amyot 2004: 113).  
In the management of the state, thus, it are 
considerations of financial balance that take precedence, in 
an interpretation of the welfare state as a system of 
clientelistic management of consensus (Paggi and 
d’Angelillo 1986: 154). The Italian welfare state was and is 
characterised by both state spending which favours middle 
and upper strata, as well as by the lack or incompleteness 
of universalist services which favour lower strata. What 
was missing from the PCI’s stance was a disaggregated 
analysis of the problem of state finances, which alone can 
generate alternative solutions to outright fiscal 
retrenchment.  This is, I believe, a key point. The critique of 
the DC regime turned into a potentially anti-labour stance, 
a factor that arguably emerged with new vigour in the 
1990s. To this one must add the fact that – also as a 
consequence of the strategy of trasformismo – the PCI was 
not a statist party, equating a ‘strong’ state with the DC’s 
clientelistic practice, as Amyot remarks: 
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“the PCI…was never a proponent of easy money, inflation, 
devaluation and large deficits. It recognised that inflation 
tended to favour business and the petty bourgeoisie and 
that deficits financed DC patronage schemes. Hence it is 
possible to understand the PDS’s commitment to meeting 
the Maastricht criteria as the product of the party’s history. 
It is indeed ironic that the PDS demonstrated a firmer 
resolve on this issue than the parties of the right” (Amyot 
2004: 113).  
 
The ‘liberal socialist’: trasformismo and the non-
communist left 
  
 Also the non-communist left was conditioned by the 
strategy of trasformismo. The key-word of what Paggi and 
d’Angelillo call ‘economic liberal reformism’ (riformismo 
liberista) was not ‘redistribution’, but ‘re-balancing of 
growth’ (riequilibrio dello sviluppo) (Paggi and d'Angelillo 
1986 ch.6). The underlying economic stance was peculiarly 
based on 'anti-monopolism' as a structural element. aim of 
the reforms was understood to be the elimination of 
positions of rent that obstruct competition in the ‘free 
market’. These ‘privileges’ were identified in both state 
aids, various forms of protection and the trade unions. 
Once again, the power of the labour movement was 
perceived as potentially contrasting with the general 
interest, and thus as a particularistic stance that must be 
tamed. In fact, one of the PCI’s programmatic alliances with 
the other left-wing forces was based upon the creation of an 
‘anti-monopoly’ coalition, whose echoes can still be heard 
in recent times (Salvati 1995). The idea was to create a 
capitalist framework without monopolies, and the state’s 
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action was seen as providing the framework for a 
competitive interaction that could achieve the maximum 
social utility. The idea, shared by Scalfari (Paggi and 
d’Angelillo: 127-128) is that situations of monopoly create 
an obstacle to the perfect mobility of the factors of 
production, that is the only mechanism that can create full 
employment. The ‘general interest’ was thus equated with 
the conservative figure of the ‘tax-payer’, and was seen as 
potentially harmed by the particularistic logic of the 
organisation of collective interests, such as trade unions or 
other interest groups. As Paggi and d’Angelillo argue, 
within this framework the critique of the ‘economic right’ 
blends with a condemnation of the “classic collusion 
between plutocracy and worker oligarchies” (Ibidem: 128). 
This position has in fact formed the thrust of the liberal 
critique of the DC regime carried out by a generally liberal 
centre-left public opinion, epitomised by the figure of 
Eugenio Scalfari and his magazine ‘Il Mondo’, and later the 
newspaper ‘La Repubblica’ (starting from 1978) (see Paggi 
2003: 86-88). This stance conditioned both the PSI and the 
left-wing of the DC (in addition to the PCI).  
The critique of the DC regime was entrusted to 
categories such as ‘parasitic capitalism’ and 
‘backwardness’. Giuliano Amato, member of the PSI, and 
in 1992-1993 prime minister of the country, proposed in 
1977 an analysis that had in nuce all the elements of the 
liberal critique not only of the DC regime, but of the whole 
‘First Republic’ experience. His analysis was based on the 
notion of modello spartitorio (essentially, a model based on 
the clientelistic and party-driven distribution of funds for 
consensual purposes) retrieving all the economic liberal 
and Paretian interpretations of trasformismo (Amato 1976). 
In the early 1990s, as the country delved into the crisis of 
288   
the First Republic, the notion of consociativismo re-emerged 
as a central category used to depict the clientelistic 
practices of the parties. In fact in Amato’s 1992 article 
(Amato 1992) one can find a harsh critique of the 
constitutional model, that generated the common 
perception of the constitution as cattocomunista (catholic-
communist) and thus hostile toward the market. This 
description of the 1948 constitution was ‘organic’ to the 
programme of privatisations begun in the early 1990s 
(Michelini 2008: 58). Ciampi himself, in his reflections on 
his experience in government, argues that the autonomy of 
his government from the political parties was a healthy 
regeneration after the parties’ “expropriation” of decision-
making power from the governments of the First Republic 
(Ciampi 1996: 9). 
To conclude this long historical and conceptual 
excursus, let us sum up the two main points that 
characterise the economic liberal tradition of the Italian left. 
On the one side, there was a view of power that focused on 
the notion of ‘corruption’ as a central analytical tool (it will 
be used by both liberal and social-liberal culture in Italy to 
attack both the DC and collective organised interests in 
Italy). On the other hand, there was the idea that the labour 
movement with its claims and demands can always be in 
contrast with the ‘general interest’. It is mostly this second 
point that marked a key difference between the economic 
culture of the Italian left and that of its European 
counterparts. The difference is that between trasformismo 
and social-democracy (or reformism). The former was 
based on: a politics of containment of the Italian labour 
movement; the constant marginalisation of wages in the 
distribution of income; and the PCI’s projection on the 
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notion of ‘national unity’ of the problems of government, 
that reflected the internalisation of trasformismo.   
 
The ‘liberal strategy’ of the Second Republic 
 
 I believe that it is worth signaling a few elements of 
the transition from the ‘First’ to the ‘Second’ Republic that 
can help us understand the genesis and consequence of the 
1993 deal. In this short section, I briefly review an article by 
Paggi (2003) that sheds light on the liberal underpinnings 
of the transformation. 
 In this long and detailed analysis, Paggi shows how 
the liberal hypothesis and strategy of a ‘politics without 
parties’ emerged in Italy starting from the 1970s (in line 
with the devising of a transnational neoliberal project), 
aiming at undermining the role of the parties in the Italian 
political system, that was increasingly portrayed as being 
characterised by clientelism and what has been termed 
‘consociativism’. This strategy must be seen as the reaction 
to the strengthening of the labour movement in the 1970s, 
against which a culture of ‘limited liberalism’ developed 
the strategy of ‘Second Republic’.  The development of this 
strategy can be synthesised in three steps. 
 Firstly, the liberal reaction to the belated 
development of the Italian welfare state, aiming precisely at 
delimiting the role of the political parties. Paggi begins his 
analysis by spelling out his theoretical stance, which views 
parties as “a deep-rooted element in civil society whose 
function is to elaborate the political direction of 
government. Elements of crisis in a parliamentary 
democracy tend to emerge when parties become weaker, 
not when they become stronger” (Ibidem: 64). In the Italian 
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case, the political parties served a crucial supplementary 
function for the state: because of the genesis of the Italian 
state and polity and its weak legitimacy and sense of 
identity, the masses were largely incorporated in the state 
and mobilised by the two major political parties, 
themselves strongly divided according to the cold war 
fracture. The crisis of the 1970s generated a weakening of 
the parties because of: secularisation and the loss of efficacy 
of patriarchal forms of politics; the proliferation of new 
social movements outside of the political parties, including 
the unions; the growth of the welfare state. The 
governments of ‘national solidarity’ of the late 1970s also 
contributed to the distancing of the PCI from its own social 
base and from the social forces that had mobilised in the 
previous years. The liberal project that emerged in this 
conjuncture had two objectives (Ibidem: 72): an institutional 
reform in a majoritarian (or even presidentialist) direction 
in order to downsize the power of the parties; an attack on 
the historical identity of the PCI, which went hand in hand 
with the resurgence of a cold war militancy in the West.  
Various intellectual milieus are part of this trend. 
Norberto Bobbio was ‘rediscovered’ as the theoriser of the 
superiority of the liberal-democratic tradition vis-à-vis the 
tradition of the working class.81 The socialist journal 
‘Mondoperaio’ started publishing articles that were                                                         
81 Bobbio had a negative idea of liberty as liberty from the state, as non-
impediment. As Paggi points out, in Bobbio there is an idea of “freedom from 
the state as an insuppressible moment in any liberal political theory. The ideal 
cannot thus be separated from the institutions in which it is realised. In the 
context of this theoretical strategy focused on the empirical link between means 
and ends, there is the idea of the inseparability of the ‘market’ and 
‘democracy’” (Paggi 2003: 75-75). This critique went to the heart of the PCI’s 
notion of democracy, that was founded on an inseparable link between 
‘socialism’ and ‘democracy’.  
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increasingly critical of the party-dominated political 
system, introducing the notion of partitocrazia (‘party-
ocracy’, the rule of political parties). In fact the very terms 
‘consociativism’ was introduced into public discourse by an 
article on ‘Mondoperaio’ by future Prime Minister (1992-
1993) Giuliano Amato, signaling here the link between the 
modernising elements in the PSI and the liberal strategy. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s also witnessed the increasing 
activism of the liberal-democratic public opinion around 
‘La Repubblica’, that inherited the stance of the magazine 
‘Il Mondo’ with its idea of liberal-democracy as a ‘third 
force’ between the two ideological and church-like political 
parties (Ibidem: 76). In the 1980s, the democratic legitimacy 
of the PCI was increasingly questioned by the combined 
strength of these new forces, in a period in which 
progressive governments, and parties were on the 
defensive worldwide (see Van der Pijl 2006 ch.4 and 5). A 
new liberal anticommunism, radically different from the 
catholic anticommunism of the previous decades, emerged 
and found new followers in a secular individualist culture 
(consider the successful referendums on divorce and 
abortion of the mid-late 1970s).  
Giuliano Amato’s 1977 article in ‘Mondoperaio’ is 
seen by Paggi as containing all the elements of this liberal 
critique of both the PCI and the post-war settlement in 
Italy: the economic liberal assumptions of Pareto’s thought; 
the category of modello spartitorio (clientelistic model); the 
idea of politics as a source of corruption. As Paggi notes, 
“the sphere in which consensus is organised is that in 
which the process of lottizzazione82 takes place. The sphere 
of the parties was that in which negotiation, compromise,                                                         
82 Lottizzazzione refers to the division of power within the state-apparatus 
according to party and faction lines. 
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and the loss of all strategic dimension takes place. The 
critique of the Christian-Democrat system turned into a 
radical mistrust of politics. This element of mistrust of 
democratic politics was an organic and constitutive part of 
the Italian liberal (liberale e liberista) tradition, originating in 
Pareto” (Paggi 2003: 81).  
To this one should add the liberal attack on the 
antifascist tradition, epitomised by the figure of historian 
Renzo de Felice. By obscuring the antifascist origins of the 
Italian republic, the objective was to further delegitimise 
the PCI as one of (if not the strongest) promoter of the 
democratic struggle of the 1940s.  As Gallerano notes, “the 
critique of antifascism is in fact an aspect of the critique of 
the PCI and, by extension, of all the social, political and 
cultural movements which had traversed the country in the 
years following 1968” (Gallerano 1986: 127 cited in Paggi 
2003: 100). This long quote by Paggi gives a good idea of 
the significance of this moment for liberalism itself: 
 
“the liberal rejection of the antifascist paradigm, proposed 
by De Felice’s revisionism, has historiographical 
implications of extraordinary importance. It means 
cancelling from the history of Europe the years not only of 
the refoundation of democracy but also of the deep 
reclassification of liberalism, that only by passing through 
the antifascist experience can shift from the appeasement 
culture, in which it was stuck at the end of the Thirties, to 
that of the welfare state” (Paggi 2003: 100). 
 
The second step in this process was the PCI’s 
defensive and identitarian reaction to this attack. The party 
failed to renew its cultural tradition by revising its notion 
of the nexus between democracy and socialism and of the 
party as ‘organised democracy’, and renewing its 
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relationship with society after the turbulent decade of the 
1970s: “there is in those years a deep nexus between the 
growth of democracy and the crisis of democratic politics 
that the framework of the Togliattian categories - that the 
PCI continues to employ – cannot even suspect” (Ibidem: 
92). The secretary of the PCI, on the other hand, started to 
talk about a ‘moral question’ that was haunting the 
Republic and that basically consisted of the illicit 
occupation of the space of politics by corrupt and 
clientelistic networks. As Paggi notes,  
 
“by emphasising in an exclusive way the moment of 
corruption, Berlinguer forgets that the Christian 
Democratic system of power developed as a distortion of a 
great phase of growth of Italian democracy and of 
development of its citizenship rights, which continued to 
exist as a fact to be interpreted and politically represented. 
By concentrating on the relationship between parties and 
institutions, he left in the background the relationship 
between parties and society, neglecting once again that 
reflection on the crisis of the parties that had to involve also 
the PCI…Togliatti’s orthodox pupil, by substituting the 
‘historic compromise’ with the ‘moral question’ de facto 
rejoins that line of containment of the sphere of politics that 
the Italian liberal tradition had started to support since the 
second half of the 1970s ” (Ibidem: 96-97).  
 
The third and conclusive step in (my interpretation 
of) Paggi’s historical survey was the institutional reform of 
the 1990s and the left’s post-communist transformation. 
The historian sees the end of the PCI experience as taking 
place on the basis of a substantial acceptance of the claims 
advanced by liberal culture and politics in the previous 15 
years: “at the beginning of the new decade there is no 
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political force in opposition or contrast to the cultural 
profile of the Second Republic” (Ibidem: 104). The two 
elements outlined above – the demand for an ideological 
transformation and institutional reform – were accepted as 
necessary by the communist leadership, who spoke about a 
phase of “discontinuity with the consociative phase” and 
reformulated its position with a strong anti-party twist. The 
use of the term ‘consociativism’ implied, as Paggi argues 
(Ibidem: 105) the abandoning of the constitutional model 
and the adoption of a strategy of renewal based on the 
elements already contained in the analyses proposed by 
‘Mondoperaio’ in the late 1970s. There was thus an 
emphasis on the new strength of civil society vis-à-vis the 
parties and the state (this should be read also through the 
Lockean/Contender state paradigm proposed above), and 
no reflection on the evolution of parties as such (it is not a 
chance that the new political formation is first informally 
derubricated as 'the thing’ and then the term ‘party’ is 
altogether removed from its name). Tellingly, the promoter 
of the 1993 referendum for the abolition of proportional 
electoral law at the Senate, the liberal conservative Mario 
Segni, was backed by the PDS, and a possible common 
electoral cartel was even envisaged. Segni’s idea of the 
change from the ‘Republic of the parties’ to the ‘Republic of 
citizens’ speaks volumes about the underlying changes not 
only in the conception of democracy but also in the political 
economy settlement that were in the making: the 
abandoning of the ‘culture’ of the parties and the idea of 
expanding the sphere of the market and reducing the 
state’s intervention in the economy. In his interview, Paggi 
underlined that the trajectory of the post-communists since 
the early 1990s can be seen as based upon this discourse of 
a ‘Republic of citizens’ against a ‘Republic of parties’ and 
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that in order to dismantle the PCI, the secretary Occhetto 
needed to lean upon this liberal culture that attacked the 
Italian constitution as a catholic-communist pejorative 
compromise.  
The 1990s, while signaling the victory of the liberal 
strategy, at the same time marked their defeat, in the sense 
that Berlusconi’s success showed that identitarian politics 
(although via the ‘media party’) was not over, and that the 
exaltation of direct democracy and the antipolitical 
positions of the liberals carried with them forms of 
plebiscitary mobilisation that were not anticipated. Let us 
conclude this section by citing Paggi’s description of the 
new reformism embraced by the left in the 1990s: 
 
“The new party of the left, that precisely due to its origin 
has decided to exclude any reference to the socialist 
tradition, begins now to postulate a reformism without 
elements of mutualism.83 That is, a reformism understood as 
a mass of more or less coherent policies deprived of any 
reference to the existence of communities that are 
concretely defined historically and socially. Reformism 
transforms from a natural drive towards ‘self-protection’ 
from the market (this was the fundamental matrix of the 
old culture of Prampolini’s socialism84, half a century 
before being theorised by Karl Polanyi!) to a technocratic 
abstraction, devoid of ideological and social referents. A 
reformism without subject, if not that represented by the 
political class, bereft of memory, of history, committed - 
regarding the important problems of the functioning of 
democracy - to an institutional modelling devoid of any 
capacity for mobilisation but to which is entrusted the task                                                         
83 The original is: “riformismo senza mutualità”. 
84 Camillo Prampolini was an Italian reformist socialist of the late 19th century-
early 20th century.  
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of miraculously realising the ‘normal country85’” (Ibidem: 
122). 
 
Left-wing liberalism in the 1990s  
 
In this section I briefly analyse the interpretations of 
the Italian economy by centre-left intellectuals and 
economists in the 1990s. These positions must clearly be 
seen as logically linked to the strategy of trasformismo 
described above. 
 One of the main exponents of Italian left-wing 
economic liberal thought is economist Michele Salvati. He 
identifies the problems of Italy as stemming from what he 
calls ‘incomplete and distorted modernisation’ (Salvati 
1995: 91), a set of problems that in his view are due to the 
fact that Italian industrial development took place late and 
liberal values have not developed in large segments of 
Italian society. He sees the project of the Italian left as that 
of completing the modernisation of the country, 
characterised – in his view – by an inefficient state, a 
dependent South and a strong criminal activity. His 1995 
article “the Crisis of Government in Italy” offers a useful 
example of the kind of left-wing liberal thought that re-
emerged in the 1990s. Consider these statements: 
 
“These problems are acutely felt by Italian citizens, 
sometimes even more pressingly than those of 
redistribution and unemployment. Is there a left-wing 
answer to these modernisation problems? A left-wing way                                                         
85 Incidentally, it is arguably not a case that one of former PDS secretary and 
Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema’s best-selling books was entitled: ‘A Normal 
Country’ (D’Alema 1995). 
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to stamp out criminality? Of stimulating capitalist 
development in the South? Of inducing public employees 
to work as hard and productively as their private 
counterparts? Are not these problems – in some way – 
preliminary to the modern distinction between left and 
right?” (Ibidem: 92) 
 
 We can see here the strategy of trasformismo at work. 
The left is urged, to quote Togliatti, to ‘pull the flags of the 
bourgeoisie out of the mud’. The idea, which has received 
much attention in the Italian left, is that of a form of 
national capitalism that is described as straccione (ragged), 
the result of an incomplete liberal revolution. In this 
condition, as Bruno Trentin critically remarked, “the main 
goal of the working class was that of bringing to 
completion the liberal revolution that Italian capitalism, 
clung onto parasitic and reactionary positions, had left 
unfinished” (Trentin 1994: 241). Another passage from 
Salvati’s work is revealing in this sense: 
 
“Perhaps Anthony Giddens is correct to state that today the 
Left is conservative while the Right is radical. This may be 
true for the Left and the Right in fully modern, or 
postmodern, societies and especially in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. It is certainly false in the case of the Italian Right, 
since it is difficult to imagine a political conglomerate so 
conservative, unprincipled, corporatist and parochial. This 
is only to be expected in a country where the kind of 
modern right-wing thinking Giddens is referring to—
liberalism, and in particular radical liberalism of the Anglo-
Saxon variety—has always been in scarce supply, even 
more than in other continental European countries, where 
it is not very abundant either. This liberalism goes hand in 
hand with a confident, open-market capitalism, rooted in a 
complex society, imbued with values of self-reliance, and 
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independent of the state. This is just the contrary of Italian 
capitalism, nurtured by the state, protected against 
‘excessive’ competition, periodically rescued by the public 
sector, and developing in a family form from a very limited 
regional base” (Salvati 1995: 93). 
 
It is in my opinion worth quoting these passages at 
length because they give a good impression of the kind of 
politics that was envisaged by the left in the 1990s, a 
politics that emerges from the particular relation between 
the working class and the ruling class that emerged in Italy. 
Salvati goes as far as to argue that liberals are stronger 
among the centre-left than among the centre-right and that 
there is nothing that prevents the left from embracing the 
banner of efficiency and modernisation more convincingly 
than the right, identifying a potential problem in the left in 
the “close ties” that it maintains with the unions (Ibidem: 
93), thus in a way confirming what was remarked above, 
namely the view of the working class as a ‘particular 
interest’ always potentially in conflict with the ‘general 
interest’. 
 The figure of Michele Salvati was also important in 
the 2000s. As the economist Luca Michelini argues, “the 
systematic attempt to make the economic culture converge 
towards the centre of the political spectrum, in order to 
strengthen the economic liberalism of the left, was 
entrusted to economist Michele Salvati” (Michelini 2008: 
29). In Salvati’s view, the problem with the left seems to be 
its remaining ‘corporatist’ links with the labour movement 
and the social-democratic traditions of the left, personified 
by the unions and the Christian-social roots of the PD (the 
new centre-left party formed in the late 2000s). In the 
following revealing citation Salvati’s understanding of the 
left’s predicament emerges quite clearly: “even if the 
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centre-left was composed of pure and tough liberals – such 
as Giavazzi or Monti – how could it pass reforms that are 
beneficial in the long run but that, in the light of perceived 
distorted interests in the short run, a large part of our 
electors do not want?” (Salvati 2007).  
 In the opening lines of a book dedicated to the 
origins of the new centre-left party PD, we find this 
reflection: “The left has to re-write its history from the 
beginning. Given that the past has a certain weight, it must 
be admitted that the DC’s victory in 1948 was a blessing 
and it must be admitted that on the issues that really 
matter, on the idea of socialism and on many of the 
economic policies for our country, Craxi (leader of the PSI in 
the 1980s) was right and Berlinguer (leader of the PCI until 
1984) was wrong” (Salvati 2003: 18). In 2007 he gives a 
good characterisation of the ideal polity for the PD: 
“educated and informed citizens that are in conditions of 
independence and economic security, that face a limited 
and transparent state, in a society fraught with 
intermediate associations, with groups that pursue the 
most diverse interests, with communities based on different 
ethical and religious conceptions, rich in chances for 
education and high quality information” (Salvati 2007: 29). 
This society must respect the autonomy of the individual 
and must fight economic and political rent. Interestingly, 
the author sees this society as threatened on the left by 
attempts to “impose conceptions of the common good on 
other citizens that do not share them” (Ibidem). Later in the 
book, we find a useful description of the PD’ social base. To 
the question: what are the social forces that the PD aims at 
representing?, Salvati answers:  
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“everyone and no one. No one, if identified by profession, 
region of residence, ethnicity, sex, age, religious 
beliefs…He or she may be a white-collar worker or a 
manager, a self-employed worker or an employee, an 
artisan or a farmer, an intellectual or a manual worker, a 
capitalist or a wage-labourer” (Ibidem: 44-45).  
 
 What Salvati seems to hope for is that there be no 
specific historic bloc of class forces explicitly targeted by 
the main centre-left party in Italy. In Salvati’s thought, 
there is no commitment to representing the world of 
labour, as in the communist or socialdemocratic experience. 
For the new party it is thus crucial to switch its “critical 
attention towards the fields in which markets can expand, 
on the competitive or monopolistic nature of the markets, 
on the areas of rent.” From this point of view, “everyone is 
a worker, from the big manager to the last of the precarious 
workers” (Ibidem). The social relations that create and 
reproduce on the one hand capital and on the other the 
workers are totally obscured. What is overcome is also a 
social-democratic understanding of the role of the state as 
the institutionalisation of a compromise among social 
classes (as in Myrdal’s thought). What better description of 
a Lockean state/society complex than this one? 
 Salvati’s interpretation of Italy’s economic history, 
included in his 2000 book Occasioni Mancate (‘missed 
chances’- Salvati 2000) is also quite interesting to analyse. 
Here the economist seems to subscribe to an interpretation 
that – in the classic liberal tradition – separates the self-
regulating sphere of the market from that of ‘politics’. 
“Italian history is one of inflationary explosions and 
disorder in the state’s budget, of a wave of social demands 
that could not be met and of an extraordinary fiscal and 
monetary appeasement vis-à-vis these demands, followed 
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by a slow and painful process of macroeconomic 
adjustment, that today leaves us with a heavy legacy of 
public debt” (Ibidem: 109-110).  All the more telling is his 
analysis of the Italy’s economic developments of the 1980s, 
which seem to support an adjustment of the economy along 
the lines of Thatcher’s neoliberalism. His argument, in 
brief, is the following (62-90). The Italian governing class 
did not want to have a direct confrontation with labour and 
in this way fight inflation and public deficits. What was 
needed was a harsher exchange policy: only in this way 
would capital have been forced to confront the unions 
directly. However, from 1980 to 1988 the Lira devalued 
55% vis-à-vis the German Mark. The turning point is 1988, 
when the Bank of Italy starts to exploit its regained room of 
manoeuvre with respect to the treasury, and devalues the 
national currency but at a slower rate than the difference in 
inflation rate with Germany. When the rate of profit slowed 
down, Confindustria “understands that the moment to 
directly attack the wage-indexation mechanism has come 
and unilaterally recedes from the 1975 deal” (Ibidem: 74). 
From this decision stems the 1992 deal with the unions. So, 
basically, the problem was the redistributive goals of the 
unions that needed to be tamed if Italy were to finally join 
the club of European ‘modern’ nations: “the push toward 
the conformity of political systems and single policies that 
comes from Europe are so strong that they will, sooner or 
later, overcome the divergences and incoherencies of the 
single national systems” (Ibidem: 93). These ‘incoherencies’ 
are easy to identify: the political right, the ‘radical’ left, the 
unions, organised interests.  
 Adding to the characterisation of the Italian right 
reported above, consider this statement: “the real problem 
in my view is not whether a modernisation and efficiency 
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programme would be worthwhile, but whether it could be 
implemented. The left is better than the right but is still a 
piece of Italian society, which shares many of those 
characters, habits and cultural predispositions that have so 
far prevented or distorted modernisation” (Salvati 1995: 
94). The solutions he proposes are clearly in line with 
liberal economic theory: anti-monopolistic policies, 
privatisations and liberalisations – “liberalism and open 
markets are in Italy a breath of fresh air and could well be 
taken up as important aims in a left wing programme” 
(Ibidem: 94). This can be equated with a programme that 
reflects Van der Pijl’s notion of a ‘Lockean state/society 
complex’ and follows the Italy-England comparison 
scheme proposed initially by Pareto, both described above.  
 What can all of this tell us about the developments of 
the 1990s? As I will show later, the consensus and reforms 
of that decade revolved around similar issues and the 
absence of a quid pro quo was remarked not only by the 
academic literature, but also by the interviewees. Thus, 
while if seen on the side of the concertative method, the 
consensus of the 1990s is an exception, if seen from the side 
of the content of those policies, one can trace back the 
availability of the unions and the left for similar kinds of 
policies back in time and identify the cultural genesis of 
these stances in the strategy of trasformismo.  
The PDS anchored its political programme on issues 
such as good governance and the ‘moral question’ and 
aimed at representing the Tangentopoli anti-political public 
opinion that surged in the early 1990s (Bazzocchi 2011). It is 
not a chance that recently, the heirs of the PCI have taken a 
further ideological step away from the tradition of 
European social democracy altogether, abandoning any 
reference to the tradition of the left and renaming the party 
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‘Democratic Party’ (joining forces with former left-wing 
Christian-democrats). This is perhaps the ultimate result of 
trasformismo: the (former) party of the working class 
abandoning – even ideally – the ambition to represent 
labour in order to pre-emptively embrace the notion of the 
general interest which, as we saw, was in Italy strictly 
linked with a liberal understanding of the role of the state 
and of the country’s insertion into the international 
economy.  
Michelini offers a useful analysis of the left’s 
economic culture in the 2000s by studying the writings of 
the major exponents of the PD (Michelini 2008). In his view, 
the party is divided between 2 broad areas: the economic 
liberals, self-defined as ‘reformists’, and what the 
‘reformists’ would call the ‘statists’86, with the former being 
the dominant group. The ‘reformists’’ stance is 
characterised by the idea that after the fall of the Berlin wall 
and the supposed failure of social-democratic models and 
experiments based on ‘Keynesianism in one country’ (such 
as Mitterand), the only game in town is liberalism. As 
Grillo, a former member of the anti-trust authority 
remarked, the PD’s economic culture has to found itself on 
the ideals of freedom and equality since “liberal ideology is 
the only one left alive” (Ibidem: 9). However, many of the 
proponents of an economic liberal culture of the left seem 
to share the preoccupation that the social base of the party 
has still not assimilated these ideas.  
A corollary of this view is - once again – the view 
that what blocks the future of Italy is a ‘tangle’ of social, 
political and trade-unionist compromises, held together by                                                         
86 Very broadly, the ‘statists’ are identified by the author as a group of 
politicians and economists including De Cecco, Fassina, Ruffolo and Tesauro. 
The ‘reformists’ are Salvati, Reichlin, Polito, Sapelli, Visco, Toniolo  
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rents and corporations. The only way to disentangle this 
‘conservative’ bloc is to liberalise and privatise (Ibidem: 11), 
also against the interest of the union leadership, which is 
seen as protecting ‘corporatist interests’ (Ibidem: 13).87  
The political dividing line that characterises Italy is 
seen by the liberal reformists of the PD as that between the 
interests of the ‘corporations’ and those of sectors that are 
ready to ‘bet on competition’ and that propose an ‘anti-
corporatist liberalism’ (Ibidem: 19). In Toniolo’s view, the 
former group include basically almost every organised 
group: Confindustria, the catholic church, the trade unions, 
the anti-globalization movement, professional associations 
and – crucially – political parties (Ibidem: 19-20). The logical 
consequence of this stance is the idea that the PD must 
distance itself from its social base in the labour 
movement,88 in order to better fight its political enemy, 
                                                        
87 An extreme version of this left-wing economic liberalism can be seen in the 
writings of the journalist and politician Antonio Polito, who seems to recycle 
the classic critiques of progressive ‘collectivism’ of Popper and von Hayek, 
without their intellectual sophistication. In his manifesto (Polito 2007) he 
basically argues, that the Bolsceviks, referring to a tradition that arches back to 
Rousseau and Plato, have attempted to create a totalitarian society based on the 
imposition of the will of a minority on the majority, and that this experiment 
left traces in lefist thought and politics. The latter still has to emancipate itself 
from a culture that projects the imperfections of human beings on society, thus 
‘de-responsabilising’ the individual and giving excessive power to a state that 
knows what they really want better than them. At the end of this book, he 
proposes a short breviary for the ‘new democrat’: anti-egalitarianism, labour 
flexibility, fight against ‘parasitism’, anti-pacifism, anti-laicism, anti-classism. 
Moreover, he revives a standard 19th century anti-socialist line of attack: 
refusing egalitarianism as defined by ‘social envy’.  
88 As Toniolo himself remarks (cited in Michelini 2008: 25), “apart from a lot of 
paleo-unionism, from those that are nostalgic of the ‘state-entrepreneur’, from 
those that demonise anything that refers to international capitalism, there exist, 
luckily, staunch and coherent supporters of a solid market culture and its 
rules”. 
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seen as the personification of political and economic rent-
seeking. 
Nicola Rossi, an economist close to the ideas of the 
liberal wing of the PD, has a similar view of the differences 
between the ideals of the right and those of the left, which 
he characterises as those between a “clientelistic and anti-
egalitarian neo-dirigisme and a privatised and liberalised 
economic system, that … tends towards a certain 
egalitarianism” (Ibidem: 100). According to him, the historic 
values of the left must be modified because its traditional 
social base defends interests that are legitimate but that are 
in contradiction with the constitutive values of reformism. 
As he remarks, 
 
“the years of the Olive Tree coalition, from 1996 to 2000, 
were the years of the large and expected retreat of politics, 
which consciously and deliberately abandons some of its 
room of manoeuvre and of freedom in favour of 
supranational and sub-national entities, in favour of social 
organisation or single sectors of society and in particular 
the private sector” (cited in: Ibidem: 101). 89 
 
This stance resonates with a general trend within 
neoliberalism of a disarming or ‘hollowing out’ of the state. 
For instance, Della Sala argues that greater capital mobility 
and economic interdependence have caused a shifting of 
political authority “upwards to supranational 
organisations; downwards to regional and local 
governments…; sideways to new polities such as the                                                         
89 Compare with how Nicola Rossi sees centre-right: “the choices starting from 
2001 (when the centre-right coalition formed the government) signal an inversion in 
all of these fronts and open the way to a renewed, diffused and capillary power 
of policies in all segments of social and economic life” (Ibidem: 101). 
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European Union” (Della Sala 1997: 16). Moreover, the 
concept of ‘new constitutionalism seems particularly well-
suited to capture this transformation. As mentioned above, 
new constitutionalism is, according to Gill(2001) an 
international governance framework that aims at 
separating economic policies from broad political 
accountability. According to Gill, devolving power to 
subnational or supranational entities, as the economic 
liberals in the left advocate, attenuates political pressures 
on the formation of economic policy, by redefining the 
boundaries of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’, boundaries 
which “police the limits of the possible in the making of 
economic policy” (Ibidem: 59).  
“The least democratic levels of governance in the 
emerging multi-level system tend to be in local government 
(where participation at the local level tends to be quite low) 
and more acutely at the level of regional and global 
governance in, for example the EU and the international 
financial institutions” (Ibidem: 58). Hence, what these 
intellectuals argued for was very much in line with a 
neoliberal ‘bracketing’ of the economy (the ‘retreat of 
politics’).  The idea of re-establishing a ‘correct relationship’ 
between state and market against an outdated ‘mixed 
economy’ system is seen by van der Pijl as the reflection of 
a neoliberal transformation and discourse in which “the 
restructuring of civil society against the state is the pivotal 
transformation in the neoliberal counter-revolution” (van 
der Pijl 2006: 157). 
 Carrying on with the analysis of left-wing liberal 
culture in the 1990s, consider this statement from a self-
proclaimed ‘reformist’ economist: “the Italian welfare state 
has been designed to suit the needs of the generations that 
have built it, that were able to hand the costs off to the 
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future generations in the form of public debt interests, 
financially unsustainable pension entitlements and lower 
employment because of an excess of regulation. Today’s 
youth are the ones called to pay the price for such 
squandering” (Nannicini 2005: 69 cited in Cesaratto 2006).  
Apart from the first statement (it is difficult to imagine a 
welfare state that is not built to suit the needs of the 
actually existing population), in these reflections – 
including the ones reported above – we find no mention of 
Italy’s fiscal imbalance since the 1970s, nothing on the DC’s 
strategy of divide et impera privileging ‘baby pensions’ and 
disability pensions for electoral purposes, little on the huge 
problem of fiscal evasion, on the origins (and thus 
diagnosis) of the public debt problem. Once again, the 
obstacle is seen as residing in ‘irresponsible’ claims 
(deriving either from political extremism or from simple 
lack of knowledge). 
  Several elements are worth underlining about the 
new ‘reformist’ stance. First of all, there seems to be an 
explicit attempt to abandon as political reference points the 
organised groups, as well as a clear will to weaken the 
major elements of the socialist tradition. Since the 1990s, in 
a situation in which the electorate of the centre-left was 
asked to make tough sacrifices (financial adjustment, 
reduction of public services, lower salaries, labour 
flexibility90), in the face of an explicit attempt of the centre-
left élite to find a new social base, the traditional electorate 
has arguably partly switched allegiances. Reflecting on the 
consequences of the 1997 labour flexibility law, Simoni 
argues that                                                         
90 Gallino (2007) draws attention to the fact that the governments of the left and 
the right interpreted the phenomenon of labour flexibility similarly and enacted 
legislations based on a similar commodifying philosophy.  
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“the flexibisation of the labour market had the effect of 
further pushing to the margins, in terms of reduced welfare 
entitlements and reduced job protection, a cohort of 
citizens already comparatively disadvantaged (…) There 
are robust hints suggesting that the political alliance 
between the electoral left and organised labour in the 1990s 
sew the seed of subsequent losses for its protagonists. 
Arguably, the increased segmentation of the labour market 
makes both union recruiting policy and social-democratic 
electoral strategy harder to accomplish. Paradoxically, the 
unity of Italian organised labour in the 1990s paved the 
way to a socially and politically divided labour movement 
in the 2000s and possibly beyond” (Simoni 2009: 17;19).  
 
 I believe it is not stretching concepts to argue that 
the ‘technocratic centre-left’ line of the 1990s (represented 
by the governments of Amato, Ciampi, Dini, Prodi and 
d’Alema) has been able to build a quite compact hegemony 
around the notion of a ‘culture of stability’ (Ciampi 1993). 
This hegemony has allowed the bourgeoisie to reproduce 
itself successfully, perhaps not as an internationally 
competitive economic system (vis-à-vis the more advanced 
countries), but certainly in the form of a more entrenched 
social hegemony in civil society. Bourgeois notions of 
meritocracy, individualism and personal responsibility 
parallel the move towards a ‘Lockean’ state, with a reduced 
role for decommodifying social policy based on ‘social 
protection’ (in the Polanyian sense) and an intensification 
of work discipline.  
 The move towards a political system based on 
alternation in government is an aspect of this 
transformation. It can be argued that in this way, the 
bourgeoisie was able to politically control the organised 
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social forces of labour, with the goal of creating a more 
market-friendly society. However - post festum - the fall of 
the First Republic (see below) and the discourse and 
politics of ‘anti-politics’ it has generated (in line, in fact, 
with the neoliberal idea that politics should not adventure 
into the economic world of ‘freely interacting individuals’) 
has arguably marked the end of ‘reformism’ as such, as 
neoliberal strategies in Italy now have few antagonists 
among the main parties. 
 
The ‘Copernican revolution’ of the 1990s: from 
1992 to the Prodi government 
 
The years from 1992 to 1998 represented a real U-
turn in Italian economic policy-making and in the Italian 
political economy. Not only was the country able to join 
EMU with the first group of countries – a result that was 
judged near to impossible by many observers – but the 
governments were able to implement far-reaching and 
unprecedented reforms in various areas of economic and 
political life: industrial relations, the budgetary process, 
pensions and the labour market, to cite just the most 
important ones. Crucially, this set of reforms were largely 
agreed upon by all the social partners with the government 
and emerged out of what Simoni (2009) calls a ‘policy 
alliance’ between the centre-left and organised labour. 
Thus, the consensus achieved in 1992-1993 was not only on 
labour costs and the reform of industrial relations (see next 
sections) but also on the subsequent reforms of the welfare 
state and on EMU. In fact, the two arguably most far-
reaching reforms of the mid-1990s – the 1995 pension 
reform and the 1997 flex-law – were not only agreed upon 
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by the trade unions, but even included the latter in the very 
drafting of the bills. Thus, starting from 1992 every major 
economic and social reform in Italy was carried out 
through concertation. This method also allowed for a 
strong devaluation of the currency in 1992 without a 
substantive increase of inflation and then for the building 
of the necessary consensus for fiscal austerity to meet the 
Maastricht criteria.  
This impressive set of reforms were carried out in 
the framework of a reconfiguration of the state apparatus 
towards the new paradigm of ‘new constitutionalism’, itself 
the result of class struggle and the emergence of a 
transnational historical bloc of social forces with an interest 
in implementing largely neoliberal reforms also by 
increasingly insulating the government from societal 
pressures, by enhancing the autonomy of the executive and 
delegating power to European institutions. As the next 
section will detail, a more insulated executive, economic 
decision-making increasingly immune from democratic 
accountability, the political use of the ‘external constraint’ 
and the greater power of technocratic bodies were crucial 
instruments for the implementation of reforms (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1996; Della Sala 2004a). Crucially, the debate 
was framed around the buzz-word ‘modernisation’ and 
was seen by the left as a way to dismantle what were 
perceived to be entrenched political and economic 
oligarchies (Ibidem: 126). 
The most radical U-turn in Italian economic policy-
making was in the field of budgetary measures. 1992 has 
been judged as the crucial year (Salvati 1995; Amyot 2004: 
156) as it was the year when the First Republic parties 
started to dissolve themselves under the attacks of the 
judiciary for the enormous corruption scandals that had 
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emerged. It was in this situation that the first, harsh attack 
on the debt problem was carried out. In the previous 
decade, public deficit had always been higher than 10% 
and the DC-PSI governments seemed unable to tackle the 
issue, fearing reactions from their electoral constituencies.  
Amato came to power at the end of the First 
Republic, when the Tangentopoli scandals had started to 
take their toll of the old parties and personnel.91 Giuliano 
Amato, prime minister in 1992, exploited the 
unprecedented situation of weakness of the parties to act 
more independently from them, in order to carry out quite 
radical measures that were to be followed by the Ciampi 
government. In fact, as Ferrera and Gualmini point out 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 126), an important factor that 
characterised the 1990s was the gradual process of 
separation of the national executive from the “grip” of the 
parties. As the relationship between the executive and the 
legislative moved in favour of the former, the introduction 
of reforms was eased as mediating moments with the 
parties and societal interests were weakened. This 
‘autonomisation’ of the executive was strengthened also 
thanks to the change in electoral system after the April 1993 
referendum, which ended the system of proportional 
representation and cleared the way towards a more 
majoritarian system. As Della Sala argued (2004a:137), 
 
“while the entire political class faced a crisis of legitimacy 
and credibility, the executive, particularly the Prime                                                         
91 Michelini (2008: 60) argues that it were the external factors and constraints – 
such as NATO, the fall of the USSR and the rise of financial markets – that have 
allowed Italy to avoid that the ‘Clean Hands’ revolution could transform into a 
social revolution.  This is – I believe – a bit exaggerated, as it is difficult to 
identify the political and social actors that could have both the material 
capabilities and the ideas to create the bases for a ‘social revolution’.  
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Minister’s office and the Treasury, were able to seize the 
initiative. This was due partly to the presence of 
technicians in government and to some of the institutional 
changes of the previous decades, but also to the external 
constraints of European integration that favoured the 
executive over other constitutional structures”. 
 
This element will be given some space below when 
looking at these transformations through the lens of ‘new 
constitutionalism’. It is worth underlining moreover that in 
a moment in which the political parties – particularly in the 
years between 1992 and 1995 – were in disarray, the role of 
the social partners and particularly of organised labour 
became suddenly more important as a means of dialogue 
between the executive and civil society. The unions 
themselves aimed at exploiting this weakness of the parties 
as a way to regain some influence over decision-making.  
Overall, in 6 years, between 1992 and 1996, the 
public deficit decreased from 9.5 to 3% of GDP thanks to 
measures consisting of 360 trillion Lire of cuts and tax 
increases (Amyot 2004: 158). Della Sala defined the changes 
in Italian public finances in this period as “impressive” 
(Della Sala 2004a: 134). The Amato government 
immediately found itself in an extremely difficult situation, 
as the country was not only going through an 
unprecedented political crisis, but the national currency 
was also under intense speculation from financial markets. 
In this situation of ‘perfect storm’, pressures stemming 
from European integration and financial markets 
converged to generate a situation of emergency. In January 
1992, the Maastricht treaty – that committed the country to 
achieve a 3% deficit by 1997 – was signed. The speculative 
attack was very strong, as investors grew increasingly 
doubtful of the possibility that the authorities could 
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maintain a currency level that had become increasingly 
overvalued. In fact, looking at the data on inflation and 
currency depreciation of the previous years, one can see 
that the Lira was devalued at a slower rate than the level of 
inflation, thus creating increasing differentials in the real 
exchange rate and creating the conditions for the radical re-
adjustment that occurred in 1992 (an important factor here 
was the rise in interest rates due to German fiscal measures 
after the re-unification of the country). 
The first measure adopted by the Amato 
government was the elimination of the wage-indexation 
mechanism in the summer of 1992 (see below for more on 
this). In September, the Lira left the EMS and suffered a 
strong devaluation up to the end of the year. Public opinion 
was shocked and so opposition to both spending cuts and 
tax increases was immobilised. The Amato government 
implemented the most significant single deficit-reduction 
measure in Italian history: 90 trillion Lire, that coupled 
with a following measure of 32 trillion Lire, summed up to 
the astounding figure of 122 trillion (Amyot 2004: 159). 
Interestingly, Amyot points out that the self-employed, a 
group that had enjoyed significant fiscal privileges in the 
previous decades, was singled out for extra increases in 
taxes (Ibidem). These harsh measures made the 1992-1994 
recession worse, thus considerably increasing 
unemployment to double-digit figures. 
The Amato government, formed mainly by non-
political personnel in the key ministers, also acquired new 
responsibilities as parliament delegated to the government 
the authority to change four areas that were considered to 
be structural causes of the high deficit: the health system, 
pensions, public sector employment and local government 
finance (Della Sala 1997: 25). Significant changes were 
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introduced, such as limiting early retirement packages, 
increasing health fees and changing the public employment 
conditions (see above). As Della Sala argues, 
 
“the delegated legislation gave the executive a virtual free 
hand to introduce changes in the four areas with little 
possibility for Parliament to obstruct or amend the reforms. 
Given the relatively weak position of government 
legislation in the parliamentary process, delegating to the 
government the powers to reform four areas of major 
public expenditures was seen by political and economic 
observers as an ‘historic’ turning point” (Ibidem: 25-26). 
 
 From 1992 until the end of the decade, the 
Maastricht criteria dominated Italian political and 
economic life. Amato, in his speech to the Senate before the 
confidence vote, said that there was no alternative to 
meeting the criteria. The choice that was presented to the 
country was simply one between harsh but necessary 
measures or being relegated to a Mediterranean holiday 
resort. This kind of discourse captured a coalition of 
economic and political actors that crossed traditional 
ideological divisions and was made up of a core of 
professors from academic, political and administrative 
backgrounds that were accustomed to international 
meetings (see Regonini 1993 on their role in Italian policy-
making). In addition, the 1992 speculative attack and the 
way it was presented to public opinion shocked the Italians 
and arguably made them more ready to accept ‘sacrifices’. 
In the next chapter, I will analyse the role that the 
perception of crisis played in this conjuncture.  
Apart from tough budgetary measures, the Amato 
government also began the privatisation of state-held 
enterprises. As Michelini pointed out in his interview, the 
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Italian public sector was among the largest one in Western 
Europe and one of the measures demanded by the financial 
markets was precisely to carry out a deep process of 
privatisation. Between 1992 and 1995, many state 
enterprises were carried out, bringing close to 30 trillion 
Lire to the state coffers. The centre-left government then 
continued this policy (see below). The Minister of the State 
Enterprises (Partecipazioni Statali) was the largest single 
public apparatus in the Western world before the 
privatisations of the 1990s. So, in fact, one of the tasks of the 
political élites in this moment of Italian history was to 
dismantle their own state apparatuses. The journalist 
Massimo Mucchetti notes that in June 1992 a group of 
representatives of the major business banks in the world, 
including Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Schroeders, JP 
Morgan and Crédit Suisse, met with key exponents of the 
Italian state class (including Mario Draghi) on the British 
yacht Britannia in order to discuss the privatisation of large 
industrial assets that were to be placed on the market in the 
following months (Mucchetti 2003: 22). This episode can be 
understood as an instance of élite interaction among 
members of the transnational capitalist class and political 
personnel that, according to Van der Pijl (1998 ch.4), played 
a key role in the expansion of capitalist hegemonies.  
 The effects of the Maastricht treaty on national socio-
economic life must not be undervalued By setting in stone 
largely market-enhancing and neoliberal policies at the 
supranational level (competition policy, the internal market 
rules, the role of the ECJ and the monetarist principles 
guiding the ECB), the new framework of ‘embedded 
neoliberalism’ left the ‘embedded’ elements to national 
member states (see van Apeldoorn 2002). As Van der Pijl 
points out, the historic role of European institutions such as 
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the European commission was to extend the legal sphere 
where capital could freely move among different countries. 
In fact, European integration developments since 
Maastricht have made this quite clear, as the Commission is 
now even more committed to neoliberalism – liberalisation, 
privatisation and marketisation – while the member states 
have to maintain elements of social protection. In fact, since 
it is the latter that have to deal with their populations most 
directly, they have to face the tensions and frictions that the 
neoliberal project inevitably brings about (Van der Pijl 
2011). In Italy, the U-turn of the 1990s cannot be 
understood without factoring in this role of European 
institutions.  
 Let us now turn to the measures carried out by the 
following governments.  The Ciampi government made 
Parliament approve two fiscal packs for a total of 50 trillion 
Lire, almost exclusively based on spending cuts, with 
health costs and government purchasing the two largest 
items singled out for savings (Amyot 2004: 160). The 
following Berlusconi government was however softer on 
the budget. His 1995 package of deficit-reduction measures 
was considered as the indispensable minimum by financial 
markets, and the two largest single items were amnesties 
on unpaid taxes and buildings erected without permits 
(Ibidem:160-161). As noted above, this timid stance towards 
meeting the Maastricht criteria stemmed from the centre-
right coalition’s social base of support. On the expenditure 
side, the government attempted to carry out a quite far-
reaching pension reform that would have considerably 
reduced contributions for those who retired before the 
normal retirement age (a full pension was hitherto 
guaranteed to workers with 35 years of contributions), and 
reduced the value of all pensions relative to pre-retirement 
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wages. However, the proposal was soon discarded as the 
union organised mass demonstrations and the Lega Nord 
withdrew its support for the government – even if in the 
end six trillion Euros were saved with some changes in the 
pension system. Amyot sums up the Berlusconi 
government’s budgetary measures arguing that they “were 
weighted in favour of its own constituency: the self-
employed were the principal beneficiaries of the tax 
amnesties, while employed workers and pensioners 
suffered most under the pension and health provisions” 
(Ibidem: 162).  
 The Dini government enacted measures totalling 
more than 55 trillion Lire, hitting relatively equally all 
social classes (Ibidem: 163). The centre-left coalition 
government led by Prodi – with Ciampi as treasury 
minister –, who took office in 1996, was completely 
committed to reaching the Maastricht criteria, and his 
measures were in fact second only to those of Amato for 
their toughness. The 1997 budget consisted of cuts and tax 
increases of 78.5 trillion Lire, with the largest cuts hitting 
railways, post offices, highways and local government. 
Moreover, as Ferrera and Gualmini pointed out, the value 
of privatisations between 1996 and 1998 was the highest in 
Europe (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 71). SME, Enichem, 
ENI and Telecom were the most important privatised 
enterprises, while also many public banks (including 
Cariplo, Banca di Roma and San Paolo) were placed on the 
market, considerably alleviating the state budget.  
 The welfare retrenchment measures were also an 
important part of the attack on the deficit. As argued 
above, Italy’s historical problem had been exclusively on 
the revenue side, as the country’s state spending was 
comparable, and at times lower, than that of other 
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European countries. However, the 1990s witnessed a heavy 
fiscal retrenchment in the name of largely ‘technical’ goals: 
financial adjustment, ‘modernisation’ and efficiency. 
Crucially, the process of financial adjustment was 
presented to public opinion also as a fight against financial 
rent, as a way to free up resources in order to reduce 
interest payment and invest in new infrastructure or a more 
balanced redistribution, as Ciampi also argued (see below). 
What is striking about the consensus achieved is that in fact 
the reversal in budgetary policies has been achieved largely 
through spending cuts, at a ratio of 2 to 1 (Della Sala 1997: 
26). Through this financial ‘adjustment’, the centre-left – 
that supported all the governments in the country starting 
from 1993 apart from the 1994 Berlusconi government – 
supported a heavy redistribution away from its social base, 
that is well described by Salvati: 
 
“the macroeconomic policy that technocratic governments 
have pursued would have been followed by any liberal 
government in Europe…having accepted unrestrained 
capital mobility and not wanting to scare owners of public 
debt, the PDS is supporting a huge and perverse 
redistributive process. In order to contain its deficit the 
state had to cut its essential social services and raise taxes, 
and these savings were feeding a huge and ever-increasing 
stream of income towards the owners of state bonds who 
are, on average, the middle classes and old people, living 
mainly in the richer north” (Salvati 1995: 85). 
 
Clearly, capital and its representatives were in 
favour of a tough stance on the deficit issue, although – as 
noted above – many SMEs were more cautious on 
monetary union and feared an increase in taxes. However, 
it was the concept of the external constraint that helped to 
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build what Ferrera and Gualmini (2004 ch.4) call an 
‘advocacy coalition’ around the goals of institutional 
reform and economic liberalisation. I would argue that the 
PDS was the party most in sympathy with the objective of 
monetary union and the measures that this entailed. The 
party supported the Ciampi and Dini governments and 
pushed hard for meeting the criteria with the Prodi 
government in 1996-1998. This particular stance of the PDS 
and the ‘culture of stability’ with which the centre-left 
identified itself was also the result – as the next section will 
detail – of the peculiar history of the left in Italy and its 
apparently paradoxical affinity with liberal economic 
thought.  Moreover, the PDS had no business interests of its 
own and little direct ties with business, so that it could 
project itself as the guarantor of the general interest also by 
implementing sacrifices in the short term to the dominant 
classes – the recessionary consequences of austerity, higher 
taxes and a less lenient approach to tax evasion.  
In the 1990s what emerged was a clash between two 
coalitions who interpreted in different ways capital’s 
interests. On one side there was the centre-right bloc that 
drew on strong anti-political sentiments (Mastropaolo 
2000) and whose base of support had largely been inherited 
from the DC’s historic bloc. The centre-left coalition 
enjoyed deeper links with transnational capital, as argued 
above, and thus its political project was more akin to the 
general neoliberal transformations that were sweeping 
through the European political economy. The centre-left 
was formed not only by former communists, but also from 
elements coming from the moderate wings of the Christian-
democrats, as well as from minor First Republic parties 
such as the republicans. The traditional pro-European 
sentiment of both the latter forces and the PCI – at least 
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from the 1970s onwards – was a fundamental ideological 
factor in shaping the discourses and policies of the 1990s.  
The use of the ‘external constraint’ for domestic 
political purposes has not only served the function of 
making political – class – decisions appear as the automatic 
result of technical norms, such as the Maastricht criteria. It 
also needs to be reconnected to the negative idea that many 
Italians continue to have on the role of the state, itself the 
result of the lack of legitimacy that the Italian state has 
historically had. These elements are not merely ideological, 
but they structure the very materiality of social relations in 
Italy. The notion of the ‘external constraint’ was thus linked 
with the idea of the country suffering from economic 
vulnerability. This common sense assumption was in itself 
linked with the idea that in order to adjust to the world 
economy, wages needed to be curtailed. On the other hand, 
there is no doubt that the political use of the external 
constraint in the 1990s has been unprecedented. Budgetary 
policy was seen as increasingly dictated not only by Europe 
but by financial markets generally, and this made the 
assessment of the budgetary plans by European institutions 
or bond rating agencies paramount. In addition, the 
reference to being part of the ‘core’ of Europe was a very 
strong argument, particularly vis-à-vis organised interests 
such as the unions: it presented them with the difficult 
choice “of being seen as rejecting Italy’s European role in 
the name of sectional benefits” (Della Sala 2004a: 133). This 
created a favourable terrain for the acceptance of 
‘sacrifices’. The particular understanding of the Italian 
polity as somehow ‘lacking’ vis-à-vis its European 
counterparts is an element I shall return to below.  
The restructuring of the relations between state and 
civil society generated a resurgence of the primacy of 
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market forces and principles in many areas of social and 
economic life. This necessitated, as I will argue below, a 
state that is more autonomous from societal pressures.  
 
Reforming pensions 
  
Let us now look at the two most important reforms 
of the 1990s, the pension reforms of 1992 and 1995 and the 
1997 ‘Treu’ flexibility law, starting with the former. 
Although public welfare expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP is below the EU average in Italy, in the case of 
pensions it was the reverse (Regalia and Regini 1998: 493). 
So, naturally this was a good target for welfare 
retrenchment and could count on the support of large 
sectors of society. The first reform of the pension systems 
dates back to 1992, when the parliament delegated to the 
Amato government the authority to intervene in this field. 
The Amato reform introduced a number of innovations in a 
restrictive direction (the following, as well as the 
description of the 1995 reform, is based on Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004: 109-113; see also Ferrera 1997: 240-241).  
The earnings-related formula, as well as the 
occupational schemes established in 1969 were maintained 
in place, with the innovations consisting in: an increase in 
the retirement age from 55 to 60 for females and from 60 to 
65 for males by 2002; the gradual elevation of the minimum 
requirement of contributions for old-age benefits from 10 to 
20 years; a gradual extension of the period of reference for 
pensionable earnings from the last 5 years to the last 10 
years (and to the whole career for the new entrants in the 
labour market); the elevation of the contribution 
requirement for seniority (early retirement) pensions of 
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civil servants with a gradual phasing in; an increase in 
contribution rates and the abolition of the wage-indexation 
mechanism (Ibidem: 109).  Although initially met by 
opposition from the unions, the protest was defused by 
dropping the proposal for elevating the minimum 
contributory requirement for seniority pensions from 35 to 
36 years and the proposed freezing of the indexation 
mechanisms for 1993. Moreover, all workers with more 
than 15 years of seniority were excluded from the new 
rules.  
The Ciampi government carried out a minor 
modification by penalising seniority pensions and 
increasing controls on the beneficiaries of disability 
pensions. In the course of 1993 and 1994 international 
institutions such as the IMF, the OECD and the European 
Commission – as well as Confindustria – enhanced their 
pressures for a tougher reform. The Berlusconi government 
in 1994 attempted to pass a unilateral pension reform. 
However, the unions protested,  organising the largest 
union demonstration on 12 November 1994. At this point, 
Confindustria – who had backed up the proposal of the 
government – became increasingly worried about the 
unions’ mobilisation. The government was forced to back 
down and the unions witnessed a surge of popularity 
among the workers. 
The Dini government – who took office in late 1994 – 
took it upon itself to accomplish a more inclusive reform 
with the participation of the social partners. In fact, the 
government accepted as the initial text a draft that was 
proposed by the unions themselves. The main innovation 
of the final reform – defined as one of “the most radical 
reforms of the Italian welfare system” (Regalia and Regini 
2004: 11) – was the introduction of a contributions-based 
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system in place of the earnings-based one. The pension is 
longer linked with earnings but with the total amount of 
contributions paid in by each worker. Moreover, it is not 
related to the duration, but to the actual amount of 
contributions paid in, that is divided by a coefficient that 
depends on the age of retirement (and that varies on the 
base of demographic trends). The elderly without sufficient 
contributions are granted a social pension financed by 
general taxation. Other innovations include: the phasing 
out of seniority pensions by 2008; the gradual 
standardisation of rules for private and public workers; 
stricter rules on the cumulability of disability benefits and 
incomes from work and a tougher control on the 
beneficiaries. In addition the reform started to harmonise 
the fragmented regime of 17 different funds, each with its 
own premium and benefit schemes (Della Sala 2004a: 143). 
As a concession to the unions, the reform exempted all 
workers with more than 18 years of seniority by August 
1995 (the same group that was exempted from the Amato 
reform three years before) from the application of the 
formula. In addition, special provisions were obtained for 
workers engaged in so-called lavori usuranti (i.e. hazardous 
jobs). Moreover, to avoid generalised benefits reductions, 
the reform sought to penalise early retirement rewarding 
those workers who chose to postpone their retirement.  The 
reforms arguably ‘sacrificed’ the benefits of blue-collar 
unqualified workers and the youngest workers (Carrieri 
1997: 88). According to Ferrera and Gualmini, the Dini 
reform was to produce savings of 0.6% of GDP per year 
until 2005.  
There is agreement in the literature that this 
agreement was a retrenchment of workers’ entitlements 
(Baccaro 2002; Regalia and Regini 1997) or an outright 
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downsizing of the welfare state (Negrelli 2000: 95) in which 
the pension system was “reduced in scope” (Simoni 2009: 
2). However, it was presented as the best possible option in 
times of austerity (Carrieri 1997: 88). 
A fundamental point that signals that consensus was 
quite widespread and extended beyond the union 
leadership into the union base, was the organisation of a 
worker consultation that approved the proposed reform, 
marginalising internal opposition (Baccaro 2002: 343-344). 
Four and a half million people voted, with 64% of them 
approving the reform (Ibidem: 144). However, if one looks 
more in depth at the results, it is easier to recognise the 
fractures within the labour movement. Although 91% of 
pensioners voted in favour of the deal, active workers 
approved the reform but with a lower percentage (58%), 
and a level of support that varied by sector and region 
(Ibidem). Thus, the pensioners – who were largely 
untouched by the reform – overwhelmingly supported 
harsher measures for the workers, who were split on the 
issue. 
An important point to underline is that the Dini 
reform was not much more moderate than the one 
proposed by Berlusconi’s government a year earlier (Della 
Sala 2004a: 139). As Simoni (2009: 11) argued, “the major 
difference between the two reforms was attributable to the 
composition of savings. The centre-right reform was 
concentrated on the abolition of seniority pensions. On the 
contrary, the centre-left…distributed the costs of 
retrenchment over a larger social base, gradually phasing 
out seniority pensions”. What changed considerably, 
however, was the method employed. It has been noted that 
the success of the Dini reform was more due to the method 
adopted (the inclusion of the unions into the decision-
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making process) than to the content of the reform (the 
raising of pension age) (Saudino 2004). As the massive 
protests in 1994 showed, it was clear from that point 
onwards that any change in the welfare system in Italy had 
to incorporate a discussion with the trade unions. In fact, as 
Regini and Regalia argue (2004: 12), it was precisely the 
assent of the unions – that were able to muster the workers’ 
more or less convinced approval – that yielded the opposite 
result to the failure to achieve consensus the previous year.  
Here one can see the strong value that the unions attached 
to concertation and to achieving reforms based on 
consensus. Referring to the ‘culture of stability’ that had 
been proposed as the political horizon of the centre-left in 
the 1990s, Paggi and Cantelli argue that 
 
“If the macroeconomic effects of the (pension) reform are 
not immediate, it is difficult to underestimate its symbolic 
meaning and its political impact. The reform acentuates the 
process of distrust of the labour movement vis-à-vis its 
traditional political and union representatives and favours 
the movement of electoral support towards populist 
protest. The rise in the credibility of the country in the eyes 
of the financial markets is paid by a fall in consensus of the 
social forces on which a reformist policy must be based. 
The absolute priority that has been given to the objective of 
‘Europe’ has implied an underestimation of the necessary 
conditions for the democratic ‘hold’ of the country” (Paggi 
and Cantelli 2011: 134).  
 
 Minimal concessions to the unions were necessary in 
order to gain the consent for an outright retrenchment of 
the welfare state (a curtailment of indirect wages). It must 
be noted, in addition, that the debate around pensions was 
part of the overall discussion about the ‘modernisation’ of 
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the Italian welfare state, having as ultimate aim the 
increasing of competitiveness. As Della Sala argues,  
 
“the terms of the debate about pensions were broadened to 
arguments about how pensions increased labour costs, and 
therefore diverted Italian savings away from investment in 
industry and into financial instruments. In this way, 
pensions were an obstacle to the competitiveness of Italian 
firms, and a cause for high unemployment rates” (Della 
Sala 2004a: 143).  
 
Here one can see a further example of the kind of 
unequal political exchange carried out in the 1990s. The 
unions accepted a framework for reform based on wage 
moderation (see below), retrenchment of the welfare state 
(pensions) and flexibisation of the labour market. In fact, as 
Simoni underlines, “rather than being a programmatic 
liability for a modernising centre-left, Italian unions were a 
programmatic asset” (Simoni 2009: 15). As Baccaro points 
out based on a series of interviews, one of the reasons why 
workers accepted the reform was that it was presented not 
as the best of possible worlds for labour, but as a measure 
that aimed at restoring the financial equilibrium of the 
country while limiting the losses for older workers (Baccaro 
2002: 345). Thus, what the workers feared was that in the 
absence of consensus on the reform, a much tougher 
measure would be approved unilaterally anyway. It is 
precisely this consensus that needs further explaining. On 
the other hand, as Paggi and Cantelli argue above, the deep 
political modifications of the electorate in the 1990s and the 
rise of parties such as Lega Nord in former strongholds of 
the left in the North can be interpreted as a loss of support 
for policies that target the traditional electorate of the left.  
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Reflecting on the reforms of the 1990s, the economist 
Aldo Barba concludes that what he calls the ‘scissors of 
adjustments’ have curtailed wages “with four blades” 
(Barba 2011: 81). I have reviewed above his analysis of how 
the growth of public debt acted as a form of ‘reverse 
redistribution’, aided by the transformation of half of the 
public debt into foreign debt. To this he adds the adverse 
effects on labour that the 1993 deal caused in the primary 
distribution of income. The third ‘blade’ was the 
privatisation of public assets in the 1990s, (Ibidem: 78-80). 
The fourth element of this curtailment is the pension 
reform. Thus, as Barba argues, labour has been hit in four 
dimensions of the collective wage: net wages, gross wages, 
indirect wages and differed wages.  
 
Reforming the labour market 
 
 Let us now turn to the 1997 set of legislative 
measures that introduced greater flexibility in the Italian 
labour market.  The reform was based on the indications set 
out in the 1993 protocol and confirmed in the 1996 Patto per 
il Lavoro (‘Pact on Work), signed between the social 
partners and the centre-left government. The latter aimed 
at relaunching job-creating measures in a time of very high 
unemployment, responding also to the expectations of the 
centre-left electorate. The philosophy underlying the 1996 
pact and the 1997 ‘Treu’ reform was a substantially supply-
side understanding of the problem of unemployment, seen 
as stemming from excessive rigidities in the labour market 
that did not allow for sufficient flexibility both with regards 
to the entrance in the labour market and with regards to 
rules regarding firing. The problem was seen as a lack of 
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balance between supply and demand for work, and so 
advised measures focused on the need to reflect the local 
supply and demand (and productivity) rather than national 
contracts, and on creating more ‘incentives’ for workers to 
accept the jobs on offer by implementing ‘active’ labour 
market policies. These were very influential views in the 
1990s and were diffused by the OECD (see OECD 1994) 
and other international institutions. One should keep in 
mind that the role of international institutions in spreading 
the dominant neoliberal ideology and practices has been 
fundamental in shaping the very contours of acceptable 
policy discourse and in constraining the ‘limits of the 
possible’ in political action.  
 Before the 1997 reform, some minor changes were 
carried out in 1994, with the extension of apprenticeship 
contracts and the extension of vocational training contracts, 
as well as the creation of so-called ‘solidarity’ contracts, 
according to which it is the labour-force of a firm which 
takes upon its shoulders the economic difficulties of the 
enterprise – receiving lower wages with reduced working 
hours. 
 So, in contrast to a previous understanding of the 
problem of unemployment as stemming from lack of 
demand, now the supply-side is considered central (see 
also Overbeek 2003). Firm competitiveness thus becomes 
the cornerstone of the reform effort. The 1997 reform 
introduced far-reaching changes in the functioning of the 
Italian labour market. The measures included: the 
extension of temporary employment and apprenticeship 
contracts; tax incentives and the simplification of the 
procedure for employing part-time workers; the creation of 
‘territorial pacts’ and ‘area contracts’ that allowed for a 
curtailment of minimum standards for work and wages in 
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depressed areas; the dismantling of the existing public 
monopoly on job placement established in 1949 and the 
legalisation of temporary work agencies (included in the 
1993 pact but not yet approved); a plan for the 
enhancement of vocational training programmes and the 
extension of vocational training contracts (that pay lower 
wages) to all sectors of the economy, including agriculture. 
Agency work allows authorised agencies to employ 
workers and then ‘lend’ them to other firms. Overall, the 
gamut of cheaper flexible jobs characterised by lower 
protections and fewer welfare entitlements was increased.  
In 1998 a ‘pact for development and employment’ 
was signed with a wide array of interest groups (extending 
concertation beyond the traditional social partners). 
However, while stating employment as its major goal, few 
specific targets were envisaged and there was no shift away 
from looking to supply measures emphasising flexibility 
(Della Sala 2004a: 140). From 2000 temporary employment 
was extended also to the public sector. 
It must be underlined that as with the previous 
pension reform, the unions contributed to the very drafting 
of the 1997 law. Moreover, they secured a regulatory role 
for themselves, as specific clauses gave the social partners 
the authority to decide in bipartite deals the details not 
specified by law. For instance, the unions had a role in 
fixing the quota of flexible jobs within each industry that 
could be employed as a proportion of total workers (Simoni 
2009: 14). So, the greater flexibility that was introduced was 
included within the national contracts, allowing for a 
control on the part of the unions. Flexible jobs were 
considered as exceptions within the general rule, with a 
clear quantitative limit (this clause was then eliminated by 
the following centre-right government without the consent 
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of CGIL). So, there were compensatory measures that 
‘softened’ the pill that organised labour had to swallow. 
Moreover, the new kinds of contractual arrangements were 
increasingly used by the newly employed younger workers 
while the workers already in occupation were very 
marginally affected by the reform. Thus, the unions 
managed to maintain the consent of their members shifting 
the costs of the reform onto the younger generation.  
Neoliberalism, new constitutionalism and 
reformism  
 
How do we theoretically make sense of these 
transformations? According to Morton, two tendencies 
characterise neoliberal hegemony: the internationalisation 
of production and the internationalisation of the state, in 
the context of a transnational restructuring of capitalism 
(Morton 2007: 124). The crisis within several forms of state 
– including Italy, for which the 1970s was a period of deep 
crisis not only in the economy or in the political system, but 
also in the very mechanisms of social control and authority 
– in turn provoked a reaction on the part of capital. It is 
however crucial to keep in mind that there was no outright 
homogenisation of neoliberal governance and no simple 
expansion of neoliberalism across different forms of state: 
within each state there were specific conditions, entrenched 
social forces and historical legacies that made the path 
towards a more neoliberal state different. As Drainville 
argues, “as a political reality, neo-liberalism is both a broad 
strategy of restructuring and a succession of negotiated 
settlements, of concessions to the rigidities and dynamics of 
structures, as well as the political possibilities of the 
moment” (Drainville 1994: 7).  
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Neoliberalism was a political project aiming at 
organising political and economic life around the principle 
of the ‘minimal state’, according to which state regulation 
must be reduced, the state should curtail public 
expenditure and privatise state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, capital movement would be liberalised and the 
collective principle of responsibility should be replaced by 
a notion of individual responsibility, translating into a 
notion of consumer choice and into the idea that the 
general interest is the consumer’s interest (on neoliberalism 
see Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; Van der Pijl 2006: ch.5). 
However, as Drainville also underlines, “what is realised in 
the end…is never an abstract blueprint; everything that 
happens on the road to neoliberalism, all the unforeseen 
complications and grim details, contribute to and are 
implied in the new relations. This is what in the end 
determines the ethical and political status of neoliberalism” 
(cited in Van der Pijl 2006: 157). So, one should not conceive 
of this historical transformation as a shift that was planned 
within transnational capitalist circles and then consciously 
applied to national political and economic contexts.  
The general trend that emerged from the 1970s crisis 
was a shift to financialisation and the accumulation of 
capital in the money circuit (M-M’), as the profit rate in 
productive capital decreased and thus capital had 
increasing difficulty valorising itself in productive activity 
(see McNally 2011). Marx described money capital as 
‘fictitious capital’, as it valorises itself without actually 
producing use-value. Money capital is therefore based on 
claims on the future surplus-value of productive activity 
and crucially emerges as the dominant form of 
accumulation at the end of a growth cycle, when elements 
of crisis in production emerge. The 2008 financial crisis is 
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thus the necessary outcome of the financialisation of the 
previous decades (see Harvey 2010, Foster and Magdoff 
2009, Bellofiore 2012a; 2012b for analyses of financialisation 
and the crisis). This shift towards neoliberalism and 
financialisation was built into the ‘automatic’ reaction of 
capital to economic crises of profitability. On the other 
hand, the changing class compromises at both 
supranational and national level involve the interplay of 
national and historical factors that are territorially specific. 
This shift has enhanced what Gill (2008 ch.6) terms 
the structural power of capital. In contrast to the direct 
power of capital (such as business influence over 
government policies, the control of the media and the 
disproportionate use of financial resources), the former 
refers to a deeper dimension inherent in the very mode of 
production on a world scale, that structures the state 
system as such and constitutes the foundations of liberal 
states, with their division between the ‘economic’ and the 
‘political’, with the rule of law guaranteeing property rights 
and contract. As Van der Pijl argues “capital remains a 
force that by preference seeks to occupy the 
interconnections between separate political jurisdictions” 
(Van der Pijl 2006b: 15). The structural power of capital also 
involves common sense elements such as the assumption 
that economic growth should have priority as a policy goal 
and that this is best achieved by creating favourable 
conditions for capital accumulation (Gill 2008: 105). These 
assumptions, following Bruff (see ch.3) reflect our 
dependence on the material basis for existence, our need 
for means of subsistence, which make common sense ideas 
skewed towards capital’s objectives. A good example of the 
structural power of capital is the spontaneous, almost 
automatic reaction of capital to adverse economic or 
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political conditions, such as a condition of full employment 
that may empower the working class: the investment strike 
(Kalecki 1943). Whereas this possibility is built into the very 
constitution of a market economy and of capital as a social 
relation, the corresponding possibility of labour to have 
influence on state policy needs to be politically organised, 
for instance through a strike.  For instance, the 1992-1994 
recession was a reaction of capital to adverse economic 
conditions both in Italy and in Europe, but had a 
disciplining effect on labour and on the trade unions: by 
increasing unemployment, it weakened their power and 
moreover, had the ideological effect of creating more 
favourable conditions for an acceptance of the 
reformulation of the unemployment problem from a 
problem of demand to one of supply (the latter one 
implying policies of labour flexibisation).  
This structural power has increased since the 1980s, 
as financial markets have acquired the power to condition 
government policies by, for instance, rapidly decreasing 
their purchase of government bonds. In these conditions, a 
government may be unable to finance its current spending, 
unless by provoking inflation (thus devaluing its debt), 
which will further decrease the ‘credibility’ of the 
government vis-à-vis financial capital. The 1992 speculative 
attack on the Lira was a moment in which the structural 
power of capital in Italy was manifest. The lack of 
credibility of the Italian state’s ability to repay its debts 
heavily conditioned the following path of re-adjustment, 
based on moderate labour costs, privatisations and 
liberalisation of the national economy. 
The ‘disciplinary’ aspect of neoliberalism – described 
by Gill as a global ‘panopticon’ (Gill 2008 ch.7) – can be 
seen in the rapid reaction of financial capital to adverse 
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conditions than that of productive capital (linked as it is 
with concrete means of production and organisational 
forms). The result of a sudden withdrawal of supply for 
state finances may result in a balance of payments 
imbalance (in the case of fixed exchange rates) or in a 
currency crisis (in the case of flexible exchange rates). In 
1992, Italy was forced out of the EMS because of a balance 
of payments crisis, and the devaluation that followed did 
not cause a surge of the inflation rate, mainly because of the 
1992 and 1993 pacts, that moderated labour costs. Thus, it 
can be argued that unions had acquiesced to this enhanced 
structural power of capital. The transnationalisation of the 
Italian economy also played a role here. Above I showed 
how in the late 1980s and early 1990s foreign FDI stock 
increased considerably in the Italian economy, itself the 
result also of the creation of an increasingly integrated 
European market after the signing of the Single European 
Act in 1986, that set in stone the goal of creating a full 
Internal Market by 1992.  Moreover, stock market 
capitalisation – as I showed above – also increased 
dramatically in the 1990s. As Gill notes (Gill 2008: 112-113), 
the rise of transnational capital must be seen both vis-à-vis 
national capital and the unions. Transnational capital has 
more of an ‘exit’ option, and therefore can realistically 
threaten organised labour with relocation of investment 
and plant closures. So, the pressure on the Italian unions to 
accept the 1993 deal and moderate wages can be seen as an 
element in the transnationalisation of the Italian economy 
and the increasing power of transnational capital. What, 
however, needs explaining is precisely how and why labour 
acquiesced to these harsher conditions, that is the task of 
the next chapter.  
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Originally, Robert Cox had talked about the 
‘neoliberal’ state acting as a ‘transmission belt’ for 
neoliberalism and the logic of capitalist competition from 
global to local spheres (Cox 1992: 31). Cox aimed at 
stressing the way in which transnational processes in the 
global economy and in consensus formation in the global 
élite – both fuelled by the internationalisation of production 
– have been transmitted via the political channels of 
different states. However, in this view states tend to be 
depicted as powerless ‘receptors’ of external dynamics. 
Bieler and Morton, complementing Cox’s view, underline 
how capital is not simply ‘footloose’, beyond the power of 
state institutions, but it is represented by social forces 
within the very constitution of the state (Bieler and Morton 
2003: 487-488). As Morton underlines referring to 
Poulantzas’ work, “the phenomenon now recognised as 
globalisation, represented by the transnationalisation of 
production, therefore induces the reproduction of capital 
within different states through a process of internalisation” 
(Poulantzas 1975: 73-76 cited in Morton 2007: 132).  
Refusing to view transformations within nation states as 
either the outcome of simply internal dynamics or as mere 
impositions from transnational capital - with the state 
acting as a ‘transmission belt’ – it is therefore more useful 
to couple internationalisation of the state with internalisation 
(Ibidem: 132-133; ch.6). Thus, it is not simply external social 
forces that restructure the state form, but also internal 
social forces that transform the social purpose of the state in 
line with the new forms of accumulation. Therefore, the 
notion of a ‘retreat of the state’ or its ‘hollowing out’ are 
problematic from this point of view. What happened was 
not a retreat, but a restructuring of state functions and of 
the social purpose of the state, thus a reconfiguration of the 
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social forces that underpin state action.92 As Morton 
underlines, “national economies are not simply governed 
by the political will of territorially defined constituencies 
but at the same time nor should one suppose that the 
imperatives of the world market alone are simply imposed 
on societies” (Morton 2007: 138). States, in this view, are not 
dominant moments in the world capitalist totality, but are 
nodal points between the ‘national’ and the ‘international’ 
(Ibidem ch.6). 
The increasing transnationalisation of the Italian 
economy therefore changed the social purpose of the Italian 
state, attempting to make it more attuned to a changed 
world order and material conditions of accumulation, more 
centered on money capital (M-M’). This created further 
interdependence with the ‘international’, and in turn 
increased the power of transnational social forces. In Italy, 
the focus on the retrenchment of the welfare state, 
moderation of labour costs and a more flexible labour 
market are elements of this modification of the Italian form 
of state. Gramsci argued that  
                                                          
92 Thus, the focus within neoliberalism on the weakening of direct public 
control of sectors of the economy or on the retrenchment of the welfare state is 
only one side of the coin. The other, for instance, is the increasing intervention 
of the state for instance in the field of security and policing, the active 
intervention of the state to privatise or liberalise sectors of the economy, or the 
punitive attitude towards the unemployed  - ‘active’ labour market policies – 
that do require state intervention (see Lee Mudge 2011 and Panitch and 
Konings 2009). Gill (2001: 51) argued that “economic liberalisation is not 
necessarily the same as ‘rolling back’ the frontiers of a particular state or indeed 
its ‘retreat’. It involves actively remaking state apparatuses and governental 
practices and the institutions of civil society. The cnetral goal of neoliberal 
reforms is to make stat and civil society become more permeated with market 
principles, values, discipline, transaprency and accoutability”.  
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“it is in the concept of hegemony that those exigencies 
which are national in character are knotted together…a 
class that is international in character has – inasmuch as it 
guides social strata which are narrowly national 
(intellectuals) and indeed frequently even less than 
national: particularistic and municipalistic – to ‘nationalise’ 
itself in a certain sense” (Gramsci 1971: 241 cited in Morton 
2007: 150). 
 
 What Paggi termed the ‘liberal strategy of the 
Second Republic’ (Paggi 2003) represented thus one 
instance of the way the neoliberal project was internalised 
within the Italian form of state.  A stress on overcoming the 
‘conosociative’ practices of the First Republic and on the 
need to strengthen the executive vis-à-vis parliament, as 
well as the repositioning of the relationship between 
‘economics’ and ‘politics’ that was part of the intellectual 
battle waged starting from the 1970s by the liberals in Italy 
must be placed within this wider transnational context. A 
resurgence of liberal thought went hand in hand with the 
transnationalisation of the Italian and global economy and 
the neoliberal turn in European integration starting from 
the Single European Act in 1986 and, most notably, with 
the Maastricht treaty and the new monetary order. The 
crucial moment was at the fall of the First Republic, when 
the PDS emerged as the most legitimate and organised 
party. However, with a curious ironic twist of history, the 
prospect of finally acceding to government emerged only in 
a moment when not only was the idea of socialism itself 
discredited as such, but even social-democratic and statist 
ideas were losing their appeal. The heirs of the PCI, in a 
relatively short period of time, adjusted their political 
culture and horizons to meet the interests and worldview 
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of transnational capital, thus ‘nationalising’ neoliberal 
hegemony (as Gramsci would say).  
 Further elements of the transformation in the Italian 
state described above can be grasped by referring to Gill’s 
notion of ‘new constitutionalism’, which refers to the 
development of legal or constitutional measures to separate 
or insulate economic institutions from broad political 
accountability in order to make the state and governments 
more responsive to market discipline and thus less 
responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes (Gill 
2001: 47; see also Gill 1991; Gill 2008 ch.7 and 9).  The 
discourse of ‘credibility’ vis-à-vis private investment is 
central. Government policy tends to become more 
accountable to ‘international markets’, meaning to 
institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance 
companies, and proposals underline the necessity of 
‘binding constraints’ for monetary, fiscal and trade policies. 
The corresponding political discourse is a technocratic 
position that emphasises market efficiency, discipline and 
the creation of confidence and credibility.  
 The state is thus reconfigured to make it work under 
greater market discipline (Gill 2008: 170-171). For instance, 
entry and exit options for capital tend to be locked in or 
institutionalised. In the Italian case, the complete 
liberalisation of capital achieved in 1990, as well as the pan-
European internal market are cases in point. The right to 
move capital freely is constitutionalised in the European 
treaties and creates a situation of ‘race to the bottom’ in 
fiscal policy and corporate taxes, although with regards to 
services complete liberalisation has not been reached up to 
this day. Competition policy (including state aid 
provisions) is guarded by the European commission 
bureaucracy. In these spheres, since European law has 
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primacy over national law, the last word is that of the 
independent European Court of Justice. Another obvious 
example is the creation of the most independent central 
bank in the world, the ECB, whose priority is the fight 
against inflation, and whose statute is constitutionalised at 
the European level, so that in order to change it an 
agreement among all member states needs to be reached. 
The transfer of policy competences and authority both 
upwards (at the supranational level, both towards 
European institutions and international organisations) and 
downwards (at the local level) is seen by Gill as furthering 
a ‘new constitutionalist’ paradigm as they diminish the 
power of the democratically-controlled institutions, as both 
the supranational and local level suffer from significant 
‘democratic deficits’ (Gill 2001: 59). 
In addition to the privatisation of state assets, the 
reforms of the welfare state of the decade have also gone in 
the direction of creating greater market discipline. The 
curtailment of pension rights and the flexibisation of the 
labour market reduce social and job security, weakening 
the elements of social protection (in the Polanyian sense) 
that are built into a welfarist conception of the state. They 
also increase the continuous dependence of the labour-
force on the market: workers who are under short-term 
contracts not only tend be less unionised that others, but 
also must renew their contract continually at the end of the 
previous one, under conditions of high unemployment and 
thus greater competition from the ‘industrial reserve army’. 
This serves to both lower wages and increase work 
discipline (see Gallino 2007). In fact, Brancaccio has shown 
how labour market deregulation has statistically no 
correlation with employment levels but a significant 
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correlation with a lowering of wages (Brancaccio 2008: 13-
15).  
The transformation of the state described above – its 
internationalisation coupled with the internalisation of new 
social forces – has also restructured the internal apparatus 
of the state. As Cox underlines, the state agencies in close 
contact with the global economy – offices of presidents and 
prime ministers, central banks and treasuries – have gained 
power and precedence over those agencies closest to 
domestic public policy – such as ministries of labour and 
industry (Cox 1992: 31). In the Italian case, this can be seen 
for instance in the increasing power of the Bank of Italy, 
who actually devised the Italian position on the 
foundations and design of EMU, sidelining influence from 
political parties and the government (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1996: 281). In Italy the increasing power of 
state agencies in close contact with the global economy 
meant an enhancement of the power of technocrats in key 
decision-making positions and what Pasquino describes as 
the effective suspension of party government in the 1990s 
(Pasquino 1997).  
An in-depth analysis of the power of Italian 
technocrats within the negotiations over EMU at Maastricht 
has been carried out by Dyson and Featherstone (1996). 
They argue that the Italian negotiations were largely driven 
by a small technocratic élite who shared a belief in the need 
for an externally imposed economic discipline in order to 
overcome the problems posed by party government and 
the party’s entrenched positions in civil society – what was 
pejoratively termed partitocrazia. Gill, in describing the 
nature of the ‘new constitutionalist’ settlements, argues that 
more political weight tends to be given to technocratic 
cadres such as neoclassical economists, financial 
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administrators and central bankers, figures that are hardly 
representative of broader societal interests (Gill 2001: 59). 
The power of these groups increased dramatically also in 
Italy. In fact, as noted above, the coalition that pushed more 
strongly on the need to adjust to the external constraint 
crossed ideological and party divisions and it was made up 
of personnel from academic, administrative and political 
environments accustomed to international milieus. Della 
Sala, moreover, underlines the strengthening of the 
executive and in particular of key economic ministers such 
as the Treasury in the 1990s (Della Sala 1997: 30). According 
to Dyson and Featherstone, the ‘vincolo esterno’ was 
consciously politically and discursively used – also tapping 
into the Italians’ long-standing pro-European sentiments – 
as a way to overcome the domestic resistances to change. 
The two authors cite a passage from an interview with then 
Ministry of the Treasury (and – tellingly – former general 
director of the Bank of Italy) Guido Carli that is revealing in 
this sense: 
 
“our agenda at the table of the inter-governmental 
conference on the European Union represented an 
alternative solution to problems which we were not able to 
tackle via the normal channels of government and 
parliament” (Dyson and Featherstone 1996: 272). 
 
Another interviewed official argued that 
 
“today the Banca d’Italia and the Tesoro are the import 
agents and the authorised interpreters of the austere 
market sentiment. The relative power of both institutions 
(vis-à-vis markets) has declined, but the relative power of 
their technocratic heads has increased vis-à-vis that of the 
ministers” (Ibidem: 296).  
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This increase in the power of a technocratic élite is 
not neutral in class terms. Van der Pijl argued that a 
“concept of control is a certain inflection or a politicisation 
of an imaginary ‘neutral’ set of operating rules that is in 
place anyway. We are reminded of this silent 
presupposition when, in a political crisis, there emerges the 
call for a ‘technocratic’ government; as if a way of running 
class society without its class character being taken into 
account could exist” (Van der Pijl 2004: 193). Talani (2003) 
argues that switching policy competences, and thus the 
power struggle, to the European level was a way for the 
Italian industrial and banking sectors to obtain the 
implementation of macroeconomic policies designed to 
reduce public sector spending and discipline labour 
(Ibidem: 134). Dyson and Featherstone (1996: 272) also argue 
that with the increasing power of technocrats and the 
parallel pressures of monetary integration, the domestic 
policy agenda has shifted decisively in the direction of 
budget retrenchment, reform of the welfare state and 
privatisation. Moreover, in a context that ruled out 
devaluation, wage flexibility became more important as 
means of adjustment. 
As detailed below, the notion of the ‘vincolo esterno’ 
as imposing automatically an adjustment that tends to be 
punitive towards labour is part of the common sense 
assumptions on the political economy. In fact, Dyson and 
Featherstone themselves point out that “the ‘vincolo 
esterno’ perspective stemmed from the reaction against the 
economic indiscipline of the 1970s: it was part of the 
collective memory of the monetary policy élite” (Ibidem: 
274). In the 1970s, a situation of currency instability and 
frequent devaluation coupled with high inflation. The 
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shared idea was that European commitments provided the 
necessary discipline to overcome a trajectory that otherwise 
would be ‘naturally’ followed by the country and lead to 
instability and distributional conflict. Stability thus needed 
an ‘external’ anchor. As the chapter on the interviews will 
show, the common sense assumption that Italy lacked 
discipline and thus that this needed to be imported was 
shared by the centre-left political élite. Crucially, this 
assumption is not class-neutral, as it tends to entrench a 
settlement that is more responsive to the needs of capital 
accumulation in a transnatationalised context, and it goes 
hand in hand with a form of state that is increasingly 
insulated from civil society.  
 Dyson and Featherstone also point out that the use 
of the ‘European constraint’ to transform the Italian state 
and political economy has been long-standing. In fact, the 
reference to the need to keep pace with ‘Europe’ has been 
used to shift domestic policy toward disinflation during the 
1980s, to initiate the divorce of the Bank of Italy from the 
Treasury in 1981, to justify the measures to induce greater 
wage and price flexibility culminating in the abolition of 
the wage-indexation mechanism in 1992 and  to introduce 
freedom of movement for capital in 1990 and continue with 
market-oriented adjustment (Ibidem: 291). The class bias of 
these measures is evident and signals that the appeal to the 
‘external constraint’ is a leitmotiv of the evolution of the 
Italian political economy in the last decades and has been 
used to impose radical measures that touch upon elements 
of social protection within the state and on the conduct of 
monetary and fiscal policy. The thesis of the vincolo esterno 
is based on common sense assumptions, or what Dyson 
and Featherstone call “engendered policy beliefs” (Ibidem: 
295) – also reinforcing the positive view of the EU in Italian 
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politics – that are not only shared by the technocratic élite 
but also extend to the political class and the trade union 
leadership, as the next chapter will detail.  
Morton, analysing the Mexican path towards 
neoliberalism, argues that a crucial point was “the 
institutional career paths of the élite, which began to alter, 
so that ministries associated with banking and finance 
planning provided the career experience likely to lead to 
the upper echelons of government” (Morton 2007: 156). A 
similar phenomenon was operative also in Italy. It is 
telling, in this respect, to recall the background of the prime 
ministers that have ruled the country from 1992 to the end 
of the decade. Only two were ‘professional politicians’ in 
their previous career (Amato and D’Alema). Amato was 
Minister of the Treasury in the late 1980s; Ciampi was 
former governor of the Bank of Italy; Dini was a former 
general director of the bank; Berlusconi was a successful 
entrepreneur; Prodi was an economics professor and then 
the manager of a large public holding, and the government 
he led included both Dini and Ciampi as key ministers 
(respectively, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the 
Budget).  The dominance of personnel from the Bank of 
Italy or from economics/entrepreneurial backgrounds is 
astounding. Even Prodi’s cabinet – that was not a 
‘technical’ government – was crucially characterised by a 
sort of self-disciplining as its central and undisputable goal 
has been to meet the Maastricht criteria. Fargion notes that 
the proportion of ‘technical’ experts was 52% and 96% 
respectively for the Ciampi and Dini governments (Fargion 
2001: 4). Moreover, in 1996 a unified Minister of the 
Economy was created, uniting the Ministry of the Treasury 
and that of the Budget. Prodi assigned Ciampi as head of 
the new institution, a signal that it wanted to create a 
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powerful new Ministry seen to be above political 
partisanship and able to make economic decisions in a 
relatively autonomous manner from social and political 
demands (Della Sala 1997: 30).  
This phenomenon is all the more striking if 
contrasted with the previous almost 50 years of Italian 
post-war history, dominated by a political class that was 
trained within the parties. The fact that prime ministers and 
the political class were increasingly coming from a 
background in institutions linked with the global economy, 
or from the private sector itself, is also revealing of the kind 
of ideas they tended to carry, stressing problems of 
efficiency, rationalisation and profitability, as well as the 
healthy disciplining function of the external constraint.  
Della Sala (1997) has analysed the transformation of 
the Italian state in the 1990s describing it as a process of 
‘hollowing out’ and ‘hardening’. He argues – using 
budgetary policies as a case study – that there has been a 
displacement of state authority to supranational and local 
levels of government and that this required states 
structures that are less permeable to penetration and 
demands from civil society. A ‘hollowed out’ state, in turn, 
becomes more insulated from societal pressures. This 
brilliant analysis shows how the practices of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ have affected the objectives and 
processes of Italian budgetary policies in a neoliberal 
direction. As Della Sala argues, the strengthening of the 
executive and its agencies has given priority to “system 
effectiveness” over “representation” so that “it is much 
more difficult for societal interests to find access points and 
to penetrate the decision-making structures” (Ibidem: 14). 
This represents a drastic change from the former ‘porous’ 
decision-making structures in which “parts of the state 
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were parcelled out to (a broad range of) interests and the 
political parties that represented them” (Ibidem: 19). The 
ultimate result is that key decisions are made far from 
institutions that provide access points for claims and 
demands from different organised interests in society.  
The rise of technical governments had – as already 
hinted at above – the effect of presenting the activity of 
‘governing’ increasingly as a technical and not political 
phenomenon. As ‘politics’ became more and more 
identified with inefficient, incoherent and interest-driven 
negotiations (if not with outright clientelism and 
corruption), the technical neutrality of an economics 
discourse of efficiency, modernisation and transparency 
comes to the foreground as an effective political discourse 
aiming at transforming the state. This is an obvious 
instance of ideology: the particular that becomes universal.  
The executive strengthened both vis-à-vis the 
parliament and the political parties (see also Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004: 126). The 1993 electoral law also played a 
role, as it incentivised the creation of two broad coalitions 
with a single leader before the elections. Before, in contrast, 
the leader of the executive was chosen after extensive 
consultations between different parties and factions. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, in 1992 the government 
was delegated power to reform the health system, 
pensions, public sector employment and local government 
finance. This was followed in the next years by changes to 
parliamentary procedures that made it easier for 
government legislation to be approved by parliament and 
harder for factions within the government coalition to 
defeat the proposals (Della Sala 2004a: 137). With regards to 
the budget, there have been changes in parliamentary rules 
and procedures that give greater control of the whole 
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process to the government, with the budget committee of 
the Chamber of Deputies acting as the champion of fiscal 
restraint and with the elimination of a whole series of 
access points for different interest groups to influence 
budget decisions (Della Sala 1997: 30). The budgetary 
process was thus strongly autonomised from parliamentary 
pressures.  
In addition to the strengthening of the executive, 
with a 1992 law and a 1993 legislative decree there was a 
reform of labour relations in the public sector that – with 
the aim of eliminating a web of party-driven work practices 
– introduced techniques of human resource management 
that were generally accepted in the private sector (Locke 
and Baccaro 1995: 14). This increased the power and 
autonomy of the public managers vis-à-vis their bargaining 
counterparts. Moreover, the public employees were now 
subordinated to similar mechanisms of work discipline and 
surveillance that were present in the private sector. As 
Fargion argues, the technical and centre-left governments 
also made extensive use of delegation for budgetary laws 
and social policy (2001: 5; 18). If compared to the First 
Republic, the Parliament’s ability to influence policy-
making appears downgraded.  
This quite radical change occurred in parallel with a 
change in discourse that emphasised the need to move to a 
new way of governing the country that would overcome 
the ‘consociativism’ of the parties and allow the 
government to regain its authority to rule. The 
enhancement of the government’s power was seen a 
necessary way of creating the ‘culture of stability’ that since 
Ciampi has been at the centre of the political discourse of 
the centre-left. Ciampi was in fact the first Prime Minister 
who personally chose his own ministers, not relying on the 
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political parties. Such a discourse emphasised the need for 
the country to discipline itself in order to respect the 
Maastricht criteria and join the monetary union, cut deficit 
and debt, ‘modernise’ its welfare state and reduce inflation. 
It tended to be a technocratic discourse that stressed the 
lack of alternatives facing the country and the need to unite 
towards common goals.  
Elements that used to form the backbone of 
European democracies – the power of parliament, the role 
of organised interest groups and parties as moments of 
synthesis and programmatic elaboration, the extension of 
democratic procedures by incorporating intermediate 
bodies of society in the state and in decision-making, and 
often proportional or semi-proportional electoral systems – 
were increasingly seen as threatening to the new neoliberal 
project, that therefore requires a state that is more removed 
from democratic accountability. The interviews I conducted 
with representatives of the PD (former PDS) are revealing 
in this respect, as they often signal a mistrust of the 
‘language of protest’ or the ‘politics of the piazza’ (the 
square), and make reference to the need to respond to the 
interests of the ‘silent majority’ who does not protest, and 
not those of the ‘noisy minority' who have the means to 
influence policy-making. This position, I would argue, 
tends to stress the need for a government that is removed 
from interest-group participation and from intermediate 
organisations in civil society, including trade unions, seen 
as the bearers of the a special interest that contrasts with 
the general interest.  
To sum up, the reference to ‘Europe’ and the 
external constraint was a central element in the political 
project to implement measures of fiscal restraint, that in 
turn necessitated a redrawing of the boundaries between 
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the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ within the Italian state-
society relations in the direction of enhancing the primacy 
of market forces. A central element in the construction of a 
hegemonic order is precisely the creation of political ‘limits 
of the possible, effectively marginalising alternative 
political projects as ‘unrealistic’, with ‘reality’ seen as 
dictating the terms of the debate and the nature of the 
problems to be faced. Of course, the ideological battle is 
precisely on the definition of this supposed ‘reality’. In this 
situation, as Della Sala argues, “the political arena becomes 
a shrinking one in which the space for societal interests to 
represent claims continues to be narrowed” (Della Sala 
1997: 30). 
As a conclusion to this section, it is important to note 
that the transformation of the state that has been just 
described cannot proceed by means of coercion alone. As 
any attempt to build a hegemonic order, it needs either 
active consent or the marginalisation of dissent – or passive 
acquiescence – and therefore the dominant social forces 
need to prevent the emergence of an alternative counter-
hegemonic bloc. In order to limit the effects of a harsher 
economic condition on the working population that 
neoliberalism carries with it, compensatory measures need 
to be devised. In the Italian case, this involved an effort to 
include the trade unions into the decision-making process 
and thus to co-opt a potential opposition by enlarging the 
basis of support for the state.  
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5. Political history II: 1993, the moment of 
capital 
 
“For years you’ve been walking along a razor’s edge, and the unions 
could have given you the fatal push. They didn’t do so. Perhaps you 
don’t realise it, but the unions are the jewel in your crown”  
Paul Samuelson 
 
In this section I briefly present the main elements of 
the Italian industrial relations system in its historical 
development, as well as the consequences of the 1993 deal. 
In this way, the ‘moment of capital’ of 1993 can be better 
appreciated in its uniqueness in Italian post-war history. 
Drawing from the literature, in the second part of the 
chapter, a more detailed analysis of the origin, the content 
and the consequences of the 1993 social pact, as well as the 
reforms of the 1990s, are presented. Drawing from 
industrial relations and economics literature, I argue that 
the asymmetrical nature of the deal is manifest if attention 
is paid to the wage dynamics of the 1990s. This, coupled 
with the consensual measures of welfare state retrenchment 
described above, indicates that the reforms of the 1990s and 
the consensus that accompanied this moment in Italian 
history were skewed towards capital’s interests (and 
common sense assumptions).  
 
The industrial relations system 
 
The Italian union movement has, since the early 
post-war years, been characterised by political divisions 
that reflected also different understandings of the function 
of a union. Thus, while CGIL’s identity was based on 
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militant class struggle (including notions of ‘productivism’ 
discussed above), and UIL was closer to the model of 
business unionism, the goal of CISL – in this necessarily 
ideal-typical characterisation – was to strengthen the social 
integration of workers’ interests (Hyman 2001: 143-169).  
An important point to keep in mind is that despite the 
weakness in conventional industrial relations terms (there 
was no institutionalised neo-corporatist negotiation at the 
national level nor a formal way of influencing the 
government’s economic policy), they did possess an 
important public status that derived from their role in 
managing structures of the welfare state, such as parts of 
the social insurance system (administered by tripartite 
boards). In the public sector, unions participated in a 
network of regulatory committees. Thus, they “enjoyed 
greater and more pervasive influence than standard 
indicators of union performance would suggest” (Regalia 
and Regini 1995: 136 cited in Hyman 2001: 147). This fact of 
representing structures of the social order coexisted in a 
contradictory manner with an often anti-capitalist ideology.  
 The Italian 1948 constitution created a detailed legal 
and institutional framework for industrial relations, which 
was however only marginally applied. Notwithstanding 
the non-enforcement of article 39 of the constitution, that 
guaranteed the general application of collective agreements 
and included rules to measure the representativeness of 
unions,  it is possible for an individual employee in 
companies not affiliated to any employers associations, 
through the judicial system, to secure implementation of 
the minimum wage standards defined by agreement. So, 
there was an erga omnes application of national contracts.  
In Italy there is a tradition of legislative non-
interference in industrial relations (Regalia and Regini 
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2004: 18). The interest associations, unlike other continental 
models, suffer from ‘constitutional weakness’ (their 
interaction is not regulated by law) and their membership 
bonds are weak and voluntarist .The system can therefore 
be characterised as one of ‘associative pluralism’ in which 
competition for representation is high (Regini 1997b). 
However, even if there is little institutional coordination 
and a weak formalisation of the rules (Regalia and Regini 
1997a), de facto political influence is guaranteed by both the 
welfare structures described above as well as by the 
political links with the major parties (the CISL with the DC, 
the UIL with the republicans and social democrats and the 
CGIL with the PCI). Regini and Regalia argue that 
“compared with the two polar models of European labour 
relations – the Anglo-Saxon system based on broad 
voluntarism in the parties’ behaviour and the German one 
based instead on a high degree of legal regulation – the 
Italian model has certainly resembled more closely the 
former although it has not possessed its stability and 
coherence” (Ibidem). Concertation in the 1990s, however, 
changed this scenario, introducing for the first time a 
formalisation of industrial relations that broke with this 
tradition of voluntarism. 
In 2003, it was estimated that the overall bargaining 
coverage rate was about 80-85% (Bordogna 2003b: 293). The 
rate of unionisation of workers increased markedly up to 
1980, when it achieved its maximum rate of 49%, and 
decreased to 38.6% in 1993 and 35.5% in 1998 (Regalia and 
Regini 2004: 15-16). 
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Early post-war years  
 
 The two decades after the end of the war were 
characterised by union weakness in both institutional terms 
and in the factory. Regular collective bargaining at sectoral 
level started in the late 1950s/early 1960s while company-
level bargaining started to emerge only in 1963. The post-
war economic miracle was in fact premised upon a low-
wage export-oriented strategy. In this period, 
Confindustria insisted on centralised collective bargaining 
with the unions, since this worked to the advantage of 
employers (Locke and Baccaro 1998: 5).93 In many 
continental European countries, these were the years when 
the combination between centralised bargaining of wages 
and terms of employment and universalistic and egalitarian 
systems of labour protection created the so-called 
‘European model’ of industrial relations (Streeck 1993). In 
Italy however, this centralised negotiation developed in a 
context of weak recognition and marginalisation of the 
unions (Regini and Regalia 2002: 2-4). 
The weakness of the unions could be felt also at the 
factory level, where relations were premised upon a harsh 
paternalism and the surveillance of workers (the 
surveillance techniques at FIAT were particularly tough). 
Until the early 1960s, in fact, labour law virtually did not 
exist and factories became a legal no-man’s land with 
management free to persecute union activists (Locke 1995: 
76).                                                         
93 The two authors point out that “Confindustria would set wages and working 
conditions to the most backward and unproductive sectors of the economy 
(such as agriculture) and then generalise these terms to all of industry” (Ibidem: 
5).  
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As Graziani has noted, the basis of the economic 
miracle of the 1950s and 1960s was also in the fact that the 
most dynamic sector of industry absorbed only a modest 
quantity of labour, so that the remaining labour-force was 
forced to look for employment in the less dynamic sectors, 
thus reducing the contractual power of the unions and 
maintaining low salaries (Graziani 1998: 66).   
 
The 1969 ‘Hot Autumn’ 
 
 All of this changed apparently almost overnight 
with the ‘hot autumn’ of 1969, a wave of strikes that swept 
the country for months, largely attributed to the conditions 
under an oppressive factory regime and the intensification 
of work pressures (for a good overview on the ‘hot 
autumn’ see Pizzorno et al 1978).  A wave of unprecedented 
protest from below, lasting well into the 1970s, modified all 
the political and economic patterns in industrial relations of 
the previous decades. For instance, the three union 
confederations started acting jointly and in 1972 created a 
unified federation. At the factory level, the so-called 
‘factory councils’ formed by union members as well as non-
members became the basis of worker power, and the 
unions used their new strength to demand and obtain 
higher salaries, to eliminate overtime, regulate firings, 
restrict internal mobility and slow down the pace of work, 
also by implementing rather creative forms of protest and 
strikes – the country experienced an unparalleled amount 
of strikes, totalling more than 200 million hours (Graziani 
1998: 90 – see also Reyneri, Regini and Regalia 1978 for a 
good description of the kind of strike tactics involved). 
These changes affected the rates of profitability and labour 
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costs. Between 1970 and 1974 unit labour costs increased 
64% as opposed to annual increases of 8.5% between 1963 
and 1969. One of the demands from the unions – that was 
later to be in a way institutionalised in the 1975 wage-
indexation mechanism – was a move towards equal pay.  
Unions also pushed for a number of welfare reforms in the 
area of school, pension, housing and industrial policy in the 
South. In fact, one of the innovations of this wave of strikes 
was precisely the switch from purely economic demands to 
normative claims on the quality of work (Graziani 1998: 90-
91). Citing Bordogna extensively: 
 
“these are the years of ‘permanent conflict’, of ‘social 
revolution’ and of the ‘proletarian model’, in which the 
arena of industrial relations – the ensemble of relations 
between the state, the employers’ associations and the 
representatives of workers for the determination of the 
conditions of employment –, traditionally considered as a 
partial sub-system within a larger society, becomes one of 
the critical arenas for the economic and social stability of 
the country” (Bordogna 2003a: 192).  
 
 The most important legal innovation in industrial 
relations was the ‘workers’ statute’ of 1970, a law that 
protected unions and encouraged their presence and 
activity at workplace level, providing them with a number 
of substantial rights. The statuto guaranteed the freedom of 
workers as citizens by protecting job security, limiting the 
roles of security guards and supervisors and curtailing 
various surveillance techniques, as well as posing limits to 
labour mobility, often used for union-busting purposes 
(Graziani 1998: 91). The second part of the statute also 
provided institutional guarantees for unions: black lists 
were prohibited, the right to join a union was affirmed and 
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unions were authorised to constitute their own structures 
on the shop floor.  Moreover, the three large union 
confederations were granted representational monopoly 
within most large firms (Locke 1995: 76-78). As Locke 
remarks, “the aim of this legislation was clear. By granting 
almost exclusive recognition to the most representative 
unions, reformers hoped to contain conflict by 
institutionalising relations among the various actors within 
the labour movement and between the unions and 
management” (Locke 1995: 77).   
However, as Bordogna argues, the statute did not 
introduce anything new in the process of collective 
bargaining, that remained largely uninstitutionalised and 
regulated fundamentally by power relations until the 
reforms of the early 1990s (Bordogna 2003b: 284). As Regini 
and Regalia point out, after the ‘hot autumn’ what emerged 
was a decentralisation of collective bargaining. Now, in 
contrast to the previous years, national agreements 
performed the role of generalising results obtained in the 
most innovative companies (Regalia and Regini 2004: 3). 
This new form of action was called ‘articulated bargaining 
without limits’ (Hyman 2001: 149) and resulted also from 
the attempt by the unions not to lose legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the workers. In the period 1970-1975 nominal wages 
increased by more than 40%, higher than the growth of 
productivity (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 172), thus 
squeezing profits. 
This wave of conflict prompted a double reaction 
from capital and the state. On one side, the country 
witnessed a process of decentralisation from large 
industries to smaller workplaces (what David Harvey 
would call a ‘technological fix’ – Harvey 2006 ch.4) a 
practice that aimed at reducing union presence and thus 
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conflict and at decreasing wage claims (Graziani 1998: 91-
96). On the other, there were attempts at accommodation 
and dialogue with the unions, a process that culminated in 
the 1975 deal between Confindustria and the unions (the 
Lama-Agnelli deal). As Kalecki (1943) has argued, the 
power of capital expresses itself also as a power over 
investment decisions: he argues that the confidence of 
investors crucially depends on the match between capital’s 
profit expectations and the distribution of political and 
social power. So, the greater union power in the 1970s 
certainly posed problems for capital accumulation. Chiesi 
and Martinelli argue that when unions acquire a level of 
power that allows them to potentially block the 
mechanisms of accumulation and investment, either unions 
become part of a coalition that changes the political and 
economic regime or they must reduce their veto power and 
transform it into some policy of co-determination at the 
firm level and into greater influence in government policy-
making.  However, 
 
“in Italy there was not the social consensus – either inside 
or outside the labour movement – necessary for a 
revolutionary change. On the other hand, unions were also 
not willing or prepared to play a role similar to that of 
German trade unions, which take part in the decision-
making process at the firm level. What they tried to do was 
to influence government policies in areas such as welfare, 
industrial policy, employment, etc. The strategy of political 
exchange pursued by Italian unions brought consistent 
gains to labour in the second half of the 1970s and early 
1980s, but the government was never transformed into an 
organic neo-corporatist regime” (Chiesi and Martinelli 
1989: 113-114).  
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The ‘Scala Mobile’  
 
 The 1975 deal was a bilateral pact between 
employers and the unions, without the intervention of the 
state, which is simply called to extend the pact to the public 
sector. The wage-indexation mechanism was on the one 
side demanded by the unions in order to obtain protection 
from rising inflation (Graziani 1998: 126) and on the other 
side granted by the employers as a new way of containing 
conflict (repression did not work anymore – Locke 1995: 77) 
and creating more predictable industrial relations 
(Bordogna 2003a: 197)94 as part of an attempt to create a 
‘Manchesterian’ alliance between organised labour and big 
industry. It functioned by adjusting the wage level to the 
level of cost of living for all workers in industry, whatever 
their initial wage.  
Bordogna (2003a) notes three important effects of the 
wage indexation mechanism. First of all, although the 
coverage of the mechanism would gradually erode and 
necessitated continuous adjustments, it caused the loss of 
efficacy of the ‘classic’ instrument of Italian economic 
policy, the manipulation of the exchange rate in order to 
gain competitiveness. Secondly, it caused an increase of the 
quota of wage rises due to the wage-indexation mechanism 
relative to the quota related to contractual increases. Thus,                                                         
94 Locke argues that with this deal, Confindustria hoped to accomplish several 
things. First of all, it hoped that this agreement would bring about the 
centralisation and domestication of the Italian union movement. Second, it 
hoped to enhance the competitiveness of exports by tying wages in the export-
oriented industrial sector to moderate price increases in the Italian economy as 
a whole. Thirdly, “by enlisting the industrial working class into a ‘producers 
alliance’ against the public sector, Confindustria was sending clear signals to 
the state that it was prepared to do battle if the government continued to 
encroach on the private sector” (Locke 1995: 79).  
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the creation of this automatic mechanism somewhat 
weakened the contractual role of the unions. Thirdly, this 
protection from inflation had a crucial egalitarian effect on 
the wage structure, a gradual ironing out of the earnings 
pyramid. This effect was higher the more pronounced the 
inflation rate the country was experiencing. Italy was in 
fact the country with the highest reduction of wage 
differentials both between blue-collar and white-collar 
workers and within the two categories (Paggi and 
d’Angelillo 1986: 160). The 1975 deal also created the so-
called ‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’, that extended the 
duration of state-funded partial unemployment benefits 
and guaranteed 80% of workers’ wages in the event of 
layoffs (Locke and Baccaro 1995: 5).  
 Locke and argue that there was a political exchange 
between wage indexation and the ‘cassa integrazione’ for 
greater social control and the reduction of conflict (Locke 
and Baccaro 1998), an exchange that was however still very 
far from the kind of social-democratic deals of central and 
northern European countries. In fact, the very egalitarian 
policies of the trade unions created increasing disaffection 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As Baglioni points out, 
 
“in our country the problem of the representativeness is 
stronger than elsewhere. The egalitarian policy, the wage 
automatisms, old and new forms of workerism, have 
developed into positions of distance or critique towards the 
unions by several categories (white-collar workers, 
technicians, intermediate cadres) that, rightly or wrongly, 
have felt punished and sacrificed for nearly a decade” 
(Baglioni1982: 28-29, cited in Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986: 
161).  
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 Paggi and d’Angelillo argue that while in the first 
part of the 1970s the egalitarian policy of the unions 
reflected a push in that direction from the mass of the 
workers, in the second part of the decade this policy 
continued to be pursued mainly as a consequence of the 
fact that the strategic political role of qualified workers was 
not sufficiently taken into consideration (Paggi and 
d’Angelillo 1986: 161). This element was confirmed in the 
interviews with two representatives of the trade unions.   
 
The ‘historic compromise’ and the EUR line 
 
The period of the ‘historic compromise’ and the role 
of the unions have already been partly discussed above. 
The point to underline is that by the late 1970s a consensus 
emerged – shared by both managers, politicians and 
unionists – that the wave of conflict was imposing 
unbearable costs on the Italian economy (Locke and 
Baccaro 1995: 4). The new strategy (the so-called ‘EUR’ 
strategy, that accepted the need for austerity) consisted of a 
failed attempt at social concertation. It failed because of the 
lack of significant compensations for the union’s offer of 
wage moderation and self-restraint in industrial conflict 
(Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986: 12-22). Changes were 
implemented with regard to increased labour mobility and 
wages were increasingly tied to productivity (Locke 1995: 
81).95 In exchange, a series of reforms of vocational training                                                         
95 Luciano Lama, the leader of CGIL, famously stated that “we have become 
aware that an economic system cannot sustain independent variables. The 
capitalst maintain that profit is an independent variable. The workers and their 
unions, almost as a reflex, have in recent years sustained that wages are an 
independent variable and the size of the employed workforce another… the 
imposition of excessive workers on firms is a suicidal policy. We retain that the 
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and industrial reorganisation were implemented (Ferrera 
and Gualmini 2004: 52), but these were not considered to be 
adequate compensations for the unions’ concessions. 
Moreover, the end of the 1970s were characterised by 
restrictive fiscal policies, such as increases in tariffs and 
health ‘tickets’ (Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986: 19 – for a good 
description of the austerity policies implemented in the 
1970s, see Golden 1988, ch.3). The PCI’s ‘historic 
compromise’ strategy – the party never acceded to power 
but achieved a half-way house in the 1976-1979 period - 
had at the same time achieved little result with regard to 
the economic reforms envisaged (see Paggi and d’Angelillo 
1986: 149, 151, 157) and did not deliver even the intended 
defensive compensations for bargaining restraint (Hyman 
2001: 153). Thus, the idea that “wage restraint and the 
flexible use of labour both within and between places of 
work would be accepted in return for broader reforms in 
social and economic policy” (Bedani 1995: 234-235) 
delivered little results.  
The perspective of cooperating with employers in 
improving productivity while imposing a moratorium on 
company-level pay increases (the ‘EUR’ line) did not 
generate substantial benefits. As Regini (1984: 129 cited in 
Hyman 2001: 151) commented, “if the only advantages that 
a union gets from political exchange are in the form of 
power for its leaders or of organisational gains, there 
should be a formidable amount of opposition on the part of 
the rank-and-file, since self-restraint by workers would be 
compensated for only by gains for their representatives”. 
So, notwithstanding the significant reforms and the great                                                                                                                          
firms, when it is determined that they are in a state of crisis, have the right to 
fire” (Locke 1995: 81).  
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increase in union power, the Italian industrial relations 
failed to change along the lines of a neo-corporatist model 
because of the limits posed to a logic of ‘political exchange’.   
 
1980-1990: failed attempts at reform and union 
weakness 
 
 In line with general trends in Western democracies, 
the unions lost power and membership all throughout the 
decade, as overall density among employed workers fell by 
roughly ten percentage points between 1980 and 1990 
(although the number of retired members increased). The 
central item on the agenda throughout the decade was 
precisely the scala mobile. As the PCI returned to opposition, 
in the following years there was a “long, discontinuous and 
fruitless negotiating effort at the central level between 
government, business and labour, intended to devise a 
hypothetical ‘anti-inflation pact’” (Negrelli and Santi 1990: 
164 cited in Hyman 2001: 153). Confindustria continually 
threatened to repudiate the 1975 agreement, and in 1983 a 
tripartite deal was signed which adjusted downwards the 
wage-indexation mechanism (by 15%) in exchange for 
state-financed benefits to the social partners (Bordogna 
2003a: 203: Regini and Regalia 1997: 210). 1983 also marks 
the beginning of the process of labour flexibisation, as it 
introduced work sharing agreements (solidarity contracts), 
work and training contracts and part-time work (all 
belonging to the family of deregulative policies – Ferrera 
and Gualmini 2004: 52)  and allowed firms to employ 50% 
of workers with ‘direct’ call (instead of automatic call) 
(Graziani 1998: 191). In February 1984 the government 
passed a protocol that further weakened the scala mobile, 
363   
and the PCI organised a referendum on the issue, that was 
lost the following year. 1984 thus marked a break between 
the three confederal unions that was only overcome in the 
early 1990s. 
 According to Regini (1985), while the attempt at 
concertation in the 1970s was envisaged as a ‘political 
exchange’ – although it did not achieve the desired results – 
the 1983 deal can be defined as an ‘ad-hoc exchange’ in 
which compensatory measures were offered. In 1984, 
however, the government does not offer anything in 
exchange for wage restraint, but only the expected fall in 
the rate of inflation. En passant, Graziani notes that the 
attack on the wage-indexation mechanism had little to do 
with inflation, which in these years was not of the wage-
push type (Graziani 1998: 188). This was confirmed by 
Cesaratto, who spoke about the role of the petty 
bourgeoisie and the ‘mice in the cheese’ in generating 
inflation (interview with Cesaratto). It must be remarked, – 
as we hinted at above – that the scala mobile represented one 
of the main elements that contributed to the weakness of 
the unions in the 1980s because of its egalitarian effects, 
that clashed with the expectations of the most qualified 
workers. 
 In order to understand the pressures to contain 
labour costs, one must not forget that in 1979 the European 
Monetary System (EMS) entered into force. It was a system 
based upon flexible exchange rate within fixed parameters, 
and thus it continually forced inflation-ridden countries to 
reduce inflation instead of using devaluation, and thus to 
compete on costs. 
 After the historic defeat at Fiat in 1980 (Revelli 1980), 
what emerged in the course of the decade was a tacit 
acceptance of two distinct spheres of action: while at the 
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central level, conflictual relations were maintained, at the 
local level of company or industrial district, the search for 
joint regulation prevailed (Regini and Regalia 1997: 212). 
This joint regulation regarded the move towards 
decentralisation that characterised the early 1980s. 
Altogether, the industrial restructuring of the 1980s was the 
sign of a “massive shift in the balance of power between 
labour and capital” (Locke and Baccaro 1998: 8). In fact, the 
period from 1977 to 1985 witnessed a huge increase of 
profits, even higher than in the 1950s (Ibidem: 12). It was in 
this context that new grass-roots organisations emerged 
(the COBAS – comitati di base, or rank-and-file committees). 
They coordinated highly disruptive unofficial strike action, 
most notably in public transport and education and posed 
a serious threat to the representativeness of the three 
confederal unions.  
 Reflecting on the experience of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Carrieri argues that the absence of formal procedures for 
negotiation apparently gave more power to the unions, but 
this happened only if the relations of force were favourable 
to them. Once the reverse happened, this advantage 
became a big disadvantage, as the employers found little 
obstacles in reducing wages and standards (Carrieri 1997: 
28). This was one of the reasons why finding a deal on a 
new system of industrial relations in the early 1990s was 
considered to be so important for the union leadership 
(interview with CGIL♯1).  
By the end of the 1980s, the three confederal unions 
seemed no longer capable of representing all the segments 
of the labour force, their bargaining power in the political 
arena had diminished substantially and new unions, 
particularly in the public sector, had emerged to contest 
their representational monopoly. In this context, and as 
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monetary policy became more stringent (cyclical 
devaluations often did not keep up with the higher 
inflation rate), the reaction of the confederal unions was 
basically to abandon their traditional hostility towards 
legal regulation (in the early 1990s, two important laws 
regulating strikes in public services and employment 
relations were passed) and once again engage in 
concertative relations with the government and the 
employers, this time with CGIL joining the other two 
confederal unions. Of course, the signing of the Maastricht 
treaty and thus the very stringent monetary ‘straitjacket’ 
that was imposed upon Italy, as well as the speculation that 
attacked the Lira in September 1992 and that forced Italy 
out of the ERM played a key role, in that it convinced the 
government and the employers that they too needed the 
consent of the unions in order to keep down wages, and 
thus inflation, while devaluing. 
In June 1990, Confindustria announced its decision 
to withdraw from the 1975 agreement on the wage-
indexation mechanism, thus forcing upon the government 
and the unions a solution on the question of wage costs, 
which was found only two years later. The common goal of 
the employers was to curb labour costs, which were 
increasingly difficult to pass on to consumers (it would 
generate mounting inflation) (Regalia and Regini 1997: 
220). In the meantime, the scala mobile was renewed by the 
parliament. New signs towards greater consensus among 
the confederal unions emerged when, in October 1991, at 
the 12th Congress of the CGIL, the majority approved a 
strategy sanctioning the end of class struggle, “the 
adoption of bargaining demands compatible with the 
firms’ ability to pay” (Locke and Baccaro 1998: 55) and the 
abolition of political factions, including the communist one. 
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In 1992, the unions signed together a pact with government 
‘privatising’ employment relations in the public sector. 
Moreover, there was also a gradual centralisation of 
the employers’ organisations, as in the early 1990s Intersind 
and ASAP (the public sector employer’s associations) 
gradually began to move in the orbit of Confindustria, and 
in 1992 and 1993 they both signed the social pacts. In the 
following year, as an outcome of the government’s 
programme for the privatisation of public enterprises, they 
both entered formally into Confindustria.  
 
Towards the 1993 protocol 
 
 In July 1992, a social pact definitively abolishing the 
wage-indexation mechanism was signed by the Amato 
government, the unions and Confindustria.. Crucially, in 
September of the same year, the Lira suffered a strong 
speculative attack and was forced out of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System. As 
Cesaratto argues, the elimination of the scala mobile in 1992 
and the 1993 pact had as their goals also the enhancement 
of Italian competitiveness by keeping wages and thus 
inflation low while devaluing. In order to understand the 
significance of this moment in Italian history, it is useful to 
review Talani’s approach to exchange rate commitments 
(Talani 2003). Her approach is grounded in a neo-
Gramscian paradigm in which exchange rate commitments 
appear as ‘credible’ the more they are rooted in the 
interests of a given hegemonic bloc. Thus, the ‘expectations’ 
of the markets include a crucial political component, in that 
they are deeply conditioned by the interests of the 
dominant socioeconomic groups in a given country. Thus, 
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“market expectations and thus also market behaviour, are 
crucially affected by considerations about something more 
fundamental than the fundamentals: the economic 
structure and the way in which it is reflected in economic 
and political life” (Talani 2003: 132). This fact can be linked 
to Kalecki’s argument that in a capitalist society the success 
of an economic policy is to be measured by the credibility 
of capital’s expectations of profitability. I would add that 
the more capital can successfully valorise itself in a given 
socioeconomic context, without social or political obstacles, 
the more a country’s monetary commitments are judged 
‘credible’. Crucially, and this is Talani’s argument, the 
credibility of a government is linked to the existence of 
consensus within the socioeconomic hegemonic bloc 
(Talani 2003: 133).  
 The author also argues that the decision to switch 
the power struggle from the national to the European level 
with the creation of the ERM in the late 1970s was the only 
way for Italian banking and industrial sectors to obtain the 
implementation of macroeconomic policies that would 
reduce state spending and discipline the unions. I would 
add that this kind of policy is a good example of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ (Gill 2003). Talani argues that in the 
1980s, participation in the ERM reflected the domestic 
balance of forces and so constituted the ‘political guarantee’ 
that the commitment was credible (Ibidem: 134), whereas a 
system of floating exchange rates constantly produced 
internal struggles between capital and labour over 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
 Brussels provided the opportunity to exert ‘external’ 
pressure towards the implementation of economic policies 
that would be opposed by Italian unions. On the other 
hand, as Talani underlines, the attitude of Italian capital 
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towards European monetary constraints was ambivalent: 
“whenever the commitment to fixed or quasi-fixed 
exchange rates collided with the need to improve economic 
performance, Italian industry traditionally insisted on the 
need to devalue” (Talani 2003: 135). The balancing of these 
two contradictory strategies has characterised the Italian 
position within European monetary arrangements.  
Identifying a hierarchy between these two positions, Talani 
argues that “on the one hand there was the ‘political 
economy’ strategy to shift the power struggle from the 
national to the supranational level with the aim of 
overcoming internal opposition to the implementation of 
fiscal and monetary orthodoxy. On the other hand there 
was the purely economic strategy to keep exchange rates in 
line with the desired performance of exports” (Ibidem: 136). 
Particularly in times of recession, this contradiction was 
bound to emerge in the open.  
Thus, in the early 1990s, in the heart of a Europe-
wide economic crisis and monetary turbulence fuelled by 
Germany’s use of accommodating fiscal policies (after its 
unification), industrial support for the ERM was 
withdrawn, triggering the speculative attack on the Lira. 
However, “the fact that the consensus faded only at the 
second level of analysis, that is, at the level of ‘purely 
economic’ considerations and not of structural ones, is 
demonstrated by the fact that Italian commitments to the 
realisation of EMU did not disappear despite the ERM 
crisis” (Ibidem). The overvaluation of the Lira in the late 
1980s was thus overcome by a strong (25%) devaluation in 
a few months in 1992 and 1993. However, the return to a 
system of floating exchange rates was not envisaged. 
Moreover, even a system of nonadjustable fixed rates 
would not ‘work’, since it would always leave some room 
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of manoeuvre for different monetary and fiscal policies 
(that would create interest rate differentials). Talani argues 
that there was no contradiction between the withdrawal of 
support for the ERM and private capital’s promotion of 
EMU, which provided a more satisfactory solution in that it 
‘locked in’ a set of orthodox monetary and fiscal policies 
insulated from ‘politics’. Moreover, banking capital’s 
structural dependence on industrial performance (Ibidem: 
137) enhanced the consensus in favour of a single currency 
area in Europe based on tough monetary and fiscal policies.  
While the monetary union had achieved the goals of 
eliminating currency fluctuations and interest rate 
differentials, it has done so only by shifting the adjustment 
mechanism on labour. Exchange rates could no longer be 
used to counter economic differences within the Eurozone, 
and – as monetary policy was left to the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and fiscal policy was surveilled – the only 
mechanism for adjustment was labour costs and 
employment conditions, which were targeted in order to 
achieve the needed ‘flexibility’. Hence, 
 
“if a deterioration in relative (unit) costs cannot be reversed 
by productivity improvements, unions in affected areas 
will be pressed to accept nominal wage reductions or low 
increases as well as cuts in nonwage costs, eroding 
bargained statutory social benefits. This may happen even 
without asymmetric shocks, insofar as employers (and 
governments) seek price advantages, no longer attainable 
by currency depreciation, through wage and benefit cuts 
instead” (Martin and Ross 1999: 70). 
 
What this stance implies is that the policy 
prescriptions produced by EU institutions for adjustment 
tended to include supply-side and market-enhancing 
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policies such as liberalisation and deregulation. Altvater 
summarises in this way the constraints imposed on 
member states of the EU: 
 
“within the Eurozone the expense side of government 
deficits is tightly regulated by the Maastricht criteria…The 
revenue side, on the other hand, is subject to regulatory 
arbitrage in favour of investors. Limiting wealth taxes frees 
up money wealth that is in turn used for speculation in 
financial markets” (Altvater 2011: 283). 
 
In short, only wage levels or government spending could 
vary in order to adjust the ‘real’ economies in a single 
currency area. What this means is a permanent pressure on 
workers and their organisations for wage moderation.  
 
The U-turn of 1992-1993 
 
The 1992-1993 moment in Italian history has been 
defined as a ‘new 8th of September’ (Paggi and Cantelli 
2011: 124) because it set in motion a downward path for the 
Italian economy, manifested in a significant fall in 
productivity in the following years, (that caused a decrease 
in exports, in GDP growth and a loss of competitiveness) 
and years of low growth and wage stagnation.  
 Apart from the turbulences that revolutionised the 
political system, which will not be dealt with here, these 
two years were marked by profound changes in the 
industrial relations system and in the regulation of the 
economy. In 1992 the Amato government (a government 
backed by the ‘old’ 1st Republic parties but that enjoyed 
considerable autonomy and thus acted practically as a 
technical government, due to the Tangentopoli scandals that 
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were decimating the political élite) signed a pact with the 
employers’ association and the unions that eliminated the 
wage-indexation mechanism. In July 1993, Ciampi’s 
technical government was the promoter of a new protocol 
that would deeply modify the relations among the social 
partners. For the first time a set of ‘shared goals’ became 
common among the partners. Significantly, both Amato 
and Ciampi would later join the centre-left coalitions. The 
consensus that was generated around the protocol and the 
goals it set allowed the Dini government to approve a 
pension reform in 1995 and a few years later, the centre-left 
governments approved a package of labour flexibility 
reforms. Let us look closely at the development of 1992-
1993. 
 First of all, it is important to acknowledge the 
particular role of trade unions within a capitalist society. 
Trade unions are ‘class’ organisations in the sense that they 
advance workers’ interests and organise class struggle in 
the labour market and in extreme circumstances (such as 
the hot autumn of 1969) may take back resistance to the 
shop floor. On the other hand, as Van der Pijl argues, “as 
structures of socialisation embodying a particular 
dimension of social compromise basically shaped by the 
requirements of the mode of production, they 
simultaneously give rise to a relatively distinct stratum of 
cadres, professional intermediaries comparable in many 
respects to hired managers working for capital, or state 
personnel concerned with the reproduction of complex 
social relations” (Van der Pijl 1998: 41). Hence, a general 
problem for the union is to maintain the link with the 
workplace and anticipate conflict and at the same time 
retain an institutional role within the state. The 1990s were 
an interesting period in this respect, because in this period 
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the unions both acquired legitimation and power in the 
institutional realm and increased their appeal vis-à-vis the 
workers. The confederal unions, in fact, won the workplace 
elections after 1993, the referendums on the 1993 protocol 
and the one on the 1995 pension reform.  
 The 1993 document is, in the words of Carrieri, a 
“fundamental deal” (Carrieri 1997: 9), and in the definition 
of the Minister of Labour at the time, Gino Giugni, the 
“constitution of industrial relations”. As Molina and 
Rhodes argue, “few west European countries have been 
subject to the continuous wave of reforms in industrial 
relations and welfare state institutions experienced by 
Italy” since the early 1990s (Molina and Rhodes 2007: 1). 
This wave of reforms is described by the two authors, as 
well as by Salvati (1997) as a ‘Copernican revolution’. The 
1993 deal has also been seen as the ‘turning point’ in Italian 
industrial relations (Vallauri 1995: 185) and as marking the 
‘end of an era’ (Carrieri 1997: 79). 
Salvati argues that one of the important 
preconditions for the signing of the pact was the weakness 
of the partners, who needed to lean upon each other 
(Salvati 1995). In fact, the political class and the employers 
were suffering from delegitimation in the wake of the 
Tangentopoli scandals, and the confederal unions had gone 
through a decade in which their power and membership 
had decreased considerably. The importance of the pact is 
underlined also by Baccaro, who argues that the 
concertation and the consensus inaugurated by the pact did 
not regard simply industrial relations, but the whole 
political system. In his words, “concertation is a decision-
making process that allows relatively weak and fragmented 
governments to make difficult choices that generate dissent 
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and conflict” (Baccaro 1999: 3). This is also Ciampi’s own 
view of the function of concertation (Ciampi 1996).  
The idea is that in crucial moments in which the 
state (and capital) needs to absorb the conflicts that are 
emerging from below in order to strengthen the legitimacy 
of government and implement specific policies that 
necessitate consent, co-optation becomes a useful tool. 
Unions, as Hyman notes, became in themselves “bulwarks 
of the social order” (Hyman 2001: 155) as they ‘used’ their 
remaining representativeness (lingering on from the 
‘autunno caldo’) in order to back up a specific set of 
policies that can be summed up in the goal of creating a 
‘culture of stability’, of which the social pact of 1993 was the 
most important element, as Ciampi himself acknowledges 
(Ciampi 1996: 11). Hyman usefully sums up the pressures 
on the trade unions in the early 1990s: “all main 
unions…perceived irresistible pressures: procedurally, to 
return to formal tripartite concertation as a basis for 
political stabilization, substantively to endorse austerity 
measures and institutional reforms which would align the 
Italian economy more closely with EU norms” (Hyman 
2001: 156). 
The basic idea of the ‘culture of stability’ was that by 
containing wages and inflation, interest rates would also 
decrease, and financial adjustment would thus liberate 
useful resources in order to relaunch economic growth 
based on investments in technology and education. Only in 
this way could Italy change its ‘competitive advantage’ and 
begin a new cycle of growth. Interestingly, Ciampi also 
argues that a country’s ability to exercise its own 
sovereignty is linked to its ability to produce the ‘public 
good’ of credibility and trust (Ciampi 1996: 15). I would 
argue that these kinds of statements can be seen as a sign of 
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the trends towards the creation of a neoliberal state that is 
increasingly insulated from popular-democratic influence 
and more conditioned by the need to create credibility vis-
à-vis the financial markets. In fact, as argued above – and 
also by Ginsborg (1989: 276) –, with Ciampi the tendency 
for the Italian executive to be dominated by non-political 
‘technical’ experts reached a high-point, although this trend 
continued all through the 1990s. Ciampi himself 
represented a sophisticated culture that emerged in the 
Action Party during World War Two, and later entrenched 
in the Bank of Italy.  
 The ‘culture of stability’ that Ciampi supported was 
increasingly seen as the way forward for the new party 
emerging out of ashes of the PCI. If we take a short step 
forwards, a link can be made between the new centre-left 
position in Italy and the emergent ‘new labour’ culture of 
the British Labour Party and then of other leftwing parties 
in Europe. Here, globalisation is seen as an inevitable 
process, in whose presence the problem of inequality 
cannot be solved ex post. The presence of individual ‘risk’ 
must thus be accepted, and the role of the state becomes 
one of ‘social investor’: to create the conditions that allow 
free individuals to compete successfully in the market. The 
main elements of the pacts I describe below, as well as 
Ciampi’s own programme, follow this line of thought. 
Ciampi himself underlined the need for an increasing 
autonomy of the executive from political parties as a 
precondition for restoring ‘healthy’ links with the social 
partners (Ciampi 1996). His description of the political 
programme he had in mind is crystal-clear: 
“The culture of stability has established itself in our 
country. The key moment was the pact between the social 
partners and the government in 1993: on that occasion, a 
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new incomes policy has found clear and organic 
manifestation: it has become a way of being. From the on, 
that deal has worked and is working as an anchor of 
stability, considered as a common good to be preserved in 
everyone’s interest. On the basis of that deal it has become 
easier to acquire control of public spending, strongly 
influenced by inflation. Thanks to that pact and to the 
adjustment of public finances, the rigorous control of the 
Bank of Italy could express full efficacy".  
 
The former President adds that 
 
“the link between monetary policy, incomes policy and 
adjustment of public spending has worked, enhancing the 
effect of each of the components. The fall of inflation and 
the tough actions to rebalance the state budget have 
produced a progressive rise in trust in the markets; the 
quotation of public debt bonds on the markets has been the 
daily thermometer of this recovery” (Ciampi 2004: 196-
197).  
 
The social pact, as I will show below, in fact did not 
deliver growth but wage stagnation, and inaugurated a 
path towards retrenchment of the welfare state (in 
particular, pensions) and new laws on labour market 
flexibility. So, the way this ‘culture of stability’ manifested 
itself in the eyes of the left’s traditional social base was as 
sacrifices without compensation. It is perhaps not a chance 
that, recently, there has been a dramatic shift in voter 
preference of this group towards the centre-right parties 
(Paggi and Cantelli 2011: 132-135).   
The 1992 agreement was seen as “the first true, albeit 
incomplete, turning-point in the relationships between the 
three actors” (Regalia and Regini 1997: 214) and was 
compared to the 1982 Wassenaar agreement in the 
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Netherlands (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 143). It abolished 
the wage-indexation mechanism, suspended collective 
bargaining for two years and linked for the following three 
years an incomes policy with the goals of GDP growth and 
planned inflation at 3,5% in 1993, 2.5% in 1994 and 2% in 
1995.  
It must be kept in mind that as a consequence of the 
1983 and 1984 deals, the wage-indexation mechanism in the 
early 1990s covered only 50% of inflation increases. The 
scala mobile was commonly regarded as one of the main ills 
of the nation’s economy, a consequence of the unions’ 
‘conservatism’ (Amyot 2004: 171) but it had great symbolic 
significance as it was the outcome of previous waves of 
collective mobilisation. Giving up the scala mobile also 
implied a reversal in the unions’ egalitarian policies and a 
recognition of wage inequalities for differently skilled 
workers (Locke and Baccaro 1998: 43). At the centre of the 
1992 deal there was wage restraint, without any of the 
traditional compensations that had accompanied the deals 
of the early 1980s. 
In addition to this agreement, the unions also 
accepted a partial reform of the pension system that raised 
the minimum retirement age (from 60 to 65 for men and 
from 55 to 60 for women) and eliminated certain benefits 
for public sector employees (Locke and Baccaro 1995: 17 – 
see below on the pension reforms). However, what was left 
unsolved was the problem of the collective bargaining 
system. Moreover, the pact left a lingering tension within 
the CGIL, as the secretary Bruno Trentin threatened to 
resign (he affirmed that he was forced to sign out of a 
‘sense of responsibility’ toward the nation – Locke and 
Baccaro 1998: 41), and the autumn of 1992 was 
characterised by strong protests, strikes and occupations 
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particularly in the Northern regions. Sergio Cofferati, later 
secretary of the CGIL, declared that “the agreement has 
been reached through a sort of political ‘encirclement’ of 
the unions and an intimidating attitude vis-à-vis the CGIL” 
(Cofferati 2002). In fact, the deal was reached only after 
Amato himself had threatened to resign if the CGIL did not 
agree, in the face of a fiscal and monetary crisis, which had 
already prompted the government to pass one of the 
biggest financial adjustment measures of the post-war 
period.  
The signing of the 1992 agreement must be placed in 
the context of a deep crisis of confidence in the ability of the 
Italian state to defend the Lira within the European 
Monetary System. The crisis exploded in September 1992 
and the government passed an extraordinary fiscal 
austerity package (the largest one in the country’s history) 
of 93 trillion lire. The climate was thus one of ‘economic 
emergency’. 
The 1993 pact came almost exactly one year after the 
signing of the 1992 social pact.  As I shall show below, it 
was not accompanied by any compensatory measures, as 
were the trade-offs of the early 1980s (Regalia and Regini 
2004: 8-9), not even the reduction in working hours 
contained in the Wassenaar agreement in the Netherlands 
(Negrelli 2000: 92), usually seen as a pact that largely 
embodied capital’s interests. Compensations were included 
but were minor: the inclusion of organised labour into 
institutionalised negotiations over the reform of the welfare 
state, the creation of a second level of bargaining at the firm 
or territorial level, the election of the workers’ 
representational bodies in the factories (RSU) (see below). 
The unions here de facto accepted that in order to relaunch 
growth in Italy, wages need to be curtailed.  
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The 1993 protocol 
 
The protocol itself consisted of five broad sets of 
measures  (see: Mania and Orioli 1993 for the complete text 
of the pact) that – crucially – for the first time applied both 
to the private and the public sector (therefore, the state 
itself agreed to respect the rules in its dealings with its 
employees): 
1. An income policy that had the aim of reducing 
labour costs and thus inflation. This objective was 
tightly linked with the aim of reducing interest rates 
and increasing competitiveness (by avoiding that the 
devaluation of 1992-1993 would increase inflation), 
and improving the “efficiency and competitiveness” 
of the firms (as argued in the text itself – Mania and 
Orioli 1993: 39). This required a two-stage yearly 
dialogue with the social partners in order to set the 
economic priorities for the following year. 
Moreover, the elimination of the automatic inflation-
protecting mechanism was confirmed. A new 
mechanism was set in place, which fixed salaries in 
coherence with (and thus not covering completely) 
the expected inflation rate. Each year, the rate of 
expected inflation was set jointly by the social 
partners on the basis of the analyses of the national 
statistical office (Istat). What was envisaged was a 
stable architecture of incomes policies and of 
collective bargaining relations in which the parties 
jointly committed to conform their behaviour to the 
expected inflation rate. Importantly, in the section of 
the pact devoted to income policy, there are explicit 
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references to attaining the Maastricht goals. Thus, it 
is stated that the inflation rate should be reduced to 
the levels of the “most virtuous European countries” 
(Mania and Orioli 1993: 39).  
2. The creation of a new bipolar collective bargaining 
system consisting of a national industry level and of 
a company or local one. The national industry 
contract – of two-year duration regarding wages and 
four-year duration as regards normative matters – 
was awarded the function of adjusting wages to the 
expected inflation rate. On the other hand, the 
company or territorial contracts – that are not 
compulsory – will concern “subjects and provisions 
that are different from and do not overlap with the 
compensation clauses assigned to the national 
collective agreement” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 50). 
They can redistribute further productivity increases 
(in excess to the ones needed to fund the increases 
set out in the national contract), as well as negotiate 
on the consequences of technological innovation and 
performance-related pay. The explicit formalisation 
of the second level of collective bargaining is indeed 
an innovative aspect, but these second-level 
contracts continue to be not compulsory. Crucially, 
the second level was not to overlap with concessions 
obtained at the national level. By closely linking 
local wage increases to profit and gain-sharing 
schemes, the aim here was to reduce the inflationary 
potential associated with local wage drift. The goal 
was also that of increasing the quota of wages 
directly linked to the evolution of the firm’s 
profitability and the productivity of single workers 
(Fanizza 2006: 47). This element has contributed to 
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increasing the wage differentials (Fumagalli 2006: 
106). In addition, a new mechanism for the ‘cooling’ 
of conflict before the renewal of contracts was 
created. The idea was that a sort of ‘competition-
cooperation’ would take the place of conflict. This 
system has been classified as one of ‘organised 
decentralisation’ (Regalia and Regini 2004: 32). 
The text is quite ambiguous with regards to the 
wage-setting mechanism. It states that the wage 
dynamics should be coherent with the expected 
inflation rate. However, it also adds that it can be 
influenced by “the objective of maintaining the 
purchasing power of wages, by general trends in the 
economy and the labour market, and the specific 
trends in each sector” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 48). In 
addition, when renewing the national contracts 
every two years, the social partners shall consider 
the “comparison between the expected inflation rate 
and the actual inflation rate in the previous two 
years, considering also variations in the terms of 
trade” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 49). So, differences 
between target and actual inflation rates were to be 
dealt with in the two-year contract renewal, also 
taking into account variations in the country’s 
exchange rates (i.e. ‘imported’ inflation). This 
element is crucial, because the months after the 
signing of the protocol were effectively characterised 
by a strong devaluation of the national currency. 
Leaving the decision whether to include this 
‘imported’ inflation into the wage increases to the 
social partners effectively left the matter as an 
outcome of the power struggle between the partners. 
What this meant in practice was that ‘imported’ 
381   
inflation tended to be excluded from inflation 
recovery in the following round of negotiations, thus 
creating significant differentials between expected 
and real inflation and thus lower real wages (Tronti 
2005; Rufini 2009). The economist Cesaratto also 
argued that the cost of the devaluation was 
effectively paid entirely by wages (interview with 
Cesaratto – see also below on wage developments).  
3. New rules of representation and institutionalisation 
of participation that substituted for the previous 
quite ad hoc and informal system. Never before had 
the rules governing trade union representation been 
the object of bargaining between employers, unions 
and the state. A new firm-level representative 
organisation was created (RSU – Rappresentanza 
Sindacale Unitaria), partly (2/3) elected and partly 
(1/3) nominated by the confederal unions. This rule 
was requested by Confindustria, fearing that lower 
levels of bargaining could be in contrast with the 
general line established at the national level. The 
employers’ association thus wanted a guarantee that 
their opposite numbers at plant-level negotiations 
were the same as those at the national level – to be 
sure that the two levels would not lead to 
uncoordinated wage increases (Amyot 2004: 174).  
4. A 40% increase in unemployment benefits, and the 
extension of the cassa integrazione to firms with less 
than 50 employees. The cassa integrazione is a form of 
unemployment benefit for firms undergoing 
technological restructuring or experiencing a crisis. 
The state pays a percentage of the wage for a period 
of maximum 2 years.   
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5. A ‘programmatic’ section, in which the general lines 
along which the economic and labour policies of the 
following years were devised. These included 
provisions such as the extension of apprenticeships 
and vocational training contracts, the licensing of 
temporary work agencies and the possibility of 
negotiating wages below contractual levels in zones 
hit by economic crisis (starting from 1996). These 
elements embodied parts of the employers’ 
programme (Amyot 2004: 180). Crucially, 
unemployment was here seen as the result of a 
‘rigid’ labour market, not of the lack of demand, as 
in the classic Keynesian understanding, as 
mentioned above. 
A section entitled ‘support for the productive 
system’ included more neutral measures to promote 
economic growth, such as aid to research and 
development and improved export credits. It was 
planned that investments would increase from 1.4% 
of GDP to 2% in three years (this did not however 
materialise). It was also agreed that taxes on capital 
would be lowered (Mania and Orioli 1993: 108). The 
pact even included a commitment by the 
government to legislate the application of national 
contracts to all workers in a sector, but this was 
carried out. There was one clause with a Keynesian 
flavour in the pact: the acceleration of the approval 
of public works, which had been blocked by the 
Tangentopoli scandals.  
 
The 1993 deal thus represented a more constructive 
agreement after the 1992 pact, in that it was aimed at 
devising a framework of governance that included both 
383   
rules for wage negotiations and an overall reform of the 
industrial relations system. So, while the 1992 deal was a 
response to a situation of emergency, in 1993 the aim was 
to create a functioning system agreed to by all the social 
partners. Trade unions were included in the decision-
making processes of economic policy in two annual 
sessions of debate before and after the presentation of the 
national financial plan. What emerged was a style of 
decision-making that was largely unprecedented in Italian 
history, in which the social partners were incorporated into 
formalised negotiations at the government level. Starting 
from the Ciampi agreement and up to the end of the 
decade (the 1998 ‘Christmas’ deal with the D’Alema 
government), more and more specific rules were 
introduced, reinforcing not only “the development of a 
model of policy-making based on pacting, but also its 
rhetoric and legitimation in political discourse” (Ferrera 
and Gualmini 2004: 141).  In the 1993 pact this formal role 
was institutionalised in two annual meeting with the social 
partners to discuss the economic situation, the needed 
reforms and the evolution of employment and wages.  
However, since the final objective of monetary 
integration – with the corresponding parameters – was 
accepted as the framework within which to conduct 
economic policy and thus the parameters for monetary and 
budgetary policies had been set, the formal role for the 
social partners seemed effectively like a minor concession 
(Della Sala 2004: 136). As the requirements for monetary 
union were overall quite punitive vis-à-vis labour (see 
Bonefeld 2001), what unions could claim was that the 
burdens of restructuring the welfare state and the labour 
market would be distributed in an equitable manner and 
perhaps safeguarding the core of their constituency.  
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A crucial point that differentiates this pact from 
previous ones in Italy and from similar pacts elsewhere is 
the presence of ‘programmatic’ rules, and thus the 
extension of the method of concertation to include the 
reform of the labour market. In fact, in the section of the 
protocol entitled ‘politics for employment’, the government 
promised an “organic law that will change the normative 
framework of the labour market, aiming at valorising 
employment opportunities that the labour market can offer 
if it is equipped with a richer set of instruments that are 
being employed in other European countries” (Mania and 
Orioli 1993: 81). Specifically, what was envisaged was a 
negotiation among the social partners with the aim of 
developing “active and flexible labour policies”, 
“modernising the laws on labour time” and “making the 
labour market more efficient by allowing temporary agency 
work” and fixed-term contracts (Ibidem: 81-89). These 
programmatic elements were then realised in the 1997 
labour flexibility law. 
 
The asymmetrical  exchange 
 
 In the section on trasformismo I have shown how at 
the end of the 1970s, at a time of economic crisis in the 
country, the PCI and the trade unions accepted wage 
restraint and austerity measures with quite weak 
compensations. Here my aim is to show how the 1992-1993 
deal also revealed this lack of ‘political exchange’. In 
‘traditional’ income policies (see Pizzorno 1978) the logic 
entailed wage restraint in exchange for full employment 
and/or universalist welfare state policies (that can be 
equated with the Polanyian ‘logic of social protection’). The 
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1993 deal is different: here, trade unions pre-emptively take 
it upon themselves to accept ‘sacrifices’ in the name of the 
national interest in a situation of economic emergency, 
without (or with marginal elements of) compensation. The 
logic of trasformismo must be kept in mind here: 
representing the ‘general interest’ as entailing a pre-
emptive curtailment of labour interests was a long-standing 
idea in the Italian left. Trentin himself, commenting on the 
1970s EUR line, declared that it represented the 
overcoming of a “contractualist logic that inspired the 
relationship between the unions and the state and that is at 
the moment dominant in many countries of western 
Europe”. According to him, the important fact about the 
acceptance of austerity policies was that the union refused 
the logic whereby “in order to become a protagonist of the 
new economic policy, it must claim ‘sure compensations’ 
from capital” (cited in Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986: 14).  
 Carrieri has described the nature of the exchange 
between the social partners as one between the guarantee 
of a predictable and controllable cost dynamic and the 
maintaining of the purchasing power of wages, coupled 
with the improvement of the conditions of work (Carrieri 
1997: 36). The asymmetrical exchange is clear. While capital 
obtains the control of wages (maintained well below 
productivity all throughout the decade – see below) labour 
can at best hope not to lose out in real wages. It is, 
moreover, difficult to see how the improvement of the 
conditions of work could come about when laws creating a 
more flexible labour market are implemented, and in a 
situation where only a minority of firms apply second-level 
contracts. Only 20-25% of workers, with high-points of 40% 
in the chemical industry, were involved in second-level 
bargaining, with little variation from the situation before 
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1993 (Scacchi 1998: 5).  The workers excluded from the 
second-level bargaining (almost 80% of all workers) were 
largely in small and medium enterprises and in the South. 
The overall result was that the direct wage has seen a large 
increase in variable quotas (linked to productivity and 
profitability of the firm), often unilaterally conceded by the 
employer. Moreover, there was an increase in wage 
differentiation between the lowest and the highest wages, 
between geographical areas, industrial sectors and small 
and large firms (Ibidem: 6-7).  
It seems more apt to talk about a pact on ‘regulative’ 
rather than ‘redistributive’ policies (Regalia and Regini 
1997: 22596) in a context in which the analysis of economic 
‘reality’ (in a situation presented as one of economic 
emergency) and therefore the solutions and objectives were 
largely shared, in contrast to a situation where the resources 
are shared. The fact that the pact was asymmetric is widely 
shared in the literature. Negrelli gives a good description of 
the kind of pact agreed in 1993:  
 
“unlike in previous triangular agreements stipulated 
during the early 1980s, what clearly emerges here is the 
degree of austerity of a state which can no longer put 
resources on the table in exchange for the consensus of the 
actors involved, but rather can only endeavour to help 
steer through the perilous shoals of price and wage 
controls. Thus the political exchange has increasingly 
become shaped by the external constraints of the current 
stage in the European Union” (Negrelli 2000: 99).                                                         
96 The two authors also argue that “the tripartite agreements and the negotiated 
laws of the 1990s have been based on the immediate ‘exchange’ of benefits and 
on the compensatory role of governments to a much lesser extent than were the 
relatively unsuccessful attempts of the early 1980s” (Regini and Regalia 1997: 
225) 
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 Also Salvati points out that “despite government 
statements that the path aimed at growth and employment, 
there were few concrete proposals in the agreement that 
labour could point to as a trade-off for making concessions 
on wages” (Salvati 1995: 136). For instance, there was no 
mention of the use of public finances in a redistributive 
fashion. In fact, “the commitment given to meeting the 
convergence criteria precluded any macroeconomic choices 
that would have been out of step with a priority to tight 
monetary policy and price stability” (Ibidem). What was 
missing from the protocol were social policies or policies 
geared at full employment (Carrieri 1997: 80). Thus, 
excluded from the protocol were the interests of the 
unemployed or workers under non-standard contracts.  
 Amyot, underlining that the explicit quid pro quo that 
characterised earlier phases of corporatism has been 
replaced by a recognition of common goals (mainly the 
need to Maastricht criteria), argues that “the July 
agreement has often been presented as an example of a new 
phase of corporatism, where unions seek, in return for 
wage moderation, organisational support and legitimacy 
rather than concrete benefits such as full employment” 
(Amyot 2004: 173). The author also points out that, even if 
the preservation of the two contractual levels can be seen as 
a union victory (albeit – I would add – a defensive one, 
since these two levels were already present, even if 
informally), institutionalisation of the role of the unions 
brought with it “a certain ‘taming’ of the unions, in their 
acceptance of the goal of inflation control and indeed of the 
overall economic policy of the government, and more 
specifically in their endorsement of a framework which de 
facto protected the core industrial workforce in large firms, 
388   
while offering much less to those in small plants, the 
service sector and the black and grey labour markets” 
(Amyot 2004: 175). I would add that this strategy of the 
unions made them also less attractive to workers in the 
flexible service economy, where union presence is quite 
low. 
This pact can therefore be described as a form of 
concertation without or with very little political exchange. 
Alternatively, as Carrieri argues, the pact can be described 
as a national pact instead of a social pact, since its goal is 
uniquely that of allowing the Italian political economy to 
adjust to competitive pressures: the constitutive nucleus of 
the pact is in the “adjustment and re-launching of the 
national economic system. Also in Italy the ‘independent 
variable’ is the firm’s competitiveness via the control of 
inflation, while the defence of real wages becomes a 
‘dependent variable’” (Carrieri 1997: 85).  The role of public 
policies was thus not a source of welfare benefits but a 
factor in national competitiveness (Regalia and Regini 1997: 
228). 
What government did provide that had been lacking 
was a formal role for the trade unions to take part in 
deliberations on macroeconomic policy. However, it is 
easily understood that given the parameters within which 
fiscal and monetary policy could be used, this formal role 
was but a minor concession.  So, while the ‘state’ (one 
should however here keep in mind that the state’s interest 
coincides with the interest of the dominant historic bloc) 
obtains the control of inflation and of public debt, and 
Confindustria obtains higher competitiveness because of 
lower labour costs and lower conflict, the unions can only 
point – at best – to defensive results. Carrieri sums up the 
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interest that the employers’ associations have in social pacts 
by arguing that  
 
“for the employers’ associations these pacts are interesting 
if they are able to consolidate the constraints on wages and 
at the same time do not question the flexibility at the firm 
level. So, employers are not in favour of any kind of 
centralised pact, but only those that are compatible with 
the autonomy of single entrepreneurs or managers (or, 
better still, if they contribute to strengthening it, creating 
constraints for the counterpart)” (Carrieri 1997: 87). 
 
I would argue that this was the case with the 1993 
pact, since it set in stone clear inflation targets that were 
consistently lower than real inflation, it reduced conflict to 
a minimum (see below) and it maintained the needed 
flexibility at the firm level by reducing the role of the 
second-level collective bargaining to issues of productivity 
or performance-related pay. In fact, the employers 
requested that the actors negotiating at various levels 
should be organisationally connected (only unions that sign 
national pacts can sign local pacts) so that there would be a 
strong institutional link between bargaining arrangements 
at different levels (Baccaro 2002: 350). This reassured the 
employers that the flexibility at the firm level would be 
maintained. 
So, the real exchange, I would argue, was that 
between wage moderation and the acceptance of ‘rules of 
the game’, a symbolic component of legitimation of the 
‘national’ role of the social partners, in particular the trade 
unions. While this recognition is important for the union 
leadership, it offers little benefits for the represented 
workers. While the ‘old’ social pacts also provided 
institutional advantages for the leaderships, there were 
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tangible results for workers that the unions could point to 
(Katzenstein 1985). What the unions delivered in 1993 was 
their capacity to control (even democratically, via the 
referenda) millions of workers, obtaining in return the 
inclusion in the policy making process.  
In the 1993 pact the main element unions can point 
to as a benefit is a right to access to and control of public 
policies, a right that the unions used to guarantee that the 
sacrifices were distributed following criteria of equity. It is 
interesting however, as I will show below, that 
notwithstanding the fact that the main result the unions 
could offer was an ‘equitable distribution of sacrifices’, the 
confederal organisations have become stronger, and have 
managed to win two workplace referenda on the 1993 pact 
and on pension reform in 1995, and also to re-confirm their 
representativeness vis-à-vis the grassroots unions (COBAS, 
sindacati autonomi) in the elections for the workplace 
representations (RSU).  There was also a democratic 
transformation of the unions, an element that, in my view, 
signals that the element of consensus was strong among the 
workers, in a situation approaching that of hegemony. The 
consent of the subaltern class was therefore largely 
obtained.  Considering the lack (or mitigation) of the logic 
of ‘political exchange’, the discursive element, the capacity 
of the leadership to persuade their members that the 
sacrifices are just and equitably distributed was arguably 
more important. The typical role of organic intellectuals 
here played a decisive role, as their function is – according 
to Gramsci – precisely to develop and mould the opinions 
of a social class. 
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The democratic transformation of the unions: the 
referendum and the RSUs. 
 
 Contra neo-corporatist theory, the 1993 deal was not 
accompanied by forms of centralisation of decision-making 
power within the unions and an accentuation of the 
hierarchical elements. There was instead a reform of the 
structure of representation in the workplaces – the creation 
of the RSUs – that has made it easier to legitimise the 
choices of the union leadership from below. Moreover, two 
referenda were organised – in 1993 on the Ciampi protocol, 
and in 1995 on the pension reform – and the majority of 
workers agreed with the proposed measures. 
As noted above, the fact that a referendum was held 
in 1993 and that the majority of the workers approved the 
pact (67, 1% voted ‘yes’) is in itself a significant sign of the 
ability of the unions to mobilise their social base. It signals 
that the common sense assumptions of the union 
leadership extended significantly to the union base. 
However, it must be stressed that only 1.3 million workers 
turned out to the referendum voting booths, less than a 
quarter of the members of the unions and less than a tenth 
of the salaried population. So – as will be detailed in the 
next chapter – passive acquiescence played a crucial role. In 
fact, a hegemonic order is based not only on active consent 
but also on containing dissent through passive 
acquiescence.  
 Moreover, the new participatory nature of the 
workplace representations shows that, unlike what 
corporatist theory would predict, the signing of the social 
pact went hand in hand with new forms of participatory 
democracy. The confederal unions, in fact, soon won the 
large majority (90%) of the votes in these bodies, thus 
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recovering the terrain lost to new grass-roots unions in the 
1980s and this time turn-out at the elections was 
remarkably high (75% of all workers) (Locke and Baccaro 
1995: 20). Thus, the representativeness of confederal 
unionism came out strengthened from the experience of the 
early 1990s, although union membership did continue do 
slowly decline, from about 5.6 million members in 1993 to 
5.1 million at the end of the decade.  However, the fall of 
membership was much slower than in the previous decade: 
from 1980 to 1990 it fell by 18.3%, while from 1990 to 2003 
the decrease was of 9.3 percentage points (in the decade 
1970-1980 membership witnessed an outstanding increase 
of 51.8%, the highest among Western European countries) 
(Visser 2006).  
On the other hand, the creation of the RSU 
contributed to taming the union movement, because the 
continuous involvement in direct negotiations with the 
employers over issues such as productivity bonuses usually 
brought the partners together around the common 
problems of the firm’s competitiveness (Amyot 2004: 178). 
Moreover, the reserved third of seats to the confederal 
unions restrained the more radical plant activists.  
As Regini and Regalia argue, contra neo-corporatist 
theory, such a pact was successful precisely because it 
strengthened workplace representation (Regini and Regalia 
1997). Simoni also argues that the referendum acted as a 
powerful legitimising device (Simoni 2009). The standard 
argument of the strengthening of the unions’ position 
thanks to democratic procedures has been provided by 
Locke and Baccaro (Locke and Baccaro 1995; 1998; Baccaro 
2002). They basically argue that workers have accepted to 
comply with these agreements since they had been 
involved in internal discussions and in deliberative 
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referenda. In fact, it is precisely the fact that the workers 
were involved that differentiates these pacts from previous 
ones in the 1970s and 1980s, which were top-down 
decisions that met with considerable hostility from parts of 
the membership of the unions. As Baccaro argues, “far 
from further reducing the country’s capacities for 
negotiated policy making, these reforms (i.e. the reforms that 
enhanced democratic procedures) contributed to generating 
and sustaining the corporatist deals of the 1990s by 
increasing the legitimacy of the moderate confederal 
leaders’ policy choices (aggregative effect) and by 
providing these confederal union leaders with 
opportunities to shape the preferences of their constituents 
(deliberative effect)” (Baccaro 2002: 348).  
 One can draw a parallel between Baccaro’s 
characterisation of the role of deliberative democracy and a 
neo-Gramscian understanding of the role of organic 
intellectuals. Basically, the theory of deliberative 
democracy argues that the democratic process does not just 
aggregate preferences but contributes to shape them 
(Ibidem: 334). Thus, workers often rely on their leaders or on 
‘expert’ knowledge in order to make a decision or to create 
their opinion. This process of persuasion is precisely the 
function of organic intellectuals, according to Gramsci. 
Organic intellectuals give a sense of direction and purpose 
to a certain class perspective. These ideas do not just 
emerge from nowhere or from ‘rational’ choices but are 
crucially conditioned by the ‘material basis for human 
existence’ (see above), thus capitalist social relations, and 
the skewed dependence on the market of both capital and 
labour. Therefore, the use of democratic procedures is a 
quite clear sign of the pervasiveness of a shared common 
sense among both members of the unions and the 
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leadership. In Gramscian terms, this phenomenon is 
important because it means that a new potential hegemony 
is being built based on moral and political persuasion.  
In the 1990s Italian firms witnessed the rise of 
different forms of worker participation, both in economic 
terms and in terms of decision-making (Carrieri 1997: 57). 
In a production system increasingly characterised by lean 
production and ‘total quality’ production, there is a strong 
relationship between the quality of the product and worker 
participation (Ibidem: 62-63). Therefore, the direct (also 
emotional) involvement of the workers, and their 
‘responsabilisation’ vis-à-vis the goals of the company are 
considered crucial elements. However, as Carrieri argues, 
in Italy the dominant perspective was firm-centered, and 
there was no link between wider forms of participation 
either in terms of planning or in terms of economic 
democracy (Carrieri 1997: 64). Perhaps it is useful to 
distinguish between the concept of participation and that of 
involvement (Ambrosini 1994). The latter concept stresses 
only one dimension, which is the worker’s support for and 
adherence to the goals of the firm. In this perspective, the 
interests of the workers lose their specific identity and get 
watered down in a one-dimensional arrangement in which 
the only real actor in the regulation of social relations 
within the firm is the firm itself. On the other hand, the 
concept of participation stresses the presence of plural 
actors with different interests. It does not exclude a 
convergence of interests but does give space a decision-
making process in which the unions have a role (Ibidem). 
 The forms of ‘participation’ that have had success in 
the 1990s – financial participation, communication 
techniques, ‘quality circles’, semi-autonomous working 
groups or ‘total quality management’ (Carrieri 1997: 65) – 
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are closer to forms of involvement than to actual worker 
participation. According to Carrieri (Ibidem: 75-76) almost 
25% of firms had joint committees in 1997 and 47% of the 
firm-level deals included chapters on worker participation.  
The ideal-type seemed to be the firm-community. I would 
add that forms of worker involvement premised on the 
financial participation of the workers tend to be capital-
friendly because they motivate the worker to produce more 
surplus-value.  
There is another way of approaching the role of 
workers’ participation.  As Carrieri argues, the firms 
themselves have shown increasing interest in valorising the 
channel of communication towards the workers that 
representative and participatory bodies (such as the new 
RSU) play (Carrieri 1997: 44). This phenomenon is to be 
understood in the context of a switch to post-fordist 
production techniques that aim at motivating and 
involving the workers towards meeting the goals of the 
enterprise. This feature of post-fordism has been brilliantly 
captured by André Gorz in his ground-breaking book “The 
Immaterial” (Groz 2003). He refers to the tendency of 
capital to rely on a more anti-hierarchical, participatory 
style of labour management. The idea is that work is no 
longer (or not only) an externally directed activity, in which 
the worker is simply told what to do in an environment in 
which he or she has no control whatsoever over the means 
of production, or over the ‘technical composition of capital’. 
The ‘immaterial turn’ signals that we might be entering into 
an era in which workers are increasingly motivated to 
participate in a more direct, creative way in the production 
process. This is coupled with a post-industrial work ethic 
that, instead of stressing the instrumental nature of work as 
a means to achieve social mobility or greater consumption 
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(as was in the ‘Fordist’ era), work is characterised as a path 
to individual self-expression, self-development and 
creativity (Weeks 2011: 46). 
Thus, what is increasingly expected of workers is not 
only (or not even) a submissive attitude, a respect for 
authority and hierarchy in the workplace, but a creative, 
active behaviour and a firmer motivation to participate in 
the goals of the company. Thus, exploitation is perhaps 
breaking new grounds and is morphing into a sort of self-
exploitation in which the capitalist mode of production not 
only produces commodities with the goal of valorising 
capital (hence generating even more surplus value) and 
labour-power as an object (the continuous production and 
reproduction of the working class as an effect of the cycle of 
capitalist accumulation), but workers themselves are more 
and more incentivised to look upon themselves as 
commodities in virtually all respects, a self-
commodification that involves not only physical labour-
power but emotional, linguistic and relational aspects that 
hitherto tended to be excluded from the sphere of 
production (for a great interpretation of the 
commodification of the self see Van der Pijl 1998: 13-15; see 
also Hardt and Negri 2000; Lazzarato 1997). 
Now, going back to our focus, this general trend 
means that capital must increasingly be receptive and 
tuned to capture the changing conditions and perceptions 
of its workers, if it wants to include them into a participatory 
mode of management. It must also successfully exploit the 
relational and emotional elements of their work (see also 
Vercellone 2006). Conflictual relations are dangerous 
because they pre-empt the possibility of exploiting the 
creativity and motivation of workers, which would tend to 
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become passive and develop grievances that would be 
difficult to re-absorb.  
 Concluding this brief section, I would argue that in 
contrast to its recent history, which has been one of conflict 
and opposition – although gradually mitigated in the 1980s 
by ‘micro-concertation’ – Italian unions have shown in 
recent years unexpected capacities to prevent conflict and 
mobilise consent with regard to unpopular choices. It is this 
element that made the unions such a precious ally for the 
government and capital.  
 
Consequences of the 1993 deal 
 
Let us now briefly analyse the consequences in terms 
of wages of the 1993 deal. As mentioned above, the new 
collective bargaining system was divided in two levels, 
with the local or territorial level bargaining covering issues 
of productivity increases and performance-related pay. 
Thus, if the first level bargaining completely covered the 
inflation rate and second-level bargaining absorbed all the 
productivity increases, wages would move in line with 
productivity, and the quota of work in national product 
would remain unvaried. However, as both Tronti (2005) 
and Rufini (2009) argue, this is not what happened. In the 
course of the decade wages did not keep in line with 
inflation rises and increases in productivity. Between 1993 
and 2000, the quota of added value going to wages has 
decreased from 72.3% to 67.4%, with the quota going to 
capital increasing from 27.7% to 32.6% (Paggi and Cantelli 
2011: 132). 
Unemployment also reached an unprecedented level 
in Italian post-war history in 1995, with a figure of 12.3%. 
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The following graph clearly shows that the most significant 
impact on the distribution of income has occurred in the 
years following the 1993 deal. 
 
 
Graph 1- Distribution of income before and after 1993 (% on Gross National Product) 97 
 
 The following two tables are drawn from Stirati and 
Levrero (2002) – based on ISTAT data – and show, 
respectively, the evolution of gross salaries and of net 
salaries in the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
97 Translation: 
risultato netto di gestione (scala di sinistra) : profits (left scale) 
quota di lavoro (scala di destra): wage rate (right scale) 
quota del lavoro dipendente (scala di destra) : dependent wage rate (right scale) 
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Table 1 - Gross Real Salaries for Unit of Labour  (1990=100) 
 
 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Wages 101.3 103.0 104.0 104.9 105.5 
 
 
Table 2 - Net monthly wages for full-time workers (year 2000 value in Lire) 
 
   
 Based on these tables, one can see that after 1993 real 
gross wages decreased until 1995, after which a slow 
growth (1% a year) ensued. However, due to higher taxes 
and social contributions, real net wages in fact decreased all 
through the decade and in 2000 were lower by 5% than in 
1989. Moreover, wage differentials between the Central and 
Northern parts of the country and the Mezzogiorno 
increased in the same period. The turning point of 1993 can 
be clearly seen in both tables, as well as in the graph above. 
Taking 1993 as the starting point (the following data is 
reported in Paggi and Cantelli 2011: 132), between that year 
and 2007 wages grew 2.74% a year on average, while 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Wages 100 102.5 102.3 102.5 101.6 100 
Year 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 
Average wage 2424 2336 2400 2308 2295 2326 
Central and 
Northern Italy 
2441 2370 2438 2364 2371 2402 
Southern Italy 2379 2250 2304 2175 2109 2120 
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inflation was at 3.28% on average. So, wages were curtailed 
by 0.54%.  
 Similar data is stressed by evidence from other 
economics literature I have accessed (Tronti 2005; Rufini 
2009; Ghiani and Binotti 2011). Ghiani and Binotti, in 
particular, add that between 1992 and 2002, according to 
the OECD, real wages in Italy decreased by 5%, marking 
the third worst performance within all OECD countries 
(Ibidem: 172). The two authors underline that the real wage 
compression experienced by the salaried class in the 1990s 
is without precedent in the post-war history of the country 
and also in comparison to other European countries.   
As Tronti shows, profits increased over than three 
times more than real gross wages (Tronti 2005: 5). 
Concretely, this meant an annual transfer of wealth from 
labour to capital of 29 billion Euros (Ibidem: 8). In fact, 
according to a OECD study, Italian manufacturers have 
improved their cost competitiveness by 34% from 1992 to 
the end of the decade, a figure higher than all of Italy’s 
international competitors (Locke and Baccaro 1995: 1). 
Locke and Baccaro show data that proves that the business 
rate of return increased tremendously between 1993 and 
the end of the decade, up to a figure higher than that in the 
1970s or 1980s (Locke and Baccaro 1998: 57). Tronti, on the 
other hand, argued that the increased profits of the firms 
have not been used to stimulate productivity, but to 
employ workers in low-productivity jobs (Tronti 2005: 11-
12).  
Turning to the effects of the industrial relations 
reform, data shows that the local level collective 
bargaining has only been marginally applied. In fact, 
Regalia and Regini cite a study by the Bank of Italy that 
shows that in the manufacturing industry, 85% of the pay 
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was determined by items decided at the national level, 
while the remaining 15% depended on decisions previously 
taken at company level, and only 3% was linked with the 
firm’s economic performance (Regalia and Regini 2004: 28). 
In 1995/1996, only 12% of firms in the industrial sector 
were covered by enterprise-level collective agreements 
(Bordogna 2003b: 288) and less than 20% of the labour force 
was involved in the constitution and renewal of the RSU 
from 1993 to 1998 (Scacchi 1998: 5). Moreover, second-level 
bargaining occurred mainly in large firms in the North of 
the country – the ones that already had these kind of 
arrangements before the 1993 reform (CNEL 2008). 
It can thus be argued that the so-called ‘high road to 
competitiveness’, that was the central goal of the protocol 
itself, was not attained.  This was based on a strategy of 
investment in education, training and technological 
innovation, since Italy could no longer use devaluation as a 
mechanism for fostering competitiveness, in the classic 
paradigm of the ‘knowledge-based economy’. However, 
the data shows that notwithstanding an increase in 
employment after 1997, productivity remained low and in 
fact witnessed one of the worst performance in the 
European Union (Tronti 2005: 14). Moreover, as Regini 
argues, the regulation of training was still inadequate in the 
1990s, despite the signing of the protocol (Regini 1997a: 
114). 
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So, the bet proposed by the government to the social 
partners, asking for wage restraint and getting in return 
more investment in technology and innovation, as well as 
the reduction of the interest on public debt (in order to free 
up productive resources), did not really materialise. What 
is commonly referred to as the politica dei due tempi (the 
politics of the ‘two moments’: first austerity, then growth 
and redistribution) did not deliver the ‘second moment’, 
and Italy remained stuck in a path of low growth, 
stagnating productivity and low wages (Tronti 2005). 
 This second graph shows that real wage increases in 
Italy between 1996 and 2002 have been the second-lowest 
in Europe. In fact, the difference between the wage 
dynamics and the increases of productivity were of 11 
percentage points (Tronti 2005: 6).  
A further point that is worth mentioning is a 
decrease in industrial conflict that was unprecedented in 
recent Italian history. As Istat statistics show, after 1993 
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industrial conflict, as measured by the hours lost to strikes, 
has literally fallen to annual levels that are one tenth of the 
previous ones (Istat 2003). Paggi and Cantelli also report 
data showing that from 1990 to 1999 there has been a 
decrease in hours lost to strikes from over 30000 to less 
than 4000 (Paggi and Cantelli 2011: 133).  
Rufini talks about the 1993 pact as the ‘unequal 
exchange’, and argues that the increased profits of the firms 
were largely not invested in technological or organisational 
changes but predominantly in portfolio investment (Rufini 
2009). It was this phenomenon, according to the author, 
that generated the negative trend on productivity, and so 
on salaries and on the purchasing power of workers. 
Moreover, the higher productivity of other European 
countries has contributed to limiting the potentially 
positive effects on exports that wage moderation has 
(Rufini 2009: 13). In fact, the trade balance worsened in the 
years 1993-1997 so that although foreign (the comparison is 
here with the EU15 countries) workers on average earn 
more than Italian workers, their products are 
comparatively cheaper.  
The arrangement that emerged from the 1993 
protocol did not therefore manage to protect wages from 
inflation and increased the gap between wages and 
productivity. A possible solution to this problem was 
proposed by the economist Ezio Tarantelli, considered to be 
the ‘father’ of concertation. In his original idea, firms or 
sectors that did not respect the expected rate of inflation 
faced sanctions or higher taxes (this was the so-called tax-
based income policy). These kinds of sanctions were not only 
never applied, but also never threatened, so that the rate of 
inflation was constantly higher than the expected rate, thus 
curtailing real salaries. Maintaining a difference between 
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the actual rate of inflation and the expected one meant that 
the cost of ‘imported’ inflation was all on labour’s 
shoulder.98 Tronti himself concludes that it were the 
employers and the government who did not ‘respect’ the 
deal, mainly because of their inability to guarantee the 
respect of planned inflation (Tronti 2005: 18).  
The following tables on employment and the 
distribution of income (drawn from Scacchi 1998) are quite 
revealing of a shift that occurred in the years immediately 
following 1993 (see also above on wage developments). 
However, one should not limit the analysis simply to wage 
dynamics: what emerged from 1993 was a consensus not 
only on incomes policy and workers’ representations, but 
also on pension reform, welfare and the adjustment of 
public finances. 
In brief, the contributions cited above underline that 
since 1993 there has been a decrease not only in gross but 
also in net wages and that at the same time there has been a 
redistribution of income favouring profits over wages. The 
rationale for this pressure on wages was that higher wages 
tended to have a negative effect on the competitiveness of 
Italian products and so on the balance of payments. 
Moreover, the demand for wage restraint was also linked 
to the need to avoid the growth of inflation after the 1992 
devaluation of the Lira, also with an eye to meeting the 
Maastricht criteria.   
 
 
 
Table 3 - Employment – 1993-1996                                                         
98 Fumagalli argues that it was this mechanism that contributed to mitigating 
the conflicts between small and large firms in the 1990s (Fumagalli 2006 - part 
III). 
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Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Employed people (% 
change from previous 
year) 
-2.9% -1.5% -0.4% 0.4 
Dependent workers (% 
change from previous 
year) 
-2.7% -1.5% -0.8% -0.4% 
Unemployment rate 10.2% 11.3% 12.0% 12.3% 
 
 
Table 4 - Quota of labour income as a percentage of GDP, factor costs 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Quota of 
dependent 
and 
autonomo
us labour 
73.8
% 
74.9
% 
72.3
% 
70.8
% 
68.2
% 
67.3
% 
67.8
% 
 
Table 5 - Quota of profits calculated as factor costs (difference between value added calculated at 
factor costs and labour income) 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1970-
1979 
1980-
1992 
Quota 
of 
profits 
36.6 37.7 40.8 42.3 41.5 31.4 36.5 
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6. Common sense in 1993: the moment of 
consensus 
 
 In this chapter, I analyse the interviews conducted 
with the representatives of the trade unions, the employers’ 
organisation and the political parties. As mentioned above, 
I base this analysis also on interviews conducted by Mania 
and Orioli (1993) with some of the protagonists of the 1993 
protocol, that give some useful indication of the kind of 
common sense assumptions that dominated the discourse 
at the time of the signing of the pact. The aim of this 
chapter is to analyse the content and the genesis of the 
common sense assumptions on the political economy that 
were shared between the social partners in the early 1990s, 
and ground these in the historical development of the 
country within the capitalist world totality.  ‘Culture’ is 
often used as an attractive catch-word in academia when an 
additional ad-hoc explanation is sought in order to 
complement an argument. However, it has been an 
argument of this work that our forms of thought – ‘culture’ 
– permeate the whole social world, as they are part and 
parcel of capitalist social relations, which they both 
generate and reproduce. Capitalist social relations in their 
materiality in themselves heavily condition our forms of 
thought and skew them towards capital’s (rather than 
labour’s) dependence on the market, and hence capital’s 
valorisation goals (the goal of capital accumulation, that is 
the disciplining force on production). Thus, our forms of 
thought both condition and are conditioned by capitalist 
social relations and how these have been internalised 
within a national political economy.  
As mentioned above, the design of the interviews 
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was structured around theoretical expectations based on 
the literature on the economic and political history of Italy. 
The chapter is organised around recurrent themes that 
emerged from a theoretical analysis of the interview data. 
This mode of presentation was preferred to an alternative 
one (presenting the analysis divided according to the 
interviewees) because it allowed for a better understanding 
of the shared assumptions in the different interviews.  
 As Bruff argues, common sense must be seen not as 
something that does the explaining (the oft-referred to 
‘national culture’ or ‘tradition’, whose genesis is then left 
unquestioned) but as something that must be explained in 
itself (Bruff 2008: 91). So, it is not enough to say: this was a 
long-standing tradition in this or that country. What needs 
explaining is how this tradition emerged and how it is 
linked with a particular position within the capitalist mode 
of production in its global reach. In this way, one can reach 
an awareness of the material constitution of common sense 
that permeates our social world and – crucially – how 
production is organised. Gramsci himself referred to a 
‘material structure of ideology’ through which ideas that 
are linked to a specific constellation of social forces emerge 
and develop. These ‘organic ideas’  are the ones that 
“organise human masses, and create the terrain on which 
men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle” (Gramsci 1971: 376-377, cited in Bieler and 
Morton 2006a: 24).  
In this chapter I seeks to discover what the economic 
‘facts of life’ are from the point of view of the actors 
interviewed. Ultimately, the goal is to attempt to de-
naturalise economic phenomena (and the forms of thought 
linked to them) and show their historicity, the fact that they 
are created by and through human action and struggle. My 
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argument is that the common element in the various 
versions of common sense is represented by the 
assumption of economic vulnerability of the country. The 
latter expressed itself in the idea that in order to compete in 
the world economy or to adapt Italy to economic change, 
real wages needed to be kept sufficiently low, lest the 
country face disequilibria in the balance of payments (see 
previous chapter). This assumption was felt more strongly 
as the state class formally constrained the country into the 
‘EMU straightjacket’ that ruled out devaluation.  
Crucially, it is not only positive consent that is 
important for maintaining a particular hegemony. Passive 
resignation is just as significant, as it signals that, even if 
the dominant ideas or common sense assumption are not 
accepted as a suitable explanation per se, no alternative is 
seen on the horizon and thus there is acquiescence. This 
element emerged clearly in the interviews.   
While I would argue that it is quite unproblematic to 
explain why capital generated and internalised this 
common sense view – it reflects more directly its interests – 
what needs explanation is why labour and the left 
internalised such a common sense assumption. I argue that 
it is the peculiar internalisation of ‘the international’ into 
‘the national’ by the unions and the left that lies at the 
origin of this form of thought (see Ch. 4), that basically sees 
the rise of real wages as a constant problem for the 
equilibrium of the balance of payments.  While 
deterministic explanations are not sought, what is stressed 
is that the different versions of common sense tend to find a 
common ground in the assumption of economic 
vulnerability. This tendency does not guarantee that 
consensus will automatically be found, but it does give a 
useful indication of how that consensus is achieved. 
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Moreover, it helps to understand that it is easier to find 
consensus in moments of economic ‘emergency’, when the 
versions of common sense will tend to overlap to a larger 
extent. I will show below the different angles through 
which the assumption of vulnerability has been 
internalised. It is precisely through shared common sense 
assumptions that ‘the international’ is internalised within 
‘the national’, and the dynamics of the world economy in 
turn condition (without determining) the dynamics of the 
Italian political economy.  
The assumption was that Italy could maintain 
international competitiveness by means of wage 
moderation. When inflation or wage increases threatened 
competitiveness and thus threatened to unsettle the balance 
of payments (or actually produced a deficit in the balance of 
payments) the strategies sought were to moderate wages or 
to devalue (thus effectively lowering real costs). This has 
been the means by which the Italian actors have interpreted 
the conditioning of the ‘international’. Crucially, when 
devaluation was no longer an option – or, when the Italian 
state class decided to tie its own hands by adhering to the 
EMS first, and then the much more stringent EMU – the 
strategy of real wage moderation and thus the assumption 
that real wages must be cut in order for the Italian economy 
to compete successfully in the new environment, came to 
the forefront. Within a monetary union such as EMU (the 
1990s can be seen as approaching the full monetary union), 
since devaluation is no longer an option, it are wages that 
have to adjust. Moreover, as the economist Bagnai shows, 
every time Italy has ‘rigidified’ its monetary policy by 
adhering to an European fixed or quasi-fixed regime, its 
exports have suffered and in turn productivity has 
decreased (Bagnai 2012). 
410   
This is not to argue, therefore, that wage moderation 
was the strategy pursued all the time. However, below I 
argue that in periods of ‘crisis’ (one must not lose sight of 
the fact that crises themselves are subjectively constructed –
see chapter 3) tend to generate a perception of ‘common’ 
problems to which ‘common’ solutions ought to be found. 
In this way, the assumption of economic vulnerability 
become stronger and the versions of common sense 
overlapped more smoothly.  Crucially, this perception of 
crisis tends to depoliticise the social relations that lie at the 
origin of capitalist crises, and – apart from generating a 
solution to the crisis that reproduces the same mechanism 
that created the crisis in the first place – makes the ‘material 
conditions for existence’ felt more strongly. In periods of 
economic crisis, high unemployment or more difficult 
economic circumstances re-activate elements of common 
sense that see in capitalist accumulation and valorisation 
the means to guarantee access to the means of subsistence 
and an acceptable standard of living for everyone, a form of 
thought that is rooted in the material dependence of the 
mass of the population on capital (once again, it is not 
merely an illusion, it is grounded in the materiality of social 
relations).  
The period of economic emergency at the end of the 
1970s was also characterised by the quest for common 
solution to economic problems, solutions that – as I have 
shown above – found their anchor in wage moderation 
with little or no compensation (see Paggi and d’Angelillo 
Ch. 1). Through an analysis of the interviews, I show that 
the same common sense assumption re-emerged in the 
early 1990s, when a collective perception of crisis 
developed. Thus, in moments of economic difficulty, ideas 
about how to ‘solve’ the crisis tend to revolve around the 
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assumption of economic vulnerability and hence the need to 
moderate wages. As the previous section has shown, the 
1993 pact and the following consensus, on which the path 
of ‘adjustment’ was based, was strongly skewed against the 
interests of labour. Clearly, other alternatives always 
materially exist but it is the very common sense 
assumptions about wage moderation that depoliticise 
economic relations and foreclose the possibility of 
attempting other ways of integrating the Italian economy 
into ‘the international’, let alone radically changing the 
path of economic development or social relations. These 
alternatives would – however – need to be grounded in 
different versions of common sense. While change is 
always possible the tendency is for forms of thought and 
common sense assumptions to reproduce themselves: as 
Marx argued, “men make their own history, but they do 
not make it as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances of their own choosing, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past” (Marx 1963: 15).  
In 1992-1993, what Ferrera and Gualmini call the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the state over the social partners 
was therefore not neutral, in the sense of attempting to find 
a common ground between capital and labour by 
privileging consent over conflict, but was the beginning of 
what can be called capital’s ‘moment of power’ in the 
Italian political economy, that has been in fact long-
standing and arguably continues up to our days. This can 
be seen in the continued trend towards wage moderation 
and labour’s acquiescence vis-à-vis the pension reform and 
the laws promoting the flexibisation of the labour market of 
1997.  
The chapter is divided in eight sections. The sections 
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represent the different recurrent themes identified in the 
analysis of the interview data. These nodal issues around 
which the chapter is structured are the findings of the 
research, and were arrived at thanks to a careful theoretical 
reading of the empirical material. In the first section, I 
analyse the issue of consensus and conflict in Italy from the 
actors’ perspective. The second section considers the 
internalisation of ‘the international’ into ‘the national’ and 
shows that the world economy has always been a reference 
point in discussion on the political economy by the Italian 
actors. The argument that economic vulnerability is the 
dominant common sense assumption is fleshed out. 
Moreover, it will be argued that consensus in the Italian 
political economy is strongly driven by the perception of 
‘economic emergency’. In the third section, I focus on how 
the idea of economic vulnerability couples with the idea of 
the need for an ‘external constraint’, and the effects of such 
a common sense assumption. The fourth section is devoted 
to an analysis of how common sense assumptions 
effectively depoliticise social relations and hence foreclose 
possible alternative routes.  The fifth section looks at the 
economic crisis of the early 1990s and analyses the 
collective perception of such a moment as an ‘emergency’ 
that must be dealt with by developing common solutions. 
The sixth and seventh sections focus respectively on an 
analysis of common sense on the 1993 pact and on the post-
1993 reforms (looking specifically at the issue of labour 
market reform). I conclude with a final section focusing on 
elements of the ideological transformation of the left 
emerging from the interview data.  
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Conflict and consensus in the Italian political 
economy 
 
In this section I analyse the interviewees’ common 
sense assumptions regarding the nature of consensus and 
conflict in Italian history. These historical influences shape 
political attitudes up to our days, as they form the basis 
upon which the actors’ form of thought are developed. The 
analysis of trasformismo in the previous chapter is crucial, as 
it provides a background for how the actors have analysed 
their situation and the possible strategies they could adopt.  
 In the previous chapter I have referred to Paggi’s 
historical analysis of Italian post-war development as 
characterised by a strategy of trasformismo, entailing the 
marginalisation of the working class from the possibility of 
attaining political power through a strategy of negative 
integration, a co-optation of different sectoral and 
corporatist interests into the DC regime, with the aim of 
preventing the development of a counter-hegemonic 
project. The way this strategy conditioned the left and the 
unions – it was argued – was through the internalisation of 
an essentially economic liberal culture whenever the 
problems of governing the country were dealt with and the 
possibility of forming government became more realistic. 
The interviewees, when talking about the history of the 
Italian state, often referred to the traditional weakness of 
the Italian state vis-à-vis ‘specific interests’, and the 
inability of the state to effectively program a strategic 
economic path based on coherent policies.  
As an introduction to this section, a few references to 
the interviews with the political scientist Vincent della Sala 
and the historian Leonardo Paggi are useful. As della Sala 
underlined, the Italian state pursued neither a Keynesian 
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route nor a (neo-)liberal one, but a mix that was strongly 
based on the need to maintain the consent of the DC social 
base in the petty bourgeoisie, as I also detailed above 
(interview with della Sala).  Leonardo Paggi, referring to 
the Italian state’s fiscal revenue deficit and the problem of 
tax evasion (see Ch. 4), argues that  
 
“the problem of tax evasion must be placed within a larger 
picture, it is a problem of the lack of legitimacy of the state, 
not a problem of the lack of control, it is something deeper. 
The Italian state is born weak. Everyone bargains and 
negotiates with it since the beginning”.  
 
Moreover, in tracing back the origins of the 
weakness of the Italian state, Paggi argues that it was the 
very foundations of the state that lied on precarious bases: 
 
“in fact, even the policies of fascism were not strong, they 
were policies of compromise and bargaining…the whole 
Christian-Democratic system of incorporation within the 
government of a large quantity of interests – corporatism – 
has its basis in fascism. These policies of kickbacks, 
corruption, corporatist management of society, was a 
fascist policy. Behind the rhetoric of the strong state and an 
aggressive foreign policy, there is in fact a big weakness. 
Mussolini does not even control the war economy. The 
Italian war economy is the only war economy that does not 
grow. This means that Mussolini does not control the 
direction of the economy, he doesn’t have the 
instruments”.  
 
Here, we should keep in mind what was said in the 
previous chapter, namely the exclusionary nature of the 
‘policies of compromise and bargaining’ pursued by both 
fascism and the DC. The interview with Cesaratto also 
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provided an interesting insight on the development of the 
Italian bourgeoisie, which must be interpreted keeping in 
mind the strategy of trasformismo: 
 
“there is this Italian bourgeoisie that is incapable of 
maturing. Beccaris99, fascism, the strategy of tension100, 
Berlusconi: the Italian bourgeoisie has answered in this 
way to any demand for change, systematically. In turn, it 
has also prevented a maturation of the left. On the left there 
is this oscillation between moderatism and extremism that 
is part of Italian history”. 
 
Both Romano Prodi and UIL♯1 used the proverb 
“Francia o Spagna purchè se magna”101 to describe the 
traditional stance of Italians towards ‘their’ state, when 
asked about the origins of the (supposed) problems of the 
Italian state,  Prodi added a telling description of the view 
of the Italian state: 
 
“looking back in history, from the Rinascimento onwards, 
we have always acted as if: Francia o Spagna purchè si magna. 
This is what makes me sad when I observe my country. A 
country that has such a proverb is a country in which daily,                                                         
99 Fiorenzo Beccaris was an Italian general that is famous for having guided the 
brutal repression of the Milan riots in 1898.  
100 The ‘strategy of tension’ is an interpretation of postwar Italian history that 
tends to see the terrorist episodes in the 1960s and 1970s as characterised by a 
political will to maintain social control and isolate the left.  
101 Literally, ‘France or Spain, the important thing is to eat’. The proverb wants 
to underline the attitude of indifference, distance and opportunism of the 
people towards the government and the people who govern. The important 
thing, for them, is to eat, thus to carry out with their lives, neglecting the 
problems of government and taking advantage of the government for their 
own personal interests. The original saying is by the 16th century writer and 
politician Francesco Guicciardini and refers to the fact that the people of the 
Italian municipalities and communes relied alternatively on one or the other 
great power in order to maintain a minimum of autonomy.  
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everyday life prevails over the future of the next 
generations, and I think that this is a fundamental fact 
about Italy: the refusal to program the future in a coherent 
way, with the necessary sacrifices, with the necessary 
restructuring and organisation”. 
 
Also PD♯2 is critical of the ‘disorganisation’ of the 
Italian state:  
 
“there has always been a strong inefficiency of the system. 
The ruling classes, and not only the political one, have 
never considered efficiency as one of the fundamental 
elements of justice. But this is a problem that is shared also 
by many forces of the left that consider efficiency as an 
incidental aspect, in any case as not essential in defining in 
terms of content the concept of equity”. 
 
The interviewee added that 
 
“I would like to say that on the role of the state in the 
economy there has been a convergence of common sense, 
of politically transversal sub-cultures. And also socially 
transversal, in terms of interests. Even Confindustria was 
in favour of a direct intervention in the economy, in the 
same way as the CGIL, the CISL and the UIL were in 
favour”. 
 
For a moment neglecting the position of distance 
that the latter interviewee expressed vis-à-vis the leftist 
tradition of origin (to which I shall return below when 
analysing the transformation of ‘common sense’ in the left), 
it is important to underline that very similar positions were 
expressed by practically all the interviewees. PDS♯1 
added that “the governments, starting from the late 1970s 
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until the early 1990s, have used debt as a way to achieve 
consensus”.  
 On the part of the representatives of the left, there 
seems to be an almost universal negative stance on the role 
of the state during the First Republic, identified with 
clientelistic spending for reasons of consensus formation. 
Speaking about the particularity of the Italian route within 
neoliberalism, PD♯3 remarked that 
 
“I think it is this sort of amoral familism and culture of the 
firm, which is a long-standing tradition in Italy. This sort of 
tolerance, at times even justification of evasion, this 
acceptance of a personal private logic in the relationship 
between the subjects in the economy and the 
administration of the State. So, there has been a twisting of 
the neoliberal paradigm, within a framework that tends to 
avoid the formal terrain because politics in Italy is not keen 
on explicit conflict or because there is this trend not to 
accept a brutal paradigm such as that of Thatcher, perhaps 
also due to our catholic background.” 
 
 Referring to the traditional ruling social bloc in Italy 
and the emergence of a ‘new right’, the interviewee added 
that 
 
 “the centre-right in Italy, the DC, could never have said 
that society does not exist. On the other hand there is a sort 
of do-it-yourself paradigm. The Berlusconi right signs a 
sort of pact with a whole series of categories: we will not 
do the reform, you do whatever you want…it has not been 
an innovation of Berlusconi. I think that the explosion of 
our public debt since the early 1980s reflects this attitude, a 
weak politics that is not able to reform and that builds 
bilateral pacts with a variety of subjects and makes the 
public pay, and then is forced to devalue”.  
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 The view of a weak, fragmented and ‘captured’ (by a 
series of corporative interests) state was the leitmotiv also of 
the interviews of the trade union representatives. Consider 
this fragment of the interview with CGIL♯1: 
 
“That is the nature of our bourgeoisie, Italy has been made 
by foreign forces. It is a fragmented bourgeoisie. The 
absence of an autonomous force of the labour movement in 
Italy leaves the field open to a bourgeoisie that doesn’t 
even do the operations that other countries were doing. For 
itself, naturally. For example the fact that large industry 
must be safeguarded, that rent should not be favoured and 
rewarded, unless like in Britain you think you can be the 
centre of finance in the world, but this you could never 
have thought in Italy…here there is a specific weakness of 
our bourgeoisie that is incapable of acting with an 
international ambition of power and supremacy”. 
 
 Below, the same interviewee argued that  
 
“In Italy one thing is particularly valid, that in the absence 
of a real strong and politically serious opposition by a 
labour movement that is not fragmented, you cannot 
achieve much. We have had a forced industrialisation at 
the end of the 19th century that is highly dependent on , for 
instance, Austrian and German capital – Falk…then you 
have the post-war years, and the bourgeoisie is unable to 
realise any relationship with the labour movement, they 
find no way out of it…and they create fascism.” 
 
A few elements – that will be given more space 
below – need to be highlighted in the analysis of these 
opinions. First of all, Italy’s weak position in the 
international, the perception of a ruling class that is unable 
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to effectively take the lead of the nation and organise it 
according to modern, efficient liberal principles. And thus 
the idea that there is a gulf between the way the 
bourgeoisie has acted in Italy and standard modern 
capitalist relations in other parts of Europe. Secondly, and 
linked to this, the idea, on the part of the representatives of 
labour, that you can have a true development of the 
country only if the working class effectively takes the lead, 
if the working class ‘becomes’ the state – as the PCI’s 
dominant interpretation of Gramsci’s thought held. 
Moreover, on the part of the representatives of the PDS-PD, 
one can see a longing for a truly liberal force in Italy. 
Interestingly, one may notice this even in the interview 
with the representative of the CGIL. So, we can see here 
aspects of the strategy of trasformismo, visible for instance in 
the liberal critique of the DC regime on the part of the PD 
representatives.  
According to the interviewees, Italy has been 
marked – in contrast to other European experiences – by a 
history of strong conflict in the post-war decades. There is a 
general view that there was little or no consensus over the 
direction that the country should take and over socio-
economic policy. According to the representative of 
Confindustria, the main reason why Italian political life 
and society was so marked by conflict is the fact that 
“liberal thought has always been the reference point of a 
minority”.  
As shown above, apart from the brief and temporary 
experiment at the end of the 1970s, relations between the 
social partners were characterised by conflict. The 1980s 
did witness a timid rapprochement between the unions, the 
employers’ organisation and the governments, but – 
crucially – the largest trade union confederation, the CGIL, 
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did not participate and refused to accept the two pacts of 
the mid-1980s that curtailed the wage-indexation 
mechanism (see above). This history of conflict was 
referred to by all the interviewees, without exception. The 
representative of Confindustria argued that 
 
“In contrast to the experience of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, 
today the small and medium enterprises are not 
prejudicially hostile towards the unions. Before there was 
an ideological conflict because the unions were ideological, 
now they are less ideological and so there is less conflict, 
notwithstanding rare cases of prejudice…Now the unions 
have brought back to the centre of their attention the 
question of productivity, of the firm as living organism of 
production, of profit but also of wages, of economic 
development but also of employment and development of 
the territory.” 
 
The vision (by the representative of Confindustria) 
of the trade unions is that of conflictual, ideological 
institutions that must change their culture in order to 
‘modernise’ themselves in a world of globalisation, 
although – as the previous quote suggests – he claims that 
the unions have already undertaken steps in this direction. 
 
“There is a role for the unions in our times but they have to 
go through a big ideological shift, in the sense that the 
unions could have an essential function in a globalised 
Italy…For example, not opposing foreign investment or 
outsourcing because these are useful for increasing 
employment in Italy. They should not be against it, in an 
ideological way…so, unions certainly have an important 
role to play but this role must be seen in the context of a 
globalised world and not in a world that ends at Italy’s 
frontiers.” 
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According to this interviewee, conflict in Italy is to 
be ascribed to the fact that there was a “strong 
communism”, and an ideological stance on the part of the 
unions. Interestingly, the very inefficiencies of the Italian 
state (particularly the welfare elements) often referred to by 
the interviewees and in particular by the representative of 
Confindustria, are explained by making reference precisely 
to the conflictual tradition of the relations among the social 
partners: 
 
“this enormity of Italian public debt in relation to other 
countries, has historically been useful as a social macro 
‘shock absorber’ in order to avoid strong conflict in a 
country that is strongly characterised by anti-capitalist and 
solidaristic ideologies. Conflict has been managed and 
tamed with public spending.”  
 
The representative of Confindustria, when asked 
why he claimed that industrial relations in Italy have been 
particularly marked by conflict, answered: 
 
“because of the strongest communist party in the West. 
Until 1976 the overtaking of the DC by the PCI was just 
around the corner. And so this contrast has been very 
strong, the Gladio affair and the struggle between the 
Soviet and American secret services have been real 
phenomena. This is very different from the German 
system, that is consensual, like their system of co-
management…There, there was less conflict because there 
was no antagonistic ideological interest, that derived from 
the fact of being the ‘transmission belt’ of the PCI or of the 
DC. All three of them (i.e. the unions, the PCI and the DC) 
bearers of anti-capitalist ideologies. The German unions are 
born and they co-manage immediately in a capitalist logic. 
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In Italy, the Marxist parties were and have remained in 
opposition until the 1990s”.  
 
 The idea of a society characterised by strong internal 
conflicts is quite clear, and emerged in all the interviews. 
The inefficiencies and deficiencies of the Italian state with 
regards to creating the conditions for capital accumulation 
is generally judged harshly, most markedly by the 
representative of Confindustria and of PD. Consider the 
following statement by PD♯3. 
 
“Devaluation and tax evasion have not been only or even 
predominantly a compensation for the deficiencies of our 
enterprises, but they have also been compensatory factors 
in a context that was less hospitable, less favourable to 
competitiveness than in other countries”.   
 
 Let us now turn to the opinions expressed by 
CGIL♯1. Specularly to the above quotes, consider these 
statement by CGIL♯1: 
 
“In second half of the 1970s they (i.e. the bourgeoisie) 
thought that by reducing the contractual power of the 
workers you could achieve growth…thus, when you are 
facing the turning point of the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s, there is no answer on the part of the 
bourgeoisie. They are only waiting for the moment to crush 
you…think about public welfare that is covered by the 
taxes on labour not by general taxation. In the South, in 
fact, the large operations have been done by the labour 
movement, all the factories that have been built in the 
South…they have all been made under pressure from the 
labour movement.” 
 
 The same interviewee argued that  
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“After we have done everything that was necessary to 
enter Europe in the 1990s, then one could say: now, let’s do 
the rest. No. At that point they have continued on the same 
road, that has brought us to this point, to a country that 
without being urged and stimulated by the social, 
autonomous and free presence of a general union of 
salaried workers, genetically follows other roads, moves 
towards rent, abandons projects of industrial research, and 
slavishly follows the general situation without adopting a 
role that can be critical and autonomous. And then you get 
to where we are now, with the inkling that with Monti the 
same thing is happening…you are recomposing in a decent 
way an internal situation in the direction of certain 
dynamics of development that in Italy are always 
translated in the same way: you attack the people that 
work, the workers!” 
 
 These two statements have been chosen  in order to 
underline the general common sense opinions expressed by 
the interviewees. Conflict in Italian history is seen as 
endemic and the positions of labour and capital as 
irreconcilable. Moreover, both CGIL♯1 and the 
representative of Confindustria blame the other (CGIL♯1 
blames the bourgeoisie and the representative of 
Confindustria blames labour) for the inefficiencies and 
supposed problems of development of the country. This 
perception of conflict as an inherent characteristic of the 
Italian political economy is very different from a more 
harmonious view of social relations, prevalent in countries 
such as Germany or the Netherlands. Moreover, both the 
representative of Confindustria and CGIL♯1 underline the 
lack of a liberal force in Italy. Above, I reported CGIL♯1’s 
opinion that the Italian bourgeoisie was unable to develop 
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a coherent capitalist project for itself and that, therefore, it 
was only under pressure from a strong labour movement 
that the country was able to implement successful projects 
of development. Otherwise – according to the interviewee – 
reflecting the ‘backward’ nature of the Italian bourgeoisie, 
capital has always sought to crush labour. Specularly, the 
representative of Confindustria lamented the fact that the 
dominant ideologies of the major parties in the post-war 
decades were anti-capitalist. As a further example of the 
view of the Italian state as marked by social turbulence and 
incoherent ad hoc initiatives to contain conflict, consider this 
statement by PD♯1: 
 
“This is a country in which demagogy reigns, where 
protest as an end in itself reigns…in the history of Italy you 
can find many episodes of inconclusive rebelliousness. In 
fact, we have never re-absorbed neither 1968 nor 1969, 
because then we have had 1977, terrorism. And these 
things then have an influence…in the labour movement 
there have always been radical positions of refusal. As a 
matter of fact this can be seen clearly because in other 
countries, social-democratic countries where there is a 
tradition of a reformist left, such as the Netherlands or the 
Nordic countries, there the reforms have been done by the 
socialist parties. And then they lost the elections, but then 
they got back into power. But there, there was a union that 
faced and accepted the economic constraints, and there was 
a political class that understood something about 
economics. Here, there is no comparison.” 
 
 When asked about the economic slow-down in the 
1970s, the same interviewee (PD♯1) answered that 
 
“what we have not been able to handle, what the Italian 
firms have not been able to handle, is the wage shock of the 
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early 1970s, plus radicalisation and terrorism. Factories 
were places of incubation for terrorism, there was that 
phenomenon that has been described as ‘worker opacity’. 
Workers were not terrorists but they were also not against. 
They knew that some of them were terrorists, but they 
protected them. Neither with the state nor with the Red 
Brigades…So, put yourself in the position of a manager or 
the owner of large industrial group with ten thousand poor 
guys inside the factory…the most obvious choice that they 
did in this context was that of closing down, decentralise, 
sell, move outside of the country, stop investing in the 
country. And so in Italy large industries have 
disappeared”. 
 
 Both excerpts are revealing. It is telling that the 
representative of the PD uses the pronoun ‘we’ to refer, 
essentially, to the firms’ position. Moreover, one can see 
here the strategy of trasformismo in a quite pure manner. 
The problems of the country are blamed on the labour 
movement’s claims, which are in a way even equated with 
terrorism. The class struggles of the 1970s and the 
conflictual decade of the 1970s are described in very stark 
terms, as if the problem was one of terrorism alone. 
Moreover, the labour movement’s claims are perceived as 
subversive, and the commonsensical reaction – according to 
the interviewee – was, by definition, the one adopted by 
capital, that – in a ‘technological fix’ vein (see ch.3) – 
decentralised production. So, there is a significant 
distancing from the labour movement’s position on the part 
of the interviewee. Also in the first quote, what is claimed 
is that the obstacle to ‘reform’ was the extremist tradition of 
the labour movement, with its ‘positions of refusal’, a 
stance that is contrasted with the ‘realist’ position of the 
unions in other countries, where they accepted “economic 
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constraints”. Other differences, such as the fact that in other 
countries the labour movement governed the country and 
was thus able to implement more vigorous redistributive 
welfare policies, are neglected.  
 To wrap up this section on the conflictual view of 
Italian history, I propose a further excerpt from the same 
interviewee. When asked about the reasons for the strong 
conflict in Italian post-war history, and the difference 
between Italy and other European experiences of ‘neo-
corporatist’ consensus, PD♯1 answers: 
 
“There was the bridge between the CGIL and the PCI. And 
the others (i.e. the DC) were with the USA. There was the 
cold war, which was the real problem in Italy. There was 
no political turnover, one had to do everything 
surreptitiously, creating confusion in the people, 
demagogy and populism…And then Italy is the only 
country where there were so many technical governments. 
In other countries there were large coalitions. Here, when 
you tried doing something like that, they killed Aldo Moro, 
and then Piazza Fontana, there were the secret services, 
there was terrorism…This is history. At the same time this 
country, in spite of everything, has carried on, even with 
vitality, but it has always been a half-country, in which 
something is missing. So, for instance, now (i.e. January 
2012) the unions have managed the results of this financial 
package, and there were no protests, no strikes, but they 
have done so because they were forced, they have done it 
reluctantly, and now they ask for some symbolic 
compensation, that a useless symbol such as article 18 (i.e. 
art.18 of the Workers’ Statute) remains, just to say: we exist. 
And the left is then very much influenced by this, and so 
everyone thinks he deserves something”. 
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 This is another extremely interesting passage. As 
also in the interview with PD♯2, the problem of a politics 
of ‘reform’ is seen as the resistance of organised labour. 
And this takes us to a crucial point of our analysis, that is 
revealed with clarity here: the problem of organised labour 
– from the standpoint of the main centre-left party – is that 
it wants something in return for concessions (on wage 
moderation, but also in its capability of social control vis-à-
vis the worker). Thus, what is hoped for is that labour 
renounces these kinds of demands and makes unilateral 
concessions.  
 The first part of this long quotation is also telling of 
the predicament of the left and how this was translated into 
‘common sense’. The Italian bourgeoisie and political 
centre-right is seen as adopting a tactic of constant 
exclusion of the opposition from government and refusal of 
compromise, utilising also violent means. The problem – 
for the interviewee – seems to be that the social opposition 
– the unions – constantly claim some compensation, 
whereas it should accept the objective ‘economic 
constraints’, something that in his opinion the social and 
political actors of the post-war decades have not done (see 
more on this issue below). Thus, according to this 
interviewee (and PD♯2, that holds the same view), the DC 
regime’s clientelism has had negative consequences on the 
unions, generating on the part of organised labour constant 
claims for some sort of particularistic benefit in a 
‘corporatist’ fashion. Here, the internalisation of a liberal 
critique of trasformismo is manifest. In fact, PD♯2 holds 
that ‘corporatism’ was the weak point of the whole 
concertative era of the 1990s. One must not forget the 
negative connotations that the very word ‘corporatism’ has 
in Italy, as it reminds of the fascist period. 
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However, as detailed in the previous chapter, there 
was an episode of consensus formation in recent Italian 
history, at the end of the 1970s. The unions, proclaiming the 
‘EUR’ line of wage moderation, accepted austerity policies 
obtaining little in return (see Paggi and d’Angelillo 1986 
ch.1). So, notwithstanding the strong conflict that marked 
Italian post-war development and the stark ideological 
differences that are described in the above quotations from 
the interviews, there was a brief but significant moment of 
consensus. Consensus was constructed also at the 
beginning of the 1990s when unions acquiesced to capital’s 
desire for wage moderation obtaining little compensation. 
My argument is that consensus tends to emerge most 
prominently in conditions of emergency, as I will argue 
below. A neo-Gramscian analysis is able to capture the 
‘common sense’ underpinnings of such a consensus by 
looking at how in moments of economic crisis or 
emergency, the different versions of common sense tend to 
overlap to a much greater degree, whereas in period of 
relative ‘smoothness’ of the political-economic situation, 
and lacking a call for strong measures and ‘sacrifices’, the 
different versions of common sense diverge more. 
In chapter 3 it was argued that a hegemonic project 
is based also on the need on the part of the leading social 
group to gain the consent of other social groups, in that 
way offering reasons for acquiescing to the hegemonic 
project. It can be argued that capital in Italy was willing to 
compromise with labour in periods of economic crisis or 
‘emergency’ (on the discursive nature of such moments of 
emergency, see below), whereas in other times the 
trasformismo strategy of exclusion and marginalisation 
tended to be pursued. Thus, one can see that what the 
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labour movement obtained when it effectively entered into 
such agreements were mostly symbolic concessions or 
agreements to include the unions into the formal decision-
making process of negotiation. This was in fact the main 
element that unions could point to as a compensation in the 
1993 pact, as the representatives of the unions confirmed in 
their interviews.  1993 can be seen as the ‘moment of 
capital’ in the Italian political economy, as it set in stone a 
series of elements that confirmed labour’s acquiescence to 
capital’s position and view on the direction that the Italian 
economy should follow. Unions were granted little more 
than a notional commitment to greater investment and an 
inclusion into the decision-making process (as well as the 
limited concession on second-level bargaining), in 
exchange for real concessions on not only wages, but also 
on pensions and the labour market. The unions were also 
co-opted into the pact as the goal of ‘entering Europe’ 
emerged as a shared objective across the political and social 
spectrum, thus signaling the emergence of a further 
element of ‘common sense’ (see below). The unions did in 
fact manage to extract some concessions from capital in the 
1993 deal and in the following reformist period, but overall 
real concession tended to flow from labour to capital, 
whereas symbolic concessions the other way around.  
Bruff, by referring to the interviews he himself 
conducted with the Dutch actors, argued that the tradition 
of consensualism in the Netherlands came to be understood 
as a set of arrangements in which no party is the ‘absolute 
loser’ from the bargaining process. Citing Becker (2001a: 29, 
cited in Bruff 2008: 95), he argues that “this means that ‘the 
dominant interpretation of the general interest’ is rendered 
the generally accepted opinion and, further, that this is 
presented by leading and subordinate groups as a joint 
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decision… Thus, the offering of concessions is 
asymmetrically spread across stronger and weaker 
groups”. I argue that this is the case also in Italy, albeit with 
an important modification. Italy, as I showed above, is not 
characterised by a tradition of consensualism. Consensus 
emerged – as an exception – only in moments of economic 
emergency, in which capital successfully incorporated 
labour into its hegemonic strategy. It was in these moments 
that the dominant interpretation of the general interest 
became accepted also by labour. Thus, one should add, in 
the case of Italy, an important element in the relationship 
between capital and labour: consensus formation in Italy is 
strongly driven by economic crisis. When asked about the 
reasons for the absence of a neocorporatist system in the 
Italian political economy, UIL♯1 answered: 
 
“It is a cultural issue. We are not predisposed to deciding 
serious things, the reforms that are valuable, that last and 
actually change society, in conditions of normality. When 
there is normality in management, we think about 
everything except doing the serious things. We are always 
urged and motivated to do something by need or by 
emergency”. 
 
Later, the same interviewee gave a more detailed 
description of the same concept, that also sheds light on the 
discursive construction of the kind of political exchange 
proposed in 1993: 
 
“We needed to transform ourselves from a people made of 
savers, but also a messy, unorganised people, into a 
virtuous country, which did not link the well-being of the 
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people, like with policies of assistenzialismo102, to public 
spending, but to a balanced system of public spending and 
a bet based on the enhancement of productive activity. It 
was an emergency, which means that it is situations of 
deep crisis that have forced us…Conditions of 
exceptionality produce choices, decisions, contrasts and 
consensus but this never happened in conditions of 
normality, always in exceptionality. Unfortunately it is like 
that, we are not made to reason effectively in the long 
period, we always reason in the short period, because 
Italian politics knows only short periods…We always work 
on short periods, which means that often we stumble upon 
emergencies.” 
 
Notice the use of the verb ‘forced’ to describe the 
pressure of the situation of emergency on the trade unions. 
Asked about the reasons for the weakening of the method 
of concertation starting from the late 1990s, UIL♯1 
answered that “the motivation of living in an emergency 
period ended, and when you don’t live in an emergency, 
also the external push for finding a solution to many 
problems is weakened”. So, emergency seems to be the 
catalyst of consensus, as it activates what the interviewee 
referred to as ‘external’ constraints that motivate the actors. 
Although more critical towards the stance adopted by the 
unions, also CGIL♯1 confirms that it is in times of crisis 
that consensus is more easily found (see below).  
The crisis of the 1990s will be considered below. For 
now, a few points are worth highlighting in the dominant 
interpretation emerging from the interviews. First of all, the 
understanding of the Italian ‘First Republic’ as marked by                                                         
102 This is an Italian word whose translation into English is quite problematic. 
Perhaps the best option is “dependency culture”, albeit one based on 
inefficiency and waste in welfare allocation.  
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waste and inefficiency (by a union leader), a feature that in 
itself must be linked to the strategy of trasformismo. 
Secondly – once again – an idea of the state as inherently 
incapable of programming in the long run. And thirdly, 
according to the views expressed by CGIL♯1‘s, the idea 
that it is only by incorporating labour into the decision-
making process that ‘serious’ decisions can be taken.  
 Before turning to an analysis of how the assumption 
of economic vulnerability shaped the common sense views 
of actors, I would like to review an aspect of the history of 
the unions and their ideology that has emerged in the 
interview with Leonardo Paggi. When talking about the 
asymmetrical exchange of the 1990s he argued that 
 
“In 1993 there is the idea of a sacrifice for the common 
good. The referendums of 1993 and 1995, this is a 
consensual stance. There is this idea, this ethos of the Italian 
popular classes. It was also linked to the ethics of the PCI, 
based on work, sacrifice and austerity. I remember the 
contempt with which the communist trade unionists talked 
about the French trade unionists: the ‘trade unions of the 
steak’.103 There was this sense of cultural superiority vis-à-
vis a vision of the union as an organ of wage bargaining.” 
 
This ideological element was in my opinion quite 
important, as it made the acceptance of a policy of wage 
restraint and austerity – paradoxically – easier.  
In the next section, I will argue that the shared 
assumption of economic vulnerability is the cornerstone of 
the different versions of common sense. I then consider the 
economic crisis of the early 1990s and the following reform                                                         
103 Literally: “il sindacato della bistecca”, meaning a trade union focused 
exclusively on increasing wages and on material returns for their struggles.  
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of the labour market. In this way, I also show how 
alternative routes for the Italian political economy, 
dependent as they are on alternative forms of thought and 
ideas about the world, were effectively precluded by the 
common sense assumptions that depoliticise social 
relations. An important part of these assumptions was that 
Italy’s weak position within the ‘international’ (both 
because of its dependence on the outside for raw materials, 
demand and for much-needed export earnings, as well as 
for its weak ‘constitution’ and ‘backward’ character rooted 
in its history) left the country with little choice about how 
to adapt to the world economy and to economic 
transformation.  
 
The assumption of economic vulnerability 
 
In this section, my aim is to show that the 
interviewees in their virtual totality considered Italy to be 
in a relatively weak position within the world economy. 
Italy is viewed as a country that has little choice in how to 
adapt to economic change, and thus experiences a constant 
economic vulnerability. Moreover, this economic 
vulnerability is seen as having increased significantly since 
the period of the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The assumption of vulnerability is strictly linked to the idea 
that in order to adjust, real wages need to be kept 
sufficiently low. 
This effective naturalisation and depoliticisation of 
the constraints can be explained by adopting a neo-
Gramscian framework. As argued above, people within a 
capitalist society are materially dependent for their own 
survival (access to the means of subsistence) on essentially 
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political and social relations that they contribute to 
producing and constantly reproducing. What does this 
mean? This means that their material bases for existence is 
dependent upon capital accumulation. It is through 
capitalist social relations that commodities embodying use 
values are created, and thus the constraints of capitalist 
social relations appear as the constraints of production per 
se, naturalising what are essentially political relations.  
Therefore, the way a national political economy is 
inserted into the capitalist world totality creates constraints 
on forms of thought, skewing them in the direction of 
capital’s rather than labour’s dependence on the market. 
The point, that is hopefully clear by now, is not that these 
constraints do not exist. They are real, in the sense that 
people within a capitalist national political economy are 
effectively dependent – in order to conserve their current 
condition – on maintaining a certain competitive balance 
with the rest of the world and on importing the needed raw 
materials. However, these forms of thought are ideological 
precisely because they are real, because they structure social 
relations within a given territory, social relations that are 
based on a fundamental power asymmetry between capital 
and labour.  
I have already referred to CGIL♯1’s idea that Italy’s 
industrialisation at the end of the 19th century was ‘forced’ 
and ‘highly dependent’ on foreign capital. This must be 
read against the background of a bourgeoisie that is seen as 
being incapable of delivering a liberal society and ‘national’ 
capitalist projects that are able to effectively modernise the 
country (see above). Italy’s insertion into capitalism was 
thus weak from the onset, and this gave the country a 
specific material basis for existence that was rooted in the 
‘international’. Consider for instance the dependence of the 
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country on foreign countries for both raw materials and 
energy provision (Italy does not produce nuclear power). 
Moreover, Italy’s economic strategy, as I have remarked 
extensively, is dependent on exports of relatively simple 
goods. That is, there is a relatively low level of technology 
in Italian products compared to other European countries. 
Italian economic development was also significantly based 
on the expansion of foreign demand more than on the 
development of internal demand. 
The intensification of European monetary 
integration has significantly enhanced the issue of the 
external constraint for the Italian economy. As monetary 
authorities could no longer devalue, the adjustment 
mechanism shifted to wages. This re-activated the long-
standing assumption of economic vulnerability of the 
country vis-à-vis ‘the international’.. The idea that Italy was 
in a weak position within the international has been 
heightened by the effective weakening of Italian capital, as 
capital valorisation slowed down and the ‘centre’ of the 
European economy created a permanent adjustment 
mechanism – also by a tougher internal disciplining of 
‘their’ working classes –  that tended to transfer costs upon 
peripheral countries (Brancaccio 2008; Bagnai 2010).  
In this section I argue that the world economy has 
been a constant reference point for Italian actors. In 
particular, the assumption of economic vulnerability has 
served as the common element for the different versions of 
common sense. I argue that this assumption of economic 
vulnerability is in itself grounded in the strategy of 
trasformismo and in the nature of the vincolo esterno and its 
political use (see ch.4). Both have been extensively 
discussed above. The idea was that real wages in Italy 
should not be allowed to rise significantly because this 
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would imperil the traditionally weak position of the 
country in the balance of payments, and generate a crisis. 
Consider the following excerpt from the interview with the 
economist Cesaratto. When asked about the nature of the 
exchange in the 1993 social pact, the economist answered 
that 
 
“There were no compensations…the unions internalised 
was the idea that higher real wages are incompatible with 
the Italian economy, that is an old incompatibility. There is 
no doubt that Italy has an external constraint. Ultimately, 
what is the real constraint to the increase in real wages? It 
is the external constraint. That is, the increase in real wages 
becomes increase in consumption and thus increase in 
aggregate demand. Italy clashes with the fact that imports 
increase. So, fundamentally, it is not that there is no 
constraint from this point of view…Now, there are clearly 
alternatives on how to face this constraint…But 
internalising this constraint without having an adequate 
proposal to overcome it, this is what the unions did.” 
 
He adds that 
 
“Valletta in 1947-1948 used to say: Italy can grow only 
inasmuch as exports grow. That is: real wages can grow 
inasmuch as exports allow. In Germany this trade surplus 
has become a kind of myth, which also constrains trade 
union attitudes. You ask for discipline in order to maintain 
a trade surplus. It becomes a sort of national goal, 
internalised also by the unions”.  
 
The first quotation goes to the heart of what I am 
arguing here. The assumption of economic vulnerability 
was accepted –  internalised – meaning that real wages 
could not rise above a certain level without the risk of 
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generating a crisis in the trade balance. This internalised 
common sense assumption, as Cesaratto also notes (more 
on this below) has effectively foreclosed alternative paths 
for the Italian economy.  
 The understanding of the Italian economy as being 
characterised by a history of vulnerability has often been 
referred to in the interviews. Moreover, what was often 
also remarked was that this vulnerability has become more 
pronounced in the last decades. Consider the following 
statements, the first one by PD♯1: 
 
“Without any kind of external constraint we would have 
become like Lebanon. By ourselves we would have been 
unable to do anything. We are dependent on the outside 
and very disorganised. We would have ended up like 
Greece. We have the same level of tax evasion, and 
moreover we have organised crime, that they don’t have. 
We are like that. So, I am completely in favour of a 
protectorate de facto, if also other countries in Europe do 
what they have to do”. 
 
 Asked about Italy’s dependence on the outside and 
the nature of the external constraint, UIL♯1 remarked that 
 
“I don’t know, without the external constraint we would 
have ended up like Argentina, in the best scenario. And 
without having the means of recovery that Argentina has, 
because we don’t have any natural resource except for 
cultural or archaeological goods, we have beaches, things 
like that. It is true in every country, but I think especially 
for Italy, that our only wealth is labour. Labour-force. 
Apart from that, we have nothing, we don’t have raw 
materials. And when I say that we would have ended up 
like Argentina in the best scenario, I mean that Argentina 
has lots of resources, a vast territory, large zootechnical 
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industries, it’s not a poor country”. 
 
 UIL♯1, as well as many other interviewees, argued 
that Italy missed the only chance it had to become stronger 
in the global economy by neglecting investments in 
innovation and technology. This is another aspect that is 
shared by all the interviewees. What has actually happened 
and will continue to happen unless Italy ‘changes course’ – 
according to the interviewee’s opinion – is depicted in quite 
stark terms by UIL♯1: 
 
“In an increasingly globalised market, what was needed 
and is needed is to find ways to valorise research and 
technological innovation, like the USA, Finland or 
Germany, or even Spain and France, otherwise in some 
time we will have to rely upon the German or Russian 
tourist that comes to Italy to spend money, because that 
will be the only remaining industry. So we don’t need 
scientists to understand these simple things. We have some 
niche products where we really constitute excellency, but 
they are niche products and they are only a part of the 
Italian economy. So we have become the periphery…We 
used to be at the cutting edge of nuclear technology and 
then it was abandoned. We have to live with the fact that, 
and I say it with bitterness but also with conviction and 
realism, that other countries are different. France, for 
instance is a real sistema paese104”.  
 
 The same interviewee also gives a description of 
what he considers the weakness of the Italian economy:                                                         
104 This expression is a general term that is held to mean all those elements that 
contribute to a country’s economic success. These elements are both material 
and immaterial, and can include for instance: the public administration, the 
state’s investment strategies, the role of the unions, the international strategic 
choices of the country, the education system, etc.  
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“the economic boom has had as its catalyst sectors such as 
construction, roads, highways and also the export sector, 
but essentially technologically weak sectors. We used to be 
the first European producer of  household appliances, but 
now not anymore. So, we are the sixth or seventh world 
economic power only if consider the quantity of the goods 
produced, for sure not their quality. Because in the high 
technology goods, including cars, we are very weak or non 
existent (…) Now we have some sectors of excellency, but 
we are running the risk that they will take also these 
sectors from us. At the times of the Borboni the saying went: 
Francia o Spagna purchè si magna” (see above). 
 
 There is here an assumption that Italy is weak in the 
global economy. This assumption is linked to the 
acceptance of the idea that there is little choice in how the 
country adapts. The fact that low wages have been the main 
adjustment mechanism is shared across the board. 
Consider the following quote from PDS♯1:  
 
“Natural resources have always been a problem. The weak 
point is that Italy could count on a system of small 
enterprises that were not always able to export on a large 
scale. (…) Most companies needed a comprehensive policy 
to help them with exports, and since the Italian big players 
are not many, it is inevitable that this role should have 
been played by public intervention. Otherwise, and it is 
precisely what happened, the big players became the large 
companies of other countries, with the Italian ones left to 
subcontracting”.  
 
The interviewee, moreover, argues that 
 
“Italian companies engaging in the competitive challenge 
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could not count on a sistema paese105, and therefore have 
compressed labour, with low salaries and precarity”  
 
The view that emerges here is that the state’s role favoured 
a punitive stance on labour. The interviewee’s opinion is 
that Italy’s weak position in ‘the international’ has been 
faced by adopting a strategy based on the “compression” of 
labour.  
Other interviewees were not as pessimist, as they 
underlined the still important role that the manufacturing 
sector has in Italy, but they also tended to present Italy’s 
economic situation as weak and deteriorating. CGIL♯1 
argued that 
 
“Italy still has a resource that others such as Spain don’t 
have, that is a significant manufacturing sector. In some 
respects better than France, but France has the big groups. 
This is the strength of Germany. What Italy has is the 
presence in manufacturing, it has a long history in this 
respect, you cannot invent it overnight…The real point of 
weakness is the lack of large groups. Since the late 1970s, 
maybe also due to the illusion that by compressing wage 
costs, the economy would have become better, we have 
completely lost the structure of the large groups. Now, the 
absence of large firms is dramatic, because the small firm 
may be good for some things, but if you don’t have large 
firms it’s a mess. The small firms in some respects have to 
comply with the orders of the large firms. So, Italy as a 
whole counts much less than in a certain phase of its 
history, even if it never really counted a lot”. 
 
Later, the interviewee added that 
                                                         
105 See above for an explanation of the expression sistema paese.  
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“we are already a periphery, now we run the risk of 
becoming periphery of the periphery…There are deep 
reasons that generate this situation of weakness, in a 
situation in which you are even more peripheral and 
marginal”. 
 
 PD♯1 also compared Italy’s strength in the 
international economy to other European countries. When 
asked about the Italian productive structure’s position in 
the world economy, he argued that 
 
“Vis-à-vis German or France there is no doubt that we are 
more vulnerable, because they have large firms. Vis-à-vis 
Spain not, because in Spain there is nothing.” 
 
Another view confirms on one side the negative opinion on 
the role of the state, and on the other Italy’s weakness in the 
international context. This is the opinion of PDS♯1: 
 
“The essential difference, in my opinion, is in being able to 
fare sistema106. Other countries with big groups are more 
able to decide on what to concentrate. Even a small country 
like Finland is a leader in the cellular phone sector. Italy 
risks to become a big supermarket in which you can buy 
everything, but it is produced by others”. 
 
 This general pessimism on Italy’s ability to succeed 
economically in the international context is shared across 
the board. An interesting point is the agreement of all the 
interviewees that Italy’s weak position in the international 
economy is due also to the predominance of small firms                                                         
106 This expression is similar to the one cited above (sistema paese) and refers to 
the ability to develop a coherent system of national economic management that 
promotes the strong points of a national economy adn attacks the weak points.  
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and the absence of large firms. Romano Prodi, in his 
interview, argued that Italy is “vulnerable in the sense that 
it has the problem of the size of the firms”. However, the 
interpretation of the causes of this increasing predominance 
of small firms, are different.  PD♯1 argues – as we saw 
above – that the switch to a model based on small firms 
was due to the conflict of the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
employers were forced – in a situation of radicalisation and 
“worker opacity” vis-à-vis terrorism in the factories – to 
decentralise production:  
 
“Put yourself in the position of a manager or the owner of a 
large industrial group with ten thousand poor guys inside 
the factory…the obvious choice that these people have 
made in this context was that of closing the factory. 
Decentralise, sell, move outside of the country and stop 
investing in Italy. And so the large industry has 
disappeared in Italy, the large industries that were 
potentially competitive. It started off with the chemical 
industry, steel, all the crises…until we reached this point, 
when we don’t have anything. And so it is there that the 
small firm was born, and the small firm was weak precisely 
because it was born in this way, from firing the workers, 
decentralisation, fragmentation, delocalisation, etc. And the 
small firms needed devaluation”. 
 
  So, here we can see that the transformation of the 
Italian economy towards a less competitive and weaker 
system based on small firms is held to be the result of the 
‘natural’ reaction of the employers to the radicalisation of 
the 1970s. CGIL♯1, in the excerpt that I cited above, 
attributes the responsibility of the lack of large firms to the 
bourgeoisie’s strategy of wage compression, which has 
incentivised the development of small firms.  Also the 
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representative of Confindustria argued that Italy’s position 
within the international economy is one of weakness and 
vulnerability. This signals that this was indeed an anchor 
for the different version of common sense. The 
representative of Confindustria argued that Italy is 
particularly vulnerable to the dynamics of the world 
economy because 
 
“it has many weaknesses. Its public finances are in 
disarray, it has a low level of organisation in the public 
system, its firms are on average smaller than other 
European partners, the property nature of the firms is 
familiar and not managerial…so Italy is really vulnerable 
and it is regressing. Although it has always been like that, 
globalisation in the last thirty years has swept away the 
small firms that have not focused on a hyper-specialised 
niche of the global market (…) and the small size of the 
firm is not suitable for a global market. The problem of 
competitiveness, this is and has been the problem of Italy, 
together with that of public debt”. 
 
Below I argue that this assumption of economic 
vulnerability went hand in hand with a positive idea of 
Europe as the virtuous force that is essential to mitigate the 
‘vicious’ attitudes that are seen as typical of Italy. For the 
moment, I would like to stress that in the interviews, there 
was a sense of inevitability in how Italy – as a relatively 
small, weak and ‘backward’ country – had to adapt to both 
economic change and the international economy. The 
economist Graziani gives a useful description of the issue 
of economic vulnerability and of the nature of the economic 
constraint of the country. Quoting him extensively: 
 
“The long path of industrialisation has been covered by the 
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Italian economy in the typical conditions both of a small 
country that is largely open to foreign exchanges and of a 
country that possesses an industry that – lacking 
technological autonomy – could not reach positions of 
authentic ‘vanguard’, notwithstanding a continuous 
updating. Like any small economy, also the Italian 
economy had to draw on foreign productive resources for 
its development. Which means that the growing flow of 
exports was necessary in order to face the need for imports. 
Lacking a highly developed industry, Italian exports had to 
impose themselves on the global markets relying more on 
price competitiveness than on product quality or 
innovation. The Italian industry and thus the Italian 
economy were therefore forced to pursue constant 
increases in labour productivity in the export industries 
avoiding at the same time excessive increases in wage 
levels” (Graziani 1992: 9).  
 
 Cesaratto, in his interview, also gives a telling 
description of the predicament of the Italian economy: 
 
“We are a country that is dependent on the outside for oil 
imports, we are dependent for many technologies, we are 
dependent for energy…even if Italian exports are not doing 
so bad, we constantly have to keep them up, otherwise 
they are insufficient”. 
 
 He adds that 
 
“The external constraint can explain a lot of things about 
the Italian economy…for example, the problem of energy 
dependency and thus energy saving is a primary 
problem…In spite of everything, it is clear that the external 
constraint is the main constraint that the country has”.   
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 The quest for economic growth and competitiveness 
in Italy was therefore generally based upon moderate 
labour costs, whose maintenance has been an important 
goal, although it has not always been achieved (consider 
the 1969 ‘hot autumn’ that generated a sudden hike in real 
wages). My argument is that within the Italian political 
economy, the goal of maintaining moderate labour costs 
can be justified by referring to the world economy as an 
external constraint. What I am arguing is that all the actors 
accept economic vulnerability as a ‘real fact’ that must be 
faced collectively, as an external constraint that is grounded 
in the country’s position in the global economy. Here one 
can see the internalisation of ‘the international’ into ‘the 
national’, as adapting to the world economy by moderating 
labour costs is seen as the crucial condition for Italian 
development. The excerpts below help to flesh out my 
argument, as they link the assumption of economic 
vulnerability to the need to maintain wage moderation. 
 UIL♯1, the interviewee that highlighted the risk of 
ending up like Argentina without a strong external 
constraint, later adds that: 
 
“What I am saying is that Europe, for its own virtues, and 
the Euro, for the cage that it built around our clothes (i.e. a 
straight-jacket), are the reasons why we did not end up like 
Argentina. It has forced us to adopt virtuous attitudes like 
for instance contain our instinct to conflict, chaos and 
chaotic spending and wage claims, and finally realise that 
we need to accept certain things about how a sistema paese 
works,107 in which we all accept that we have to sometimes 
contain our demands in order to compete, and then maybe 
redistribute on other levels”.                                                          
107 See above for an explanation of the meaning of the expression sistema paese.  
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 When asked what is the room of manoeuvre of 
unions in Italy in times of globalisation, the same 
interviewee – although he is referring here to 2012 –argued 
that 
 
“Unions can do very little, we cannot exaggerate with the 
wage push. The only thing that is allowed to the unions in 
this phase of globalisation is to verify the levels of 
employment, the amount of production that remains in 
Italy…but for example if an American or a French buys a 
company and then there is a crisis, the first structures that 
are eliminated are the ones abroad”.  
 
 Even if the interviewee is talking about the current 
situation, the general point is revealing. Specularly, the 
representative of Confindustria argued that 
 
“unions, as I said before, need a cultural shift. We all need 
to realise that even if of course we cannot become China or 
India, wages are dependent on how well the whole 
economy is doing, and they – the unions – need to realise 
this, and then we can build a competitive economy in the 
world. And yes, I believe that the fall of the Berlin wall and 
of the myth of the welfare state108, of the public economy, 
has been fundamental for the union inspired by Marxism, 
but this has included also the catholic union: once the 
alternative development model based on wages as an 
independent variable has fallen, also the catholic union 
realised that there can be no solidarity if there is no cake to 
share”. 
                                                         
108 Here, the expression that is used is not literally welfare state but stato 
assistenziale, that has a similar but perhaps slightly derogative meaning, 
pointing to the potential inefficiency and waste of state spending.  
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 The use of the verb ‘realise’ is interesting, as it 
signals that what the unions had to do was simply to 
become aware of a simple economic ‘fact’: that wages are 
dependent on the competitiveness of the economy and that 
they – the unions – cannot demand a certain level of wages 
‘independently’ of economic constraints. So, what can be 
seen in these quotes is that keeping wages moderate is a 
goal that is legitimated by invoking the constraints of the 
world economy. Let us cite a passage from the interview 
with PD♯1 that has also partly been referred to above. 
PD♯1 contrasts the experience of Italian unionism with 
that of the northern countries, arguing that in the former 
there has always been “radical positions of refusal”: 
 
“in other countries, social-democratic countries where 
there is a tradition of a reformist left, such as the 
Netherlands or the Nordic countries, there the reforms 
have been done by the socialist parties. And then they lost 
the elections, but then they got back into power. But there, 
there was a union that faced and accepted the economic 
constraints, and there was a political class that understood 
something about economics. Here, there is no comparison.” 
 
“…and in Germany…the unions and the employers sat on 
the same table and decided that wages would not grow 
anymore, that they would grow less than productivity (…) 
in exchange for this, the firms would not fire. And the 
German economic boom began (…) while here in Italy we 
have always had, even before the Euro, quite eccentric 
attitudes: we have had two, three, four contracts of the 
public sector employment. So if wages increased while 
there was a public deficit, revenues did not increase, and 
spending was excessive. And our competitiveness got 
worse, our balance of payments. So, there was no logical 
reason to increase wages.” 
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 Notice how the problem is considered to be the 
unions’ excessive wage claims, which in turn caused the 
country’s competitiveness to deteriorate. Above we also 
reported the following statement from PD♯1: 
 
“what we have not been able to handle, what the Italian 
firms have not been able to handle, is the wage shock of the 
early 1970s, plus the radicalisation and terrorism”. 
 
 So, the link between the common sense assumption 
of the economic vulnerability of the country within the 
world economy and the idea that the country needs to 
maintain low wages can be established. Representatives of 
the unions, the employers and the major centre-left party 
all agreed – albeit with different qualifications – that the 
wage push needed to be contained in order to maintain 
Italy’s competitiveness. Perhaps the only dissenting voice 
was that of CGIL♯1, that emphasised that the country’s 
position within the international was stronger in times of 
greater union strength. For instance, in the quote cited 
above, the interviewee argues that “the absence of an 
autonomous force of the labour movement in Italy leaves 
the field open to a bourgeoisie that doesn’t even do the 
operation that other countries were doing. For itself, 
naturally”.   
 The picture is that of a general consensus on the 
need to maintain relatively moderate wages in order to 
compete, even if this is shared differently across the social 
spectrum, with the interviewee from CGIL expressing some 
doubts on this strategy. Thus, the common sense anchor of 
economic vulnerability and hence the need to maintain low 
wages was not totally internalised by CGIL. Therefore, the 
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process of depoliticisation was not as strong in the CGIL’s 
common sense. Below we shall see how the CGIL 
representative himself described the 1993 deal and his own 
version of common sense regarding the wage moderation 
of the 1990s, which confirmed this.  
Above I have argued that the way the Italian 
strategy for competitiveness in the international economy 
was carried out was either through currency devaluation or 
its ‘functional equivalent’, wage moderation. However, it is 
important to underline that the pursuit of wage moderation 
was not always followed and not always adhered to. The 
assumption of economic vulnerability did not simply 
reproduce itself in the same way in the different historical 
moments. The pursuit of moderate labour costs manifested 
itself in different ways historically. This is because, 
ultimately, it is the pressure of the ‘material basis for 
existence’ that conditions the production and reproduction 
of common sense. Moreover, one should never lose sight 
that decisive political and social events, or new hegemonies 
or counter-hegemonies can always modify ideas and 
common sense, albeit taking as its starting point the already 
sedimented ideas. 
One can thus propose a more refined view of this 
argument: in moments of relative prosperity and economic 
growth, or in moments of intense class mobilisation, as the 
versions of common sense adhered to by the various social 
actors became increasingly different, there was more of a 
wage push and thus devaluation tended to be the dominant 
strategy (the early and mid-1970s). In these periods, wage 
moderation was not adhered to by all the actors in the 
political economy. This was the period of rising inflation in 
the Italian political economy (in fact, all European countries 
experienced high inflation, but Italy’s problems with price 
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rises was more acute). Inflation stemmed from both the oil 
crisis (a reminder of the country’s economic vulnerability) 
and from the wage rises in a period of harsh social conflict.  
The political economist Wolfgang Streeck argues 
that “inflation can be described as a monetary reflection of 
distributional conflict between a working class, demanding 
both employment security and a higher share in their 
country’s income, and a capitalist class striving to 
maximise the return on its capital. As the two sides act on 
mutually incompatible ideas of what is theirs by right, one 
emphasising the entitlements of citizenship and the other 
those of property and market power, inflation may also be 
considered an expression of anomie in a society which, for 
structural reasons, cannot agree on common criteria for 
social justice” (Streeck 2011: 11-12). So, a high level of 
inflation signals a lack of consensus within the political 
economy. This level of inflation was faced with repetitive 
rounds of devaluation all through the 1970s and 1980s 
(starting from the mid-1980s, however, devaluation did not 
keep pace with inflation, thus increasing the real exchange 
rate). For the purposes of this research,  devaluation and 
inflation can be seen as the counterpoint of wage 
moderation, the latter being – generally – the sign of a 
consensual approach between the social actors in the 
political economy.  
This adherence to the common sense idea that in 
order to adapt to the world economy, wages needed to be 
moderated, is to be understood in the context of the 
strategy of trasformismo. In the previous chapter, I have 
reported Paggi and d’Angelillo’s argument about the 
difference between the Italian experience and that of 
‘social-democratic’ compromises in other European 
countries. Whereas the logic of political exchange 
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dominated in the latter case, generating a situation of 
containment of wage pushes, low inflation, universalist 
welfare state and policies of full employment, in the Italian 
case the wage pressure has been stronger because there was 
a lack of compensation any time wage moderation was 
pursued, and because of a generally more hostile political 
and social climate with respect to organised labour. The 
wage push of the unions tended to be interpreted as in 
some way subversive also in sectors of the political left in 
the PCI. High inflation and devaluation were the ultimate 
result of this process, of this lack of consensus. As I argued 
above, starting from the 1980s and increasingly in the 1990s 
with the shift to EMU, this ‘model’ changed and there was 
more pressure on an adjustment based on wage 
moderation rather than one based on devaluation.  
In moments of economic difficulty, when the 
pressure of the balance of payments made itself felt more 
strongly, and/or when the Italian state class and capital 
adhered to more stringent European monetary parameters 
(the late 1970s, and the early 1990s), the strategy that was 
pursued tended to be wage moderation. The control of 
wages was deemed to be crucial for controlling possible 
disequilibria in the balance of payments. Crucially, in the 
early and mid-1990s, both were pursued at the same time, 
as the 1993 pact allowed for the sterilisation of the greater 
cost of imports due to the 1992-1993 devaluation. Cesaratto 
argues that 
 
“Italy is wrung between a 1970s model of inflation-
devaluation and the current strict monetary system model, 
a system in which we tie our own hands.”  
 
“There is no doubt that Italy has an external 
constraint…Ultimately, what is the real constraint for the 
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increase in real wages? It is the external constraint…So, 
evidently, the logic of the wage as an independent variable 
worked well when the Italian economy was growing, not 
later”. 
 
PD♯3 also gives a good description of this sui 
generis trade-off between devaluation and wage 
compression. He is talking here about what he considers to 
be the missing reforms of the 1990s, to which he attributes 
some responsibility also to the centre-left governments: 
 
“When the effects of the devaluations of the 1990s ended, 
there was a significant fall in wages, because those 
accompanying factors that have eased development were 
not there anymore, and the reforms were not made. We 
were able to enter into the Euro, we did some other 
reforms, for sure too little with respect to what we should 
have done and inevitably all of this hit labour. Clearly, now 
we are in a position in which it is evident that this spurious 
compensation, this devaluation of labour that happened in order 
to compensate for the devaluation of the currency, did not work. 
It’s not like we can become Serbia, not to say China”. 
 
 The interviewee explicitly recognises this alternative 
between devaluation and wage compression, and argues 
that wage moderation does not ‘work’, in the sense that it 
has deteriorated the conditions of labour to low standards. 
In fact, as has been detailed above, the strategy that was 
discursively proposed by Ciampi in the 1990s was to 
overcome this alternative by putting in place another 
strategy, based on investments in technology, education 
and innovation. This is what PD♯3 seems to support, even 
if he acknowledges the failure to enact the ‘reforms’ that 
would have made it possible.  
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 A similar trade-off is also described by UIL♯1:  
  
“In 1992-1993 the goal was to devalue for the last time, to 
have some breathing space, some room of manoeuvre 
because we have always travelled on the wavelength of 
inflation and devaluation. When one was missing we 
created the other so that our goods always had a market”. 
 
The same interviewee, in detailing the above view, 
also seems to envision a strategy based on higher 
investment and technological innovation, but recognises its 
failure. When asked why, according to him, Italy has 
tended to adopt the instrument to devaluation, UIL♯1 
answered that 
 
“because our productive system is made up of micro-firms 
or small firms (…) So, first, the size of our productive 
system…Second, also due to this first point, and due to the 
nature of our employers, that are reluctant on some things, 
if you do not invest on the quality of the product and on 
productive models, you can maintain a market only by 
reducing the cost of labour. Not being able to reduce to cost 
of labour, inflation and devaluation developed. That was 
the physical, credible alternative, to the scarcity of 
investments in processes and products of high technology. 
I would like to remind you about something that everyone 
has forgotten, that in the 1993 deal with Ciampi, the 
unions, and not the employers, asked and obtained that in 
the governments’ acts an increasing quota for investments 
was planned, up to the figure of 2.5% before a certain 
deadline. None of this naturally happened”. 
 
Here, the union representative acknowledges an 
important point of the asymmetry in the 1993 deal, to 
which I shall return below. What is also crucial to highlight 
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is that also the representative of the unions thinks that the 
alternative to devaluation was wage moderation. Also 
Romano Prodi, in his interview, was critical of the strategy 
of devaluation. He argued that 
 
“devaluation means condeming the economy to a low 
productive level, to being suppliers of low technology 
goods, with low quality, and neglecting productivity. So 
devaluation can give some room of maneouvre in the short 
run but it is a curse in the long run…there was the general 
awareness that competition was bound to become much 
harsher. Ultimately, any time there was a devaluation, 
everyone was happy, from Agnelli downwards. And the 
duty of a politician is to think in the long run and in the 
long run the country becomes rotten. And Italy was 
already characterised, long before the entrance into the 
Euro, by low cost production, something that I wanted to 
end, and in part this has worked, in part not…but I am 
profoundly convinced that a civilised country that wants to 
become modern, that wants to do research, innovation and 
modernisation of the firms, cannot go forward with 
devaluation, of this I am convinced”. 
 
Also in Prodi’s view, the alternative to the coupling 
of devaluation and inflation or wage moderation was a 
strategy of investment and upgrading of specialisation. 
PD♯1, in describing the nature of Italy’s predicament, 
being based on small firms, has also noted that these kind 
of firms are forced to compete with firms from emerging 
markets, and therefore are forced to reduce wages, but 
ultimately will fail – and are failing – as wages can never 
compete with Chinese ones. Devaluation, according to him, 
allowed these firms to survive, but he also argued that 
“what we needed was a long-term strategy”.  The 
representative of Confindustria, on the other hand, 
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attributes the responsibility for the strategy of devaluation 
on the strong social conflict in Italy. When asked why, in 
his view, Italian élites used devaluation so much, he 
answered that 
 
“Probably it was because Italy had to govern social conflict, 
in a country that was split between Catholics, a market 
economy and a state economy, with high 
unemployment…policies of state spending were useful in 
order to tame social conflict. Think about the hot autumn, 
the red brigades, high intellectual  unemployment. So, for 
example, the politics of hiring in the education system was 
an element in a strategy of taming conflict. It was also 
strongly supported by the ideological trade unions at the 
time. And so public spending has been useful as a social 
shock absorber…” 
 
 So, what the interviewee assumes is exactly what 
Streeck was arguing: inflation is a sign of the lack of 
consensus in a society, and devaluation offered a way out 
for capital.  
 The conclusion I draw from the interviews and the 
common sense assumptions that are expressed is that in the 
absence of a crisis or an emergency, the different versions 
of common sense tend to diverge, generating conflict. In 
this kind of situation, the material basis for existence are 
more taken for granted, and the perception of economic 
vulnerability is less felt, particularly by the weaker group, 
labour. So, the legitimacy of a policy of wage moderation, 
in a situation of relative economic well-being, weakens, as 
the power of the ‘objective’ nature of the external constraint 
diminishes. In moments of economic crisis or emergency, 
however, there is a stronger pressure on weaker actors to 
accept the ‘inevitable’, and thus there is greater overlap 
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between the different versions of common sense on the 
need to maintain wage moderation in order to adjust Italy – 
a country marked by economic vulnerability – to changing 
economic conditions. The range of ideas about the political 
economy narrows, as the discursive construction of the 
crisis creates the conditions for the strategies of wage 
moderation, the need for which is anchored in the long-
standing assumption of economic vulnerability. Common 
sense ‘sediments’ have thus accumulated on the state’s 
institutional terrain. In times of crisis, the reminder of the 
country’s weak position in the ‘international’ serves as an 
important element in the creation of consensus, because it 
depoliticises social relations to a larger degree. Clearly, this 
depoliticisation goes to the benefit of capital’s dominant 
version of common sense.  
 For instance, when PD♯1 and CGIL♯1 describe the 
situation in the 1970s (see above), one can see the 
divergence of the common sense assumption, and how 
capital reacted to labour’s increasing radicalisation. In 
times of crisis, however, the different versions of common 
sense tend to converge, as I will argue more in detail below 
looking at the crisis of the early 1990s. 
 
The ‘vincolo esterno’ and European integration 
 
 Let us recap the analytical argument so far. The 
insertion of the country into the ‘international’ capitalist 
totality was interpreted by the actors as characterised by a 
particular weakness: the absence of raw materials and 
natural goods, the need to maintain export levels, 
dependence on the foreign markets, low technological 
development and the fact that the country’s only resource 
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is its labour-force. This weakness was expressed in the 
assumption of economic vulnerability, which in turn was 
the reference point for arguing that the country can 
compete only by moderating wages. This assumption that 
low wages are the key for Italy’s economic success emerges 
in the foreground most markedly in times of economic 
crisis.  
 In this section, I will argue that the reference to 
Europe, as part of the reference to the ‘international’, has 
served as a crucial benchmark and point of reference for 
pushing through reforms and transformation within the 
country. Europe was interpreted by practically all the 
interviewees, albeit with different levels of intensity and 
enthusiasm, as the ‘best practice’ against which Italian 
‘modernisation’ was to be judged (the only interviewee 
expressing some reservations was CGIL♯1). The references 
to a ‘virtuous’ Europe and a ‘vicious’ Italy abound in the 
interviews. The assumption is that the country needs a 
virtuous ‘external constraint’ that would force it to adopt 
measures and policies that by itself it would be unable to 
carry out. ‘Europe’ is here a key reference point – what the 
post-structuralists would call a ‘master-signifier’ – that 
stands precisely for virtuous discipline. The understanding 
by the interviewees of the fragmented and disorganised 
nature of the Italian state – noted above –goes hand in hand 
with a view of Europe a ‘civilising force’ in Italy. Practically 
all the interviewees, underlined the positive influence that 
the idea of ‘Europe’, as well as the constraints (supposedly) 
imposed by European integration, had on Italian historical 
development. Moreover, Europe was seen as a 
‘modernising’ force in a country that had only partially 
entered modernity and needed to be ‘saved from the 
outside’ from its own ways of doing things and inherent 
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defects.  The dominant idea that Italy is still not a 
completely ‘modern’ country, and thus that it needs the 
external constraint in order to implement the necessary 
reforms is a crucial element in understanding the 
traditional pro-European stance of the Italians. The idea 
that is shared by many interviewees was that the only way 
to reform the country was by making a constant reference 
to ‘European’ standards and by internalising the European 
pressures.  
Above I have reported the reflections of UIL♯1 and 
PD♯1, who argued that without an ‘external constraint’ 
Italy would have become like Argentina (in the best 
scenario) or Lebanon, respectively. Clearly, such a scenario 
– that is, the absence of an external constraint – is a pure 
ideal, a myth, as the capitalist world totality develops 
internationally since its inception, and thus via the constant 
flow of capital through national borders, thus structurally 
developing ‘external constraints’ that are rooted in the 
capitalist mode of production. Capital, as described above, 
tends by preference to occupy the interconnections between 
separate political and legal jurisdictions since its genesis 
(an instance of its structural power). So, the interesting issue 
to delve into – and it is what I am attempting to do here – is 
not what the ‘external constraint’ is but what is does: that is, 
how the common sense assumptions about the external 
constraint actually affect the country’s social relations. The 
same argument goes for ‘Europe’: what is relevant is not 
what the term ‘Europe’ is or what it really means: what 
counts is what it does in the Italian political economy. The  
interview data reveals that the reference to Europe served 
to strengthen the common sense assumptions of economic 
vulnerability and wage restraint as the adjustment 
mechanism. The anchoring of the country’s development 
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and modernisation to an adherence to ‘European’ 
standards is another way of expressing Italy’s weak 
position in the ‘international’. Consider the stark language 
used by PD♯1: 
 
“I would be in favour of a de facto protectorate”. 
 
PD♯2, in describing the content of the 1997 reform 
of the labour market argues that 
 
“The European constraint has been, for the centre-left, an 
element that increased our strength and a point of 
reference. Our overall reference was certainly an idea of a 
European labour market…We have Europe as our 
benchmark, our yardstick. And we can see, having Europe 
as our yardstick, how imperfect, how limping, our system 
is, how problematic it is”. 
 
Speaking generally about the reforms of the 1990s, 
the same interviewee argued that 
 
“Europe has been crucial, Europe must be put in first place. 
Europe has been really decisive, and I think that the 
unique, grandiose, political result of the centre-left has 
been the entrance into the Euro. Because Europe has meant 
the saving of Italy, not only the fact that the different élites, 
us, the institutional élites, but also the economic élites, have 
come to terms with Europe, they have measured 
themselves against Europe and they have also changed 
their styles of production, their relationships. Europe has 
saved Italy in the sense that an Italian élite has committed 
itself, has invested on Europe, followed by the Italian 
people, perhaps unconsciously, but followed by the Italian 
people. Because the Italian people have given their consent. 
When we created the special Eurotax, we did not witness 
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mass revolts. We did a survey and we realised that 50.4% 
of Italians agreed. It was something extraordinary. We 
were asking them to pay more…we had the majority of the 
Italians with us”. 
 
“The phrase ‘transfer of sovereignty’ that the President of 
the Republic often repeats, was common language in the 
1990s within the centre-left”. 
 
 UIL♯1 describes the whole path of concertation as 
an effort to 
 
“reach the necessary parameters in order to access the first 
group of countries to enter into the common currency. But 
the whole process from 1992 onwards – the Maastricht 
treaty had just been signed – had as a final goal Europe. So, 
not only the problems and needs of Italy, but the goal, that 
was fundamental for us, of Europe”. 
 
Romano Prodi argued that the goal of EMU gained 
precedence over internal conflict within the country, 
during his period in government: 
 
“There was no distinction between Confindustria and the 
unions until the entrance into EMU.” 
 
Speaking about the reasons for the traditional strong 
pro-European sentiment of the Italians, the former Prime 
Minister remarked that 
 
“Among the six founding countries we were by far the 
poorest, and the one that was living the harshest political 
events, with a strong communism at home, and Europe has 
always been seen as something from which we could only 
benefit, and had nothing to lose. While in France, that is 
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full of past, Europe was something from which they could 
have something to win and something to lose. Germany 
was attempting to build its own industrial power. Italy had 
a scarcity of raw materials…Being married with the North 
of Europe that was richer than us was seen as a promotion 
without negative aspects. While remaining outside would 
have been a sign of isolation.” 
 
Consider also this third statement by Prodi, in which 
he explicitly links the process of modernisation in Italy 
with the creation of more intensive links with ‘Europe’, 
assuming that by itself Italy were not modern, and 
constantly needed an external anchor that would guide it: 
 
“The process of modernisation in Italy is indispensable…I 
think that the Euro is a strong and essential prod of which 
we are very in need. A devaluation would still give us 
room of manoeuvre in the short run, it would make us get 
out of emergency, but then it makes the country rot. (…) In 
this sense I see the Euro, in a long-term vision, as an 
indispensable fact, in order to give discipline to a country that 
really lacks it. And to force us to enter modernity in the long 
run.” 
 
PD♯3 also has a highly positive view of 'Europe'’s 
impact on Italy: 
 
“For us the foreign constraint has been a fundamental 
factor of modernisation, there is no doubt about it. ‘Doing 
like in Europe’ for us has always been the rallying cry that 
has coincided with a social, economic, cultural and civil 
progress and so, inevitably, the forces that are most 
conservative, that are afraid of change, have resisted”. 
 
He adds that 
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“Maastricht has represented an important stage, first of all 
because we did not have, historically, a culture of stability. 
We arrive at Maastricht, and exit from the European 
Monetary System in 1992, with an explosive debt. We spent 
12, 13% of GDP in interest, and so for us Maastricht has 
been that virtuous external constraint that allowed us to 
face with greater strength a whole series of obstacles”. 
 
UIL♯1 also has a similar view of Europe: 
 
“We constantly had to keep our system under control to 
enter Europe, because we have nothing to spare with other 
European countries, we are completely different.”  
 
 The interviewee argued that the church and the PCI, 
the strongest traditional institutions in Italy (according to 
him) were “against the European Union” – and for this he 
criticises them – because European integration was  
 
“contaminant, it introduced in Italy new customs and ways 
of doing and thinking, new freedoms. We should not forget 
that both the church and the PCI were the ones that wanted 
the ‘bombastic’ television, with didactic purposes…” 
 
 What is visible in these and other comments is the 
contrast between a typical Italian way of doing things and a 
more virtuous European way, which - so goes the 
argument - needs to imported. The only interviewees that 
expressed some reservations about European integration 
were CGIL♯1 and PDS♯1. It is useful to quote at length 
from the interview with CGIL♯1 because it gives a good 
picture of the kind of problems that the largest Italian 
union was facing in its relationship with Europe and the 
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restructuring of the Italian political economy. I would say 
that it also reveals, on the one side, a critical attitude 
towards European integration in the form that it has taken, 
but on the other, the lack of alternative paradigms or 
political projects that were available for the labour 
movement. Consider these reflections, prompted by a 
question on his idea of the phase of European integration 
that started with the Maastricht treaty: 
 
“In a first phase, all of the reforms that were done in Italy 
were justified by the fact that we had to remain inside and 
not go outside of Europe. To a certain extent, this was 
something around which the consensus was quite vast. 
This has made you lose sight of what kind of Europe was 
being built. Actually, it has made you consciously or 
unconsciously, but de facto, it has made you an accomplice 
in the building of a Europe that was becoming dangerous 
for workers’ rights in the country. When the problem 
emerged, you continued to move in the same way, so that 
was the moment of the break with the Prodi government.109 
There, all the blame was given to Bertinotti, which 
probably did not play his cards well. But a problem 
emerged: we did all that was necessary because we had to 
enter, but now it’s time to see the other things. But of 
course the other things did not come about and so that was 
when the crisis of the government emerged (…) The 
problem was real precisely because of the things I said 
before, the 1993 pact and so on. The real change did not 
happen. Then there was the D’Alema government, all of                                                         
109 In 1998, after Italy had been accepted among the first group of countries that 
would have adopted the Euro, the left-wing Partito della Rifondazione Comunista 
withdrew its support for the Prodi government, and thus the governing 
coalition lost its majority in Parliament. However, a new centre-left 
government was formed by PDS leader Massimo D’Alema with centrist 
elements in Parliament.  
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this of course must be understood in the context of a 
thought in the left that, not only in Italy, had become a 
thought that was all internal and apologetic towards the 
model that was being built in the world since the 1980s. 
The theorists were Blair, Clinton, D’Alema, it is enough to 
have a look at the Lisbon documents, it was all there”. 
 
 The weak position of the unions and of the left 
emerges clearly from this quote. The interviewee implies 
that, notwithstanding an awareness about “what kind of 
Europe was being built”, the left and CGIL were unable to 
both devise an alternative project (either at national or 
supranational level) or to condition the process of 
integration. “The problem was real” but no alternative was 
envisaged except passive resistance.  The interviewee’s 
opinion on the latest phase of European integration is quite 
critical:  
 
“There is no doubt, think about the enlargement to the East 
in the forms in which it was done. They thought about 
everything except building a European structure that 
would be a social one, with social rights and social 
freedoms. Take for instance the right to strike, if you 
analyse it you see that this right is different from country to 
country… In fact one can say that the right to strike is 
present in full form only in Italy and France…so you have 
built this Europe, perhaps also in good faith, like Delors, 
and all that milieu, that wanted flexsecurity in the whole of 
Europe, steps forward with social Europe, and then the rest 
will follow. We’ll become competitive with the Chinese 
and the Indians etc. But this was all external to the change 
in the relations of force within the workplaces. And from 
there it was all free room of manoeuvre to the firm, 
monetary policies and financial power”. 
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He adds that 
 
“all in all, European integration has not had any relation 
with worker subjectivity, that has remained substantially 
excluded, and has simply become a force to be used by 
those that have built Europe according to paradigms that 
did not recognise that there was a different subjectivity in 
the field”. 
 
 According to the same interviewee, moreover, the 
process of European integration has had negative effects on 
union organising: 
 
“The unions are historically born and have developed 
within national bases. And what was won, it was referred 
to the fact that there was a national context in which 
different solutions were found...the welfare state, all of this 
was inside a national monetary control. From the moment 
in which processes like European integration have 
modified this framework, this relatively closed world has 
opened up. At this moment, finance started to move. The 
unions were not able any longer to get out of this national 
‘cage’ and have continued to have a kind of 
understandable attitude, because it’s not simple, because 
the design of Europe does not emerge from the world of 
labour...the national framework was the one in which the 
unions remained closed, so (…), there is little solidarity, 
because everyone thinks that what one can do to have 
strength as a union it can be done at a national level. Now, 
if that opens up you don’t know how to act”. 
 
What emerges is a quite pessimistic view of the kind 
of change of the last 25 years. What is interesting is the lack 
of any credible alternative that can be read between the 
lines. The trajectory that was followed by the Italian 
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political econnomy in Europe is described in quite stark 
terms: the neglect of the workers’ subjectivity, the absence 
of guarantees for social rights, union weakening and a “free 
hand” to capital. On the other hand, CGIL – the trade union 
the interviewee belongs to – participated in the consensus 
around the need to ‘enter Europe’. Thus, while a posteriori 
the interviewee is critical of the path followed, at the 
moment alternatives were effectively foreclosed by the 
dominant common sense assumptions. As will be detailed 
in the next section, this process of depoliticisation and 
foreclosure of alternatives is precisely one of the effects of 
common sense as such. 
PDS♯1, coming from the left-wing of the PDS in the 
1990s, argued that  
 
“the external constraint, including the European one, has 
been always used as a weapon for pressure towards the 
country, beginning from Amato’s setting of the issue in 
1992. After all, Amato talked about it openly. Personally, I 
have always thought that this stance was wrong. Of course, 
it was more comfortable to give responsibility for one’s 
choices to someone else”.  
 
 To sum up this small section on Europe, it can be 
argued that the ‘anchor of Europe’ was a shared common 
sense assumption among all the interviewees except 
CGIL♯1, that, however, acknowledged that the process of 
European integration and monetary union had a wide 
following and that there was consensus around it. I would 
argue that references to a virtuous Europe (vis-à-vis a 
‘vicious’ Italy) form part of the assumption of economic 
vulnerability. This assumption in turn generated the idea 
that Italy had to be saved from itself, from its own ways of 
organising society (ultimately, production). Once again, 
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these assumptions are better understood if placed in the 
context of a strategy of trasformismo. The idea of a virtuous 
Europe becomes an important anchor for the centre-left 
forces that seek to modify the traditional channels of 
political support that were built during the DC regime. On 
the other hand, such a vision assumes an essentially liberal 
understanding of social relations and the role of the state.  
 
Common sense and the foreclosure of alternatives 
 
 As argued in chapter 3, one of the ways in which 
common sense functions is by foreclosing alternative 
projects grounded in alternative routes of socio-economic 
development, let alone different ways of organising 
production. This is done by overshadowing alternative 
forms of thought that go hand in hand with transformed 
social relations and ways of organising society: all 
knowledge is here understood as an aspect of social 
practice. Common sense effectively naturalises social 
relations by turning them into economic ‘facts’ that 
reproduce themselves quasi-objectively. The depoliticised 
idea is that there is little choice in how a country like Italy 
adapts to the world economy and to socio-economic 
change. What is internalised is a certain inevitability in how 
to adapt: one may not like it, or necessarily consent to it, 
but this is just ‘how things are’. This depoliticised idea is 
shared across the political spectrum, as hopefully this 
chapter makes clear.  Above, it was shown how even a 
critical stance of the trajectory of the political economy 
becomes politically powerless if it is not linked with an 
alternative vision. It may thus generate passive 
acquiescence in the place of active consent, unless the 
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organic intellectuals of the social force actually envision an 
alternative political programme.  
 Consider these reflections by the economist 
Cesaratto on the nature of the external constraint that 
conditions the Italian economy (the first part has been cited 
above): 
 
“There is no doubt that Italy has an external 
constraint…Ultimately, what is the real constraint for the 
increase in reale wages? It is the external constraint. That is, 
the increase in real wages becomes increase in 
consumption and thus increase in aggregate demand. Italy 
clashes with the fact that imports increase. So, 
fundamentally, it is not that there is no constraint from this 
point of view. Now, this constraint could be attacked in 
two ways. On the on hand, Italy could try to fight for 
coordinated expansive policies at the European level. If we 
all expand, the constraint becomes looser for everyone.  On 
the other hand, Italy could implement industrial policies 
aimed at strengthening the supply side in Italy and so 
making Italy technologically, and also from the energetic 
point of view, less dependent on the outside. Ultimately, 
the awareness of these problems makes the unions say: we 
cannot really do much. On the other hand, there is the 
awareness of the problem but there is no awareness, on the 
part of the unions, of the left, of the possible solutions, that 
naturally are not easy”. 
  
In the interviews, as a consequence of the perception 
of inevitability in how to adapt to economic change, there 
was also an idea that certain attitudes were rational and 
efficient, as they represented the only logical, natural way 
that Italy had to follow. Alternative routes were considered 
to be short-sighted and irrational, as they reflected specific, 
sectoral interests that might be able to ‘capture’ the state 
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apparatus but are seen as not reflecting the ‘general 
interest’. Reflecting what was perceived as the country’s 
long-standing inability to program in the long-run, many 
interviewees judged that virtuous exceptions were 
attempted mostly in times of emergency, hence the need for 
an external ‘anchor’ to maintain discipline. 
Virtually all the interviewees underlined the 
inevitability of ‘sacrifices’ in the early 1990s, and thus the 
legitimacy of a policy of wage moderation per se, as this 
was perceived to be the only rational reaction vis-à-vis 
economic ‘facts’, an external ‘reality’ that was seen as 
unmodifable. There are, however, a few partial exceptions. 
PD♯3, as I will show also in the next section, in 
recognising the asymmetrical nature of the pact, also points 
out that an alternative route could have been taken: 
 
“The 1993 pact is a tripartite pact in which – now everyone 
forgets about it because 20 years have passed and nobody 
wants to remember – the unions accept an extraordinary 
wage moderation, that manages to substantially sterilise 
the inflationary impact of a devaluation of 35-40%. In 
exchange, I remember Ciampi’s insistence on investments 
on the part of the firms. Ciampi was very disappointed 
during his period at the Ministry of the Economy because 
he expected that in the face of this dramatic wage 
moderation – real wages either remained constant or lost 
purchasing power in real terms – he was expecting an 
entrepreneurial reaction towards investments, but this 
second part of the pact was not very present”. 
 
Asked about what the ‘missing reforms’ of the 1990s, 
to which the interview was referring to, PD♯3 remarked 
that 
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“unfortunately we did not do some of the reforms, we 
should have done a reform of the fiscal system, because 
there is no doubt that there is a too heavy fiscal load on 
labour incomes and firm incomes, I mean the formal taxes. 
We should have done a significant reform of the public 
administration, we should have modernised our 
infrastructural system…we should have built an energy 
policy, an industrial policy, because other countries have 
carried out an industrial policy (…) In Italy all of this was 
missing. So in the end you pay for these delays. We spent 
15 years discussing about the labour market as if it’s the 
decisive variable while it is substantially irrelevant as is 
evident”. 
 
There is here a quite critical attitude vis-à-vis the 
trajectory of the Italian political economy in the 1990s that 
must be taken into account. In this quotation, there seems 
to be the idea of a different possible route: the interviewee 
recognises the missed change to implement a possible 
alternative, based on higher investment on the part of the 
firms and on a different economic policy on the part of the 
governments. Also UIL♯1 had in mind a slightly different 
trajectory, as he highlighted in the excerpt cited above, in 
which the interviewee underlined that it was the unions 
who insisted in including in the pact a clause stating that 
investments in technology and innovation should rise to 
2.5% before a certain date. However, both interviewees 
recognise that none of this actually happened. The 
interesting aspect is that – as the section below details – 
notwithstanding these shortcomings, the pact was 
described as an example of how a country like Italy could 
find consensus on economic policy. So, the asymmetry of 
the deal is acknowledged but this does not prevent the 
interviewees from having a positive view of the consensus, 
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overall. The exception to this consensus on a positive view 
of the 1993 pact – despite a not complete consensus on the 
symmetrical nature of the exchange – is CGIL♯1’s position, 
as noted above.  
The next section looks at the impact of the crisis of 
the early 1990s on the Italian political economy. It will be 
argued that the common sense assumption of economic 
vulnerability - and ‘hence’ the need to moderate wages – 
was strengthened because of the moment of emergency the 
country was going through. So, the range covered by the 
various versions of common sense narrowed and the 
conditions for capital’s ‘moment of power’ emerged.  
 
Crisis in the Italian political economy 
 
In chapter 3, I have argued that the idea of crisis-as-
narrative theorised by Hay can be incorporated within a 
neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective. The basic argument 
was that the state (conceived as the Gramscian integral state) 
and therefore the social forces that constitute the state’s 
social purpose, has the power not only to respond to crises, 
but to identify and define what constitutes a crisis in the 
first place. As the subject-object dichotomy was refused 
epistemologically, it does not make sense to argue that 
crises exist merely objectively. Crisis is a discourse that is, 
however, always to be linked to the material reality and 
humans’ needs for means of subsistence.  
The picture that emerges in the perceptions of the 
situation of the country in the early 1990s by both the 
interviewees and public opinion is one of an economy 
characterised by recession, high unemployment and 
speculative attacks. In addition, there was a perception of 
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political crisis: the Tangentopoli scandals were decimating 
the traditional political parties, and new political forces 
were emerging: the socialist left and the DC rapidly 
crumbled, the communist left was changing its ideology 
and positions, and the centre-right was going through a 
process of deep transformation with the emergence of 
Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia.110 
The political field was opened for new articulations 
of elements left behind from the First Republic. ‘Europe’ 
seemed suddenly further away, but at the same time its 
‘disciplining’ power was strongly evoked as an absolute 
necessity of the country. There was a sense that Europe 
would save Italy from chaos, a perception that was strongly 
felt in the progressive camp. The political scientist Della 
Sala argued that 
 
“there was a political, economic and union élite that was 
strongly pro-European…they said: everything is changing, 
there is a European social model, the Italian model is more 
or less part of it. It’s unclear what this European social 
model is but we’re in. And so, we must do all that is 
necessary in order to remain inside. There is a moment of                                                         
110 Perhaps it was not a chance that the political and economic ‘crises’ 
intertwined in this key moment: the economic historian Michelini argues that 
“it is not hasty to hypothesize that it were mainly the external constraints and 
conjunctures – the fall of the USSR, NATO, the globalisation of the financial 
markets, with the attack on single currencies independently of the fundamentals – 
that allowed Italy to avoid that the ‘Clean Hands’ revolution would have 
transformed into what the dominant classes would have defined as a social 
revolution, that Antonio Di Pietro would become the new Robespierre or 
Buonarroti, that the PCI (if it had not lost its cultural and strategic identity) 
would become the anchor for a process of deep and original social 
transformation, thanks also to the implosion of those small parties that have 
made the relationship between the state and the market an instrument of 
consolidation of the capitalism of the big families, and of criminal complicities 
and political rent” (Michelini 2008: 60-61, italics in the original).  
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void in Italian politics in 1992-1993 because already in 1995 
things change. The entrance of Berlusconi on the one side 
fills a void and on the other side is useful for consolidating 
the centre-left, to give them a sense, a reason for existence. 
But in 1992-1993 there was that void, the crisis of 1992 was 
a moment of panic. And this has given a lot of space, 
maybe more than usual or expected, to actors that were 
outside of formal politics, like the social partners. 
 
Della Sala describes discourse that emerged at this point to 
attempt to fill this ‘void’: 
 
 “You can see that there were two important narratives at 
that point. There is Europe, the future will be European 
and Italy must be a part of it.   And the other narrative was: 
in this moment that is so crucial for Europe we have this 
political void because the two political forces that have 
defined us are not there anymore. What shall we do? And I 
think that the pacts, not only that of 1993, but also the 1992 
budget law of Amato, these were moments in which 
everyone was amazed, flabbergasted. They said: we are 
willing to accept anything, a bit like what happened in 
December 2011”. 
 
This description gives a good idea of the crisis 
awareness of the early 1990s. As the interviews show, the 
‘void’ Della Sala refers to has been filled, on the centre-left, 
by references to a virtuous Europe that ‘we’ should not 
abandon. This discourse of the positive influence that 
‘Europe’ can have on Italy emerged and consolidated in 
this moment of ‘crisis’, in which the social partners were 
“willing to accept anything”. The tough austerity measures 
of the Amato, Ciampi and Prodi governments, as well as 
the 1993 pact and the tough wage moderation that followed 
it, were all presented as the only way to ‘fix’ the problems 
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that the country had always been unwilling to face. The 
discourse presented a country that had until then lived in 
denial, accumulating public debt and using devaluation as 
an easy adjustment mechanism.  The measures and policies 
carried out in the course of the 1990s (see ch.5) were all 
proposed and accepted as the ‘solution’ to a ‘crisis’, as 
virtuous acts that would make ‘us’ ‘Europeans’, thus more 
modern. The newly acquired legitimacy and responsibility 
of the trade unions were but a subsequent step after they 
had ‘responsibly’ accepted that ‘things had to change’ and 
that ‘sacrifices’ are needed. Thus, as the interview data 
shows, once unions had acquiesced to capital’s common 
sense, they were partly incorporated into the decision-
making process with the 1993 deal.  
On the other hand, this awareness must be linked 
with the historical internalisation of the ‘international’ into 
national forms of common sense, discussed above. The 
assumption of vulnerability found new confirmation in the 
perception of the difficult economic situation of the 
country. In 1993, there was a decrease in national GDP that 
was more than twice the European average. All of this 
created a situation of ‘emergency’ that narrowed the scope 
and diversity of the different versions of common sense. In 
this way, a consensus was created, albeit one skewed 
towards capital’s version of common sense. Interestingly, 
and in line with Hay’s remarks about the discursive 
creation of crisis awareness, the unemployment rate 
significantly increased after 1993, overcoming 10% in 1995 
and then reaching 11% by 1997 (EP task force 1998: 13). 
This was a consequence also of the deflationary measures 
implemented – with the consent of the unions – in view of 
the entrance in the Eurozone. So, lacking a political and 
social force that constructed a political project out of this 
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worsening of the economic situation in the mid-1990s, the 
perception of crisis waned as the country resumed from the 
speculation on the national currency and regained 
moderate growth thanks to a surge of exports, itself the 
effect of devaluation. Significantly, crisis awareness 
decreased in parallel with an improvement in the balance 
of payments starting from 1993. The latter remained in 
surplus from that year until the end of the decade 
(Brancaccio 2008: 3).  
The interviews show that there was a desire to deal 
with the ‘crisis’ in a collective manner. Here, I would like to 
recall the notion of ‘impending catastrophe’ discussed in 
chapter 3. The idea is that conflict resolution is based on 
general perceptions of an intolerable situation in case of 
lack of agreement. A moment that is ‘ripe for resolution’ is 
thus associated with a ‘precipice’: the perception that the 
situation is rapidly bound to get worse if an agreement is 
not reached. This moment of ‘impending catastrophe’ 
provides a “deadline or a lesson that pain can be sharply 
increased if something is not done about it now” (Zartman 
2002: 228). The discursive creation of the impending 
catastrophe that was (supposedly) awaiting the country if 
the necessary measures were not adopted was a 
fundamental element that produced consensus, as the 
following excerpts reveal. Thus, the narrative of impending 
catastrophe provided a deadline within which agreement 
needed to be reached, and the political authorities – 
particularly Amato and Ciampi – heavily insisted on the 
absolute necessity of consensus, otherwise the country – 
‘us’ – would face dire consequences.  
UIL♯1, asked about the reasons of the consensus of 
the early 1990s, remarked that 
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“First of all, there was the emergency of the early 1990s, 
and then there was the goal of keeping the system under 
control in order to enter in Europe…it is in times of 
emergency, in situations of deep crisis, it is these situations that 
have forced us to accept certain things. No union would have 
ever dreamt of facing so unashamedly the period that we 
faced from 1992 onwards, moving from the labour laws to 
pension, to laws on public employment…Amato, when he 
was appointed to form the government in May 1992, 
decided to meet me – we were friends - , to meet me 
informally. There were four people, me, D’Antoni (the 
leader of CISL), Del Turco (the leader of the socialist faction of 
CGIL) and Trentin (the leader of CGIL), and he told us: if Italy 
were a private company, at this point we would have been forced 
to declare bankruptcy. This has really impressed me. What he 
said was that we were running the risk of not being able to 
pay wages…a state like Italy that runs the risk of not 
paying wages, which is crazy. It could not go bankrupt 
because it is a state, but even in that case it was an 
emergency, always an emergency, when we decide serious 
things”. 
 
This quotation expresses in a clear way what the 
perception of crisis entailed. The discourse, insisting on the 
dramatic consequences of the absence of agreement and of 
the possible conflictual stance of the social partners, 
provided the background for the necessity of consensus. 
Later, the same interviewee argued that 
 
“the whole trajectory from 1992 onwards – the Maastricht 
treaty had just been signed – has as a final goal 
Europe…And so all of this, with a method that was not 
always spectacular, but that worked because it was based 
on the principle of a diversity of roles – firms, government 
and unions – but the common responsibility regarding the 
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future of the azienda Italia.111 That is, the unions – in those 
circumstances, from 1992 to 1997 – were attributed a role of 
substitute, of a national responsibility, that was not present 
before. Mostly in the years 1992, 1993, the unions, UIL, 
CGIL and CISL, have been the government’s majority, 
because the political situation was so decayed…we 
shouldn’t forget that in 1992 Tangentopoli began, and the 
parties were at their lowest point. In 1994 there were the 
elections, when there were none of old parties. While 
CGIL, CISL and UIL were in the squares and in 1994 we 
did the largest labour demonstration that has ever been 
made in Italy” 
 
“Concertation has developed essentially on a common basis, 
that was planned inflation”. 
 
Consider also the following quotation from Trentin: 
 
“Reasoning with good sense one can say that in a situation 
that was very close to catastrophe, the social partners, with 
the decisive consensus of the government, have decided to 
face that terrible phase with new rules…The alternative 
would have been a declaration of tribal war” (cited in Mania 
and Orioli 1993: 156). 
 
Nesi also pointed to the situation of emergency 
faced by the country: 
 
“So suddenly we realised that the system had become 
unsustainable, it was getting out of hands, and there were 
elements who wanted a complete break with any kind of 
social dialogue, on the right. And so suddenly the unions, the 
majority of Confindustria, the people around Amato, Ciampi and 
even the PDS, they realised that there was a common problem,                                                         
111 The term used by the interviewee can be translated with ‘company Italy’.   
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we need to get the country going, get in Europe and make the 
system workable”. 
 
The representative of Confindustria stated that 
 
“That was the moment we realised something had to be done, the 
firms could not live with this wage indexation mechanism, 
the country needed to find new ways of adapting, become 
competitive, and we could not lose the train of Europe, stay 
outside. The unions were also becoming less ideological and they 
understood this, not everyone, but there was this feeling of 
national unity, we needed to save the country”. 
 
 The perception of 1992-1993 as a moment of crisis 
and emergency is shared by all the interviewees. Crisis, in 
turn, is seen by practically all the interviewees as 
generating a need for consensus formation. The clearest 
enunciation is that by PDS♯1: 
 
 “The 1992-1993 deals, despite their differences, were 
both prompted by a particularly difficult economic 
situation. After all, when things are not working, one has to find 
common solutions”.  
 
There was thus a widespread feeling of urgency and 
of crisis. Moreover, these quotations highlight the 
willingness to face the crisis collectively, assuming that the 
solutions of the problem were objectively related to the 
situation of crisis and, moreover, that the actual measures 
proposed and adopted entailed equal ‘sacrifices’ on the 
part of the actors involved.  
What is interesting is also the catastrophic tone that 
is used. It is itself a sign of the success of the discourse on 
the crisis. The idea of impending catastrophe emerges 
clearly: consider Trentin’s remark that the alternative 
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would have been a declaration of tribal war, UIL♯1’s 
shock after having heard the possible dire consequences 
(“not being able to pay salaries”) of the continuation of the 
crisis, or the general insistence on the fact that “something 
had to be done” in order to “save the country”.  
The narrative has focused on a series of elements 
that must be changed in order for the country to get back on 
its feet. Moreover, consider the use of the term azienda Italia 
(literally, ‘company Italy’ or ‘business Italy’) by a union 
leader to refer to the Italian state, equating the financial 
situation of a capitalist state with that of a capitalist firm. 
This is quite revealing of the extent to which capitalist 
social relations have become naturalised and depoliticised 
in sectors of the labour movement. The assumption is that 
Italy must work like a private company, and that in fact the 
role of the unions is to help make this possible. 
Interestingly, it seems that this awareness of the need to 
make the country work like azienda Italia emerged more 
strongly in times of crisis, therefore signaling that the kind 
of common sense assumption that dominates discourse in 
times of emergency is closer to capital’s interests.  
Despite the feeling of unity and the discourse on 
‘common problems’, as the previous chapter has detailed, 
the 1993 deal was reached on an unequal basis. Trade 
unions acquiesced to capital’s quest for wage moderation, 
in exchange for mainly symbolic concessions regarding the 
legitimation of the unions at the institutional and company 
level and a nominal commitment to higher investments 
(that did not materialise – see Ch. 5). The debate about the 
economic ‘facts’ was favourable to capital’s perspective and 
the weaker actors eventually accepted the nature of these 
‘truths’, also because they were grounded in the materiality 
of social relations and their own dependence on the market. 
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The reforms of the labour market and of pensions can be 
interpreted as a further acquiescence to capital’s version of 
common sense. The consensus on these reforms can be 
viewed as the continuation of capital’s moment of power in 
the Italian political economy.  
At this point, it should be clear why these ideas 
became ‘facts’ about the economy. The particular relation 
between ‘the international’ and ‘the national’ in the Italian 
case generated specific forms of thought regarding how 
Italy adapts to economic change and to the world economy. 
Although often marked by conflict, in times of crisis there 
was a tendency in Italian history to find a common ground 
among the various social actors. The consensus in favour of 
moderate labour costs is the expression of capital’s power 
within the Italian political economy, and the unions 
acquiesced to it in times of crisis.  
An important point to underline is that this idea 
does not necessarily win over all of the labour movement 
and is not unproblematically consented to by the unions. 
However, the depoliticisation of common sense managed 
to contain dissent on the unequal exchange of the 1990s. 
The referendum organised in 1993 signals that even though 
the ‘yes’ vote passed and thus there was a significant 
consent for the measures and reforms included in the 
protocol, the turnout at the elections was low (one out of 
four workers that participated in the assemblies turned out 
to vote), thus showing that there was also a large area of 
‘indifference’. Therefore, dissent was successfully 
contained, as this indifference did not turn into an 
alternative political stance. The way common sense and 
ideology function is also through this distancing: economic 
‘facts’ are accepted for what they are, or what they seem to 
be: ‘facts’, ‘truths’ that one may not appreciate, but 
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nonetheless elements that cannot be changed, that form 
part of ‘how things are’, undebatable factors that lie in the 
background. They are seen as ‘natural’ constraints that 
need to be tackled collectively because they are supposedly 
objective pressures of reality on ‘Italy’ conceived as a whole 
(thus, neglecting the capitalist nature of the state and hence 
the internal social and power relations). Therefore, there 
need not be necessarily positive adherence to or acceptance 
of ideology or common sense. The same result of 
subordination to the hegemonic project is attained if 
dissent is contained, if it lacks a political channel for 
expression, if it turns into passive resignation.  
 In order to understand how hegemony is produced 
and maintained, one must realise that its task is not only to 
produce consent – the subordinate classes that accept their 
position within society as ‘legitimate’ – but also to contain 
dissent. As noted adobe, “consensus does not necessarily 
entail positive agreement; reluctant acquiescence is just as 
likely” (Bruff 2008: 95). In this, the crucial element that is 
underlined here is that alternative routes are foreclosed by 
the very reproduction of the common sense view of 
economic vulnerability and ‘hence’ the need to maintain 
low real wages. In the absence of alternative political 
projects, dissent tends to manifest itself in passive 
acquiescence. And, as argued in chapter 4, an alternative 
political project is unthinkable – literally – without the 
work of ‘organic intellectuals’. If the ‘organic intellectuals’ 
of large sectors of organised labour are co-opted into the 
hegemonic order, also because of their acquiescence to the 
dominant version of common sense, it is thus very difficult 
that alternative routes are considered or that protest or 
dissent find a political counterpart. 
 The particular intertwining of ‘the international’ and 
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‘the national’ discussed above, and the assumption of 
economic vulnerability and the consensus on moderate 
labour costs that went hand in hand with it, does not in 
itself guarantee that deals such as the 1993 protocol will be 
successful or accepted. What I am arguing is that there is a 
tendency for consensus to form around the anchor of wage 
moderation based upon a common sense perception of 
Italy’s weak position in the world economy. The different 
versions of common sense adhered to by Italian actors tend 
to overlap on this point: the need to maintain wage 
moderation. What matters in the analysis of common sense 
is not to fix certain elements as variables that can be added 
to the analysis. Following Bruff – as argued in chapter 3 – 
what is relevant is to “identify certain asymmetries, 
tendencies and repetitions within any one version of 
common sense, without needing to fix, homogenize and 
universalize this version across space and time” (Bruff 
2010: 624). Clearly, the fundamental asymmetry is the one 
that skews our ideas towards the material basis for 
existence, the needs for means of subsistence that form the 
most basic ‘constraints’ on our life and hence also on our 
ways of thinking within a capitalist society. So, there is no 
certainty that pacts based on wage moderation will be 
signed or adhered to. A neo-Gramscian framework, on the 
other hand, makes it to possible to understand how and 
why such asymmetric deals are accomplished, when they 
indeed occur, and delve deeper on the underlying 
ideological elements that make them possible. 
In 1993, the employers were the dominant actor, the 
one that set the agenda, for example by calling off the deal 
on the wage-indexation mechanism in 1991, an act that then 
prompted the definitive elimination of the mechanism in 
1992, in agreement with the government, and with the 
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acceptance of the unions. So, the need for reforms and the 
necessity to reach them by consensus, were goals of capital, 
not of labour. The moment of reform was therefore 
launched by capital and necessitated labour’s continued 
acquiescence for it to be sustained. Significantly, PD♯2 
claims a continuity between the Ciampi government and 
the following centre-left governments starting from the 
mid-1990s (of which Ciampi was Minister of the Economy 
for some time): 
 
“The PDS supported the Ciampi government, to the point 
that the Ciampi government is considered to be in many 
ways an anticipator of the centre-left government”. 
 
He added that 
 
“there is no doubt that the Ciampi government, in part also 
Giuliano Amato, started a ‘discourse of truth’112,because 
the situation of the public budget presented huge problems 
and it was necessary to start intervening in a structural 
fashion, to start with structural reforms, but also start 
producing a change of mentality. And Ciampi, and the men 
around Ciampi, had the idea of starting to build this 
system of concertation, that meant also building 
dimensions of trust, so that certain painful changes would 
be allowed, would be agreed upon. However, these were 
only partly painful”. 
 
 This claim to continuity is important, because it 
signals that the consensus built by the Ciampi government 
continued with the centre-left governments, who saw 
themselves as the heirs of Ciampi’s process of adjustment, 
and as the parties responsible for its consolidation (as                                                         
112 In the original, un linguaggio della verità.  
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underlined in chapter 4). The common sense view of wage 
moderation as the means of adjustment of the Italian 
economy consolidated on the state’s institutional terrain, 
and the state was able to mobilise the consensus achieved 
in the previous years to implement relatively far-reaching 
reforms of pensions (1995) and the labour market (1997).  
Therefore, while initially launched by capital’s offensive, 
from the Amato government in 1992, passing through the 
Ciampi government and the centre-left governments of the 
following years, the idea of the necessity of reforms, based 
on the common sense assumption of wage moderation, 
sedimented on the state’s institutional terrain.  
 
1993: common sense and the asymmetrical 
exchange 
 
In this section I analyse the common sense 
assumptions on the actual 1993 protocol and the 
asymmetrical exchange set in stone in the pact. I being with 
the views expressed by the scholars Della Sala and 
Cesaratto on the objectives of the 1992 and 1993 deals, that 
help set the terrain on which other opinions will be 
analysed. Della Sala argues that  
 
“I myself am guilty of giving too much importance to the 
issue of the external constraint in my work. The issue of the 
external constraint is also a conservative argument, in the 
sense that the constraint was also the means of 
guaranteeing – at the level of the unions and capital – that 
the forces that had certain interests to protect would be 
part of the solution. The 1993 deal may seem like a 
paradox, because it offers little to labour, but on the other 
hand it established that the unions enter into a decision-
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making process. But then things went differently, but the 
principle still exists today, in the sense that not only the 
unions but the social partners generally need to be part of 
the decision-making process”. 
 
 As the following excerpts also show, the nature of 
the asymmetrical exchange emerges clearly: wage 
moderation in exchange for essentially symbolic 
compensations, mostly a formal recognition of the unions’ 
role at the institutional level. And this outcome was 
achieved by evoking the ‘external constraint’ that, as Della 
Sala points out, “is also a conservative argument”. As 
argued in the previous chapter, formal legitimation of the 
union leadership was the main counterpart to the offer of 
wage moderation, a kind of logic that is at odds with the 
traditional ‘political exchange’ of neo-corporatism. As Della 
Sala claims: 
 
“Italy has only in part taken the policies that would have 
helped it to adjust to the new framework of the Euro. For 
instance, it has introduced elements of a flexible labour 
market but without, on the other hand, having policies to 
favour growth, to create jobs, but also without policies of 
professional training, a whole series of other elements that 
are in other countries part of a flexible labour market and 
that protect workers who are not already protected”. 
 
Cesaratto, in his interview, held that 
 
“ultimately, concertation had the aim of avoiding an 
increase in inflation after the devaluation. And it was 
successful. The elimination of the wage indexation 
mechanism the year before, and in September the 
devaluation, it worked”. 
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While such a view risks being – in my opinion – too 
mechanic, in the sense that it presupposes the unions’ 
consent to a policy of wage moderation without explaining 
why and how unions consented, it does point to a crucial 
objective of capital: that of exploiting the possibility of 
devaluation for the last time before the setting in stone of 
the exchange rate quota (before the coming into force of the 
Euro itself), and thus increasing competitiveness. However, 
devaluation brought with it an increase in import costs, and 
thus could potentially create an inflationary spiral, if wages 
rose together with inflation. The mechanism created in 
1992/1993 managed to avoid wage rises by constantly 
keeping the planned inflation rate lower than the real 
inflation rate.  
In 1991 the employers had called off the scala mobile 
deal, thus signaling that they were unwilling to continue 
with this mediating mechanism in their struggle with 
labour. As Regalia and Regini argue, in the early 1990s 
“common to all employers was the crucial problem of 
mounting labour costs that were increasingly difficult to 
pass on to consumers” (Regalia and Regini 1997: 220). The 
unions accepted the definitive elimination of the wage-
indexation mechanism in 1992, and 1993 represented the 
pars construens, that is, the attempt to build a new system of 
industrial relations and a new framework for the 
relationship between capital and labour and the 
incorporation of the unions in the decision-making process, 
after the 1992 ‘break’.  
What is being argued is that the acquiescence by the 
unions to an essentially unbalanced arrangement was made 
possible by the implicit assumption that Italy had to adapt 
to economic change and to the requirements of a 
competitive international market, whose pressures become 
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stronger once the criteria for European monetary 
integration were set in stone at Maastricht and devaluation 
was no longer an option. Therefore, the trade unions 
reluctantly accepted the idea that wage moderation was the 
way forward, the means by which the country could find a 
path of economic and employment growth. The 1993 pact 
can thus be seen as capital’s moment of power in the Italian 
political economy, a moment of power that lasted all 
through the decade and shaped the reforms of the mid and 
late 1990s. These transformations were indeed innovative 
in the sense that they were achieved largely in a consensual 
manner, but the element of continuity is to be found in the 
path-dependency of the common sense assumption of 
economic vulnerability and wage moderation as the key to 
the country’s success.  
 Let us start off with the analysis of the opinions 
expressed by the ‘organic intellectuals’ by looking at how 
even the more leftist elements of the labour movement 
(CGIL♯1 and PDS♯1) perceived the 1993 pact as a step 
forward for labour in a context marked by what was 
perceived as capital’s unwillingness to mediate, expressed 
in the previous year’s elimination of the wage indexation 
mechanism. CGIL♯1 believes that 
 
“the key moment was the July 1992 deal. The actual 1993 
deal was in some way an attempt to recover the 1992 
wound, and give a general sense that could be shared by all 
the unions, in particular within the CGIL, vis-à-vis a 
situation that had become unsustainable since 1992, since 
that injury had left a void. 1992 was a really dramatic 
moment. The secretary general of CGIL, Bruno Trentin, 
was in a direct negotiation with the government, CISL and 
UIL. The Amato government, in a financial situation of the 
Italian state that was very harsh, with great risks, made this 
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situation a tool for an attack, I insist on the subjective 
responsibilities. The Amato and Ciampi governments used 
this situation in order to promote certain choices, and these 
choices were shared by large sectors of the labour 
movement, CISL, UIL, and parts of CGIL. The situation 
aimed at attacking the contractual power of the workers, 
their conditions. So, 18 months of freeze of collective 
bargaining, elimination of the wage-indexation mechanism. 
(…)  
 
The situation described by the interviewee is one of a 
situation of ‘impending catastrophe’, in which the choice 
was heavily constrained because “if you don’t agree 
tomorrow the situation will precipitate”:  
 
“that was a very dramatic situation, Trentin found himself 
in a position in which he himself had to decide, in a 
framework in which all the other unions and Del Turco (the 
leader of the socialist faction of the CGIL) presented 
themselves as already in agreement with Amato…Trentin 
was in a condition in which he had to choose yes or no, and 
if he agreed, the choice would have been totally in contrast 
with the mandate he received from the organisation. In a 
tragic night, in which the situation was: if you don’t agree 
tomorrow the economic situation will precipitate, so you 
have a huge responsibility on your shoulders, Trentin – 
right or wrong – signed, without having a mandate (…) 
The people that were responsible for this kind of blackmail 
vis-à-vis CGIL, the link between Del Turco, Amato: if you 
don’t sign, the country will fall”. 
 
 The interviewee, referring specifically to the 1993 
deal, adds that  
 
“having said this, I understand the situation and Trentin’s 
position. The year after the real deal was done. This deal 
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had all the characteristics of a concertative agreement in 
which the elements of the year before were confirmed but 
in a more organic framework. That involved the workers 
not only in the reduction of the autonomy of collective 
bargaining but also in a whole series of policies that next to 
an incomes policy would create a framework with which to 
face the problems of the country. So, industrial policies, 
social policies. So it was not simply a deal on contractual 
rules, it was a deal on how to go through a phase, with 
what kind of system of relations, with what kind of 
industrial, economic and social policies, to face the 
situation of the country. At the same time, the deal 
composed the important elements of industrial relations 
that formalised a situation that used to be informal, giving 
it institutional value. For example, the national contract 
and the second-level contract that until then had been 
present but not formally, not included in a framework. In 
including it into a framework, we accepted also rules that 
were somewhat limiting with regards to the exercise of this 
contractual power”. 
 
 Despite these positive elements in the deal, CGIL♯1 
remarks that 
 
"what happened was that what operated in reality was 
1992 and not 1993, in the sense that in fact what happened 
was a real wage moderation of the workers and the 
elimination or curtailment of a series of historical gains like 
the scala mobile…”. 
 
 I would like to note that notwithstanding the 
unbalanced content of the pact, the very conditions in which 
the pact was signed were the result of capital forcing 
labour’s hand, in the sense that the 1992 deal was perceived 
as a wound that needed in some way to be overcome, and 
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1993 represented a pact on a wider framework in which 
there were some compensatory elements in exchange for 
wage moderation, albeit ones that were largely symbolic 
(see ch.4). The aspect of impending catastrophe is clear also 
in the quotation above, when it is remarked that the CGIL 
leader Trentin had the responsibility of ‘saving the 
country’: “if you don’t sign, the country will fail”. Trentin 
argues that the 1993 deal was in some way a step forward 
from the situation of isolation of the labour movement 
(similarly to CGIL♯1): 
 
“the pact and the negotiations that preceded it are born out 
of a fact that has been totally ignored by the mass of 
workers, because of a delayed awareness on the part of 
organised labour, and also because the mass media have 
not contributed to clarifying it: the breaching of a social 
pact, of a social compromise, that had held up the system 
of industrial relations for the last thirty years. This is the 
point. In 1989 Confindustria threatens to cancel the deal on 
the wage indexation mechanism…I want to say that over 
time a whole series of factors accumulated, that brought 
Confindustria to cancel the wage indexation mechanism 
and then attack the whole structure of industrial relations. 
And, at some point, the employers have found an ally in 
the Amato government, because of the emergency. And 
this is the condition from which we started: the declaration 
on the part of the government and Confindustria that the 
scala mobile was cancelled; the freezing – absolutely without 
precedent – of public employment bargaining for three 
years; a moratorium on collective bargaining. It is from 
here that we had to begin anew, in order to redesign an 
industrial relations system. We were facing the breaching 
of a historical pact. The breaching of the material 
constitution of labour relations” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 
153). 
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PDS♯1, who was a member of the general 
secretariat of CGIL until 1996, also highlights that 1992 was 
a defeat, prompted by the attack on the wage-indexation 
mechanism on the part of the employers: 
 
“Confindustria’s goal was clear and the relations of force 
were not in favour of the workers, as before, and the 
government was supporting the employers.” 
 
This is the general perception of the situation the trade 
unions were faced with: the employers and the government 
agreed on the need to contain inflation through the 
elimination of the scala mobile. The unions – and in 
particular CGIL – perceived their ‘entrapment’: either they 
accepted the 1992 deal or ‘chaos’ would set in, as PDS♯1 
confirms: 
 
“Trentin deemed that he could not take the responsibility 
of the collapse of the country, that the government argued 
would happen if a deal was not found, and so he signed 
the agreement (…) My judgment on the 1992 agreement is 
very poor, it was a real trap”.  
 
The situations of weakness and subordination of the unions 
is clear in the opinions of all three representatives of CGIL 
cited above. PDS♯1 goes as far as to hypothesise that the 
elimination of the scala mobile and thus the lack of 
indexation with imported inflation was the catalyst for the 
decision to devalue the currency. This devaluation, as 
noted above, was punitive vis-à-vis labour, as it went hand 
in hand with a real wage moderation that allowed for a 
recovery of exports and thus economic growth. PDS♯1 
argues that: 
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“In 1992 (…) Amato asked for the sterilisation of imported 
inflation from the scala mobile, and then immediately after 
there was a 25% devaluation of the Lira, that tremendously 
hit purchasing power. Amato also asked for a freezing of 
bargaining and other constraints, always with the declared 
objective of defending Italy from external attacks and 
achieving economic growth, but then he devalued 
immediately after. There are no certain proofs that the 
intention of devaluing was already there. However, it is 
difficult to think the opposite”.  
 
 The same interviewee, as Trentin and CGIL♯1, 
noted that 1993 was an attempt to regain some power in a 
situation of weakness, and thus represented a way forward. 
However, PDS♯1 also highlights that the 1993 deal was 
also unbalanced against the trade unions: 
 
“The 1993 deal was very different from the 1992 pact (…) 
However, also the 1993 agreement contains limits and 
constraints. It would have been difficult to imagine to 
cancel these constraints in such a short period of time and 
with changed relations of force. I was personally against 
this deal as well, but mostly because I saw that the negative 
aspects of the 1992 deal were still there (…) The 1993 deal 
was necessary for the union in order to recover the recoverable”.  
 
The perception of being stuck in a trap is quite 
evident from the above remarks. The general attitude vis-à-
vis both deal is not one of ownership and defence of the 
content, but of resigned acceptance of the ‘least worse 
solution’ that was imposed from the outside. CGIL♯1 
highlights the ‘blackmail’ that other actors had posed to 
CGIL and, while ‘understanding’ the situation in which 
Trentin was forced to sign, nonetheless expresses his 
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negative opinion on the kind of reforms that were 
introduced and on the limitations on the role of collective 
bargaining. Trentin himself, as is clear from the passage 
quoted above, admits to a weakness of the labour 
movement, and seems to argue that given the difficult 
circumstances and the defeat of 1992 – that is 
acknowledged without ambiguity by both interviewees 
cited above –, the deal struck in 1993 was the best possible 
one. Trentin stresses that the creation of elected RSUs was a 
form of compensation. CGIL♯1 also underlines the 
importance of the second level bargaining as a benefit. 
However, as Tronti argues, this second level bargaining 
had a very limited diffusion outside of the large factories in 
the North and in the Centre of the country, where they 
were largely already present (Tronti 2005: 5). The 
asymmetry of the exchange is quite clear, considering also 
the wage dynamics in the course of the decade and the 
following reforms of pensions and of the labour market, as 
argued in the previous chapter. However, it was 
considered to be the best possible deal by the union 
representatives, even if both Trentin and CGIL♯1 
acknowledge its limitations. Interestingly, CGIL♯1 also 
argued that the unions were unable to draw what he 
considered to be the necessary logical conclusions from the 
outcomes of the pact, that in the end – according to 
CGIL♯1 – did not work as expected and was largely 
punitive vis-à-vis labour. So, once again, it is important to 
stress that containment of dissent is just as important as 
creation of consent for the reproduction of a given 
hegemonic order. Even if there was no complete 
agreement, passive resignation set in and no other political 
project was envisaged. The asymmetrical nature of the pact 
was in some way – explicitly or implicitly – acknowledged 
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by all the interviewees. The underlying assumption of 
economic vulnerability, linked with the idea that wage 
moderation represented the only means by which the 
country could adjust to economic change, also emerges 
clearly.  
As pointed out above, the 1993 deal managed to 
avoid wage rises by keeping the planned inflation rate 
lower than the real inflation rate. Moreover, the 1993 deal 
itself was ambiguous vis-à-vis the recovery of the 
difference between these two figures, as it stated that in 
setting the terms for such recovery, other issues such as the 
country’s international position and the cost of imports 
could be taken into account in the 2-year contract renewals. 
Asked about this potential source of conflict, PD♯2 
unambiguously supported a restrictive interpretation of the 
pact, arguing that the unions’ demands that the rise in the 
cost of imports needed to be included in the wage increases 
were out of line with the text of the pact itself: 
 
“The problem of interpretation. Well, ultimately there was 
little to interpret. Because if ISTAT (i.e. the national statistical 
office) gave you the overall framework for the inflation 
dynamics, the roof of planned inflation, you could not ask 
for salary increases based on real inflation…I confirm that 
there was a discussion on this, and that the government 
was attacked by FIOM, it was attacked because of 
disinterest, indifference”.113 
                                                         
113 The issue the interviewee is referring to here is the 1997 conflict between the 
government and the metal-workers unions. The unions requested wage 
increases that covered not only the planned inflation level for the coming two 
years, but also the difference bwteen planned and real inflation in the previous 
two years (1994-1996) (for a description of the conflict around the 1997 
metalworkers contract, see: Amyot 2004: 175-178).  
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Turning to the other actors involved in the 
negotiations of the 1993 pact, let us analyse first the 
interpretations given by the representatives of the 
employers’ association. Callieri, the representative of 
Confindustria that was responsible for industrial relations 
and that contributed to the negotiations in 1993, argued 
that the responsibility for collective bargaining even at the 
second level should be limited to the confederal unions and 
not to other bodies or representations of workers: 
 
“nobody will be able to deny that collective bargaining is 
the responsibility of the union associations, and not of 
clouded clutters that organise themselves through the 
electoral instrument. These are rotten conceptions of 1968 
that it is best we forget” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 146). 
 
Here, what emerges is also Confindustria’s concern 
to maintain the unions’ role of social control on the 
workers. By rejecting the possibility that local union that 
are not signatories of the protocol can be able to accede to 
collective bargaining, what is guaranteed is that at all levels 
the pact will be respected. Later, speaking about the reform 
of the labour market, the interviewee remarked that  
 
“Parliament cannot oppose the use of flexible and agency 
labour. We cannot say we are European in all things, and 
then we remain at the level of the Middle East for the 
labour market. If other European countries use this 
instrument, I cannot understand why we should not use it” 
(Ibidem: 146). 
 
Clearly, it can be seen that labour flexibisation was a goal of 
capital. Once again, moreover, Europe is used as a 
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reference point. The representative of Confindustria that I 
interviewed argued that 
 
“the situation was dramatic in 1993, and the unions 
understood that. You needed to keep wages down, and 
they agreed. On the other hand, they got this second level 
of bargaining, also because the small and medium 
enterprises were willing to compromise, and so we made 
the deal. And the unions demonstrated their responsibility, 
of course there are always tensions but Europe could not 
wait”. 
 
 From these quotes, it is clear that capital supported 
wage moderation and the flexibisation of labour 
unambiguously, and also conceived of the role of the 
unions also as a watchdog of social control on the workers. 
The Minister of Labour of the Ciampi government, the 
former union representative Gino Giugni, expressed quite 
clearly that: 
 
“in the 1993 pact there are practically no elements of 
exchange. It is this that makes it anomalous, unique, 
atypical and difficult to assimilate” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 
138). 
 
 The interviewee then asked the question: “so you are 
saying that there was no exchange?” Giugni answered:  
 
“Let’s ask ourselves what the unions obtain from the deal. 
They have guarantees that the contracts should be signed. 
But these are still guarantees for the future. So, it is not 
money that enters into their pockets. And the employers? 
They obtain a mechanism that, after having eliminated the 
scala mobile, should guarantee the workings of the system in 
the face of the nightmare of social tensions that may 
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emerge precisely because of the total elimination of social 
shock absorbers related to wages” (Ibidem). 
 
 Below, Giugni also remarked that 
 
“in order to understand the significance of 1993, you just need 
to imagine what would have been 10 years ago the reactions 
of the unions to the mere hypothesis of distinguishing 
between the national contract and the firm contract. They 
would have reacted like a cat whose tail is being stamped on. 
Go back another 10 years and imagine that someone proposed 
to the unions the introduction of a moratorium or a cooling 
clause on strikes. It would have been like stamping on their 
tail another time. All of this has now changed, even if a part of 
the leftist jurists remain anchored to that idea of non-
regulation” (Ibidem: 139). 
 
 Consider the first quotation from the interview with 
Giugni. It is clear that the kind of exchange described by 
the Minister is asymmetrical: the unions accept wage 
moderation in exchange for the guarantee that contracts 
will continue to be signed. The employers, apart from wage 
restraint, obtain a guarantee of social control. The second 
quotation expresses in quite clear terms the evolution in the 
unions’ power in the last decades: it is argued that while in 
the previous decades such a deal would have been 
unambiguously refused by the labour movement, in the 
1990s labour was in a defensive position and was therefore 
forced to accept.  
What is also significant in these quotes is the fact 
that the power of the government was not used neutrally in 
order to broker a deal, it in itself tended to favour one actor 
over the other. The positive remarks by the representative 
of the government Giugni – the one who effectively made 
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the two parts agree on the deal – on the moderate stance of 
the unions in this occasion are a good example of how this 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ been used in order to force labour’s 
hand. Telling in this respect is also Trentin’s comment 
(reported above) that the employers had found “an ally in 
the Amato government because of the emergency”, indicating 
that in this time of crisis, capital and the government 
shared the same position, and therefore organised labour 
was left alone to choose whether to acquiesce or to face 
probable unilateral measures. Another telling quote from 
Giugni’s interview concerns the nature of the opposition. In 
a way admitting that this kind of deal is punitive to the 
workers, he argues that 
 
“in September we would not have made it: 114 there is a 
wave of protest in the air, that is operative within the 
CGIL, and is most visible in the Northern factories, where 
the pressure of unemployment certainly cannot generate a 
favourable view of this kind of deals. And it is here that the 
appeal of the Lega Nord, even if does not enter into the 
workers’ organisation, emerges and develops, and finds its 
corners in the café conversations. And then the leghista 
protest takes on another name, another characteristic, it 
becomes Bertinotti (…)The point of departure of 
‘bertinottismo’ in the North is, in many cases, this 
discontent. And then there are the industrialists. The 
rigidity of the small firms is born in large part in the leghista 
atmosphere. The strong resistance of Abete (the leader of 
Confindustria), his will to have elements of certainty to 
exchange (for instance on firm-level bargaining), in order 
to show them and say that there is a new policy on labour 
costs, and that the unions give up conflict, signal that                                                         
114 The deal was signed in July, just before the summer holidays, thus in a 
period in which workers’ militancy was at its lowest.  
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within Confindustria there is a strong, worrying centrifugal 
push. The deal has flowed down this process, maybe it has 
blocked it…The deal also creates a kind of convergence on 
both sides, with the marginalisation of the most radical 
industrialists and ‘Essere Sindacato’115. A real front of 
protest” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 139-140). 
 
 The attempt to occupy the centre of the political 
spectrum, the sphere of ‘reason’ against irrational 
tendencies, is always a crucial element in any hegemonic 
project. The creation of an antagonist, of an obstacle to 
change – what the post-structuralists call a ‘constitutive 
outside’ (Torfing 1999: 51; 85-86) – is the main element of 
formal politics per se. There is no politics without 
antagonism. And this is what gives Giugni’s remarks 
significance. In a way, he equates left-wing opposition to 
the deal with the increasing sympathy towards the Lega 
Nord that was emerging in the North of the country, thus 
creating an equivalence between populism, protest and 
opposition, that together face a group of ‘reasonable’ 
people that worry about the future of the country.  
 Let us now turn to the representatives of the unions. 
We shall see that there is a generally positive view of the 
pact, both at the moment of the signing of the agreement 
itself (I quote the interviews reported in Mania and Orioli 
1993) and retrospectively. UIL♯1 is among the most 
outspoken in underlining the positive responsibility that 
the unions took upon themselves in order to ‘save the 
country’: 
 
“what now emerges is a classic system of concertation of 
triangular responsibility (…) The nature of the union                                                         
115 ‘Essere Sindacato’ is the left-wing faction of CGIL. 
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changes. This does not mean that the union revokes or 
renounces the use of strikes, that it abandons struggle. The 
union simply entrusts to struggle a subordinate function. 
To the point that a clause for the cooling of conflict during 
contractual phases has been introduced. The process must 
be seen as a continuous process from 1992 to 1993. 1992 
represents the phase of union availability in order to favour 
the recovery, the adjustment of the country. And as a 
matter of fact, what followed were the government 
measures concerning pensions, healthcare, public 
employment, the state budget. Each one of these measures 
has been painful for labour. But each one has been 
functional for the containment of public spending, for a 
reduction of the interest rates” (Mania and Orioli 1993: 
166).  
 
The union leader here explicitly recognises the 
positive role of the unions and their sense of responsibility 
in a difficult moment for the country, a sense of 
responsibility that manifested itself in the acceptance of 
sacrifices. Therefore, while recognising that the measures 
were “painful for labour”, he also point out that they were 
necessary, and thus implicitly that there was no alternative. 
Moreover, in contrast to the view of the representatives of 
CGIL, UIL♯1 argues that the 1992 and 1993 deals were 
part of the same process of ‘union availability’, that 
continued even after the 1993 deal on welfare state issues. 
Here, the common sense view that the sacrifices on the part 
of labour (essentially, wage restraint) were objectively 
necessary and simply derived from the ‘state of the 
economy’ is perhaps expressed most vividly. As the same 
interviewee remarked,  
 
“competition is between systems: we are now aware of that, we 
saw it with our own eyes. And so, in order to create a 
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competitive sistema paese,116 certain premises are unavoidable” 
(Ibidem: 168). 
 
According to him, the common basis of the new system 
that was being built with the consent of the unions was 
planned inflation. In my interview with UIL♯1, he 
underlined that the structuring of the system along these 
lines was 
 
“an important signal to demonstrate that Italy had 
embarked upon the path of the control of public debt and 
the containment of public spending. This is how 
concertation starts off”.   
 
 When asked about the wage dynamics of the 1990s, 
and specifically about the risk that there could be a 
difference between real and planned inflation, and 
therefore a fall in real wage, the interviewee answered: 
 
“No, because without the scala mobile and with inflation 
being free to move according to market parameters, there 
would have been a strong erosion of real wages”. 
 
So, basically, it is implied that the deal was the best 
one that could have been achieved, given that the wage 
indexation mechanism had already been abolished. 
Regarding the asymmetrical nature of the pact, above we 
have reported the disappointment of UIL♯1 in the face of 
the fact that the 2.5% target in investment in technology 
and innovation was not reached. In describing the positive 
results of concertation, the interviewee pointed out that: 
                                                         
116 See above for an explanation of the meaning of the expression sistema paese.  
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“Italy had reached a 5% surplus primary surplus, a 
wonderful thing, a huge result. It has not ben a politics of 
austerity, of rigour, because it has produced very 
important results for the life of the Italians. The positive 
result of the primary surplus was one of those, because it 
allowed us for the first time to actually reduce public debt, 
not only payments on interest”.  
 
What is interesting is that when asked about the 
positive results of the pact, the representative of labour 
immediately put himself in the position of the government, 
arguing that the pact managed to help the country achieve 
important macroeconomic goals. UIL♯1 points out that the 
positive results in macroeconomic terms were attained 
thanks to the ‘painful’ measures. Here, the national 
standpoint is totally internalised. In listing the positive 
effects of the deal, there is no mention of the outcomes in 
terms of labour conditions and wages, issues that regard 
the membership of the union (the workers), and thus a 
partial interest, and not the perspective of the general 
interest that is taken as the basis, the yardstick against 
which to measure the success of the pact.  
As argued by the interviewee above, the concessions 
were seen as fundamentally unavoidable if the unions were 
to adopt a responsible political stance. The common sense 
assumption that this was the only way for ‘Italy’ to adjust 
to economic change in effect foreclosed alternative 
possibilities and also obscured the fact that the kind of 
changes sought and enacted were asymmetrical, as the 
costs tended to fall more heavily on labour’s shoulders. It is 
also interesting how the objective of low inflation was itself 
presented as a goal of labour by D’Antoni (the leader of 
CISL in 1993): 
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“with a high rate of inflation, the weakest sectors of society 
would be abandoned to themselves (…) The choice we 
have made favours the weakest in the labour movement, 
and not the strongest”  (Mania and Orioli 1993: 160). 
 
What is neglected – from labour’s standpoint – is Streeck’s 
argument (see above) that inflation is a representation of a 
distributional conflict in society, an indication of the lack of 
consensus in the political economy. Here, the objective of 
low inflation is presented as the ‘general interest’ of all the 
members of society. In a neo-Gramscian perspective, the 
incorporation of sectors and groups in society within a 
‘general interest’ can be interpreted as a sign of a successful 
hegemonic order. 
A confirmation of the common sense assumption of 
wage moderation in this phase is given by the same 
interviewee (D’Antoni). The following is also a good 
example of how common sense forecloses alternative views 
of the world.. He acknowledges that the current 
recessionary phase cannot bring real wage increases (thus 
confirming the common sense assumption that it is only 
through wage moderation that Italy can get out of the 
crisis, increase exports and start growing again) (Ibidem: 
159-161). He adds that 
 
“it’s clear that in an expansionary phase the problem of a 
real increase in wages will emerge. However, I would like 
to add a reflection: Unfortunately, even when the recovery 
will arrive, the employment problems will all remain. What 
is happening in the United States shows that with the first 
signs of recovery of the system, there is no parallel 
recovery of employment. In such a phase, the union will 
have to make a choice: either it privileges an increase in 
real wages of the employed or it points at increasing the 
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employment levels. I would have no doubts and would opt 
for the second choice” (Ibidem: 160). 
 
Here the idea that in order to increase employment 
you must make the labour market more flexible is already 
present. In fact, as Brancaccio shows citing OECD data, the 
effect of labour market deregulation is statistically not an 
increase in employment (on which it has no effect) but a 
curtailment of wages (Brancaccio 2008: 13-15). The union 
leader’s perspective is once again rooted in the assumption 
of economic vulnerability, presupposing that the only way 
to increase employment is by keeping wages low. What is 
implied is that increasing real wages is threatening not only 
for the country’s international position, but for labour itself. 
This quotation signals the fact that sectors of the labour 
movement pre-emptively accept capital’s dominant version 
of common sense that – even in times of economic 
expansion – real wages cannot rise too much without 
threatening the economic wellbeing of the country and 
employment levels. The internalisation of this common 
sense view makes it possible for representatives of labour 
to present their acquiescence as an act in the general 
interest of the country, neglecting its anti-labour content. 
Both Trentin and CGIL♯1 held a slightly different 
position, and Fausto Bertinotti – the former leader of the 
left-wing faction ‘Essere Sindacato’ – held an almost 
completely negative opinion on both the pact and the idea 
of concertation. From the interviews with the first two 
interviewees one can draw the conclusion that the pact was 
signed not out of a convinced adherence to the kind of 
exchange proposed, but because of a mix of resigned 
acquiescence, lack of alternatives and political pressure. 
This kind of stance is just as significant for our purposes, 
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because it signals the normalising power of common sense, 
its capacity to contain dissent. Let us start with a couple of 
excerpts from the interview with Trentin. In the first one, 
the leader of CGIL responds to the interviewee, which 
points out the limited nature of the democratic 
participation of the workers in the referendum on the pact. 
Trentin argues that 
 
“clearly, much more could have been done in terms of 
participation, of presence. But here we can see with our 
own eyes problems of a much deeper nature, which cannot 
be overcome in a few days. This is the glaring fact: a non-
presence, or an absolutely occasional presence, in the 
assemblies (the trade unions organised 30000 assemblies in the 
factories to explain the content of the reform and inform workers 
on the referendum), a real disengagement on the part of the 
workers. A disengagement that we must analyse. I believe, 
however, that one thing is certain: there is a vast area of 
mistrust vis-à-vis organised labour…the belief that not 
even the unions (in addition to other political subjects) are 
able to change, to actually influence the problems that 
people perceive as primary, such as the defence of jobs, the 
defence of the social protection system…People don’t think 
that these are things they should be interested in (…). In 
this phenomenon I also see the effects of the culture of Lega 
Nord, which blames all institutions and all parties. And so, 
why not include the unions? I think this is the real state of 
affairs that one should acknowledge, in order to try to 
understand the absences in the referendum” (Mania and 
Orioli 1993: 151).  
 
Here there is a quite evident acknowledgment of the 
perceived weakness and weakening of organised labour in 
a moment of lack of trust in politics generally, a moment 
that coincided with the Tangentopoli trials, the fall of the 
506   
First Republic parties and the crowning of the liberal 
project that I have described in the previous chapter. This 
weakening of the union is also a result of the economic 
crisis of the early 1990s, which increased unemployment to 
unprecedented levels (more than 10%). Attempting to 
regain a dialogue with the base was thus perceived as an 
important goal, even if – as Trentin himself admits – it 
partly failed. The low level of participation – as argued 
above – was a sign that there was no widespread 
agreement with the proposed deal, but also that there was 
little organised opposition. Instead, as I stated above, what 
emerged was a resigned acquiescence. The following set of 
excerpts from the interview with Trentin is, in my opinion, 
also significant, as it clarifies the kind of political exchange 
envisaged and the role of the unions within in: 
 
“what needs to emerge with clarity is the diversity of 
responsibilities. The government has the responsibility to 
propose a measure to the Parliament, and the latter has the 
responsibility to actually take the decision. This distinction 
of roles must remain intact. The alternative is both very 
dangerous and catastrophic.” (Ibidem: 154). 
 
“conflict is at the basis of democracy, if there is no conflict, 
democracy risks being questioned (…) We always have to 
keep in mind, being realist, that either there is a division of 
responsibilities, and so the possibility that each force uses 
the instruments that are democratically assigned to it, or 
the result can turn out to be the impotence of an industrial 
relations system…The model may have success if the 
responsibilities are distinct, and if the negotiations are 
really substantive and not on the rhetoric of convergence. 
The alternative is a purely superficial operation without 
substance” (Ibidem: 154-155).  
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Notice the tentative language that is used. The 
interviewee explicitly recognises the possibilities that the 
pact will fail and will be punitive vis-à-vis labour, and 
takes distance from a view of ‘common responsibilities’ 
(that has on the other hand been positively claimed by 
UIL♯1), underlining the continuing importance of conflict. 
It can be argued that there is here a flexible interpretation 
of the kind of responsibilities that the pact entails, in order 
to guard against a vision that sees the union as a 
collaborator of the government’s policies. However, the 
asymmetrical nature of the pact and the weak position of 
labour are acknowledged. Consider the following excerpts, 
also drawn from the interview with Trentin, dealing with 
the nature of the exchange: 
 
“fundamentally, I see the opportunity of making 
transparent that which yesterday was more or less hidden. 
In the Italian tradition, as a matter of fact, the government 
has always dialogued with the social partners on the big 
issues of economic and social policy. These have often been 
hidden relations…now we have the opportunity of 
negotiating openly, a fact that – I repeat – leaves each one 
free to take his own decisions” (Ibidem: 155). 
 
“the deal opens up an unprecedented perspective for 
organised labour. In the heat of the moment, what was 
forgotten was that the Councils (the forms of worker 
representation that emerged in the 1970s) were limited to a 
marginal role, they were divided and unelected for years, 
and they never had the legal ownership to conclude 
agreements, for collective bargaining. The RSA had it, but 
they were appointed by the confederal organisations. Now, 
the RSU will be elected” (Ibidem: 157). 
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Here, one can see the preoccupation of the union 
leader for issues of legitimacy. The fact that workers’ 
representative bodies become elected is seen as a chance to 
increase the participation of the workers and the legitimacy 
of the unions (see ch.4). The unbalanced nature of the pact 
also emerges: wage moderation is concretely offered in 
exchange for a formal recognition of the role of the unions 
at the national level and the creation of elected workers’ 
representative bodies. What can be argued is that the 
concessions on wage moderation were real, while the ones 
that flowed back in favour of labour were largely symbolic 
and also reflected the preoccupation of the union 
confederations to maintain legitimacy in their base. 
In the following quotations from CGIL♯1 – partly 
cited above – one can see the perceived weakness of CGIL 
that, according to the interviewee, needed to move on and 
find a new framework after what the interviewee considers 
to be the defeat of 1992. 
 
“The year after (i.e.1993) the real deal was done. This deal 
had all the characteristics of a concertative agreement in 
which the elements of the year before were confirmed but 
in a more organic framework. That involved the workers 
not only in the reduction of the autonomy of collective 
bargaining but also in a whole series of policies that next to 
an incomes policy would create a framework with which to 
face the problems of the country. So, industrial policies, 
social policies. So it was not simply a deal on contractual 
rules, it was a deal on how to go through a phase, with 
what kind of system of relations, with what kind of 
industrial, economic and social policies, to face the 
situation of the country. At the same time, the deal 
composed the important elements of industrial relations 
that formalised a situation that used to be informal, giving 
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it institutional value. For example, the national contract 
and the second-level contract that until then had been 
present but not formally, not included in a framework. In 
including it into a framework, we accepted also rules that 
were somewhat limiting with regards to the exercise of this 
contractual power. 
 
 CGIL♯1 also points out the difference between the 
way CGIL interpreted the deal and CISL’s stance: 
 
“ultimately, all of this was not a kind of regime, a general 
system for the organisation of society, no. Its sense was: 
how do I go through this phase, a series of reciprocal 
commitments that we called concertation. This way of 
interpreting the pact was different in the CGIL and in the 
CISL and UIL…CISL interpreted concertation as a system, 
a regime. This is not a minor difference, because for CGIL it 
was simply an instrument that was necessary in this phase. 
This allowed CGIL to unite within itself, to attempt to 
unite, the elements that were closer to CISL and the people 
who expressed a deep dissent vis-à-vis concertation”.  
 
 According to the interviewee, the deal was necessary 
in 1993 because 
 
 “You had to find a way to recover after the 1992 
wound. You needed to acknowledge what had happened 
and then re-position yourself in a more acceptable 
framework. 1992 was a deal just on four or five things. 1993 
was the positioning of these things in a wider framework 
in which the sacrifices of the workers were counter-
balanced with a structure of industrial relations that 
recognised the second level that had formally never 
existed, it was there de facto but it was not formalised 
before. The pact introduces the democratically elected RSU, 
so it organised and consolidated certain things, and linked 
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all of this together so that you could say: next to certain 
aspects that limit the workers’ ability to struggle for wages, 
worker conditions and so on, there are other things…We 
were in a framework in which the wages were decreasing, 
the profits were increasing, as well as rents.  
 
Thus, the interviewee’s argument is that there was an 
exchange: 
 
“in that framework the moderating initiative on wages was 
only one aspect. Linked to it were other aspects such as the 
structure that formalises and accepts a series of guarantees 
on union organising, national collective bargaining, the 
second-level contract, the election of the RSU, the 
contractual role of the RSU. On another level, there are 
initiatives of industrial policy, certain choices on research 
and development…This is the framework that allows you 
to say: we will go through this phase with these 
commitments. After that, what happened? What happened 
was that what operated in reality was 1992 and not 1993, in 
the sense that in fact what happened was a real wage 
moderation of the workers and the elimination or 
curtailment of a series of historical gains like the scala 
mobile, there its story ends…moreover, this went in parallel 
and maybe favoured a whole series of things that had 
nothing to do with the 1993 deal”.  
 
 So, here the interviewee argues that even if the pact 
itself did include certain potentially substantive 
compensations for workers, these did not materialise. A 
further example of the acquiescence of labour is given by 
the interviewee himself, when he talks about the union’s 
reaction to the actual functioning of the pact in the years 
following 1993: 
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“at a certain point, the framework of concertation had no 
sense anymore. It was not being respected, and so we had 
to realise that concertation was over, it was not there 
anymore. This step of awareness was never done by the 
unions, both because of general problems of all the unions, 
and also internal problems of the CGIL…In the end the 
question that was asked was not: the 1993 deal was right or 
wrong? The reasoning that was done was not: having 
signed this deal, let’s see if it is being respected a few years 
later, and you could say: it is not being respected, so the 
deal is not there anymore (…)  
 
 The interviewee also highlights the flexible nature of 
the pact, which left certain elements open to interpretation. 
However, these elements 
 
“were strangely interpreted restrictively by a large part of 
the union, both by those who were in favour of the deal 
and those who were against it. A classic example is the 
wage increase in the national contracts. What passed was 
the interpretative idea that the deal said that you could not 
ask for wage increases beyond the planned inflation rate, 
that was the official one, and it was different from the 
inflation rate from the point of view of the worker, 
otherwise you were outside the deal…It was not true that 
the 1993 deal prevented other possible interpretations. In 
fact, the metal-workers at the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of 2000, asked for wage increases that are linked 
to the profits in the sector and not simply to inflation and 
both the CISL and UIL and Confindustria were against, 
they said this was not allowed, this was outside the rules of 
1993…it was the metalworkers who directly faced the fact 
that it is not true that the 1993 deal prevented us from 
having as a reference point the profit dynamics of the 
sector, the productive dynamics”. 
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 Later in the interview, he points out that in the end it 
was the employers’ side that ‘broke’ the deal, also because 
the unions had been unable to react and to take an 
autonomous position: 
 
“concertation was swept away from the right. In the sense 
that the powers that be ignored it and the unions were 
divided between those that interpreted the deal in a certain 
way and stayed totally inside without having an attitude 
that would focus on its possibilities and thus also its 
contradictions, and this was also done paradoxically by 
both those who agreed with the pact and those that initially 
did not agree, who – precisely in order to demonstrate that 
they were right when they said that they did not agree – 
said: that is the correct interpretation, what you are saying 
cannot be done. This is the paradox. In the end it was 
swept away by the right”.  
 
 It is significant that, according to CGIL♯1, the union 
did not have the strength and the autonomy to react in the 
face of what he considered to be an asymmetrical exchange. 
It can be argued that the sectors of organised labour that 
were critical of the pact were unable to mobilise support for 
an alternative or to push through a different interpretation 
of the clauses of the pact. Once again, this signals that 
dissent was contained and thus the dominant version of 
common sense was able to become stronger. The necessity 
of enhancing the legitimacy of organised labour in its 
relationship with both the workers and the political system 
played an important role, as the interviewee CGIL♯1 also 
confirms: 
 
“the 1992-1993 deal have also been a means to attempt to 
regain a relationship with the workers. The unions have 
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done so not so much because of a fear of the COBAS. In 
industry they were non-existent (…) But there is no doubt 
that 1992-1993 must be understood also as an attempt to 
regain an authority of the union on the system”. 
 
The only sector of the trade unions that was 
unequivocally against the pact was ‘Essere Sindacato’, the 
left-wing faction of CGIL, led by Fausto Bertinotti. He 
argues that the 1992 and 1993 deals are agreements that 
follow the same general anti-labour guiding lines. As the 
following quotations highlight, there is little overlap in 
common sense assumptions with the previous 
interviewees. An element that is shared with Trentin is the 
view that conflict is the cornerstone of a democratic society. 
The conclusions that Trentin and Bertinotti reach based on 
this assumption are however rather different. 
 
“I believe that a society that is unable to consider conflict as 
a dynamic element of democratic growth, is a society that 
is characterised by an authoritarian tendency that can take 
even all-encompassing forms. For example, with this 
tendency to deny conflict, to characterise it ever more 
negatively. The organisation of Japanese firms is the 
expression of this culture. The firm becomes a unitary 
institution with common interests that is constantly in 
competition and conflict with another community that is 
constituted by another firm. This is a tragically regressive 
idea that tends to transform the firm in a total institution 
and make this the cell of an authoritarian society” (Ibidem: 
176). 
 
It is based on this vision of conflict and democracy 
that Bertinotti criticises the 1992 and 1993 deals: 
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“they are two different things but with the same 
inspiration. The first deal (i.e. 1992) directly attacked the 
material conditions of workers, blocking the scala mobile 
and suspending collective bargaining (…) one can say that 
for Confindustria, the 1992 deal represented the conclusion 
of a long pars destruens that began in the 1980s. A process 
that culminated in the elimination of something that was 
even symbolically representative of workers’ power: the 
scala mobile. In 1993 there is the pars construens. That is, 
Confindustria obtains the definition of an industrial 
relations system that is based on a conciliatory and 
substantially collaborative idea. In this model the accepted 
paradigms are: the market and the firm. The workers’ 
paradigms are, so to speak, overshadowed by the former. 
Therefore, there is a link between the two agreements. With 
1992, the labour movement suffers a harsh defeat on its 
previous gains. On this basis, the 1993 deal builds a system 
of industrial relations that encages the unions” (Ibidem: 
171). 
 
Speaking about the prospects of the labour 
movement, Bertinotti argues that: 
 
“it seems to me that what emerges is a union movement 
with reduced spaces of autonomy of claims, and even of 
initiative. With this deal, what is delegitimised is the 
autonomous possibility on the part of the workers to meet, 
to consider as unacceptable the labour and/or wage or 
power conditions under which they are forced to work. 
And then to autonomously propose a platform of claims, to 
promote the protest against the status quo, struggle for 
these demands and for a contract that would include these 
demands. The deal establishes that in order to access the 
negotiations, there is always a condition that is external to 
the workers that must be a priori respected. This condition 
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can be the competitiveness or profitability of the firm, or 
planned inflation” (Ibidem: 171-172). 
 
This radical position of refusal was not incorporated 
into the dominant version of common sense. The distance 
that this part of the union movement expresses vis-à-vis the 
deal and the rest of the labour movement is clear and is 
visible also in the following statement. Commenting on the 
low turnout at the referendum and on the fact that in many 
union bastions in the North (such as Milan and Venice) the 
‘no’ vote gained a majority, Bertinotti argues that 
 
“the union movement is facing an unprecedented problem: 
the dissent vis-à-vis its strategies on the part of its 
base…the unions become stronger as an institution and the 
workers distance themselves from a union that presents 
itself to them with this face…the union becomes an element 
in the system. It becomes an element in the system of 
government that the country is building. In brief, the 
unions have become, with this deal, an institutional part of 
the government” (Ibidem: 174-175). 
 
 Let us now turn to an analysis of the interviews with 
representatives of PD, former PDS. The three interviewees 
all share an overall positive opinion of the pact and the 
reforms that followed it. The sense of urgency and of 
impending catastrophe that the perception of going 
through a crisis generated is a common thread in these 
accounts – as detailed above. Moreover, and most 
prominently in PD♯1 and PD♯2, the limit of this kind of 
social pact is identified in the demands on the part of 
labour of some form of compensation in exchange for the 
offer of wage moderation. PD♯1, asked about the nature of 
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the exchange between the social partners in the 1993 deal, 
stated that: 
  
“there were many meetings with the unions, in those years 
there have been exchanges with respect to welfare policies, 
not in infrastructure and investments, not with respect to a 
strategy for the country, for Italy’s role in the world. The 
problem was a distributive one. And this was the limit that 
I see also today in the attitudes…” 
 
Before, the same interviewee had argued that a 
policy of concertation does not really work because, 
ultimately, what the unions want is to “make a deal with 
the employers and present the bill to the state. This is how 
it works”. Later, he repeats a similar point, arguing that: 
 
“for instance, now (i.e. January 2012) the unions have 
managed the results of this financial package, and there 
were no protests, no strikes, but they have done so because 
they were forced, they have done it reluctantly, and now 
they ask for some symbolic compensation, that a useless 
symbol such as article 18 (i.e. article 18 of the Workers’ 
Statute) remains, just to say: we exist. And the left is then 
very much influenced by this, and so everyone thinks he 
deserves something”. 
 
The vision here is one of a labour movement that 
must not ask for compensations in exchange for wage 
moderation, as it should view this policy as commonsensical, 
as the only possible line of action. This opinion is telling of 
a general attitude within the major centre-left party. In fact, 
PD♯1 sees the possibility that unions do ask for something 
in return as the limit of this kind of pacts. The 
internalisation of the idea that labour represents a sectoral 
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interest that is potentially in contrast to the general interest is 
clear. I have reported above PD♯2’s restrictive 
interpretation of clause on the recovery of past inflation, an 
interpretation that was at odds with the CGIL’s opinion. 
What this stance implies is that organised labour should 
accept wage restraint as the rational strategy for the 
country as a whole, limiting their demands for 
particularistic benefits. Asked about the limits of a policy of 
concertation with the social partners, PD♯2 remarked that 
the greatest obstacles to the consensus of the early 1990s 
came from the unions’ “corporatist pressure”, adding that 
 
“one should go and read the national contracts that were 
signed after the government’s mediation. There was always 
an outlay of public money. It concerned the management of 
restructuring operations and thus the conditions of 
workers, the ways in which they received their cassa 
integrazione…” 
 
What is lamented is once again the ‘corporatist’ 
stance of the unions and the excessive claims that they 
voiced. PD♯3, however, has a slightly different view, 
perhaps reflecting his positioning in the left-wing of the 
party. Above we reported his view that the kind of 
exchange sought in 1993 entailed the increase of investment 
on the part of capital, something that did not materialise. 
Nonetheless, the interviewee holds a positive view of the 
pact: “now everyone forgets about it because 20 years have 
passed and nobody wants to remember, but the unions 
accept an extraordinary wage moderation, that manages to 
substantially sterilise the inflationary impact of a 
devaluation of 35-40%”.  However, he also acknowledges 
that the political exchange has been asymmetrical: 
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“this trilateral pact has worked but in a downward 
manner. It has not built a reformist path and thus has not 
found more advanced solutions after the implosion of the 
pre-1990s model that was visibly unsustainable and that 
worked thanks to exports and public spending. I believe 
that the changes have been deeply asymmetrical, because 
they have involved much more the field of labour and not 
enough the other interested subjects, because if we look at 
what happened in recent years we see a significant 
retrenchment of welfare, we see an increase in taxes on 
dependent labour, the data are very clear”. 
 
He adds that 
 
“substantively, in the so-called Second Republic, instead of 
the ‘balanced disarmament’ Monti talks about in his 
articles for Il Corriere della Sera, we had an ‘unbalanced 
disarmament’ and so today, when one talks about equity, I 
think this should be taken into consideration. That is, the 
previous match did not end up with a draw, it ended up 
with a very negative result for one part, and so equity 
should take into consideration this trajectory”.  
 
 What one can see here is the re-positioning of a part 
of the centre-left political élite towards a more critical 
stance on the changes introduced since the early 1990s, a 
move perhaps  also motivated by the economic and 
financial crisis that has hit the Western economies since 
2008, seen by the interviewee as the result of thirty years of 
neoliberal policies.  
 A secondary but nonetheless significant aspect that 
emerged from the interviews with two union 
representatives (UIL♯1 and CGIL♯1) was the 
interpretation of the issue of egalitarianism, one of the 
cornerstones of the era of ‘union centrality’ (Lange et al. 
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1982) in the 1970s. In the previous chapter I have discussed 
the scala mobile as a crucial outcome of labour’s struggle 
and as a mechanism that reinforced the egalitarian ideology 
of the trade unions. Interestingly, both the interviewees – 
coming from quite different traditions in the Italian labour 
movement – considered the battle of egalitarianism as not 
suitable to the changed economic situation starting from 
the 1980s. Moreover, both see it as a stance that the 
confederal unions should have overcome earlier, and one 
that contributed to the weakening of labour in the 1980s. 
When asked if he considered the scala mobile as a gain for 
labour, UIL♯1 answered 
 
“in my opinion, no, it was not a gain. Just like you cannot 
define gains all that tends towards egalitarianism, all that 
tends to consider the world of labour in the same way. The 
scala mobile was a necessary choice (…) but it was a wrong 
one because if you consider all the workers in the same 
way, it is like saying that merit, knowledge and 
professionalism count nothing. So in principle it was 
wrong but practically, back then, you brought home 
something and naturally a cost-benefit analysis in these 
cases is secondary (…) Like egalitarianism, it is a mistake, 
even if it very felt in CISL, it is a mistake because it 
considers all labour as uniform. They were not numbers 
but people, each one with his own characteristics, his own 
story, his own ambitions and possibilities. So…all that 
tends to consider a phenomenon as equal among the mass 
of the population, the rights and needs, and so on, 
ultimately it is wrong. It has caused a flattening out of 
wages”.  
 
 CGIL♯1, speaking about the same issue, remarks 
that 
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“in the 1980s the unions were suffering because you were 
paying for the chaotic way in which you went through the 
1970s. The COBAS reproduced in a rhetorical way what 
happened in the industries...I spent three years in the 
transport union. General secretary for Emilia-Romagna, 
from 1986 to 1989, and I was able to see in a crucial phase 
the problem of the engine drivers, that then created Or.S.A 
(i.e. a COBAS union). Coming from the experience of the 
metal-workers, I immediately realised the nature of the 
issue. What had happened? In the industrial factories, same 
increase for everyone, egalitarian policies, in the sense that 
the key productive structure that had imposed this was the 
factory, what was called the ‘mass worker’. What 
happened? That in the assembly line of Fiat or Indesit, 
Zanussi, Weber, at some point the worker raises his head 
and says: I am the centre of the production of the 
commodity (…). I am not complementary, but you give me 
less than to all the others. And I have the lowest 
qualification and salary. I question all of this. And from 
here: equal wage increases for everyone, the struggle for 
improving the conditions of work, and so on.  
 
 According to CGIL♯1, this struggle was translated 
in the transformed situation of the 1980s in a completely 
different way: 
 
“these things are simply translated as slogans in situations 
where the same thing has an opposite meaning, for 
instance in the railways. It becomes: equal wage increases 
for everyone, for the workers that are in the office and 
don’t do anything as well…this is felt as an abuse by the 
engine driver, the equivalent of the mass worker…the 
opposite happens, and the confederal unions follow the 
first path: equal wage rises for everyone. (…) All of this 
then causes the rebellion of the engine drivers, that say: 
you don’t represent us, there is no democracy, or simply 
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you use democracy to put everyone else against me…and 
so tensions form and the real COBAS emerge. It is a strong 
wound, there’s nothing you can do about it, because the 
unions continued to say: you are just part of the process. 
And solidarity had worn out”.  
 
 Here, one can see that the union leadership itself 
perceives the battle for the equalisation of wages as an old 
struggle, as an element that was important in a previous 
phase but has now lost much of its appeal and attraction. In 
fact, ideological forms of thought tend in their very 
structure to present those who fight back as old, 
antiquated, and unable to perceive that ‘times have 
changed’. In fact, it is noteworthy that not only public 
opinion, but the interviewees themselves, perceived hard-
won victories of the labour movement as an obstacle to 
change. The perception is that organised labour, in some of 
its positions, is still linked to archaic symbols and ways of 
‘doing politics’. This certainly indicates in itself a position of 
weakness.  
For instance, it is significant that the union 
leadership has partly – at least with regards to this specific 
aspect – internalised the dominant ideology of the 
individualisation of the labour relation. UIL♯1’s opinion is 
here particularly revealing: he presents the necessity to 
overcome the battle for the equalisation of wages as based 
on the need to enhance meritocracy and professionalism. 
These are elements that imply a vision of a more 
individualised contractrual relationship, a discourse that 
emphasises the need to better reflect (even economically) 
each workers’ individual skills and competencies, not 
necessarily neglecting but certainly pushing into the 
background a class-based standpoint.  Clearly, this point 
must be understood within a more global context in which 
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common sense perceptions tended to present neoliberal 
positions as innovative and even, in some aspects, 
revolutionary, with the left and labour seen as conservative 
and defensive in the face of the offensive. Again, this 
defensive position is in itself weak, because it does not 
relaunch the (material and ideological) struggle based on a 
political project, but aims at defending established 
positions. The foreclosure of alternatives generated by 
common sense is here quite clear. Moreover, once the 
commitment to an equalisation of wages weakens, labour – 
precisely because of the absence of alternative projects – by 
default seems to internalise capital’s position regarding the 
need to individualise the labour relation, thus introducing 
elements of ‘flexibility’ in what were perceived to be ‘rigid’ 
mechanisms.  
 
The post-1993 reforms 
 
 The trajectory of the reform period that began in 
1993 was described in chapter 4. This section will therefore 
look at the common sense views on these reforms, 
specifically the reforms of pensions in 1995 and on the 
labour market in 1997. These – particularly the latter – are 
quite representative of the overall consensus and overlap of 
common sense among the social partners.  
Summing up what was said in the previous chapter, 
the 1997 ‘Treu’ package legalised temporary work in 
various forms. Progressively, temporary work was 
extended to several branches of the private and the public 
sector (the latter from 2000), both for skilled and unskilled 
jobs, although initially it was limited to more skilled 
labour. The law also abolished the automatic conversion of 
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temporary contracts into lifelong contracts in the cases in 
which employees continued working, replacing it with 
wage compensations. As Ferrera and Gualmini argue, 
“large urban centres in northern Italy have been the main 
areas of expansion of this new form of employment (i.e. 
temporary work), and male workers and young workers 
below the age of 40 have been its main protagonists” 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 102). In the 1998-2000 period, 
part-time jobs increased from 4.9% to 8.1% of the working 
population, while fixed-term contracts rose from 5.1% to 
9.3%, and continuous and coordinated employment 
contracts (a common form of temporary contract) from 
6.9% to 9%. In-work training contracts also increased, 
surpassing 8% (Ministero del Lavoro 2001).  
The reform also officially dismantled the public 
monopoly on job placement established in 1949. Private 
organisations were admitted for labour market recruiting 
and were allowed to set up their own employment centres, 
competing with the existing public ones. In recent years, 
both national and international temporary work agencies 
have proliferated.  
The law came one year after the signing of the 
‘employment agreement’ between the social partners and 
the government, that formed the basis for a law agreed 
upon by the unions and the employers’ associations. Under 
the heading “negotiated planning”, the government 
introduced several policies aimed at fostering local 
entrepreneurship, based mostly on training programmes 
and the establishment of the so-called territorial pacts and 
area contracts in order to encourage ‘employability’ in 
depressed areas. The former encourage the creation of 
procedures and bargaining rules designed to promote 
business development and employment, with the 
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participation of both the social partners and a wider 
network of private subjects. The latter are contracts for 
specific areas that are suffering from economic crisis. These 
agreements can waive the national contractual standards 
and accept greater wage and administrative flexibility in 
the labour market.  
These combined reforms were mostly agreed upon 
by all the social partners and the parties supporting the 
centre-left government, with the exception of sectors of 
CGIL and Rifondazione Comunista. The overall agreement 
was found by offering, in return for their consent, funds to 
finance welfare provisions in the South (mainly, work 
fellowships and the so-called ‘socially useful jobs’). 
Let us now turn to the interviewees. As can be easily 
expected, the employers held a generally positive view of 
these developments and of the rationale of the labour 
flexibility law, as the interview with the representative of 
Confindustria confirmed. The trade union representative 
UIL♯1 also expressed support for these measure, but used 
a cautious language: 
 
“following the same method and with a lot of patience and 
many contrasts and discussions, in 1997 we made the first 
reform of the labour market and for the first time we 
introduced temporary work, for the moment limited and 
circumscribed to certain categories, mainly of a high 
professional level. We accepted to create temporary work 
agencies that were common all across Europe”. 
 
Notice the use of the pronoun ‘we’ to describe the 
social partners (both trade unions and employers’ 
organisation). In fact, the 1997 law was the outcome of the 
tripartite negotiations and so was presented as a common 
answer (of all the social partners) to the problem of 
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unemployment. Despite the fact that the trade unions and 
the employers’ organisation did not agree on everything, 
they did hold similar ideas on how to face the problem of 
unemployment, even if this common ground was the 
outcome of the acquiescence of labour to capital’s common 
sense view. So, once the unions accepted capital’s version 
of common sense, the social partners were able to agree 
upon the effective measures and present them as a common 
solution to a common problem. Later, the same interviewee 
argued that 
 
“whatever people may say, the method of concertation has 
produced substantial benefits for the citizens and for 
azienda Italia. This has (…) disappeared with the idea of 
doing something new, which was only words, because 
substantively nobody can tell me what was done. After, the 
only thing that was done with efficacy was the 
pulverisation of labour rights, because next to the forms of 
flexibility that we have introduced with temporary work, 
from 2001 onwards all the other forms of access to the 
labour market proliferated. They already had the co.co.co. 
(i.e. the continuous and coordinated employment contracts), but 
no, it was not enough, they wanted more, and they have 
created the precarity that now concerns millions of 
people…I had nothing against Berlusconi, but there is no 
doubt that he has devastated the economy and labour”. 
 
I interpret this view as signaling a weak position of 
labour. Temporary employment and the flexibisation of the 
labour market are not goals of labour but of capital. Hence, 
the use of the phrase “we accepted to create temporary work 
agencies” in the first quotation. This signals the fact that 
labour was willing to offer unilateral concessions as long as 
the government agreed to continue negotiating reforms 
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with the unions, and thus to include labour in the decision-
making process. After the new right-wing government was 
elected in office in 2001, the forms of negotiations with the 
social partners changed, and in place of the tripartite 
negotiations based on the method of ‘social partnership’ – 
concertation of socio-economic reforms with the social 
partners –, the government opted for ‘social dialogue’, a 
form of mediation in which the government consults the 
social partners but has the upper hand in making decisions 
unilaterally.117  
The nature of the asymmetrical exchange emerges 
clearly: concessions in exchange for incorporation into the 
decision-making process and formal legitimation. This does 
not mean that the concessions to the unions were entirely 
symbolic. The labour movement remained a powerful actor 
in the Italian political economy, and the unions were able to 
mitigate the effects of the reforms on their own members by 
‘dumping’ the cost of the reforms (both of pensions and of 
the labour market – see ch.4) onto the non-members or the 
younger generations, therefore maintaining consensus 
within their social base. It is clear, however, that these were 
defensive positions, as unions had accepted the principle of 
reform according to capital’s needs.  
There was thus an accomodation with the consensus 
on the part of the unions, who interiorised the depoliticised 
views on the political economy. Turning now to the 
representatives of the parties, one can see the extent of the 
consensus achieved. PD♯2 remarks that the trade unions,                                                         
117 During the Berlusconi government (2001-2006), sectors of the labour 
movement did manifest more conflictual attitudes, and the largest labour 
demonstration was organised in 2003 against the government’s proposal to 
curtail art.18 of the 1970 Workers’ Statute that defends workers in companies 
with more than 15 employees against firing ‘without a just cause’ (the 
government then abandoned the proposal, even in a watered-down version).   
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the parties of the government majority and the employers’ 
organisation all agreed on the reforms, and that the only 
form of resistance came from the left (Rifondazione 
comunista) and from some sectors of the CGIL. The 
interviewee argued that the most significant limit to the 
experience of concertation in Italy was the ‘corporatist 
pressure’: 
 
“the experience of the Treu legislative package is 
significant. The most extremist sectors of the CGIL and 
COBAS asked for 100.000 socially useful jobs in order to 
accept temporary work, pretending not to know that we 
were being sanctioned at the European level, that we could 
not introduce it, because we had already lost at the judicial 
level, we could not introduce temporary work (…) So there 
was the language of the square, of the protest. This is a 
hypocritical and irresponsible form of action, that also does 
not have faith in the intelligence of single people, who are 
not the noisy minority, but the ones who work hard every 
day, that develop their own opinion, many times even 
different from common sense, and far away from any kind 
of meetings, of organisations”. 
 
This kind of opinion seems to parallel the neoliberal 
idea that organised interests in society – especially 
organised labour – represent a minority that, thanks to its 
positioning as a veto-player in the decision-making 
structure of the state, is capable to push forward the 
corporatist interest of sectors of society at the expense of 
the silent majority “who works hard every day”, who is 
unable to make its voice heard. Moreover, in this quote one 
can see the ideological posture of ‘reason’ against “the 
language of the square” and against “common sense”.  In 
critiquing the position of the left, PD♯2 argues that 
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“the attitude of Rifondazione Comunista was typical of the 
idea of social relations of some forces on the left. What do I 
mean? First of all, Rifondazione had the problem of 
maintaining a dialogue with the COBAS, with the 
organisations of the unemployed in the South…and with a 
minority within the CGIL…So, since for them temporary 
work was equal to caporalato118, it did not matter that we 
showed them with statistical data that the use of temporary 
work in this country was more expensive and more 
difficult than anywhere else in Europe. It’s not true that 
precarity in this country was born out of temporary work, 
it’s absolutely not true, it has been demonstrated, but even 
today it is politically useful to use these slogans. The 
problem in our country was that lifelong contracts have not 
been made more expensive than fixed-term contracts, and 
so the employers use it more, now even more so after the 
right-wing governments have extended their use”. 
 
The problem, according to the interviewee, was that 
 
“Rifondazione Comunista posed as compensation the outlay 
of large sums of public resources to finance 100.000 socially 
useful jobs in the South. There was a very painful internal 
discussion, they threatened a government crisis. It goes 
without saying that the Prime Minister, Treu, me and 
Veltroni, that was vice-president, did not agree at all, and it 
turned out to be a lethal things from the point of view of 
assistenzialismo (i.e. ‘dependency culture’ – see above), even 
today…Certainly there was the idea that since we created 
temporary work we had to give an answer to 100.000 
people in the South. The data shows that it was a totally 
inadequate answer”. 
                                                         
118 A form of illegal recruitment system that is widespread in the South of Italy. 
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PD♯2 defends the position of the government arguing that 
 
“employment was slowly growing, why? Because we had 
on the one hand freed up some resources, and on the other 
we had given a more flexible normative answer to the 
problems of the labour market. For instance the majority of 
small and medium enterprises in the North don’t have any 
recruitment office. They use the work agencies. Thus, they 
externalised costs and so became more competitive, they 
were able to employ one more person, perhaps two or 
three. The European constraint for us in the centre-left has 
been a reference point. Our overall reference point is 
certainly a European-style labour market”.   
 
The pro-capital stance of the opinion expressed in 
this last quote is quite clear: deregulating the labour market 
allowed small and medium enterprises to save on labour 
costs by externalising the service to work agencies, that 
used temporary work, that is more easily displaceable 
when needed. There is no mention of the consequences for 
the workers of this enhanced competitiveness for the firm. 
Asked about the reactions to this legislative package on the 
part of other social partners or political forces, including 
the employers’ organisation, the interviewee answered: 
“there were no problems”. Therefore, the reform of the 
labour market was conceived as a process of modernisation 
to which everyone agreed to, except “extremist sectors of 
the CGIL” and Rifondazione Comunista. It can be argued that 
capital’s common sense view on the labour market 
(deregulation brings greater competitiveness and 
employment) had by now consolidated on the state’s 
institutional terrain. The introduction of greater flexibility 
was thus a goal of the employers who were able to demand 
and attain trade union acquiescence in a time of high 
530   
unemployment (above 10% starting from the mid-1990s). 
This acquiescence was also based on the perception that 
there was no other way to increase employment other than 
deregulating the labour market and thus moving in the 
direction of an economy with greater worker insecurity, 
fewer rights and lower salaries. 
The resistances were coming from the left, and 
particularly from the left-wing of CGIL and Rifondazione 
Comunista, a party that was led by Fausto Bertinotti (former 
leader of the ‘Essere Sindacato’ faction of CGIL) whose 
opinions on the 1993 deal have been reported above. It is 
clear that these opinions did not overlap with the common 
sense that was gaining ground within the centre-left 
coalition. Rifondazione Comunista later withdrew its support 
for the Prodi government. 
The deflationary impact of the Maastricht certainly 
played a role in how the labour market reform was 
conceived: as I remarked above, the deregulation of the 
labour market tends statistically to lower wages and has no 
statistical effect on the level of employment. Deregulation 
was however deemed useful to increase employment, as 
also PD♯1 remarked:  
 
“back then, what we said was: let’s try to change the labour 
market so that we can increase the quota of active workers, 
women’s labour, and ultimately in order not to face the real 
problems, we have created the most dual labour market in 
the world. We said: let’s defend the workers that are there 
already, and then let’s give to the firms the possibility to do 
something on the margins. And then the margins became 
the normality…this was the issue, and there was no 
opposition. It seemed like a way forward in the direction of 
flexibility….flexibility as a way to increase employment. It 
is better to have a job than no job”. 
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 Although the tone of this latter comment is 
somewhat critical, there seems to be resignation to the fact 
that no alternative was envisaged “it seemed like a way 
forward”). The common sense version of the main centre-
left party thus overlapped quite markedly with the goals of 
capital, as the party acquiesced to labour market 
flexibisation together with the bulk of organised labour. So, 
it was the subordination of the most significant sectors of 
organised labour that made concertation work well. By 
‘working well’ I mean that labour continued to acquiesce to 
capital’s version of common sense, that was consolidated 
on the state’s institutional apparatus.  
Clearly, and as I pointed out above, the concessions 
to labour were not merely symbolic. The participation of 
the unions in the drawing up of both the 1997 law on the 
labour market and the 1995 pension reform did prevent the 
reforms from touching more heavily on the interests of 
organised labour (and on the indirect salary). In fact, the 
1995 reform was more lenient on labour than the one 
presented by the right-wing government the year before 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 138-145; see chapter 4).  As 
mentioned above, the 1995 reform was actually not only 
negotiated,  but largely drafted by union exports informally 
assisting ministerial technicians (Regalia and Regini 1998). 
There is little doubt in the literature that it represented an 
instance of welfare retrenchment, even if its effects were 
chronologically spread out over the following years (see 
Barba 2011: 79; Paggi and Cantelli 2011: 134; see Ch. 4). 
 One of the reasons for this kind of acquiescence that 
emerged in the interviews was the argument that a refusal 
on the part of organised labour to accept a ‘modernisation’ 
of welfare and of the labour market could be detrimental in 
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the sense that capital would then have an incentive to 
implement more radical reforms refusing the method of 
consensus and concertation altogether and aiming at a 
restructuring of the economy towards a much more Anglo-
Saxon set of arrangements.  
The absence of a tradition of consensualism in Italy 
generally makes the possibility of reaching an agreement 
difficult. The interviewees from labour and from the centre-
left political spectrum tended to stress that reaching 
consensus was the priority and that the resistances came 
from sectors of Italian capital that were ‘unwilling’ to 
mediate, usually described as linked to the political right, 
and from sectors of the left that were ‘ideological’. An idea 
that tended to surface in the interviews with 
representatives of labour and of the political centre-left was 
that if an agreement among them was not found on how to 
‘rationalise’ the Italian political economy by 
institutionalising a mechanism for maintaining wage 
moderation and partially retrenching the welfare state 
keeping certain rights for organised labour, then either the 
economic situation would become unsustainable or the 
centre-right would implement much more punitive reforms 
vis-à-vis labour. Thus, the indirect pressure of capital to 
break the method of concertation was felt and it forced the 
hand of labour. Labour was forced to “learn”, to “be 
convinced on” (to use Ferrera and Gualmini’s language – 
Ferrera and Gualmini 2004) how to adapt. It was not a 
neutral learning process, but one that was happening 
against the background of the threat of unilateral reform. 
This can be seen as a variation of the ‘impending 
catastrophe’ argument: either agreement and consensus are 
reached rapidly, or a much worse (for labour) settlement 
will be devised. 
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In the quote cited above, UIL♯1 argued that the 
1993 pact was the best one possible because by then the 
wage-indexation mechanism had been abolished and so 
leaving the setting of the inflation rate entirely to market 
mechanisms would have been worse (in his opinion). 
Consider the following excerpt, in which UIL♯1 describes 
the advent of the Berlusconi government in 1994. 
 
“the system of concertation worked well until a certain 
point, then it entered into a crisis. In 1994 there were the 
elections. Forza Italia became the first party and so formed 
government with AN and the Lega. Notwithstanding his 
initial remarks, Berlusconi has never maintained his 
promises. He said that he was in favour of concertation, we 
organised some meetings on incomes policy. But then after 
having said all of these things, in the summer of 1994, his 
Minister of the Treasury, Dini, from the Bank of Italy, gave 
an interview on the weekly Panorama and without having 
discussed anything with us, presented a framework for a 
reform of pensions that would have been a real social 
massacre…They wanted a very strong compression of the 
pension system and without discussing anything…and 
then there was the reaction that we all know, a very strong 
reaction and one of the reasons of the reaction was that 
they were unilaterally violating the protocol that bound 
each one of us to certain attitudes, including the 
government(…) 
 
However, with the new Dini government, formed after 
Lega Nord had withdrawn its support for Berlusconi, 
 
“we worked together and we worked well with patience 
and constancy, and we did the first real pension reform. 
The one whose effects we feel up to now. Now the 
government (i.e. the Monti government) says: the 
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contribution-related system will be the effective system for 
everyone. But that system was introduced in 1995 with 
Dini. It was sometimes painful but we did that reform, it 
worked”. 
 
 Here one can see that the fear of a harsh pension 
reform was one of the elements that convinced the unions 
to negotiate with the new government a pension reform 
that – even if ‘painful’ – would mitigate the costs for 
organised labour and prevent a more radical reform. 
Considering that, according to the literature (see ch.4), the 
1995 pension reform was not very different from 
Berlusconi’s failed proposal, it seems from the interview 
above that the element that made the difference was the 
inclusion of organised labour into the decision-making 
process. Thus, the unions were willing to accept a punitive 
reform if the government was willing to negotiate it with 
the unions. The need for reform was however perceived as 
necessary. PD♯2 also has a positive view on the pension 
reform of the Dini government: 
 
“the interesting thing is that that kind of government 
majority – we supported the government – with Treu as 
minister and Dini as Prime Minister, was able to do the first 
real important pension reform. Together with the unions, 
but with a decisive role of the parliament. The unions 
naturally had many ‘bellyaches’, but it was done”. 
 
The deal is presented as touching on some of labour’s 
interests but nevertheless necessary. PD#1 describes the 
nature of the 1995 deal on pension as follows: 
 
“in 1995 we risked default once again, the Berlusconi 
government fell, and then came Dini who had the task of 
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doing this pension reform. And in fact he did it, it could 
have been decisive and more radical and the PDS was in 
favour of the contribution-related system but some in the 
unions were against (...) PDS proposed to have a pro quota 
system starting from the first year…but then the idea of 
UIL, that was backed by CISL and the others, prevailed. 
And this thing of 18 years remained, and we carried it with 
us until now119. So, once again, delays and fears”.  
 
 The compromise found in 1995 is judged by the 
interviewee as insufficient, as it prevented a more radical 
reform in the direction of a contribution-related system in 
place of an earnings-related system, (the traditional welfare 
state solidaristic pension system). The former links the 
actual pension with the individual wage (see ch. 4 and 
Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 112). The inabilty of the 
government to pass a more radical reform is judged a 
consequence of fear of change on the part of the Italians. 
But this ‘change’ was not class-neutral.   
 The acquiescence of labour to the flexibisation of the 
labour market and pension reform was driven by the 
dominant position of capital in general. This is visible in the 
fact that the state was not a neutral agent, but effectively 
supported these reforms and even attempted to pursue – as 
with the 1994 Berlusconi government – a unilateral action 
in the face of a lack of agreement, although it was forced to 
give up. However, the state was an active actor in the 
process, constantly pushing for consensual reform (as the 
Amato, Ciampi, Dini and Prodi governments).  In this 
situation, labour had to ‘learn’ to accept the reforms, and to                                                         
119 The reform maintained the earnings-related system for workers with at least 
18 years of work in 1995. This was a compromise solution, as the unions were 
skeptical on the new contribution-related schema starting immediately for 
everyone.    
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be more ‘realistic’, because it was forced from the 
beginning to either negotiate the reforms and attempt to 
mitigate what it considered to be its harshest aspects, or 
risk seeing tougher reforms pass unilaterally. Reforming 
the labour market or retrenching the welfare state were 
clearly not in the interest of labour, but of capital. Although 
the unions did manage to limit the extent of the reforms, 
they were stuck in a position of weakness and forced to 
accept an asymmetrical deal.  
 From all the above, it can be concluded that 1993 
was capital’s moment of power in the Italian political 
economy, a key turning point that set in stone the path that 
socio-economic policy was to follow in the next years. As I 
reported above, even some of the critical voices (like 
PD♯3) of certain aspects of the reforms, believed the 
attainment of consensus in 1993 to have been beneficial for 
the Italian economy, allowing it to respect the Maastricht 
criteria (except the debt criteria) and join the monetary 
union. On the other hand, the relatively poor economic 
performance of the economy in the 1990s was not sufficient 
to generate a transformation in labour’s common sense 
towards a more critical stance. In fact, the assumption that 
the country suffered from economic vulnerability and that 
wage moderation was the means by which Italy could 
adapt to a new economic scenario was strongly internalised 
by labour. Once devaluation was ruled out as a mechanism 
for adjustment, in purely economic terms the deflationary 
bias of the structure of the Eurozone implied that only 
wage moderation could be used to compete, and more so in 
a situation in which the surplus country (Germany) uses 
wage moderation and productivity increases to enhance 
exports, and in turn finances the peripheral countries with 
the earnings (see ch.4).  
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Elements of the left’s ideological transformation 
 
This final section adds a reflection on a few elements 
in the ideological transformation of the left in the 1990s. 
Here I use the term ‘ideology’ because I do not simply refer 
to interiorised forms of thought, such as common sense, but 
to conscious interventions that seek to create a new 
synthesis among different elements to develop a coherent 
framework of thought more in line with the 
transformations in contemporary capitalism. Obviously, 
considering the complexity of the Italian left’s 
transformation, the following just refers to a few  aspects 
that have emerged during the interviews.  
 In the preceding chapter, I discussed the emergence 
of a centre-left discourse in the 1990s centered on the 
‘culture of stability’ and on what historian Leonardo Paggi 
called a ‘reformism without mutualistic principles’, in an 
attempt to overcome not only the Italian communist 
tradition, but also the socialist and – eventually – the social-
democratic ones. As an introduction to the opinions of the 
interviewed actors, I would like to report a couple of 
comments from the scholars Della Sala and Paggi, starting 
from the former:  
 
“in the 1980s and 1990s, when all the rest of Europe was 
going in the neoliberal direction, there hasn’t been much 
discussion in Italy. Strangely enough, if there was any 
discussion, it was within the left. And at times even within 
the unions. I remember (…) an editorial from Cofferati (the 
leader of CGIL in the 1990s),  in 1995-1996, in which he says: 
we have to think about a society based on shareholders. 
Not stakeholders, but really: shareholders. This is the 
leader of a leftist union confederation. So, if he says this it 
means that on the other side there is no discussion and 
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Italian capital has often made a strategic use of liberal and 
neoliberal arguments. When they are necessary, we want 
them, but not necessarily accept the neoliberal package” 
(interview with Della Sala).  
  
 This is a quite revealing comment. Della Sala’s 
description of the right in the 1990s must be linked with 
what has been said in the previous chapter, namely the 
importance of the strategy of trasformismo and the legacy 
that the construction of the Italian democratic state in the 
postwar decades by the DC has left. Italian capital, as well 
as its not always loyal political referent (the DC) – as I show 
above – has made a selective use of liberal policies. On the 
other hand, the internalisation of a liberal critique of the DC 
regime on the part of the left, as well as the lack of a 
conflictual theory of society and the myth of national unity, 
were also important legacies that re-surfaced in the early 
1990s when they encountered a new international 
neoliberal culture that was rapidly becoming hegemonic 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. This long quotation from 
my interview with Paggi gives a good idea of the kind of 
transformation: 
 
“the areas where the PCI was strong were the areas of the 
democratic tradition of Mazzini. This tradition is very 
important in the left. It was a weak and at the same time 
idealist political formation. It was fragile, without many 
links with other forces, very sublimated.  Exactly like the 
PCI. Without the Soviet Union the PCI would have 
collapsed, because it was the centre, it gave a sense of 
identity, of antagonism. The reference to the USSR was 
fundamental, even for the myth. The 1993 deals cannot be 
explained without the fall of the USSR”. 
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The presence of a myth was therefore central for the 
identity of the PCI. However, as argued in chapter 4, this 
hyper-identitarian element of the party coexisted with a 
theory of society that was essentially harmonic, based on the 
mutual development of socialism and democracy. As Paggi 
argues, 
 
“in the PCI there was no theory of society based on conflict.  
Even if the PCI had done a lot of conflict. The 1975 deal is 
attained after a series of struggles that start at the 
beginning of the 1960s. It’s not that the PCI has not been 
conflictual, that it has not defended interests, it’s that all of 
this does not translate into political conscience, into 
democratic culture. And so this democratic hegemony 
remains in the hands of the tradition of the Action Party, 
the deflationary tradition of Einaudismo…the important 
thing now is that this leftist tradition since 1991, this PD, is 
born on the basis of the ‘Republic of citizens’ against the 
‘Republic of parties’. This is an important fact. Occhetto (the 
leader of the PCI-PDS in the early 1990s)  joins forces with 
the ones that organised the referendum, with the populist 
attack. In order to dismantle the PCI he has to lean on this 
culture, for instance Mario Segni. And Maranini, the 
extreme liberal constitutionalists, who have always 
attacked the Italian constitution as a Soviet constitution, as 
a ‘consociative’ constitution. Amato is a central 
figure…there is a strong attack against the parties, as an 
element of imperfection in a democracy”.  
  
I believe this quotation effectively describes central 
elements in the transformation of the left. The absence of a 
conflictual theory of society makes the heirs of the PCI 
more open to liberal political positions, also because of the 
lack of a conflictual understanding of social relations. Once 
the hyperidentity of the party weakened with the emergence 
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of a post-modern individualist society and with the fall of 
the USSR, the liberal undercurrent in the left re-emerged.   
Let us now turn to some elements that can be drawn 
from the interviews with the political actors. The first 
element that has emerged with clarity in the interviews 
with two of the representatives of the PD was the explicit 
distancing from what is considered an archaic ‘statist’ 
political culture. This factor has been underlined quite 
markedly in the interviews, and in several instances by 
PD♯2. The interviewee also affirms that the main obstacles 
to reform during the centre-left governments of the 1990s – 
the interviewee was a member of the government under 
the Ministry of Labour – came from leftist resistances to 
‘modernisation’, as I also noted above when discussing the 
issue of labour flexibility (the fact that Rifondazione and 
leftist elements in CGIL asked for a compensation for the 
passing of the labour flexibility law). These resistances, in 
PD♯2’s opinion, stem from the missed chance to overcome 
an antiquated conception of the role of the state. Consider 
the following statements by PD♯2. It is significant that 
PD♯2 comes from the experience of the PCI, having been 
elected in Parliament in the 1980s. When asked about the 
strategy the centre-left had in mind in combating 
unemployment, the interviewee argued that 
 
“for the left, for the centre-left, the fundamental 
transformation in the view of how to combat 
unemployment and of the role of the state is linked to two 
elements. The first, luckily, is the abandonement, that I 
think is definitive – if not for a minority – of a statist 
culture: the idea that the state can do business. It is 
completely abandoned. Actually, on the contrary what 
happened was that perhaps we emphasised too much the 
effects of some privatisations that in the end have not really 
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worked as we had predicted, such as the privatisation of 
Autostrade (the national highway system) (…) some 
privatisations worked, others did not (…) but employment 
was slowly growing, why? Because we had on the one 
hand freed up some resources, and on the other we had 
given a more flexible normative answer to the problems of 
the labour market.” 
 
 PD♯1, himself also coming from the experience of 
the PCI, talks about the role of the Communist party in the 
1980s as in some way that of a collaborator of what he 
considers to be policies of excessive state spending. In this 
critique of the role of the PCI one can see the 
transformation of the left’s ideology towards a more liberal 
understanding of the relation between state and civil 
society, as argued also above by PD♯2. Consider these 
statements by PD♯1: 
 
“in the 1980s we had a deficit…and the governments were 
the centre-left governments of the First Republic, the PCI 
and the MSI (i.e. Movimento Sociale Italiano, the post-fascist 
party) were in opposition. The governments never faced the 
problem of the cuts in state spending or the increase in 
taxes. On the other hand, the PCI – with the exception of a 
few, even if preeminent, members of Parliament of the 
‘independent left’ – was critical of the deficit, but the 
substance is that it did not want any intervention on social 
policies, even less so on pensions, and on the issue of the 
scala mobile – it even organised a referendum. This was the 
situation, from there we had to organise a new politics, a 
new direction for the party”.  
 
 PD♯2 gives a useful account of what the 
interviewee considers to be the obstacles to reform and 
consensus in the 1990s: the leftist elements within the 
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government coalition and the leftist faction within CGIL. 
These actors are seen as the bearers of obsolete ideas, in 
particular with regards to the role of the state. Speaking 
about the 1997 ‘Treu’ reform of the labour market, PD♯2 
argues that 
 
“there is no doubt that the ‘Treu’ package is an important 
step in the modernisation of the whole centre-left. 
However, there are some unresolved problems in the 
sectors that have as electoral reference the leftist parties, or 
at least that used to have that electoral reference. Now we 
really cannot say that about significant sectors of CGIL, 
because they vote anything, including Lega Nord, so now 
we cannot use these categories anymore, but in the 1990s, 
yes. Even if, already in 1996, the big success of the Lega in 
Lombardy and Piedmont was the result also of the vote of 
the working class”.  
 
Here one can see the identification of the ‘enemies’ 
of the reform in the left, and the admission that significant 
parts of the former historical bloc of the left have changed 
political referents. There is thus an awareness of the 
distance between the new reformist position of the heir of 
the PCI and the leftist trade-unionist ‘corporatism’ – as the 
interviewee defined the stance of the most militant sectors 
of organised labour. Even more telling is the following 
quote, that usefully characterises the gulf between the 
‘new’ left and what the interviewee considers outdated 
attitudes of sectors of the ‘old’ left: 
 
“the resistances to reform, in the first place, come from the 
statists, so also from the extreme left. Because Europe 
becomes the mirror of your conscience, you have to 
measure yourself against something that is larger than you. 
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And that also creates constraints, because you share the 
currency…So: certainly the extreme left. Why? Well, 
because it has an unconfessed leninist idea of the state, as 
the instrument of equity, and for them it is simply their 
state. It is not a state that is conditioned and influenced by 
parameters…and on the other hand, the populist right that 
does not want Europe”.  
 
The common sense assumption of economic 
vulnerability emerges also in this passage, where the 
interviewee underlines the ‘parameters’ that the Italian 
state must respect, and that are outside of its control, 
because “you share the currency”. There is also, I argue, a 
neoliberal posture in this kind of discourse, distancing itself 
from the ‘corporatist’ and ‘statist’ tradition of the left and 
from the ‘populism’ of the right. The ‘culture of stability’ 
that Ciampi talked about is quite close in fact to a 
technocratic view of social relations, one that tends to 
perceive alternative political stances as characterised by a 
‘populist’ or ‘demagogic’ discourse, in contrast to the 
healthy ‘realism’ of a reformist attitude that is aware of the 
parameters and constraints within which the state must act. 
From a neo-Gramscian persepective, these parameters and 
constraints are understood as themselves the creation of 
human action, and not some sort of objective criteria that 
stand outside political control.  
Moreover, the engineering of society from above 
based on technocratic principles of a rational governance of 
the economy has been seen as one of the main element of 
neoliberalism, as argued in the previous chapter. Van der 
Pijl entitles his illuminating chapter on neoliberalism in his 
2006 book Global Rivalries “the market against democracy”, 
highlighting precisely this element of élitist technocratic 
governance as a curtailment of both democratic 
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accountability and the power and influence of the 
intermediate bodies in civil society (described by 
neoliberals as ‘veto players’), that characterises the most 
recent capitalist hegemony. In Italy, the link to this 
transnational capitalist transformation was arguably 
provided by a centre-left technocratic élite (the Amato-
Ciampi-Dini-Prodi line), and not mainly by the Berlusconi 
right, still partly dependent on a network of political-
corporatist links with significant sectors of Italian civil 
society. In a curious paradox of history, it was the former 
communists who embodied most completely the neoliberal 
discourse and practice in the 1990s.  
On the transformation of the left’s ideology a couple 
of other quotes from the same interviewee are significant. 
Consider this first excerpt on the interpretation of the 
history of the left. Asked about the changing 
interpretations of the role of the state by the Italian left, 
PD♯2 answers:  
 
“I would like to say that on the role of the state in the 
economy there has been (i.e. in the First Republic) a 
convergence of common sense, of politically transversal 
sub-cultures. And also socially transversal, in terms of 
interests. Even Confindustria was in favour of a direct 
intervention in the economy, in the same way as the CGIL, 
the CISL and the UIL were in favour”. 
 
PD♯2 is also quite critical of the role played by the PCI: 
 
“even when we talk about the left we have to keep in mind 
that the left had different forms of party organisations. In 
the 1960s, the greatest innovators were the socialists. The 
communists realised only very late what the economic 
boom and the centre-left government had meant. 
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Remember that the communist party was against the 
colour television. The socialists were great innovators. 
They were the main promoters of the health system reform, 
of the unified middle school (…) They had a great vision 
(…) The communists have made great strides in the 1970s on the 
issue of the market – from a conceptual point of view –, on a 
reduction and a regulative function of the state, a non-invasive 
function of the state. However, a statist sub-culture remains, 
there is no doubt about that, while the socialist party does not 
have this statist sub-culture. It does not have it, it is more 
liberal. And then the socialists, in an effort of accreditation, 
even in the phase of the dwarves and the ballerinas,120 
import in Italy an ensemble of new cultures and forms of 
thought.  
 
In chapter 4 I discussed the role of Amato and Bobbio in the 
evolution of a liberal critique of the Dc regime. It is thus 
significant that, in praising the positions of the PSI, PD♯2 
argues that 
 
“an accomplice, a positive accomplice in this, is the fertile 
relationship between people like Giuliano Amato, Bobbio 
and Ruffolo. Bobbio brings with him liberal thought, the 
LibLabs, and they bring the relationships with the American 
universities, new trends in liberal-democratic thought…the 
socialists feel this problem of distancing themselves from a 
certain communist cultural hegemony that says that the 
taxpayer should pay also for the production of films. Even 
today they fight against the cuts in culture, including cuts 
in film production. But in this logic also the trash movies 
are financed, because it is a national production. So, there is 
a communist statist sub-culture, there is the idea that the                                                         
120 In Italian, the phase of nani e ballerine is a reference to the 1980s rule by 
coalition governments of the DC and the PSI, and to the generally held view 
that this was a decade of corruption and easy money, coupled with the rise of 
private television and a more hedonistic attitude.  
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state can do anything, the idea that if it is not public it does 
not bring justice or quality. This is a sub-culture that 
continues all through the 1980s, but then there is no doubt 
that these sub-cultures start to fall. Now they re-emerge in 
other movements, in strange movements, but certainly not 
in those, like us, who have entered a party like the PD, 
coming from the communist experience”.  
 
Moving on to the transformation of the PCI in the 1990s, 
the interviewee remarks that: 
 
“there is no doubt that the post-1989 theoretical reflections bring 
an awareness that freedom is market freedom. The communists 
even wrote it in the constitution…but you really accept it 
all the way. And the problem becomes one of the re-
legitimation of the state, conceptualised as an institution, 
the problem of state authority within a European context. 
The transfer of sovereignty…The state here takes a step back 
from the octopus state121 and its tentacles, and re-conquers a new 
authority for itself in a completely new scenario, so there is no 
doubt that the state as an entrepreneur cannot exist 
anymore…Now, the issue of privatisation is not there 
anymore. There is little left to privatise. The problem now 
is: have these privatisations been handled well? They need 
to be analised. Do they operate in a free market or are they 
still in protected markets?...This is the cultural line of the 
PD, so you are not constantly with your head turned 
backwards”.  
 
Several themes emerge in these quotes. First of all, 
the retrospective view of the socialist party as an innovator 
and the communist party as in way stuck in a statist 
impasse. Bobbio and Amato were two important figures in                                                         
121 The original term used is la piovra, the metaphor of a state that extends its 
reach in all corners of civil society.  
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the ‘liberal strategy’ of the Second Republic (see above). 
The fact that they are here cited as positive examples of the 
kind of culture that was – according to the interviewee – 
lacking in the PCI is telling of interiorisation of the liberal 
(considering the nature of Amato’s critique of the DC 
regime on essentially liberal lines) culture by the post-
communist tradition. Essentially, there is a quite negative 
view of the ‘communist sub-culture’, unequivocabilly 
identified with an antiquated ‘statism’ and thus with a 
view of an omnipotent and prodigal state. The idea that 
emerges from the interview with PD♯2 is that the new PD 
must not look ‘backwards’ but accept the challenges of 
modernity against both an uncompromising left and an 
essentially populist and anti-modern right (impersonated 
by the figure of Berlusconi).  
Another revealing element that must be 
acknowledged are the fact that the PCI’s experience is in 
some way equated with that of the Soviet Union by the 
simple fact that the interviewee refers to the ‘post-1989’ 
theoretical reflections, thus signaling that 1989 was the 
crucial year also for the Italian communists. This equation 
of Italian communism with the Soviet bloc serves the 
function of discrediting the trajectory of the PCI and 
allowing for a re-launching of the liberal elements that 
were already present in sectors of the party, but within a 
new conceptual framework.  ‘Statist’ resistances are seen as 
stemming from the antiquated sectors of the left, while the 
‘First Republic’ state is negatively presented as an 
authoritarian ‘octopus’ that invades civil society with its 
‘tentacles’, an image that brings back to mind the neoliberal 
attacks against the ‘threat of Leviathan’,  for instance by 
James Buchanan (1975).  
What is ultimately assumed in these lines is a 
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neoliberal idea of society, in which the idea of a rationally-
organised capitalism – albeit with compensatory ‘social’ 
elements – is possible only as the restriction of the role of 
the state. The restoration of micro-economic rationality to 
the individual’s life-cycle, perhaps the central objective of 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic project (Van der Pijl 1998: 
129-132; Overbeek 1993) implies a theory of society – and 
thus a policy stance – conceptualised around the 
relationship between the individual and the market. 
Intermediate institutions organised around collective 
identities – and, potentially, class identities – are seen as 
political interventions into a rational economic logic, and so 
the aim of government is seen also as  containing the power 
of such institutions. The reference to the need to a “re-
legitimation of the state” and the problem of “state 
authority” signal that what was envisaged was a distancing 
of the state from the organised interests in civil society that 
were seen as blocking reforms, and its repositioning as a 
more autonomous power. These reflections mirror Della 
Sala’s (1997) argument about the ‘hollowing out’ and 
‘hardening’ of the state mentioned in chapter 4. 
Neoliberalism was also about creating a ‘strong state’ that 
is independent from conflictual political influences coming 
from ‘below’, as a precondition for a ‘free economy’ (see 
Gamble 1994).  
 A further issue that emerges in the interviews with 
two representatives of the PD is the idea that the PDS (later 
DS), at the time of Maastricht treaty and the following 
reforms aiming at respecting the Maastricht parameters, 
was aiming at looking ‘beyond’ Maastricht. Monetary 
union was seen as one step in the political unification of 
Europe, a stance that also Prodi takes in his interview. Here 
it may be useful to briefly cite a passage from Van 
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Apeldoorn’s 2002 book Transnational Capitalism and the 
Struggle over European Integration, in which the author gives 
a good description of the rival projects that were devised in 
the early 1990s by different constellations of social forces 
across Europe. Crucially, the kind of compromise achieved 
with the successful ‘embedded neoliberal’ project, although 
incorporating elements of three different projects – the 
neoliberal project, the mercantilist project and the social-
democratic project – was skewed towards the first. The 
author argues that “all three projects favoured a 
relaunching of Europe through the completion of the 
internal market: as such, all three were relatively market-
oriented. This (particularly on the part of social democracy) 
in itself already reflected a shift away from previous 
ideological orientations vis-à-vis the integration process” 
(Van Apeldoorn 2002: 78). Moreover, 
 
 “The social-democratic project for Europe’s socio-
economic order developed within the context of the initial 
success of the internal market programme and the new 
‘Europhoria’ engendered by it. It was within this context 
that, in particular within the European Commission, the 
idea took hold that the internal market ought to be 
complemented with a ‘social dimension’ or, more boradly, 
a project for positive integration ensuring a strong 
regulatory political framework to embed the new single 
market” (Ibidem: 78-79). 
 
I argue that the following quotes from the interviews 
with representatives of the PD signal that the Italian 
progressive forces supported the social-democratic project 
for integration that – however – was itself  incorporated 
into the wider ‘embedded neoliberal’ project. The latter 
ultimately aimed at creating market-enhancing policies at 
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European level, while maintaining symbolic concessions to 
labour and social-democracy at the supranational level and 
the remaining elements of embeddedness (in the Polanyian 
sense) at the national level. 
 
 Consider the following citation from PD♯3: 
 
“Maastricht has been important, and the problems that we 
now see in Maastricht, that are there, were even more 
visible back then, in that part of the centre-left 
establishment that most insisted on the Euro, for instance 
Ciampi, Prodi, Napolitano and the union leaders. Back 
then, Maastricht was not the arrival point, but a stage in a 
longer path that should have taken us to common 
economic policies and a form of political union.  
 
This first paragraph indicates that the centre-left of the 
1990s indeed has as its political horizon the development of 
a ‘political Europe’. However, 
 
“with the benefit of hindsight we have had too much faith 
in a sort of mechanism that would have automatically 
taken us from a common currency to a common politics. In 
reality, this ambition, that a part of the European 
progressive forces had, clashed with a paradigm that was 
very strong and that substantially saw in the common 
currency and the internal market the two instruments that 
are sufficient for an economically functioning union. This 
has been the basic issue: that for some, Maastricht was just 
a stage in a process, while for others it was the end of the 
process: with budgetary policies constrained by the treaty 
provisions, monetary policy entrusted to an independent 
institution like the European Central Bank – whose only 
goal was inflation – they added the internal market, and 
there you had a recipe to make the economy work. We 
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deceived ourselves that following this paradigm, this could 
be the process to make Europe work and then we arrived at 
this situation that we know. But the progressive forces, 
particularly the Italian progressive forces, have betted on 
the Euro were not within this horizon, this vision. They 
had another vision and they rightly continue to claim it”.  
 
 PD♯1 has a similar opinion: 
 
“Delors tried to introduce more social measures with the 
social chapter, but they cancelled it immediately. He also 
said that was needed was at least some common 
infrastructure, investments, and that did not happen. 
Delors knew economics well, unlike now…The design of 
the Euro, as we were perfectly aware of, was not a point of 
arrival but a bet on the future”.  
 
 I would argue that behind this progressive idea of 
Europe stood a fundamental assumption that has guided 
the action of leftwing forces: the idea of ‘globalisation’ as an 
irreversible, irresistible and inevitable process. As Prodi 
argued,  
 
“Globalisation, there is actually little you can do, it is an 
inevitable thing. The problem is joining forces together and 
winning the competition, in order not to lose too much 
terrain. If you want to stop globalisation, go ahead, if you 
are willing to fight a new world war that destroys the 
whole world, you can do it…we are at these levels, this is 
what I am afraid of, that globalisation is an irreversible fact, 
because it is the basis for the rebirth of four billion people”. 
 
Globalisation is thus fetishised as an uncontrollable process 
that one may hope to placate but never to subdue. Even 
here, what is significant is that ‘globalisation’ is not 
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necessarily viewed positively. In fact, in Prodi’s remarks 
quoted above there is even a negative assumption 
regarding the consequences of the process. However, it is 
seen as a ‘fact’, as the current ‘reality’ that one is forced to 
face. The evoking of the constraints of globalisation 
effectively normalise the policies and measures that are 
carried out in its name and shape perspective of the ‘limits 
of the possible’ in political terms (see Hay and Rosamond 
2002 for a theoretical reflection along these lines). Again, if 
thought is conceived as an aspect of social practice, what is 
ultimately crucial is what the discourse of globalisation does 
in terms of social relations  
 
 In this chapter, based on the interviews conducted 
with the representatives of the social partners and of 
political parties, I have traced the common sense 
assumptions that have guided the ideas and actions of the 
main actors in the Italian political economy of the 1990s. I 
have analysed the issue of consensus and conflict in Italy 
and argued that from the common sense perspectives of the 
actors emerges the dominant idea that Italian history was a 
history of conflict and lack of consensus, although clearly 
there is no agreement on the responsibilities for this lack of 
consensus. I have then showed that the assumption of 
economic vulnerability forms an anchor for the different 
versions of common sense, and that this reference point is 
in itself conditioned by the view of Italy’s weak position 
within the international economy. The assumption of 
economic vulnerability in turn generated the common 
sense view that wage moderation is the means by which to 
adapt to economic change, particularly once devaluation as 
an option was ruled out. I then analysed the economic crisis 
of the early 1990s and the collective perception of crisis that 
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created the conditions for the reaching of consensus. I also 
focused on the internalisation of the common sense 
assumptions and the asymmetric nature of the 1993 pact 
and the following reforms, before concluding with a brief 
analysis of some elements in the ideological transformation 
of the left in Italy.  
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Conclusions 
 
 This research has studied consensus formation 
within a Western capitalist political economy. Its aim was 
both understanding and explaining how consensus on a 
phase of neoliberal restructuring of social relations – and 
thus of state/society relations – was achieved. Consensus in 
itself was presented as a phenomenon worth studying, thus 
overturning the mainstream bias that tends to focus on 
explaining conflict instead as the exception and consensus 
as the rule. This work assumes that in a divided society, as 
a capitalist society inevitably is, conflict is endemic. 
Whether it bursts out in the open or is mediated by ‘the 
political’, class struggle is the motive force of history and of 
social transformation. In the Marxian political economy 
perspective that is proposed here, it is not ‘the economic’ 
that determines ‘the social’ or ‘the political’; quite on the 
contrary, ‘the economic’ itself is the outcome of class 
struggle, so that the latter is the key mediation between 
structure and agency. Therefore, consensus is an interesting 
and revealing object of study in itself: the ways in which 
capitalist social relations are naturalised, depoliticised 
and/or contested is historically and territorially specific, 
depending upon historical sedimentations of class struggle 
and accompanying forms of thought, hegemonies, and 
ultimately common sense.  
 The notion of common sense, as the basis for how 
human beings make sense of the situation they find 
themselves in, was applied to the Italian case. The diffusion 
of dominant versions of common sense generates a 
depoliticisation of social relations that takes on the granitic 
quality of ‘reality’. Through interviews with organic 
intellectuals it was shown that the way ‘the international’ 
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was internalised within ‘the national’ – although with 
slight variations depending on the actual organic 
intellectual that was being interviewed – was through the 
common sense assumption that the country suffers from 
economic vulnerability and thus that maintaining moderate 
wages is key to economic success. It was shown that this 
common sense assumption was more easily able to become 
hegemonic in times of ‘economic emergency’, when there 
was greater pressure on labour to accept sacrifices in the 
name of ‘the economy’.  
 I believe that the contribution that the present 
research makes to existing literature and knowledge is 
twofold. On the one hand, I aimed at applying the concept 
of common sense to a new case study where conditions that 
were present in other cases examined previously in the 
literature on ‘common sense’ (essentially, a consensual 
history of industrial relations and, more generally, a 
consensual model of political economy) are absent. I thus 
showed that common sense is a useful analytical tool to 
analyse political economies that have not been marked by a 
history of consensus among the social partners and by the 
lack of institutionalised neo-corporatist systems of 
negotiation and social mediation, such as Italy. The 
heuristic value of the concept of common sense is therefore 
extended to account for a case that is fundamentally 
different from the other two countries to which it has been 
applied previously – that is, Germany and the Netherlands 
(Bruff 2008). By incorporating the concept of trasformismo 
into the main explanation, it was possible to elaborate on 
the historical development of common sense in the Italian 
political economy by looking at the historical basis for such 
common sense assumptions. 
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 Secondly, approaching the issue from below, neo-
Gramscian theory and the notion of common sense were 
used to shed light on the Italian consensus of the 1990s, 
with the objective of showing the inadequacy of the 
theoretical apparatus and findings in the existing literature. 
As shown in Ch. 1, there exists no lack of academic sources 
on the 1993 social pact, as well as on the reform season of 
the 1990s. However, analyses that were proposed thus far, 
by being entirely consistent with an institutionalist 
perspective, are unable to describe and explain the moment 
of consensus: as discussed in Ch.1, the conceptual and 
theoretical distinction between state and market as separate 
realms of social relations obfuscates their mutual 
constitution.  The main limitation is due to their unduly 
focus on institutions as the sole basis of consensus. In such 
accounts, the focus is entirely on the design of institutions 
(collective bargaining systems, industrial relations, trade 
unions) and their reaction to economic phenomena, seen as 
external to the institutional environment (through dubious 
categories such as ‘institutional learning’). Such a 
conceptualisation separates institutions from the society 
that is portrayed to be ‘under’ them, therefore fetishising 
them as actors and/or structures instead of viewing them 
as part and parcel of the social relations that they embody 
and reproduce. Through an analysis of the interview 
material, I have shown that common sense assumptions 
form the basis of the attainment of consensus. State 
institutions (in the Gramscian sense of the ‘integral state’) 
are not independent from the materiality of social relations, 
but – through the mediating function of organic 
intellectuals – crystallise and embody them into rules and 
procedures. Different social forces and their organic 
intellectuals in turn seek to modify the common sense 
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assumptions of the population at large. It is hoped that the 
conceptual and analytical framework used for this research 
can be fruitfully applied to other cases, in Europe and 
beyond, where different conditions are met. In my view, 
the future research agenda could focus on cross-country 
comparisons of common sense sedimentations, possibly 
focusing on the current moment of economic crisis and 
austerity coupled with a discourse of 'economic emergency' 
that is generating different reactions across Europe. This is 
all the more relevant for in times of economic crisis, the 
discursive construction of what a crisis is and what it 
supposedly necessarily entails come to the forefront of 
public debate, and form the backbone of processes of 
restructuring and of austerity policies.  
 The ambition of the present research was not only to 
identify the versions of the common sense proposed by 
organic intellectuals, but also to focus on wider 
transformations in the left’s ideology. As has been stressed 
at length in the course of this work, ideology is to be 
conceived as a social practice, and not simply as a form of 
thought that changes autonomously from material 
relations. In this sense the findings of this research are in 
my view significant also in relation to wider themes such as 
on-going modifications in the left’s raison d’être and the 
transformation of the left/right dichotomy. In the 
remaining part of this conclusion, on the basis of the 
findings, I speculate on such broader issues seeking to 
highlight those aspects that, at the end of this research, 
appear to me as potentially paving the way of new avenues 
for future research.   
 What I have termed in Ch. 4 and 5 the ‘technocratic 
centre-left project’ was developed by post-communist 
politicians by incorporating elements of the neoliberal 
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discourse and practice. However, beginning in the early 
2000s, the ‘reformist’ coalition’s electoral support waned, 
particularly within the traditional constituencies of the left 
in the working class. Since then, the centre-right coalition 
experienced large electoral gains in traditional working 
class areas. Even the 2006 electoral victory of the centre-left 
coalition was attained only by a very small margin and at 
the cost – if one may say so - of uniting a very 
heterogeneous front counting all the political forces willing 
to form an anti-Berlusconi coalition (from the communists 
to moderate catholic parties and liberals such as Partito 
Radicale). Thus, while the 1990s had been the decade of the 
centre-left, the 2000s were undoubtedly marked by the 
hegemony of the centre-right coalition and by the extension 
of its consensus to the traditional social bloc of the left: this 
was the case even in areas previously hegemonised by the 
PCI (for instance, the right managed to ‘conquer’ the 
stronghold of Bologna la Rossa).  
 An aspect which underlies the hegemonic neoliberal 
discourse of the 1990s, on which I have touched upon in the 
analysis of the interviews, is the discursive construction of 
the left – and traditionally left-wing approaches to socio-
economic matters – as conservative and in some way 
antiquate vis-à-vis the changes that are ‘necessary’ to adapt 
to a modified economic environment. In this context, 
market-enhancing and welfare-retrenching solutions were 
presented as ‘reformist’, with the term ‘reform’ taking on 
an entirely different meaning – perhaps even a specularly 
opposite one – than the one derived from the traditional 
left-wing notion of ‘reformism’, which is historically 
contrasted with the revolutionary position. Whereas the 
traditional project of the riformisti was to put in place 
institutions that would guarantee strong elements of social 
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protection (in the Polanyian sense) within a liberal-
democratic order and by adopting a gradualist approach, 
the ‘neo-reformist’ agenda is precisely to gradually 
dismantle those very instruments in the name of ‘the 
market’, ‘the economy’ and national competitiveness. The 
fact that the Italian left largely adopted this stance is highly 
revealing of the profound transformations that have 
occurred in its ideology.  
 The reformist stance of the 1990s was based – as 
argued in the previous chapters – upon the all-pervading 
goal of ‘entering Europe’ and thus policies of low inflation, 
wage moderation, harsh fiscal policies and privatisation of 
state assets. What the protagonists have described as a 
‘retreat of politics’ manifested itself in a consensus with 
little compensations to labour that stemmed into an 
unprecedented fall in the wage share and in industrial 
conflict. The latter, within a social-democratic model of 
industrial relations, is usually seen as a sign of consensus 
on the part of the workers on the economic and social 
policies of the governments. However, the elimination of 
the wage-indexation mechanism a year earlier as well as 
the effects of the 1993 protocol generated a substantial 
dispossession of the strength and capacity for action of the 
unions. Moreover, in addition to the measures of welfare 
retrenchment (the pension reforms), unemployment rose to 
record-high levels – as internal demand decreased – and 
only began to fall after the approval of the 1997 flex-law, 
that increased fixed-term precarious labour. This kind of 
labour is much more difficult to organise into traditional 
forms of union organisations, thus further weakening 
organised labour. One of the slogans produced by the 
centre-left in this phase was: meno ai padri, più ai figli (less to 
the fathers, more to the sons), highlighting that a general 
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increase in wages and welfare measures for the working 
class as a whole was deemed to be outside the ‘limits of the 
possible’.  
 It can be argued that the reforms accentuated the 
process of distancing of workers from their traditional 
union and political representatives, and favoured the 
displacement of votes towards the centre-right parties. The 
increase in the ‘confidence’ of financial markets is paid by a 
loss of consensus for the political forces of the centre-left. 
The ‘culture of stability’ to which the centre-left 
governments of the 1990s aimed at, distancing itself from 
the traditional reformist social-democratic policies, sew the 
seed of following losses for its protagonists.  
 As a result of the experience of the 1990s, the gamut 
of alternatives now perceptible by the workers is drastically 
limited, even compared to a not distant past. Translated in 
political terms, the ‘limits of the possible’ do not include 
alternative comprehensive hypotheses for society. 
Organised labour does not promote any such alternative – 
not only the classic revolutionary alternatives, but not even 
the ‘new models of development’ proposed by the unions 
and PCI over the 1970s. However, as has been documented 
by the research, there seems to be little strong support for 
the present model of society and social relations. What 
seems more plausible is that social relations have become 
increasingly depoliticised, naturalised as an ‘inevitable 
fact’. The vision of the status quo as inevitable is all the 
stronger in new generations of workers who have not 
experienced the struggles of the 1970s. This idea of 
inevitability is a huge barrier to social agency. Even if the 
unions never adhered to a neoliberal conception of society, 
the form of concertation they supported was weak and 
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lacked strong compensations.  A defensive stance is thus 
implied in these positions.  
 
 The analysis proposed in Ch. 4 and the analysis of 
the interviews in Ch. 6 reveals an interesting phenomenon 
in the left’s ideology that can be described in Gramscian 
terms as the idea of civil society as the locus of  ‘cultivation’ 
of the public virtues against a political society as the locus 
of political exchange and private vices. Thomas argued 
that, according to Gramsci,  
 
“just as Spinoza’s proposition that ‘mind is the idea of the 
body’ – that is, it is the idea of the body that constitutes the 
mind, rather than the mind giving rise to the body, 
Gramsci assigns priority to one of the terms. Political 
society is the idea of civil society, the mind of civil society’s 
body” (Thomas 2009: 193).  
 
Thus, in the new ideological stance of the left, civil society 
is increasingly seen as an autonomous realm, the sphere of 
liberty vis-à-vis the world of formal politics. The logical 
outcome of such a harmonic view of social relations in civil 
society is that political competition becomes increasingly 
void of social antagonism. The utopia of democracy is 
precisely the idea of competing ‘for’ something without 
fighting ‘against’ someone. The maximum form of conflict 
that was carried out was the temporary personification of 
that someone in the part of the ‘evil one’ (i.e., Berlusconi).  
I would argue that throughout this process the categories 
conventionally used to describe the left-right distinction 
have become outdated, and that they are in need of a 
reconfiguration. In Bobbio’s classic view (1994), the left is 
distinguished from the right because it couples the theme 
of freedom with that of equality and justice. This is the 
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classic liberal socialist position. However, in Italy such an 
articulation was arguably present only in the program of 
the Action Party, and perhaps later – starting from the 
1970s – in the one of the PSI. In a context of tremendous 
social transformations brought about by a new globalised 
capitalism, cannot the key words freedom, equality and 
justice be seen as the idealised expressions of the current 
form of capitalism? In fact, Marx argued precisely that 
freedom and equality are the forms in which the sphere of 
market exchange appear.  
 It is perhaps not by chance that the political culture 
of azionismo has come back to central stage in the post-1989 
era. In this culture, Berlusconismo has deputised fascism and 
– as any ideology or form of thought – has obscured the 
transformations of real social relations. The narrative was 
that against a pre-modern right one had to answer with a 
modern left. Arguably, what emerged was a post-modern 
left that abandoned the claim to represent a part of society 
and unambiguously embraced the 'general interest' 
understood in a novel neoliberal way.  In its quest for 
novelty, in the 1990s the post-communists have attempted 
to reset the past to zero, start all over again, with a so-called 
new beginning. Having internalised a liberal-democratic 
critique of their own tradition, the post-communists looked 
down upon the sedimented history of their political party 
as a burden to get rid of as soon as possible.  
 In the post-war decades the PCI contributed to a 
deep transformation of the form of democracy, which 
incorporated not only political society but also civil society, 
in the direction of a democratic society. Placed at the centre 
of the political realm by the successful antifascist struggle, 
communist, socialist and Christian-democratic parties 
together overcame that form of elitist liberal democracy 
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that characterized Italy since the early 1900s. The Fordist 
era in Italy was characterised not only by a party 
democracy, but also by a party society. It was not only ‘the 
social’ that was organised by the parties, but ‘the social’ 
that organised itself through the political parties. The 
democratic revolution spurred by the bourgeois 
revolutions of the 18th and 19th century here reached the 
furthest points of development, with the liberal notions of 
equality and freedom given a social twist and incorporated 
in the left's ideology and in the welfare state concept. What 
Van der Pijl terms ‘corporate liberalism’ “takes the ideas of 
popular sovereignty and universal human rights and seeks 
to accommodate, within the capitalist order, the aspirations 
for socialism spawned by them” (Van der Pijl 2006a: 19). 
The historical form of democracy in both Italy and Europe 
was characterised by competition between two strong 
partial interests, a competition based on who is more 
capable of guaranteeing the ‘general interest’ from its own 
particular point of view, a battle for hegemony. Politics was 
this: dividing the camp into poles, decomposing the 
conservative idea of ‘the people’, generating different 
values under the same general respect of the rules of 
democratic game. 
 It is precisely against this configuration that the new 
capitalist offensive sets in. The problem was described by 
the (neo)liberal culture (in its most coherent form in the 
1975 Trilateral commission report – Crozier et al 1975) as 
one of excessive demands stemming from the political 
parties and intermediate bodies such as trade unions that 
were channelled through the political system into the state. 
The ‘crisis of politics’ was a subjective intervention by 
social forces within the political system and the political 
economy. Neoliberalism and ‘anti-political’ ideology are 
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results of and are both functional to a deeply political 
process, the ‘hollowing out’ of ‘corporate liberalism’.  
 In Italy the watershed was, in this respect, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, perhaps later than in other Western 
countries. In a destructive climax of different processes, the 
‘perfect storm’ kicked off. Civil society against the state: that 
was the real process of the neoliberal revolution. In Italy, at 
the ideological level, the process found its key rallying 
cries: giustizialismo122, the culture of the referendum and 
direct democracy against the political élite, anti-party 
ideology, the success of new anti-establishment forces such 
as Lega Nord. As argued above, the post-communist party 
leadership chose to ride this ideology. The liberal anti-party 
ideology under whose aegis the PCI dissolved has had 
deep consequences in terms of the very concept of left in a 
transformed national political competition and 
international context. The post-communists abandoned the 
central issues that had been inherited from the 1970s crisis: 
the exhaustion of the kind of party organisation built by 
Togliatti’s generation of party cadres, the organisation of 
social demands within a modern welfare state, a 
redefinition of the very concept of socialism in changed 
historical circumstances. In its place, a view of the crisis of 
Italian politics largely based upon a critique of political 
corruption of the political parties and of the institutions of 
the First Republic (including, crucially, the proportional 
electoral system). Thus, a critique of political society and not 
civil society, thus obfuscating the power relations inherent 
in a capitalist political economy. 
                                                        
122 A political stance – that has no equivalent in the English language – 
expressing an overzealous pursuit of justice.  The Clean Hands season of the 
early 1990s is often described as a manifestation of giustizialismo.  
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 The liberal economic positions and the policies that 
followed from them were also a consequence of this choice. 
In this way, Gramsci’s historical lesson concerning the need 
to organise politically in civil society with a view to 
conquering political society was forgotten: the goal had 
now become to separate a vicious political society from a 
virtuous civil society. What was placed in the background 
was the whole trajectory of the left that – organised in a 
political party – proposed an alternative modernity on the 
basis of a ‘scientific’ analysis of reality that refused abstract 
notions of freedom and justice and organised a battlefield 
on which to place class struggle.  
 In Ch.5, the process by which governments become 
ever more technical and ever less explicitly political was 
analysed. It is hard to remember the last time in which 
alternative political parties or coalitions competed for 
alternative projects on society, alternative conceptions of 
the state and of politics, different modernities. In its place, 
what emerged was the classic Schumpeterian idea of 
politics as a political marketplace, as competition between 
political élites under the aegis of economicist, private 
behaviours of electoral engineering. The very name of 
‘party’ is becoming practically an insult, as politics 
increasingly conceives of its function as simply reflecting 
the contingent and continually changing moods of a deeply 
depoliticised electorate. It seems that for the post-
communists the mythical figure of the sovereign citizen is 
one that makes his public political choice from his own 
private room (and - one would add - while attempting to 
making ends meet in a deregulated labour market that 
generates insecurity). There remains little space for 
intermediate bodies and for the political elaboration of 
organic ideas and of the educating and directing function 
566   
of the party, whose role has historically been not to coalesce 
scattered opinions in a world of atomised individuals – 
each one making his choice in his own private realm – but 
to organise democracy and direct historical transformation 
with a political perspective. The means was an education of 
the masses – a ‘political and moral reform’, to use 
Gramsci’s words – and not the chasing after a ‘public 
opinion’ conceived as a separate sphere from politics. To 
put it differently, Italian post-communist practice and 
ideology has been largely instrumental in bringing about a 
Lockean state/society complex. 
 The paradox is that the political forces and 
personalities that enthusiastically welcomed a majoritarian 
democracy of alternation in government were the same that 
took for granted – ‘for everyone’s wellbeing’ – the end of 
any social conflict. They discovered political conflict but 
were against social conflict, and at the same time in which 
they condemned ‘consociativism’ they praised social 
dialogue and concertation.  
  In Italy, in partial contrast to other European 
countries, it was (also) the left that rode the anti-political 
ideology based on a mythical direct democracy – e.g., the 
referendums – against corrupt political parties. Silvio 
Berlusconi’s political strategy was ultimately based on the 
same rhetoric: the people’s direct link with the leader, 
without the mediating function of intermediate bodies. I 
would argue that today – more than 15 years after the 
period under focus in this research – ‘anti-politics’, in its 
various forms – anti-state, anti-public, anti-party – is a 
fundamental element of neoliberal hegemony. I would 
characterise anti-politics as the view of civil society’s claim 
to represent itself autonomously in a direct link with the 
image of the political leader, without the mediating 
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function of modern politics. It has become a true mass 
common sense idea, an ideology in the sense that it is 
founded upon a naturalised idea of civil society based on 
individual and free direct relations. It is also an ideology in 
the sense that is highly functional to the consolidation of a 
(neo)liberal society and the pre-emptive disempowerment 
of counter-hegemonic projects.   The real process is the 
neoliberal transformation of capitalism; anti-politics is its 
most refined and capillary ideology, projected by the 
mainstream media and reproduced daily in entrenched 
forms of common sense (that, at times, take on an explicit 
populist twist). I would argue that it is much more resilient 
to change than any positive ideology based on the 
attainment of consensus for neoliberalism, because it 
functions by depoliticisation, by rendering the status quo 
within society natural.  The very term politics increasingly 
ceases to be conceived or presented as the competition 
within society of alternative projects for modernity, guided 
by a cadre of professionals (in the Weberian sense), and 
becomes equated with privilege, corruption, dissipation of 
public resources. If politics is privilege, then the world of 
‘the economy’ is supposedly the sphere of freely interacting 
individuals, and the market distribution of resources is 
perceived as natural.  
 Italian post-communism based its competition with 
the centre-right precisely on the issue of who was most 
capable of managing the neoliberal cycle of capitalist 
growth, seen as the definitive form of globalised 
modernity. It was a hegemonic strategy based on the 
dominant ideology. The consequence was that instead of 
attempting to modify the anti-political discourse, the post-
communists decide to narrate it, so that ‘the caste’ is 
becoming a key word in popular consciousness and the 
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expression of a neoliberal common sense. Neoliberal 
hegemony continues to be based – it goes without saying – 
on forms of political democratic regulation, but then it 
builds upon this an anti-political ideological apparatus, 
brought forward by both the left and the right. I would 
argue that even sectors of the radical left in Italy have been 
strongly influenced by this common sense view, for 
instance in their refusal of party politics, seen as politique 
politicienne and as occult compromise, and in their strong 
emphasis on ephemeral forms of political organisation in 
the new social movements.  
 Gramsci’s problématique – for long a cornerstone of 
the PCI’s strategy – of the organisation of ‘private’ interests 
in civil society as the precondition for a collective process of 
political identification and for the construction of a historic 
bloc with the aim of directing historical processes, is 
overcome, and with its sunset politics’ mediating function 
too seems to be gone. The political party’s historic function 
is also transcended. Perhaps it is not a chance that the 
waning of the modern political party as a form of politics 
went hand in hand with the weakening of class identity. It 
is clear that if politics is relegated to a secondary role in 
both ideology and practice, then what gains ground is the 
apparently spontaneous organisation of society by capital 
through ‘the market’. The crisis of politics has thus secured 
for decades the strength of neoliberal hegemony. If the 
‘organic intellectuals’ of the left speak of the limits that 
must be placed to formal political action and the role of the 
state, and if the role of the state itself is conceived as a 
threat to individuals’ freedom in civil society (opinions 
confirmed by the interview data), then arguably it is the 
very notion of ‘left’ that must be re-thought.  
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 One of the classic arguments on the historical 
territorial and social cleavages that have generated the 
modern divisions in Western political systems is that 
proposed by Stein Rokkan (1999).123  The switch to what 
has been termed a post-materialist society has caused a re-
positioning of these cleavages and the emergence of new 
ones (Kitschelt 1994; 1997; Kriesi 1993). According to these 
authors, enhanced atomisation of social relations, the 
fragmentation of professional identities, greater societal 
welfare and the consolidation of market values have 
generated a new cleavage that separates leftist libertarian 
positions and right-wing authoritarian (or paternalistic) 
identities.  
 However, transformations in the Italian political 
system – I claim – cannot be grasped simply in terms of a 
turn to a ‘post-materialist’ society, but must be 
comprehended in parallel with a restructuring of the 
capitalist mode of production towards neoliberal forms of 
governance and ideology. Thus, the turn to ‘post-
materialism’ cannot be viewed – as is often done in the 
political science literature on party systems (as in Fasano 
and Pasini 2003) – as the causal factor; the switch to a                                                         
123 In his groundbreaking work, that has spurred a lively debate in political 
science for decades, the structuring of European political systems is seen as 
responding to the different configurations of a series of political cleavages 
within society (in the Rokkanian vocabulary, the structures of cleavages: their 
timing, hierarchy and intersection). In short, Rokkan considers the original 
differences in the party systems as deriving from the different underlying 
structure of cleavages, in turn produced by the processes of state formation and 
nation building. Cleavages emerge in critical junctures in the historical 
development of a political system and then freeze, giving rise to relatively stable 
and predictable patterns of alliances and oppositions, as well as political 
identities and political systems. In the Italian case, the particular structure of 
cleavages gave rise to a polarised political system in which several cleavages 
inter-locked (capital/labour; state/church; centre/periphery).  
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service-based economy, the fragmentation of labour and 
the parcelisation of identities are effects of the restructuring 
of capital as a social relation in the Western political 
economies, and not background ‘objective’ factors that then 
find correspondence in transformed political identities and 
affiliations. The findings of this research signal a 
transformation in the discourse and practice of the left in 
the 1990s towards liberal positions that goes well beyond a 
simple re-positioning or attenuation of the cleavages, 
perhaps pointing towards a radical transformation of the 
classic modern political cleavages themselves. 
 If the main leftist party becomes a supporter of a 
conception of the state as market regulator to promote 
capitalist competition, the privatisation of state enterprises 
(including public utilities) and public banks and policies of 
liberalisation, then arguably we are witnessing the eclipse 
of the traditional meaning of left and right. The waning of 
electoral support for the left in the late 1990s (most 
markedly among its traditional electorate – as indicated 
above) is an indication and at the same time a further factor 
in its transformation.  With the abandonment of the left's 
traditional electoral base in the working class and the 
latter's switch to more liberal positions in economics and 
more conservative stances in terms of security, public order 
and the 're-discovering' of local territorial identities, the left 
seems to have found a new electoral base in sections of the 
liberal bourgeoisie (Fasano and Pasini 2003: 20). Future 
research could shed light on the emergence of new 
cleavages that go beyond the contingency of the historical 
moment and point to a structural change in political 
identities.  
 A re-definition of the left-right distinction is 
necessary not only in view of the incorporation of the 
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(neo)liberal anti-political discourse and practice by the left. 
It would be a mistake, I would add, to equate the whole 
neoliberal project solely (or even predominantly) with 
centre-right parties and positions. The left’s autonomous 
role in the production of neoliberal ideology (and 
corresponding policies) must be taken into consideration in 
order to have a more complete view of the production of 
this hegemonic order (see Lee Mudge 2011). I believe the 
case of Italy to be particularly interesting in this respect. 
This is not only because of the peculiar coupling of 
trasformismo and liberalism described above, or because of 
the particular insertion of the country into ‘the 
international’ (and the corresponding common sense 
assumptions), but also because of the way the latter 
elements have intertwined to generate a left-wing free trade 
(and free capital movement) ideology that sets it apart from 
both the centre-right coalition (who has often flirted with 
protectionism) and from other left parties in Europe (such 
as the French socialists).  
 This research has shown how it was precisely what I 
call the ‘technocratic centre-left’ that was able to generate 
an unprecedented consensus on largely neoliberal socio-
economic policies. In a moment of ‘economic emergency’ 
the common sense assumptions of economic vulnerability 
and wage restraint emerged as the anchor for the ways in 
which different social actors (and their organic 
intellectuals) envisaged a ‘solution’. Crucially, the state 
cadre that managed this phase and thus narrated both the 
crisis and in turn the proposed ‘way out’ (see ch.3) was the 
‘technocratic centre-left’, whose project was based also on 
the anti-political liberal discourse I have described above.  
 In Italy the ‘U-turn’ of the left in the direction of free 
(international) trade and capital movements occurred 
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arguably in the late 1970s. The symbolic moment can 
perhaps be identified with the congress on protectionism 
organised by the communist review ‘Rinascita’ in 1976. 
Here, protectionism was explicitly refused as a political 
strategy of the left, and free international trade – beginning 
from the European Community – was embraced as the 
horizon of Italy’s economic future. Since then, and most 
markedly since the early 1990s – when the PCI dissolved – 
a kind of acritical, at times apologetic, free trade stance 
seems to prevail among the heirs of the tradition of the 
labour movement (as the interview data confirms). The 
research conducted here can shed light on the underlying 
common sense assumptions, as the ‘limits of the possible’ 
posed by the ‘external constraint’ were evoked both at the 
end of the 1970s and in the early 1990s (as well as in the 
current economic crisis). I would argue that the common 
sense assumption of economic vulnerability and wage 
restraint is operative here, as this free trade stance emerged 
most vividly in these three moments of economic crisis. For 
the PCI leadership of the late 1970s, the external constraint 
also meant the possibility of making a government formed 
(also) by communists compatible with a more stable 
integration of the country within the European order and 
the entrance into the EMS (the PCI would have approved 
the latter if a crisis in the governments of ‘national 
emergency’ did not set in). Free capital flows are a key 
element – perhaps the key element – of neoliberal 
globalisation. The race to the bottom brought about by the 
neoliberal hegemony brings with it a heightened world 
competition among workers that has been internalised and 
furthered within the EU and its market-enhancing 
competitive disinflation policies, with Germany acting as 
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the neuralgic core of wage competition (with its very high 
wage – labour productivity differential).  
 In a curious irony of history, the traditional 
internationalism of the left seems to be gradually 
transforming into an internationalism of capital, a strict 
ideological adherence to the principle of openness to capital 
movements. Even several international organisations point 
out that there is a correlation between openness to capital 
and commodity movements and a fall in the level of 
employment protection and the wage quota in national 
product (see European Commission 2007, in which OECD 
and IMF studies are cited as a confirmation of this 
correlation). Once the perverse redistributive effects of 
these policies had become clear, the centre-left élites 
increasingly justified free trade and capital movements in 
the name of world peace or as simply an economic ‘fact’ 
that cannot be modified without running the risk of 
generating a new world war (as the interview with Prodi 
and other representatives of PD confirmed). Neoliberal 
globalisation is seen as the bearer of universal peace. Any 
kind of protectionist instinct – coupled with alternative 
socio-economic and industrial policies – is seen as a 
‘nationalist’, ‘reactionary’ ‘right-wing’ reaction.  
Here I would like to make just a passing remark on the 
Italian political crisis that has been unfolding as this 
dissertation was being written, especially after the end of 
the Berlusconi government in December 2011.  As 
Brancaccio (2012) points out, the free trade internationalist 
stance of the centre-left does not allow for the identification 
of an autonomous point of view of labour in the eternal 
battle within capital between the supporters of 
protectionism and those of free trade, so that one wonders 
what would the political position of the left be in the event 
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of a speculative attack on national debt, if the attack was so 
strong as to force the country to face head on the problem 
of the EU disequilibria, brought about precisely by a form 
of European integration based on free capital movement 
and competitive disinflation.  
 I believe this research can shed light on this last 
point, for common sense assumptions on Italy’s integration 
into ‘the international’ must form the basis upon which any 
political strategy is based. The turn to a favourable stance 
on free trade on the part of the left is highly significant 
because it signals a view of the inevitability of the ‘external 
constraint’. The convinced support of these policies on the 
part of the Italian left was more deep-rooted and principled 
than that of the centre-right in the 1990s and beyond. 
Perhaps this is because the centre-right maintained organic 
links with its social basis and thus elaborated alternative 
strategies based on particular conjunctures (the SMEs were, 
for instance, less interested in furthering the international 
integration of the country). The centre-left, on the contrary, 
having significantly detached its practice and ideology 
from its traditional social base, has more easily switched to 
the ideology of globalisation.  
 Bieler and Morton, referring to Poulantzas’s work, 
argue that 
 
“The state is not a simple class instrument that directly 
represents the interests of the dominant classes. Dominant 
classes consist of several class fractions that constitute the 
state, which thereby enjoys a relative autonomy with respect 
to classes and fractions of classes. (…) Within the unstable 
equilibrium of compromises, (…) the state organizes 
hegemony by imposing certain concessions and sacrifices 
on the dominant classes in order to reproduce long-term 
domination” (Bieler and Morton 2006c: 169). 
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 On the basis of the evidence that this research 
presents, I would argue that the Italian ‘technocratic centre-
left’ governments of the 1990s acted in a ‘relatively 
autonomous’ way in order to further the long-term 
interests of capital and were able to develop a coherent 
political project around this vision. The state apparatus was 
mobilised by a new state class which had a clear political 
project based on its idea of the long-term interests of 
capital. Perhaps Marx’s notion of Bonapartism (Marx 1987) 
can be a useful way to characterise the experience of the 
centre-left governments in the 1990s. Bonapartism can be 
defined as government by an alternative leadership in a 
situation where the bourgeoisie cannot rule directly.  A 
neoliberal stance on market integration in the EU and 
privatisation was coupled with wage moderation and 
partial welfare retrenchment, achieved through a 
compromise with organised labour. The ‘technocratic 
centre-left’ governments (1992-2001) have therefore proven 
to be better able to carry out the policy favoured by 
transnational capital, also by maintaining social cohesion. 
Post festum, one can see that the communist tradition has 
predisposed a political cadre that was able to acquire the 
confidence of transnational capital, more than the Italian 
centre-right was capable of.  
 The question that arises by way of conclusion is: 
what does the left stand for in this new configuration? How 
does the discourse on a ‘new reformism’ – one that lacks a 
‘subject’ and is akin to a technocratic abstraction from the 
traditional social bloc of the left – and the Italian left’s 
convinced support of free trade and capital movements 
modify our understanding of the left-right distinction? I 
Further research, possibly also based on analyses of 
576   
common sense and on empirical interview methods, could 
shed light on this deep transformation in the left’s practice 
and consciousness.  
 
 At the end, I would like to propose a few reflections 
that are based on the present work of escavation into the 
past, but which seek to identify the possibility of the 
development of a counter-hegemonic bloc. Having defined 
a neo-Gramscian critical approach as a perspectival stance – 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 
1981:128) – and adhering to a view of knowledge as a form 
of social practice, I do not wish to shy away from the 
political implications of this research.  
 Any kind of alternative political project must be 
based upon an alternative configuration of class forces 
within a framework of specific relations of class power. 
This – organisation, organic ideas, forms of culture, 
historical consciousness – is the substance of politics. If any 
counter-hegemonic social bloc and strategy can be 
envisaged for the future, it must reconquer what Gramsci 
called the casematte (pillboxes), the trenches in civil society 
that give coherence and direction to the historic bloc and 
guarantee the smooth reproduction of the hegemonic order 
and discourse. Engaging with the terrain of common sense 
– the reproduction of inherited ‘truths’ about the political 
economy – cannot be avoided. However - adopting a view 
of historical development as an open-ended process - there 
is no historical necessity for trade unions to be progressive 
actors: this is also the outcome of social and political 
struggle for emancipation.  
 Italy represents a unique case in many respects. One 
of these is the fact that the left has for decades exercised if 
not political hegemony, certainly a cultural hegemony in 
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civil society. After having entrenched into the casematte of 
civil society, this power climaxed in the late 1960s/early 
1970s. The strength of the left in the ‘era of union centrality’ 
(Lange and Vannicelli 1982) was founded upon a particular 
material configuration of forces. What the workerists 
termed the operaio-massa (mass worker) was the dominant 
figure of labour, based on the centrality of Fordist 
production in the factories of the north. Its strength was 
based on the concentration of the workforce, favouring 
trade union organisations (and also autonomous work 
councils). Power was also an outcome of concentration of 
forces, spurring class struggle. The presence of a 
communist party was a catalyst for struggle, for it provided 
the possibility of inscribing one’s condition into a wider 
universe of meaning and equivalences (referring also to a 
territorial identification with real existing socialism in the 
Soviet bloc). The mass worker was a material reality 
implanted strategically in the heart of capitalist production 
and the party supplied the organisational and strategic 
instruments for class consciousness.  
 Now, the conditions have radically changed. One of 
the most lucid descriptions of labour’s predicament was 
provided more than twenty years ago by Accornero, who 
talked about ‘labour after class’ (Accornero 1986). This 
expression referred to an employment structure organised 
around the rise of service work – without the ‘dignified’ 
characteristics of blue-collar work –, the increase in 
precarious work and the weakening of the distinctions 
between different types of professions. These phenomena 
generate a new worker subjectivity, much more dependent 
on the ups and downs of ‘the market’ and who increasingly 
looks upon himself (or herself) more as a commodity, 
internalising the capital relation (see also Bologna and 
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Fumagalli 1997). Time of work and leisure time, as well as 
space of work and private space become increasingly 
blurred within a more commodified life-world. There is no 
doubt that, in these circumstances, class identity has 
weakened, and most workers do not feel part of a working 
class.  
 However, the partial switch to immaterial and 
autonomous labour – that conceives of itself more as 
entrepreneurial activity – does not loosen the ‘dull 
compulsion of economic relations’. This work is now 
indirectly dependent upon capital, perhaps signalling a 
partial return to forms of ‘formal subsumption’ of labour, 
after the Fordist era had entrenched ‘real subsumption’ in 
the factory system. Post-fordism has decomposed the single 
worker’s labour and the class relation in the factory. It has 
revolutionised the productive process marginalising ‘the 
factory’, that is, making the workers and the physical master 
marginal. It is the flipside of financialisation, the M-M’ 
cycle that accumulates capital based on claims on future 
production and the constant comparability of the 
profitability of different capitals through the new 
instruments of an ever more complex financial market 
(such as derivatives, that constantly measure each capital 
against each other capital in its capacity to generate 
surplus-value).   
 The left’s and labour’s loss of cultural hegemony is 
also a consequence of this fragmentation of labour, brought 
about by the proliferation of temporary contracts and 
technological innovation – itself the result of a defeat of 
alternative political projects in the 1970s. As pointed out in 
ch.3, technological innovation is never class-neutral. The 
clearest impact of new technologies is in the elimination of 
old forms of labour and the wild precarisation of new 
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labour. With the coupling of these two effects, capital has 
attacked the historic core of the working class.  However, 
while there is no doubt that the ‘working class’ has lost 
centrality in the materiality of the production process, in its 
place there is a potential political centrality of labour. There 
is little centralisation in production, but a horizontality of 
diversified yet potentially politicised form of labour. Any 
kind of counter-hegemonic project must – I would argue – 
contrast the hegemonic view that work is marginal in 
people’s lives. It is true that it is marginal in the dominant 
narrative, with its all-pervading focus on the enjoyments in 
the sphere of consumption (hence, circulation). Simply, 
labour cannot be marginalised in the production of capital, 
for it is the substance of capital. The battle for hegemony 
must have a core, and counter-hegemony must, I would 
argue, reformulate the centrality of labour in people’s lives 
in order to attempt to challenge neoliberal hegemony. 
Capital’s neoliberal offensive was based upon a similar 
(practical and ideological) strategy that coupled with the 
materiality of the real process: the idea that market 
competition and the firm are the absolute regulative 
principles of society and that labour is and must be 
subordinate to the smooth functioning of capital 
accumulation.  
 Common sense is a central battleground in the 
struggle for hegemony. If hegemony is the production of an 
ideology based on culture, then common sense is the 
precondition, the basis for that very culture. The flattening 
of political competition on the need to keep up and chase 
after ‘public opinion’ is, from the perspective of social and 
political forces committed to a counter-hegemonic projects, 
dangerous. This is because if ‘politics’ simply aims at 
reflecting what already exists in society (relations of power, 
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forms of thought and consciousness), then it can merely 
reproduce common sense. Counter-hegemonic projects are, 
in the first instance, subjective interventions against the 
production and reproduction of the hegemonic version of 
common sense. Of course, it is a mutual relationship: 
common sense is produced and reproduced in society, and 
reflected by the élites, who in turn give coherence and 
direction to it, imparting it with a political meaning. The 
terrain of common sense is crucial also because language is 
not simply a description of ‘things’ that exist autonomously 
‘out there’. The post-structuralist lesson is: language 
constitutes the very thing. A sensitivity to the ability to re-
define terms and meanings, inscribing them into a horizon 
of social and political change – with a central nucleus, a 
myth, a master-signifier – is to be regained. Ultimately, if 
hegemony cannot be defined as simple domination, the 
realm of culture becomes central. Hegemony means being 
able to insert a subjective intervention into a historical 
process, that is both guided and followed by the hegemonic 
forces. It is a movement that is already happening in 
society, also as a consequence of the very ideas and 
practices that are subjectively inserted into it. What better 
definition of hegemony, one that I would argue must be 
taken on board by labour and the left, than Rousseau’s 
maxim:  
 
“the strongest could never be strong enough to be master 
all the time, unless he transforms force into right and 
obedience into duty” (Rousseau 1987: 19). 
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Appendix: List of interviewees - Partito Democratico 
o PD♯1: Vincenzo Visco 
o PD♯2: Elena Montecchi 
o PD♯3: Stefano Fassina 
 - Democratici di Sinistra 
o DS♯1: Alfiero Grandi 
 - Confindustria (employers’ association) 
o Confindustria♯1: Pier Luigi d'Agata 
 - CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) 
o CGIL♯1: Tiziano Rinaldini 
 - UIL (Unione Italiana Lavoratori) 
o UIL♯1: Pietro Larizza 
 - Romano Prodi, Prime Minister (1996-1998) 
 - Nerio Nesi, former director of Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro and MP for Partito della Rifondazione 
Comunista (1996-1998) and Partito dei Comunisti 
Italiani (1998-2001) 
 - Prof. Sergio Cesaratto 
 - Prof. Vincent Della Sala 
 - Prof. Leonardo Paggi 
 - Prof. Luca Michelini 
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- Prof. Umberto Romagnoli 
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